Mentality as nonderivative intentionality

Thesis

I here advance the following deductively valid argument:

P1. For all x, if x is mental, x is intentional.

P2. For all x, if x is mental and intentional, x is nonderivatively intentional.

P3. For all x, if x is nonderivatively intentional, x is mental.

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C. For all x, x is mental if and only if x is nonderivatively intentional.

I thus maintain that all and only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional – that nonderivative intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’. The simplest explanation for this fact is that mentality consists in nonderivative intentionality.

Authors: Oreffo, R

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-j0rg2bgqx
• Type of award: BPhil
• Level of award: Bachelors
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Nonderivative; Tim Crane; Phenomenal; Intentional; Intentionalism; Mental representation; Mentality; Qualia; Intentionality; Mental
• Subjects: Metaphysics; Intentionality; Metaphysics of Mind; Philosophy of Mind