BPhil in Philosophy Thesis

Mentality as Nonderivative Intentionality

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Abstract

I here advance the following deductively valid argument:

P1. For all x, if x is mental, x is intentional.
P2. For all x, if x is mental and intentional, x is nonderivatively intentional.
P3. For all x, if x is nonderivatively intentional, x is mental.

———

C. For all x, x is mental *iff* x is nonderivatively intentional.

I thus maintain that all and only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional – that nonderivative intentionality is 'the mark of the mental'. The simplest explanation for this fact is that mentality consists in nonderivative intentionality.

In Part I of the thesis I motivate and defend (P1), the claim that all mental phenomena are intentional. In §1.1 I define 'intentionality' and 'intentional content' in such a way that it is uncontroversial that perceptual experiences have content, and I vindicate the claim that all mental features are intentional from the contention that there exist nonintentional phenomenal properties. In §§1.2-1.3 I rebut the most threatening challenges to (P1) – challenges according to which moods and sensations are nonintentional. I develop and propound first my 'intentional scope theory' of emotional states (§1.2), according to which moods and emotions differ only with respect to their contents, and then an 'intentional mode theory of sensations' (§1.3), according to which sensations are intentionally directed upon bodily regions.

Premises (P2) and (P3) are the focus of Part II of the thesis. I begin §2.1 by specifying what it is for intentionality to be 'derivative': a representation ϕ is derivatively intentional *iff* the fact that some other representation ψ represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ represents. I then support (P2), according to which all mental intentionality is nonderivative. I challenge the view that only phenomenally conscious states are nonderivatively intentional. In §§2.2-2.3

I defend (P3), the claim that all nonderivatively intentional phenomena are mental, by maintaining that all nonmental intentional phenomena are derivatively intentional. I first argue that the intentionality of linguistic and convention-governed representations is derivative (§2.2). I then contend that depiction too is derivative (§2.3), securing part of a new analysis of the concept *depiction*.

All three premises (P1)-(P3) of the core argument prove to be credible. We may reasonably endorse, then, the claim that nonderivative intentionality is the mark of the mental, and we should take seriously the proposal that mentality consists in nonderivative intentionality. Neither view receives defence in the contemporary literature.

Part I

The mental as intentional

§1.1 The mental, the intentional and the phenomenal

§1.1.1 Introduction: the mark of the mental

As you read this, you seem to have mental states which are in some way *of* or *about* things. You may have visual experiences that are of, represent or present the marks upon the page before you. You may have thoughts about the page and about your experiences. The property of your mental states to which I am drawing attention is their *intentionality*. I here contend that one sort of intentionality – *viz.* nonderivative intentionality – is shared by all and only mental phenomena (states and properties). Nonderivative intentionality is 'the mark of the mental'.[1]

Early commitment to a theory demarcating the mental from the nonmental in terms of the intentionality of the former has been imputed to Brentano (*PES*: 92-3):[2]

Brentano's thesis: For all *x*, *x* is mental *iff* *x* is intentional.

As I later explain (§2.1), though this view exhibits the theoretical virtue of parsimony,[3] it is untenable as it stands; for there appear to be many nonmental phenomena which represent, are of, or are about things – words, pictures, graphs and the like. These are instances of what I call 'extramental intentionality'. Are we, then, to abandon the project of delimiting the class of mental phenomena through appeal to the concept of *intentionality*? I think not. I maintain below (§§2.2-2.3) that there is a respect in which all extramental representations are alike: in a certain way, they inherit their representational powers from mental states. The intentionality of extramental phenomena, I claim, is in a sense 'derivative'. The intentionality of mental phenomena,

[1] I borrow this expression from Crane (1998).
[2] See, say, Chisholm (1956) and Dennett and Haugeland (2004: 383). As Moran (1996) and Crane (2011: §3) observe, such analytic philosophers ostensibly ignore the quasi-idealistic reading of 'phenomenon' in Brentano's original claim that '[e]very mental phenomenon is characterized by […] the intentional […] inexistence of an object' (*PES*: 92).
[3] It employs few primitive concepts. For defence of the view that 'ideological parsimony' is a theoretical virtue, see Cowling (2013).

I further argue, is contrastingly 'original' or 'nonderivative'. If this is all correct, we might revise Brentano's thesis thus:

> *The demarcation thesis*: For all *x*, *x* is mental *iff* *x* is nonderivatively intentional.

In what follows, I propound the demarcation thesis. It will emerge that a compelling case can be made for this claim. It is striking, therefore, that it receives no defence in the contemporary literature. At most, it has been argued that given a proper understanding of 'intentionality' Brentano's thesis is not straightforwardly false (Crane 1998), that meaning (linguistic intentionality) is to be analysed in terms of such concepts as *belief* and *intention* (Grice 1957; 1989; Schiffer 1972; Lewis 2002) or that we can explain the fact that states have particular phenomenal characters in terms of what they are of or about. My discussion is intended to fill the dialectical gap. Though the discussion principally provides a defence of the demarcation thesis, the simplest explanation for the truth of this claim is that mentality just *is* nonderivative intentionality. This is the broad view that I endorse.[4]

Over the course of this thesis I advance the premises of the following argument:

> P1. For all *x*, if *x* is mental, *x* is intentional.
> P2. For all *x*, if *x* is mental and intentional, *x* is nonderivatively intentional.
> P3. For all *x*, if *x* is nonderivatively intentional, *x* is mental.
> ———
> C. For all *x*, *x* is mental *iff* *x* is nonderivatively intentional.

(P1) and (P2) jointly entail that for all *x*, if *x* is mental, *x* is nonderivatively intentional. This is the first of the two conditionals which figure in (C), the demarcation thesis. The second conditional is that of (P3). The argument, then, is valid. In Part I of the thesis, I defend (P1). I begin in the present chapter by elucidating such terms as

[4] *Pace* Rorty (1980), then, I contend that a unified theory of the mental can be given.

'intentionality', 'intentional content' and 'intentional property'. My definitions render uncontroversial the contention that perceptual experiences have intentional content. I present considerations suggesting that all mental phenomena are intentional and identify with Martin the competing view that some mental states have nonintentional properties termed 'qualia'. By building upon reasoning from Mendelovici, Levine and others, I challenge this competing view. I finally employ discussion from Siewert, Siegel and Schellenberg, developing my 'pervasive assessability argument' for the intentionality of phenomenal properties of experience.

My motivation of the claim that all mental phenomena are intentional in this chapter is followed in §§1.2-1.3 by defence of this claim from the most threatening challenges levelled against it – challenges concerning moods and sensations. In §1.2 I construct and propound my 'intentional scope theory' of emotional states, according to which moods and emotions differ not with respect to their intentionality but with respect to what they are intentionally directed upon. In §1.3 I advance my 'intentional mode theory of sensations', according to which sensations are intentionally directed upon bodily regions.

Having secured premise (P1) of my overall argument above, I support in Part II premises (P2) and (P3). I begin §2.1 by specifying what it is for intentionality to be 'derivative': a representation ϕ is derivatively intentional *iff* the fact that some other representation ψ represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ represents. I contend that all mental intentionality is nonderivative. In §§2.2-2.3 I defend a consequence of (P3): that all nonmental intentional phenomena are derivatively intentional. I contend that linguistic and convention-governed representations are derivatively intentional (§2.2). I then argue for a 'hypothetical intention requirement' upon depiction (§2.3), securing a case for the derivativeness of depiction and part of a new analysis of the concept *depiction*.

All three premises (P1)-(P3) are ultimately found to be credible. I accordingly conclude (§2.4) that the demarcation thesis, according to which all and only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional, is true, and that we should take seriously the proposal that mentality consists in nonderivative intentionality.

§1.1.2 Definition through ostension

Before the demarcation thesis can be defended, we must fix our reference upon intentionality. Intentionality is often characterised as being the property of being 'about', 'of' or 'directed upon' something – it is taken to be *aboutness*, *of-ness* or *directedness* (Searle 1983: 1-2; Macpherson 2000; Crane 2001: 13*ff.*; Siewert 2006: §2; Speaks 2010b: 398; Jacob 2014). Though (as my opening remarks suggest) these characterisations provide a preliminary understanding of what intentionality is, I do not think that they adequately define 'intentionality'.

