When the threat is stronger than the execution: trade liberalization and welfare under oligopoly

Working paper

We compare trade liberalization under Cournot and Bertrand competition in reciprocal markets. In both cases, the critical level of trade costs below which the possibilityof trade affects the domestic firm's behavior is the same; trade liberalization increases trade volume monotonically; and welfare follows a U-shaped pattern. However, welfareis usually greater under Bertrand than Cournot competition, despite the fact that for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition. In general,there exists a “Nimzowitsch Region” in parameter space, where welfare is higher under Bertrand competition even though no actual trade takes place.

Authors: Neary, P; Leahy, D

• Publication status: Published
• Publisher: University of Oxford
• Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
• Publication date: 2015-12-31
• Paper number: 775
• Keywords: oligopoly and trade; Nimzowitsch region; trade liberalization; cross-hauling; Cournot and Bertrand competition