Some states which exhibit the directedness of intentionality nevertheless appear to be neither 'about' nor 'of' something. Though I might desire water and intend to find some, it seems infelicitous to say that I have a desire 'about' or 'of' water or an intention 'about' or 'of' finding some; and as I later argue (§§1.2-1.3), though moods and sensations are not 'of' or 'about' anything, they are intentional.

One may merely suggest, then, that intentionality consists in directedness. A first difficulty for this proposal is that it is unclear what a definition couched in terms of 'directedness' tells us (Mendelovici 2018: 4-5):

> It is simply not clear what is being said when we say that a mental state is "directed at" […] something, especially if this thing need not exist. An experience of a cup is not literally pointed in the direction of a cup (which may not even exist), in the way that a finger or an arrow might point to a cup, and a thought is not literally pointed in the direction of a proposition, which might be an abstract entity having no spatial location at all.

To this complaint, I here add another. I contend that there are instances of directedness that are not instances of intentionality. The growth of many plants is

directed towards the sun, and the falling of terrestrial objects is directed towards the earth's centre of mass (Nes 2008); but in neither case are we presented with instances of intentionality: in neither case does the property instantiated by perceptual experiences and thoughts – their of-ness or aboutness – appear to be instantiated.

The foregoing characterisations of intentionality are given, I think, because commentators have a prior grasp of what intentionality is, reflect on paradigmatically intentional states, and recognise that those states are of, about or directed upon things in virtue of their intentionality. Following Mendelovici (2018: 5-6), I propose that we define 'intentionality' by adverting to these paradigm intentional states. Amongst them are perceptual experiences. My visual, auditory and olfactory experiences of the rain falling around me are all experiences *of* the rain. Also paradigmatically intentional, I think, are propositional attitudes such as beliefs and hopes. My belief that it is raining is *about* the fact that it is raining. Upon noting that we are disposed to describe paradigm intentional states as being 'about', 'of' or 'directed upon' things, an ostensive definition of 'intentionality' emerges: intentionality is that property that we recognise as belonging to perceptual experiences and propositional attitudes in virtue of which we are disposed to describe those (paradigmatically intentional) states as being 'of', 'about' or 'directed upon' things.

Observe here that the language used when describing paradigm intentional states is also used to describe representations: what a name, picture or graph is said to 'represent' is what it is said to be 'of' or 'about'. Further, many of those mental states that we deem to be paradigmatically intentional are also said to 'represent' (or 'present'),[5] and what they represent is again what they are 'of' or 'about'. This is so, I submit, because the property of being representational just *is* intentionality.

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[5] I do not distinguish representation from presentation here. I do not commit to a nonrelational theory of representation. My contention that perceptual experiences represent is consistent with a naïve realist

My ostensive definition of 'intentionality' evades the difficulties incurred by the alternative characterisations above. It countenances the existence of intentional states that we are not disposed to describe as being 'about' or 'of' something, and it does not class all directed phenomena as intentional. Having secured this definition, I may define 'intentional content', 'intentional mode' and 'intentional property'. Intentional content is that which an intentional state or extramental representation is 'of', 'about' or 'directed upon'.[6] This definition of 'content' is not very committal: we can adopt this definition and consistently maintain that contents are ordinary objects and properties (or Russellian propositions), sense-data, propositions, Fregean senses, or something else. My definitions of 'intentionality' and 'content' render uncontroversial the claim that perceptual experiences are intentional and have content: whatever such states consist in – whether, say, they constitutively involve relations to ordinary objects or properties (Campbell 2002: 116; Martin 2004: 39; Brewer 2006) or are nonrelational (Crane 2006) – it remains the case that they are of or about things. I dispel concerns for the view that perceptual experiences have content below (§1.1.4).

Intentional states can differ from one another without differing in content. Supposing that beliefs, hopes and other 'propositional attitudes' take propositions as their contents, these states can share contents whilst remaining distinct types of states: the belief that it will not rain tomorrow and the hope that it will not rain tomorrow ostensibly share contents but nevertheless differ. Equally, whatever may form the content of a desire credibly may be the content of disgust. What distinguishes a belief and hope with the same content, and a desire and state of disgust with the same

claim that 'some of the objects of perception […] are constituents of the experience' (Martin 2004: 39). *Cf.* Campbell (2002: 116).

[6] This is sometimes how 'intentional object' is defined (Crane 2003a: 38-9). I sometimes speak of 'intentional objects' when referring to parts of a state's intentional content. No argument in this thesis demands a content-object distinction.

content, is their *intentional mode* (Husserl *LI*; Searle 1983; Crane 2009). The mode, we might say, is the way in which intentional content is represented.

Last, we may define 'intentional property'. Intentional properties are ways an intentional state or extramental representation might be with respect to its intentionality. These are properties of being of or about certain things, and of being directed upon things in certain ways. That is, they are properties of having certain intentional contents or certain intentional modes.

§1.1.3 Intentional states and phenomenal features

We are ready to evaluate the principal claim of Part I of this thesis: that all mental phenomena (*viz.* all mental states and properties) are intentional.

> *The mental as intentional* (MI): For all *x*, if *x* is mental, then *x* is intentional.

Initial motivation for MI draws upon my definition of 'intentionality'. It appears that the property instantiated by paradigmatically intentional states is instantiated by the vast majority of mental states. The of-ness, aboutness, directedness or representational character of perceptual experiences and thoughts seems also to be exhibited, say, by emotions, desires and intentions. One's joy about a discovery is *about* the discovery; one's desire for water *represents* or is *directed upon* water; and one's intention to declutter the attic similarly *represents* or is *directed upon* the decluttering of the attic. Reflection reveals most states to have the property of experiences and propositional attitudes with which I identified intentionality.

Why, then, might one doubt MI? First, one might think that certain states lack content. As I explain below (§§1.2-1.3), some maintain that moods and sensations are nonintentional. I find wanting the arguments enlisted for this view and argue that the most credible theories of these states take them to be intentional. A second concern for MI is that there may be properties that we deem to be mental but which are not

intentional properties.[7] Germane to our discussion here, I think, is the fact that certain mental states are 'phenomenally conscious' – there is something it is like to be in them (Nagel 1974). *What* it is like to be in a certain mental state is that state's *phenomenal character*, and we may call elements of that character (such as the red-feeling element of one's experience of a ripe tomato) 'phenomenal properties'. If any properties are mental, phenomenal properties are; for such properties necessarily only belong to mental states. A worry for MI, then, is that there are nonintentional phenomenal properties. Such properties have been dubbed 'qualia' (Dennett 1988; Block 1990).

I should flag here that the term 'qualia' has been used without precision in the literature. As Martin explains (1998),[8] qualia are often described as being 'ways things seem to us', and this characterisation masks an ambiguity; for when a subject experiences object *o*, 'how things seem' could be (i) how it is for the subject when she experiences *o*, or (ii) how *o* appears to be when the subject experiences it.[9] Such commentators as Dretske (1995: xiii) and Dennett (1998: 42) drift between these readings. My focus is upon 'ways things seem to us' in the first sense – upon those properties that are, as Martin says (160), 'determinations or specifications of the determinable, having an experience'. What I intend to deny is that any such properties are nonintentional, and I call 'qualia' those nonintentional features the existence of which I thus deny. On my view, to have an experience with such-and-such a phenomenal character is to have an experience with certain intentional properties.

Why postulate this tight connection between the intentional properties and character of a state? A first reason is that this seems to be what we find when we reflect

[7] One may demand an elucidation of 'mental property'. My preliminary proposal is this: a mental property is a property that necessarily is only instantiated by mental states or mental properties. This analysis is not circular. A property P that can only be instantiated by mental states would be mental, as would be property P' that can only be instantiated by P, as would be property P'' that can only be instantiated by mental states or P'.

[8] See also Crane (2000).

[9] For further interesting discussion of ways things seem, see Gibbons (2005).

upon perceptual experiences. A subject's first source of evidence for her experience having a certain content or character is reflective (Mendelovici 2010: 120): it is upon introspecting her visual experience of a daffodil that a subject becomes aware that it has yellowness amongst its contents and that it has a phenomenal property of yellowness. But it further seems that the subject's reflection upon her experience here reveals to her only *one* property relating to yellowness. Parallel remarks, I submit, can be made with respect to experiences from other sense modalities. When having an auditory experience of a soft whirring, it does not reflectively appear to one that two whirring-related properties are discernible. In such cases, our primary source of evidence for our experience having a certain intentional property and having a certain phenomenal property reveals there to be just one property. A straightforward explanation for this fact is that these properties are one and the same.

That phenomenal properties are intentional properties is further evidenced by cases in which contents and characters ostensibly cannot fail to correspond: cases in which (i) *F*-feeling states must be *F*-representing and (ii) in which *F*-representing states must be *F*-feeling.[10] Consider what it is like to view a circular disk held perpendicularly to your line of sight. It seems impossible for this experience to continue to feel as it does but begin to represent the disk as a square (Levine 2003: 60). We can partially explain such impossibility thus: since the property of being circle-feeling is the property of being circle-representing, a circle-feeling square-representing experience would represent an object as both circular and square, but we cannot experientially represent these incompatible properties as being jointly instantiated. In this way, by identifying phenomenal properties (such as being circle-feeling) with intentional properties (such as being circle-representing) we secure

[10] This terminology comes from Byrne and Hilbert (1997).

explanations of the impossibility of certain shape-experiences. The impossibility of certain colour-experiences is also explained (Speaks 2011: 343-4).

If for most values of *F*, the property of being *F*-representing is the property of being *F*-feeling, we should expect states' contents to covary with their phenomenal characters: a shift, say, from being red-feeling to being green-feeling should be accompanied by a change from being red-representing to being green-representing, and *vice versa*. Such covariation of content and character, I think, is what we often find. Several interesting examples involve shifts in experiences' conceptual contents (Mendelovici 2010: 122; Schellenberg 2011: 718-9). Whenever one's experience of Wittgenstein's 'duck-rabbit' (2009: 204-8) feels like an experience of a duck, it is duck-representing, and when it feels like an experience of a rabbit, it is rabbit-representing. The converse claims also hold: these states' characters match their contents.

Noting such covariance of mental states' contents and phenomenal characters, one may find plausible the thesis dubbed 'intentionalism', according to which the phenomenal character of any state supervenes upon its intentional content. Many endorse intentionalism,[11] and as a claim *vis-à-vis* perceptual experiences, I find it to be credible.[12] Nevertheless, I contend below that the phenomenal characters of certain states (sensations) are not exclusively determined by their contents (§1.3.3): they are determined also by their *modes*. Since a property of having such-and-such a mode is an intentional property, this failure of intentionalism does not threaten MI.

Rather than defend intentionalism, I here flag further considerations that indicate that phenomenal properties are intentional and that there are no qualia. My

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[11] Proponents include Tye (1992; 1995b), Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996a), Byrne (2001), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Bain (2003) and Jackson (2007).

[12] One influential defence of intentionalism comes from Byrne (2001). On one reading of Byrne's argument, he is guilty of equivocation upon the expression 'the way things seem' (Crane 2009: 484-5). On a more sympathetic reading, however, he successfully motivates intentionalism about perceptual experience (Levine 2003: 70*ff*.).

contention is that for a state to have a certain phenomenal character is for it to have certain intentional properties (and thus a certain content and mode). On this view, an explanation of the phenomenal character of a state is provided by an explanation of its particular intentional properties. The problem of explaining phenomenal consciousness thus collapses into the broader problem of explaining why mental states have certain contents and modes. My account thus reduces the number of explanatory challenges that we face. This theoretical advantage is lost if we posit qualia.

I also suspect that the qualia theorist is led to advance a more complex account of mentality. Observe that only mental states and properties can be phenomenal: phenomenal consciousness belongs exclusively to mental states,[13] and all phenomenal properties are mental. I maintain below that similar remarks can be made with respect to nonderivative intentionality (§§2.2-2.3): only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional. My explanation of these facts proceeds thus: (i) all mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional because mentality *is* nonderivative intentionality, and (ii) all phenomenally conscious states and properties are mental because they are nonderivatively intentional. My claim that phenomenal properties are intentional properties is consistent with this explanation. The qualia theorist, however, cannot accept claim (ii). How, then, might the qualia theorist demarcate the mental? She ostensibly must adopt the disjunctive proposal that to be mental is to be nonderivatively intentional *or* phenomenal. The qualia theorist ceases to treat *mental* as a unified nondisjunctive concept. As well as complicating an account of the mental, I believe that this view incurs an explanatory challenge: the qualia theorist must explain the fact that we pretheoretically take the mental to form a single category.[14]

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[13] To say that a subject is 'phenomenally conscious' is to say that she has phenomenally conscious mental states.
[14] *Cf.* Rorty (1980).

In toto, a host of considerations make credible the thesis that phenomenal properties are intentional and challenge qualia theories. The question we may now ask is this: why posit qualia, thereby committing to a less qualitatively parsimonious ontology (Lewis 1973: 87) and foregoing the advantages of my view? Some have claimed that the existence of nonintentional phenomenal properties explains the putative possibility of scenarios in which the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences does not supervene upon their intentional content – instances in which intentionalism fails (Peacocke 1983: esp. 273-7; Block 1993: 183). Challenges of this sort, I maintain, typically have little force. The challenger often identifies a pair of experiences which differ phenomenally and demands that the intentionalist explains this difference by finding a relevant difference in content between the experiences. In most cases, intentionalists like Tye readily find a difference (2002b: 448-54; 2003).[15]

One oft-discussed challenge to intentionalism about perceptual experience concerns colour inversion. Block describes a scenario in which a subject has colour-inverting lenses placed in her eyes and is transported to 'Inverted Earth' (1990: 62-4), a planet like our own but at which everything has the complimentary colour to that on Earth (such that, for instance, the sky there is yellow). Like Block, we may expect the subject's experience upon Inverted Earth to be phenomenally like that upon Earth: her experience of the sky, say, would be blue-feeling. Further, it seems that this experience would be blue-feeling no matter how long the subject remains upon Inverted Earth. Yet parallel remarks, Block claims (64), cannot be made *vis-à-vis* the subject's intentional contents: though the subject's visual experience may at first represent the sky as blue, since with time the ordinary cause of her experience of the sky's colour comes to be its yellowness, that experience becomes yellow-representing.

[15] See also Hill (1991: 197-9) and Lycan (1996: 89-91).

As Macpherson explains (2005: 131), if this shift in the subject's contents is possible, Block's scenario is a counterexample to intentionalism. For consider, say, the subject's past experience upon Earth of something yellow (say, a daffodil) and her experience of the sky upon Inverted Earth once her experiential contents have undergone the described shift. In each case, the subject's experience is yellow-representing, but whilst the first experience is yellow-feeling the latter is blue-feeling. We have here a difference in phenomenal character without a corresponding difference in intentional content. How may this be explained? One proposal is that the phenomenal properties of being yellow-feeling and being blue-feeling are not to be identified with the intentional properties of being yellow-representing and being blue-representing respectively. Instead, the relevant phenomenal properties are qualia.

I do not think that Block's challenge should worry the intentionalist. Note that the shift in the subject's intentional contents is said to take place because her experience represents its *ordinary causes*. More generally, we are required to suppose that the shift takes place only if we commit to a tracking theory of mental representation, according to which mental states represent (and represent what they do) in virtue of being caused by, detecting, carrying information about or otherwise corresponding to states or features of the environment.[16] We may doubt, though, that any tracking theory is tenable. As Mendelovici cogently argues (2013b), one significant difficulty for tracking accounts is that they deem impossible a phenomenon that seems possible – *reliable misrepresentation* (421):

> It is a live possibility that there are no colors. […] [I]t could turn out that [objects] do not have the properties our color-experiences represent them as having. If this is the case, then our color-experiences are mistaken; they *misrepresent*. Further, they misrepresent in the same way all the time. If our color-experiences misrepresent an object as red on one occasion, they are likely to misrepresent it as red on other occasions; they *reliably* misrepresent.

[16] Tracking theories are advanced by Fodor (1987), Millikan (1989), Dretske (1995), Papineau (2001) and Neander (2008). As Macpherson explains (2005: 132-6), responses of these theorists to the challenge here are unsuccessful.

The full plethora of difficulties besetting tracking theories of mental representation cannot be surveyed here.[17] I wish to point out, however, that if the intentionalist about perceptual experience denies these theories she becomes able to deny that the experiential contents of the subject in Block's example will undergo the described shift. What Block's discussion teaches us, I submit, is not that there are visual qualia, but that intentionalists should deny tracking theories.[18]

§1.1.4 Pervasive assessability

I have brought out the *prima facie* plausibility of the thesis that all mental states and properties are intentional (MI), and I have flagged theoretical costs of competing qualia theories. My final remarks suggest that qualia theories are unmotivated. We need not posit qualia to explain the possibility of counterexamples to intentionalism about perceptual experience. One might maintain that the greatest concern for MI is not that there are qualia but that certain states lack content. I address this challenge below (§§1.2-1.3). First, though, the case for thinking that all perceptual experiences have contents and have no nonintentional phenomenal properties may be bolstered. I here develop an argument for the view that all phenomenal properties of perceptual experiences are intentional.

The considerations that are most frequently used to motivate intentionalism about perceptual experience or to deny the existence of perceptual qualia are perhaps those concerning the alleged 'transparency' or 'diaphanousness' of experience (Harman 1990: 39; Tye 1992: 160*ff.*; 1995b: 135-6; 2002a; 2009: 260-2; 2014; Martin 1998: 167-74; 2002; Jackson 2007). An early description of the supposed phenomenon comes from Moore (1903: 450):

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[17] Mendelovici and Bourget (2014) identify several difficulties.

[18] *Cf.* Levine (2003).

> [T]he moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see *what*, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as it were diaphanous.

I find plausible many of those arguments from transparency that are made in the literature.[19] Yet I advance no such argument here. I develop another argument that employs considerations concerning what we can learn about the phenomenal properties of perceptual experiences through introspection and which motivates the view that those properties are intentional – an 'argument from pervasive assessability'.

My argument stems from considerations relating to *accuracy*. Following Siegel (2010: 336), we may note that nothing can be accurate or inaccurate *simpliciter*: whenever some x is accurate or inaccurate, there is some y with respect to which x is, and can be assessed as being, accurate or inaccurate. A map is accurate, say, insofar as it appropriately corresponds to features of the region mapped, a portrait is accurate insofar as it resembles its subject and a newspaper report is accurate insofar as it correctly describes a state of affairs. Upon attending to these examples of phenomena that are assessable for accuracy, I submit, we can discern a commonality between them. In each case, that which is accurate or inaccurate is a *representation*: a map represents certain features of the region mapped, a portrait represents its subject, and a newspaper report represents states of affairs. And the degree to which each representation is accurate or inaccurate is the degree to which it *veridically represents* that with respect to which it is accurate or inaccurate.

Contemplation of examples of phenomena that are assessable for accuracy reveals, I think, that they *all* represent. Mathematical equations, indicative sentences and figurative artworks all have accuracy conditions, and all represent. Contrastingly, nothing that fails to represent is accurate or inaccurate. A statue is accurate insofar

[19] Concerns for such arguments have however been raised by Loar (2003), Siewert (2004), Stoljar (2004), Kind (2007; 2010) and Crane (2009: 482). *Cf.* Speaks (2014).

as it resembles what it represents; but whilst identical twins may very closely resemble each other, one twin is not *accurate* with respect to the other; and whilst an abstract painting may serendipitously resemble paint spilt on a studio floor, that painting is not therefore accurate in some way.

My remarks here reveal the credibility of the claim that being assessable for accuracy suffices for being something that represents, something that has *content*. If this is so, that certain mental states are assessable for accuracy implies that they represent and have content. Amongst those states that can be accurate or inaccurate are *beliefs* and *judgements*: one's belief that it is raining is accurate if it is indeed raining, and inaccurate otherwise. Upon supposing that assessability for accuracy suffices for having content, we are appropriately led to infer the truism that these states represent: our beliefs and judgements are about, are directed upon, or 'say' something. And it intuitively appears that it is *because* these states 'say' something about what is the case that they can be accurate or inaccurate.

It is at this point that reason for thinking that all perceptual experiences have content comes into view. For we may note that perceptual experiences appear always to be accurate or inaccurate (Evans 1983: 226; McGinn 1989: 58; Byrne 2001: 201; Siegel 2010; Schellenberg 2011). In having a perceptual experience, the world appears to be a certain way – as containing certain properties or objects – and to the degree to which the world *is* that way, the experience is accurate. But if all perceptual experiences are accurate or inaccurate, it seemingly follows, given my claim above, that they all have content.

Some clarifications are in order. First, since I do not here distinguish between representing and presenting,[20] those who maintain that perceptual experiences

[20] See footnote 5 above. For full defence of the thesis that perceptual experiences have content from challenges levelled by Travis (2004) and Brewer (2006), see Siegel (2010). Siegel cogently argues that naïve realists can attribute content to perceptual experiences.

constitutively involve relations to ordinary objects and properties can accept my claim that perceptual experiences represent. Second, that perceptual experiences constitutively involve such relations does not imply that they are neither accurate nor inaccurate. It has been supposed that 'good' experiences (that are neither illusory nor hallucinatory) cannot have some degree of accuracy since it is impossible for them to be *inaccurate* (Brewer 2006: 169). The contention at work here might be that it cannot make sense to attribute accuracy to a state unless instances of that state can be inaccurate. Like Siegel (2010: 360-1) and Schellenberg (2011: 726-7), we may think that this contention faces counterexamples. It appears, say, that a belief in a necessarily true proposition (say, that 7 + 5 = 12) is accurate but cannot be inaccurate.

Considerations relating to accuracy, then, suggest that all perceptual experiences have content. As explained above (§1.1.2), my characterisation of content renders this claim uncontroversial. Yet on the basis of the foregoing considerations we can, I contend, argue for a controversial claim – *viz.* that all phenomenal properties of perceptual experiences are intentional. Following Siewert (1998: 220-1), observe that the phenomenal features of experiences seem sometimes to be accurate or inaccurate. If my visual experience when I look at something blue against a white background has the property of being red-feeling, it appears that my experience is to a certain degree inaccurate, and it is inaccurate because it has an inaccurate component – the property of being red-feeling. Equally, the property of being square-feeling is accurate if the object of perception is square and inaccurate if it is circular. But if these phenomenal properties are accurate or inaccurate, and if everything that is accurate or inaccurate represents, it follows that these properties represent – that they are intentional. And since consideration of the phenomenal properties of our experiences

seems to reveal that very many of them are assessable for accuracy,[21] we may reasonably maintain that many phenomenal properties of experiences are intentional.

I anticipate an objection to my foregoing remarks. One might dispute whether it makes sense to describe the *properties* of experiences, and not only the experiences themselves, as 'accurate' or 'inaccurate'. It certainly seems that these terms are never used in this way. Consider, though, a representation of a different sort – a figurative painting. Amongst the properties that might determine the degree to which a painting is accurate are the colours upon its surface. Though it may be unusual to describe as 'accurate' or 'inaccurate' a property of redness on the surface of the painting, I maintain that this does makes sense. And even if one does *not* think it appropriate to describe the redness in these terms, it seems that we can infer that the redness represents from the fact that it plays the role it does in determining the accuracy of the painting: it is only because the property 'says something' (that the depicted object is red) that the painting is accurate or inaccurate with respect to certain colour properties of the depicted object. Analogous remarks, I think, can be made concerning the phenomenal properties of experiences. Even if we are not inclined to describe such properties as being 'accurate' or 'inaccurate', that they play their role in determining the accuracy of experiences seemingly implies that they represent.

I have given reason for thinking that many phenomenal properties of perceptual experiences are intentional. The claim that I wish to defend, however, is that *all* such properties are intentional. Those who support this claim by appealing to considerations concerning transparency talk of what we can learn about the

[21] Another example: the phenomenal property of my olfactory experience of being lavender-feeling is inaccurate if I am not experiencing lavender (or something that smells of or like lavender).

phenomenal properties of experiences when reflecting upon them. I wish to proceed in a similar way:

P1. For all *x*, if *x* is assessable for accuracy, *x* represents.
P2. Whenever we attend to a phenomenal property of a perceptual experience, we find that it is assessable for accuracy.
P3. Plausibly, every phenomenal property of perceptual experience is assessable for accuracy.

———

C. Plausibly, every phenomenal property of perceptual experience represents.

I think that when we reflect upon perceptual experiences we find that all of their phenomenal features are assessable for accuracy. This suggests that *all* phenomenal features of experience are assessable for accuracy – that assessability for accuracy pervades experiential phenomenology. But if everything that is assessable for accuracy represents, and all phenomenal properties of experience are assessable for accuracy, then all phenomenal properties of experience represent.

An obvious way to challenge my 'argument from pervasive assessability' would be to propose instances in which phenomenal features of experiences are not assessable for accuracy. One could suggest, for instance, that a red-feeling experience could fail to 'say' that there is an instantiation of redness somewhere and thus fail to be accurate or inaccurate depending upon whether there is such an instantiation. But it is unclear how this could be so. It does not appear that we can conceive of a colour experience in which a colour property does not seem to be instantiated somewhere. We may grant that certain colour experiences do not comment upon whether colour properties belong to *particular* experienced objects. When my experience of the sky seen through a pane of glass is red-feeling, my experience may not comment upon whether redness is instantiated by the glass or the sky. But the redness nevertheless seems to be instantiated at certain positions in my visual field,

and it is most plausible that if there *is* redness instantiated at those positions, the corresponding phenomenal feature of being red-feeling is accurate.[22]

§1.1.5 The lay of the land

The considerations presented in §1.1.3 and my argument from pervasive assessability support the thesis that all phenomenal properties of perceptual experience are intentional. The stronger claim that all phenomenal properties (of all mental states) are intentional has also received defence: I have identified theoretical costs of positing nonintentional phenomenal properties. We have further noted that the intentionality of most of our mental states is discernible in reflection.

May we reasonably endorse, then, the thesis that all mental states and properties are intentional (MI)? Two challenges remain: it is alleged that moods and sensations are nonintentional. In the next two chapters, I develop and advance theories of moods and sensations according to which they are intentional. This completes my defence of MI, securing the first premise of my argument for the thesis that all and only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional.

[22] Similar remarks can be made concerning the phenomenal properties of phosphene experiences and after-images (Siewert 1998: 360-1, n.3), undermining challenges to intentionalism from Block (2007) and Boghossian and Velleman (1989: 93).

§1.2 The intentional scope theory of emotional states

§1.2.1 A challenge concerning moods

One class of phenomenally conscious states that putatively presents difficulty for the thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional (MI) is that of emotional states. Such states fall into two sub-classes. A first sub-class includes such states as joy about a new discovery and fear of heights. These are emotions. The other sub-class includes states that, unlike emotions, are not said to be 'about' or 'of' something: joy that is not joy about anything in particular, fear that is not fear of anything in particular, and the like. These are moods.

What distinguishes moods from emotions, then, is that they are in some sense target-less (Fish 2005: 25). It is this target-less nature of moods that is thought to jeopardise MI; for the *prima facie* best explanation for moods failing to be 'about' or 'of' something is that they are not intentionally directed upon anything – that they are nonintentional. One might maintain like Searle that it is a constraint upon an intentional state *S* that one can answer 'What is *S* about?', 'What is *S* of?' or 'What is it an *S* that?' (1983: 1-2). Such thoughts have led Antony (1997), Farkas (2009: 45-6), Deonna and Teroni (2012: 4), de Sousa (2013: §3), Kind (2014), Bordini (2017) and others to deny that moods are intentional.

In what follows, I defend MI from this challenge. I advance a theory that has not received explicit endorsement in the literature, though many have propounded accounts approaching it. My principal contention is that moods differ from emotions solely by having greater 'intentional scope': whilst emotions are intentionally directed upon particular things, moods are directed upon everything – upon the world.

I first present considerations which place initial pressure upon the Searlean challenge above and which make plausible the thesis that moods are intentional.

I then advance the most popular response to the Searlean challenge. As part of this response, it is maintained that moods are intentionally directed upon the world. Proponents of this claim may endorse one of two theories of moods. According to the most popular theory – that of Solomon (1993), Roberts (2003), Fish (2005) and others – moods are modifications of experiential states, inheriting their intentionality from the states modified. According to my preferred account, moods are distinct from such states and have their own intentionality. I motivate and defend my intentional theory of moods, rebutting objections from Kind, Hatzimoysis and others.

§1.2.2 Motivating an intentional theory of moods

I begin my defence of the thesis that moods are intentional by disputing the strength of the challenge levelled against it. I concede that moods are not reported as being 'about' or 'of' something, or 'that' such-and-such is so; and I grant that many intentional states *are* reported in this way. Perceptual states, say, are typically said to be 'of' their objects, and paradigm propositional attitudes such as beliefs are reported through a 'that'-construction – they are beliefs 'that' such-and-such is so. Yet we might deny Searle's contention that such constructions *must* be employed in intentional state attributions.

Many intentional states, I maintain, are not said to be 'about' or 'of' their objects (or 'that' such-and-such is so). I suggested above that this is plausibly true of desires and intentions (§1.1.2). Observe also that though feelings of hunger and thirst are ostensibly directed upon those things that are edible and potable respectively, it would be infelicitous to say that these states are 'about' or 'of' such things. Perhaps more compellingly, a feeling of being balanced (or unbalanced) phenomenally appears to be directed upon oneself and one's environment; but one does not feel (un)balanced 'about' or 'of' some object. Finally, I argue at length below that though sensations are neither 'about' nor 'of' something, they are intentional (§1.3.2).

We may dispute, then, the force of the Searlean challenge. Proponents of an intentional theory of moods must nevertheless explain why mood reports differ from reports of many intentional states. I explain this below. First, though, I wish to flag positive grounds for thinking that moods are intentional.

By taking moods to be intentional, we evade problems besetting those who take moods to differ from emotions with respect to intentionality (hereafter, 'difference theorists'). A first problem concerns the distinction between an emotion such as targeted anxiety (say, anxiety about public speaking) and a corresponding mood such as target-less anxiety. According to difference theorists, targeted anxiety and target-less anxiety are fundamentally distinct: they are different sorts of state, the former being intentional whilst the latter is nonintentional. Parallel remarks are made concerning targeted and target-less frustration, elation and sadness, *inter alia.* But the most intuitive view *vis-à-vis* such emotion-mood pairings, I think, takes the states in each pairing to be of the *same kind.* After all, as Fish observes (2005: 25), 'pretheoretically, emotions and moods appear to share many similarities'. Some of the similarities that Fish has in mind, I suspect, are phenomenal and functional: targeted and target-less anxiety (say) feel alike and tend to cause similar neurotic behaviours.

By appealing further to the phenomenal similarity between the states in emotion-mood pairings, another case for the intentionality of such states, I submit, can be made. Consider here an arbitrary mood *M* and its corresponding emotion *E*:

P1. *E* and *M* are phenomenally alike.
P2. A good explanation of phenomenal similarity between two states is that they have similar determinants of phenomenal character.
P3. The phenomenal character of *E* is determined by its intentional content.

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C. Plausibly, *M* has similar intentional content to *E*, and this content (at least partially) determines the character of *M*.

My suggestion is that a good explanation of the phenomenal similarity of a mood to its corresponding emotion is that its content is like that which determines the phenomenal character of the emotion. But if a mood has content, it is intentional.

How might difference theorists challenge my proposal? They could retort that the content of an emotion does little to determine its phenomenal character, and that there exists another similarity between an emotion and its corresponding mood (other than similarity in content) that explains their similar phenomenal characters. What, though, could this similarity be? Difference theorists are seemingly led to posit nonintentional phenomenal properties or 'qualia'.

I have argued that qualia do not exist (§1.1.3). But even countenancing their existence, we may doubt that the phenomenal similarity between states in emotion-mood pairings is explained in terms of them; for the characters of emotions seem to be exhaustively explicated in terms of content. Consider here some remarks from Mendelovici concerning colour-experience (2013a: 128):

> When we visually experience a blue sea, our experience seems to be an experience of an object, the sea, as being a certain way, blue. […] [T]he blueness quality of our experience behaves like represented blueness in that it binds to represented objects to yield representations of ways things are or might be. This is why it is appropriate to treat the blueness-related quality of experience as a *represented* quality of experience, rather than merely a "raw feel." […] [O]nce we take into account the representation of […] the sea as blue, there introspectively seems to be no extra "blueness" of experience to be accounted for, no remaining "raw feel."

That the phenomenal properties corresponding to colours 'qualify' represented objects, Mendelovici observes, suggests that such properties figure in the contents of colour-experiences (such that, say, the property of being blue-feeling is the property of being blue-representing). And introspection suggests that the content in which such properties figure wholly determines the phenomenal characters of the colour-experiences – that intentionalism about colour-experience is true. These points are germane to our discussion of emotional states, I contend, because the phenomenal

properties of emotions too seem to qualify their intentional objects. The 'joyfulness' (joy-feeling phenomenal property) of a subject's joy about a recent discovery seems to qualify that discovery as joyous. The characteristic feel of a subject's anger with her sibling seems to qualify the sibling as irritating or provocative. The phenomenal properties of emotions, like those of colour-experiences, thus appear to figure in the contents of emotions (such that, say, the phenomenal property of 'joyfulness' is the property of being joyous-representing). Furthermore, the phenomenal characters of emotions appear again to be wholly fixed by their contents. The phenomenology of a subject's experience of fear, say, is wholly determined by her representation of the feared objects as frightening (Mendelovici 2013a: 129):

> Whatever scariness amounts to, it introspectively seems that all the scariness of the experience […] attaches to represented objects […]. There does not seem to be any aspect of scariness that is detached from its represented objects. There is no free-floating aspect of scariness that does not pertain to them, no extra "raw feel" of scariness.

Intentionalism about emotions, it seems, is true: there are no nonintentional phenomenal properties of emotions. The difference theorist accordingly cannot explain phenomenal similarity between states in an emotion-mood pairing by appealing to such properties. The difference theorist fails to explain such similarity. But by supposing that moods are intentional, I have suggested, we may meet the explanatory challenge: a mood and its corresponding emotion are phenomenally similar due to their similar content.

§1.2.3 The world as intentional object

My foregoing considerations confer plausibility upon an intentional theory of moods. How such a theory may be developed, however, remains obscure; and an explanation of the fact that moods are at once intentional and target-less is yet to be given. I now begin to sketch an intentional theory of moods.

An intentional theory of moods takes all moods to be directed upon an object or objects (broadly construed). To specify the relevant object (or objects), I propose that we attend to the phenomenal character of moods. All moods seemingly have a certain *pervasive aspect*. That is, 'moods pervade our experience' and 'suffuse all aspects of our encounter with reality' (Hatzimoysis 2017: 1521). Reflection upon the phenomenology of moods apparently reveals that when we experience them we take certain perspectives towards *everything*. This is saliently illustrated by the case of melancholy. In melancholy, the entire world appears to be a certain way – it is seemingly 'a pointless, colourless place' in which 'nothing seems worth doing' (Crane 1998: 242), all things being 'brought down to affective zero' (Sartre 2002: 44). Though we may not be able to articulate a reason for such a mood,[23] we may maintain, following Kenny (2003: 42), that 'pointless depression is not objectless depression, and the objects of depression are the things that seem black'. The phenomenology of melancholy indicates that it represents the world in a certain way and is thus intentionally directed upon the world. Parallel remarks, I contend, can be made with respect to all other moods. Thus Fish (2005: 26):

> [W]hen I am in the different moods, the world is given to me in different ways – if I am anxious, then the world appears disturbing or threatening; if I am irritated then the world is given to me as annoying and provocative; if I am elated then the world just appears to me to be a wonderful place to be.

The characters of moods such as melancholy and target-less anxiety, irritation and elation suggest that they (like emotions) are intentionally directed but (unlike emotions) are directed upon the world.[24]

[23] By a 'reason', I do not mean a mere causal explanation, but what we might dub a 'motivating reason'. This is typically what the subject takes to justify or warrant her state.

[24] One may observe that there are different ways of reading 'the world'. On one reading, a state directed upon the world is directed upon all actual spatiotemporal objects. On another, such a state is also directed upon possible non-actual spatiotemporal objects. A more permissive reading might take a world-directed state to be directed also upon abstracta such as propositions. I do not commit to any particular interpretation here. I merely contend that on one of these interpretations it is true that moods are world-directed.

We have here, I submit, a response to the Searlean challenge with which this chapter began. The concern was that our inability to determine what moods are of or about may suggest that they are not directed. But we may now retort that moods do not fail to be directed *tout court* – they are simply not directed upon anything *in particular*, being directed upon *everything*, upon *the world*. Emotions are directed upon particular things, and such things are readily identified as what those emotions are about. But since moods are about everything, and since we seek particular things when determining what something is of or about, we less readily identify what moods are of or about.

That moods do not meet Searle's constraints, then, will not establish that moods are nonintentional. Moods, we may think, are intentionally directed upon the world. This view is endorsed by most proponents of intentional theories of moods (Solomon 1993: 71-2; Crane 1998: 241-2; 2009: 490; Seager 1999: 183; 2000: 669; Goldie 2002: 143; Sartre 2002: 34-5; Roberts 2003: 64; Fish 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008: 133-4).

§1.2.4 Intentional scope and experiential modification

How might we develop our proposal that moods are intentionally directed upon the world? Two options emerge. The overwhelming weight of opinion amongst those who contend that moods are intentional favours what I call the 'experiential modification theory'.[25] Fish (2005) articulates the theory thus:

> Moods modify the way in which our existing […] intentional states make us aware of the world. E.g. when one enters a mood of irritation, one begins to see objects in the world as annoying and malign. So the kind of intentional engagement with the world remains the same […]. What changes is the way the world is given to one in perception.

[25] Proponents include Solomon (1993: 112), Crane (1998: 242; 2009: 490), Seager (1999: 183; 2000: 669), Sartre (2002), Roberts (2003: 115), Fish (2005), and perhaps Heidegger (*BT*: §§29-30 and §40).

According to the experiential modification theory, then, a mood is 'a general way in which experience might be modified' (Crane 2009: 490):[26] moods are modifications of perceptual experiences.

I break with the literature in endorsing a distinct theory that also takes moods to be world-directed. I deny that moods are experiential modifications. According to my 'intentional scope theory', (i) emotional states are *sui generis*, consisting in a distinctive kind of intentional engagement with their objects. That is, there is an independent 'emotional' intentional mode which all and only emotional states have: representation by emotional states does not even partially consist in (say) perceptual representation or representation through propositional attitudes. Further, (ii) what distinguishes emotions and moods is their intentional 'scope': whilst emotions are directed upon particular objects, moods are directed upon everything. This difference in scope (and thus in content) is *all* that distinguishes an emotion (such as targeted anxiety) from its corresponding mood (such as target-less anxiety). This contention allows me to maintain, in accordance with intuitions, that an emotion and its corresponding mood are states of the same type. Finally, (iii) the phenomenal properties of a mood, like those of an emotion, 'qualify' its intentional object. Just as the 'joyfulness' of an emotion of joy about a discovery qualifies the discovery as joyful, the 'joyfulness' of a mood of joy qualifies the world as joyful. Such similarity in content explains the phenomenal similarity between emotions and their corresponding moods.

I concede that the competing experiential modification theory is *prima facie* plausible. Some remarks of Fish make this clear (2005: 29). When in a neutral mood, he claims, he views his cat as 'white, fluffy, and loveable'. Yet when irritable he

[26] *Cf.* Sartre (2002: 35-41).

'may come to see the same cat to be annoying and bothersome'. What changes here, Fish maintains, 'is not the kind of engagement with the world [that he] enjoys', but the way in which he 'perceives' his cat. Such a view, I think, is initially intuitively attractive. It seems natural to speak of one 'seeing' or 'perceiving' things in a different way upon changing mood. Further, that we tend to accept something along the lines of the experiential modification view explains why we find talk of moods couched in imagistic terms to be appropriate: Solomon's talk of moods 'casting happy glows or somber shadows on every object and incident of our experience' (1993: 112), say, does not strike us as infelicitous.

How might the experiential modification theory be developed? The most detailed and best defended account comes from Fish (2005). On his picture, all emotional states at least partially consist in experiential modification: '[t]o enter an emotion or a mood', Fish believes (29), 'is […] analogous to putting on a pair of tinted spectacles'. The fact that an emotion and its corresponding mood share a modification explains their phenomenal similarity. But an emotion and its corresponding mood must still be distinguished. Fish distinguishes them through a two-component theory (30-2): whilst the emotion and mood in an emotion-mood pairing share their modification, they differ in some respect. The difference, Fish proposes, is that emotions partially consist in 'beliefs that allow us to answer questions such as "What are you happy/sad/angry about" whilst moods are not attended by such beliefs' (32): whilst moods are mere experiential modifications, emotions are experiential modifications twinned with these beliefs. Such beliefs are what give emotions their targeted nature, accounting for the subject's ability to determine what emotions are of or about: they are of or about whatever the subject takes to be 'ultimately responsible'

for them (31).[27] Fish thus accounts for (i) the phenomenal similarity between emotions and corresponding moods, (ii) the emotion-mood distinction and (iii) the fact that Searle's questions are answerable with respect to emotions but not moods.

Beyond its initial plausibility, might there be grounds for preferring this account to my intentional scope theory? There are two seminal challenges made to claims which figure in my theory. Each challenge is mounted by Fish (2005), and each, I contend, fails.

Fish's first challenge is mounted against my claim that emotions have more limited intentional scope (27-8), being focused upon particular objects: this claim is, he contends, 'incompatible with the phenomenology of emotions' (27). Moods are attended, Fish maintains, by a modification in how the subject experiences the world generally – by a 'global affectivity'. It is such global affectivity that accounts for moods' broad intentional scope. But, Fish argues, emotions also have global affectivity. He takes this to be illustrated by examples such as the following (27-8):

> If I feel that I have been treated unfairly by my boss and this makes me angry, my anger changes the way I both apprehend and respond to the world in general. [B]ecause I am angry at my boss, insignificant things may irritate me: I might slam my office door, […] or kick my cat. Although I am angry with my boss, and in a sense, I focus my anger narrowly on him, my anger also has the wide focus characteristic of moods […].

The phenomenal character of emotions, then, seems to reveal that they have not only a narrow scope but also a wide scope. My intentional scope theory allegedly fails to capture this fact, offering no explanation of emotions' global affectivity. Contrastingly, by employing a two-component theory of emotion, Fish explains emotions' global affectivity whilst accounting for their targeted nature: since (like moods) emotions partially consist in modifications of all of our experiences, they have global affectivity; but emotions (unlike moods) are targeted because of their added beliefs.

[27] What is 'ultimately responsible' for a state, I take it, is its 'motivating reason'. See footnote 23 above.

We have here, it appears, grounds for denying my intentional scope theory and for adopting the experiential modification theory in its place.

This challenge, I contend, is unsuccessful. My theory readily accommodates the phenomenological facts. In Fish's example above, the apparent pervasiveness of the subject's anger is plausibly the result of that emotion's accompaniment by a *mood* of anger or irritation. More generally, I submit, we may think of cases like this as being instances in which an emotion and its corresponding mood are concurrent, the presence of the mood accounting for felt pervasiveness of the experience whilst the emotion accounts for the apparent presence of an emotional state of limited intentional scope. My proposal need not be *ad hoc*. We should, I submit, usually expect emotions to be attended by moods; for the cause of a given emotion is often disposed to cause a corresponding mood. Consider, say, the case of a novelist who is praised for the quality of her new work. Such praise, it seems, might cause the novelist to experience an emotion of pride in her work, as well as a distinct target-less mood of contentment. Later, when she no longer has her work in mind, her focused emotion of pride may cease though her mood of contentment persists.

Parallel remarks, I think, apply in Fish's case above: it is plausible that the subject's unfair treatment by the employer engenders both an emotion of anger directed at the boss and a further pervasive mood of irritation. In such a case, the causal relations at work make it unsurprising that the emotion is accompanied by a phenomenology of an emotional state with unlimited scope: this phenomenology is credibly that of a concurrent mood which shares the emotion's cause.

Fish's second challenge is levelled against the claim that emotional states are *sui generis*. According to my intentional scope theory, emotional states are not modifications of experiential states but constitute a distinct sort of intentional engagement with the world. If this were so, Fish points out (29), 'we should be

able to conceive of a mental event consisting of just that kind of engagement'. But, he claims, we cannot conceive of this: we cannot make sense of, say, being angry in the absence of perceptual engagement with the world. That one has experiential engagement with the world is a necessary condition for one having emotional states; and this confirms that such states constitutively involve experiential modifications and not distinct kinds of intentional engagement.

I have the contrary intuition to Fish here, and I believe that this intuition is widespread. I take it to be intuitively most credible that we could fail to engage in any perceptual experience and nevertheless experience an emotional state such as a mood of sadness or excitement. We seemingly can conceive of a scenario in which the phenomenal character of our perceptual states fades away whilst our moods persist: whilst one continues to experience, say, a mood of anxiety, the deliverances of sight, olfaction and the like could die away until one's only phenomenally conscious state is the anxiety and – like for Chalmers' 'zombie' (1996: 96) – 'all is dark inside'. We do not merely have a response to Fish here: that it is conceivable that a subject has emotional states without experiential engagement with the world gives reason for thinking that this is possible, and if this is possible it cannot be necessary (as the experiential modification view requires) that all emotional states partially consist in modification of extant experiential states.

§1.2.5 Moods as sui generis states

Fish's challenges to claims of my intentional scope view fail. I now argue against Fish's experiential modification account. I have just raised a concern regarding the possibility of emotional states obtaining in the absence of other conscious states. Further difficulty for the experiential modification theory emerges when we scrutinise the *prima facie* grounds for adopting it.

I granted above that it is natural to think and speak of 'seeing' or 'perceiving' things differently upon entering a new emotional state: upon becoming irritated, say, it seems appropriate to say that one 'sees' or 'perceives' things to be provocative. But it is important to appreciate, I think, the credibility of the claim that 'perceives', 'sees' and the like are multiply ambiguous. Though one may 'see' another's point of view, we might deny that one thereby stands in a perceptual relation to a belief; and though one might 'perceive' the poverty of a community, we may doubt that one really sees this property rather than ways in which it is manifested. Often, it seems, we talk of 'seeing' or 'perceiving' properties that are in fact represented in *judgement*. Suppose that I see a kingfisher. Upon seeing it, I might judge or otherwise represent the object of my perception as being rare. Accordingly, there is a sense in which I 'perceive' the kingfisher as being rare. But this property ostensibly is not, strictly speaking, something of which I am *perceptually* aware: I attribute the property of scarcity to the kingfisher through judgement.

Upon appreciating this point, we see how the initial motivation for the experiential modification view founders. It is indeed appropriate to speak of an irritated subject 'perceiving' a cat to be white and fluffy as well as 'irritating and bothersome' (Fish 2005: 29); but 'perceiving' is here used loosely with respect to 'irritating and bothersome', and that this is so is evidenced, I think, by the fact that if we ask the irritated subject what she truly perceives, she will list as perceptible qualities the cat's whiteness and fluffiness but not its being irritating. Equally, when experiencing a mood of fear, one's mood represents the world as frightening; and it is appropriate to describe one experiencing this mood as 'perceiving' the world to be frightening; but on my view this is a mere *façon de parler*.

Properties attributed to the world by moods, like that of being frightening, can rarely, if ever, be perceived.[28]

Another challenge of mine to the experiential modification theory has us contemplate uncontroversial instances of experiential modification. Observe that cases in which perceptual experience is modified – such as when seeing in poor light or through tinted spectacles, and when hearing under water – are also typically (and perhaps always) cases in which one's *epistemic status* is modified. Seeing in dull light or through tinted spectacles, say, places one in a poorer epistemic position than seeing in bright light: one's experience is less veridical. More generally, perceptual experiences of the same type that differ with respect to some modification also differ in veridicality. Were emotional states to consist (or partially consist) in experiential modifications, then, we would expect them to influence the veridicality of experience. But they do not. Seeing when joyful, say, is no more or less veridical than seeing when anxious. This further indicates that emotional states do not even partially consist in experiential modifications.[29]

Having identified overlooked drawbacks for the experiential modification theory, I now wish to challenge the most developed and defended experiential modification account – that of Fish. Fish ostensibly contends that whenever one's mood is attended by a belief concerning what is responsible for that mood, one experiences the corresponding emotion. But this contention may be disputed: it is plausible, I think, that a subject can experience a mood and hold beliefs concerning what is responsible for it without experiencing an emotion. A subject who is feeling depressed or melancholic, say, may have beliefs regarding what is

[28] Though I maintain that this contention receives intuitive support, I grant that it is contentious. For defence of the view that represented properties are not limited to such 'low-level' properties as colour, shape, depth, illumination and the like, see Siegel (2006).

[29] Fish could perhaps contend that the modifications involved in emotional states are epistemic modifications; but this proposal would require elucidation and defence.

responsible for this mood without experiencing a targeted emotion: she may blame her employer's poor treatment of her without experiencing melancholy *about* such treatment. *Pace* Fish, it seems, emotions do not differ from moods solely in virtue of being attended by beliefs about what is responsible for them.

Further consideration of Fish's appeal to beliefs, I submit, reveals another complication for his account. It appears that whilst the phenomenal character of a mood and its corresponding emotion are very similar, they nevertheless differ to some degree. For instance, when a teacher is frustrated with a particular student, the phenomenal character of this emotion has a focused aspect that a target-less mood of frustration does not have. The problem for Fish here is that he seemingly cannot account for this aspect of the phenomenology of emotions; for according to Fish, an emotion only differs from a corresponding mood in virtue of the presence in the mood of a certain belief, and beliefs ostensibly lack phenomenal character. The phenomenal difference between an emotion and its corresponding mood is not explained. My intentional scope view readily explains the difference: it results from a difference in intentional scope.[30]

I have identified overlooked difficulties besetting experiential modification accounts of emotional states. Such theories, I conclude, are implausible. The credibility of the view that moods are directed upon the world leads us to adopt instead my intentional scope theory. By taking emotional states to be *sui generis*, the problems associated with taking them to be experiential modifications disappear. An intentional theory of moods is secured which accounts for how moods are distinct from emotions without being states of a different sort, which facilitates a response to the Searlean

[30] Because of the role of belief therein, I suspect that Fish's account also faces challenges confronting cognitive accounts of emotion like that of Nussbaum (2001). For one challenge, see Addis (1995).

challenge, which explains the felt pervasiveness of moods, and which avoids the shortcomings of the experiential modification theory.

§1.2.6 Final objections and replies

I have motivated the view that all emotional states are intentional, defending my particular intentional theory from initial objection and showing it to be preferable to a competing account. I now rebut two last challenges to the thesis that moods are intentionally directed upon the world. Kind (2014: 127) contends that this claim has implausible consequences:

> Consider a new father who has been in an elated mood for hours, ever since his child was born. As he rocks his daughter to sleep in his arms, his elation deepens. Must we suppose that as this happens, his daughter starts to seem […] more wonderful to him? If his elation lessens, must we suppose that she starts to seem less […] wonderful to him?

The worry is that upon maintaining that moods are intentionally directed upon the world, we commit to the view that any change in the intensity of a mood is twinned with a corresponding change in how the world and the things in it seem to us, a claim for which there appear to be counterexamples.

I concede to Kind that in such a case as that described, my view entails that in some sense, a change in mood is attended by a change in how the world and its objects seem to one. For instance, on my view, when a subject experiencing a mood of fear becomes more frightened, the way in which her mood qualifies her (emotional) representation of the world changes such that the world is represented as more frightening. More generally, on my view, a change in mood is attended by a change in the properties the world is represented by one's emotional state as having. In this sense, there is a change in how the world seems. But note that this is a change in how the world is 'emotionally' represented – a change in how the world is represented *by one's emotional state*. I do not claim that a change in mood is attended by a change in the properties that the subject attributes to the world in *judgement* or *belief*.

Just as a change in the properties one imaginatively represents some x to have need not be attended by a change in the properties one judges or believes x to have, a change in the properties one's emotional state represents x to have need not be attended by a change in the properties one judges or believes x to have.[31] The claim that we are meant to find implausible in Kind's example above, I suspect, is that the father changes his beliefs or judgements concerning his daughter as his mood changes – that the father starts to *think* that his daughter is more wonderful. This claim is not a consequence of my view.

A further challenge to my theory comes from Hatzimoysis (2017: 1521). His contention is that emotions and moods cannot be distinguished by intentional scope, since certain emotions can be universal in scope, being directed upon the world. For instance, '[t]o be outraged with the whole world', he contends, 'is not a mood: it is an intense […] and global (in its intentional content) emotion'. The same assertion might be made with respect to *Weltschmerz* – a feeling of despair at the state of the world (Goldie 2007: 928). If these states really are world-directed emotions, then my intentional scope theory must be abandoned.

These cases, I believe, fail to undermine my theory. I focus upon the case of *Weltschmerz*, though parallel remarks apply with respect to outrage with the world. *Prima facie*, it seems that *Weltschmerz* is an emotion; for we can answer the Searlean question 'What is your *Weltschmerz* about?' – it is about the world. Yet that *Weltschmerz* is an emotion like any other is called into question upon considering how its phenomenal character relates to that of a target-less mood of despair: the characters of these states seemingly do not diverge. The best explanation for this, I propose, is that the phenomenology of *Weltschmerz* is in fact explained by such a mood.

[31] Our judgements need not represent the world as emotional states do. Whilst watching a horror film, a subject emotionally represents the world as frightening without judging that the world is frightening.

That *Weltschmerz* is then said to be 'about' the world needn't be accounted for in terms of the presence of a world-directed conscious state: it plausibly results, I submit, from representation in belief or judgement of problems with the world due to which one has *reason* to despair. *Weltschmerz*, then, consists in (i) a world-directed mood of despair, joint with (ii) a representation of reasons for that mood.

§1.2.7 Adopting the novel account

The view that moods are nonintentional, we have seen (§1.2.2), incurs difficulty. Such difficulty is circumvented by adopting an account on which moods are intentionally directed upon the world. I have challenged the orthodox way of cashing out this proposal and have propounded a view that has not been explicitly endorsed in the literature, vindicating this from objection.

My intentional scope theory explicates the felt pervasiveness of moods, captures the intuition that emotions and moods are states of the same type, appropriately treats emotional states as *sui generis* and accounts for the phenomenal similarity between an emotion and its corresponding mood without precluding a phenomenal difference *tout court*. It distinguishes between emotions and moods and facilitates explanation of the fact that we do not describe moods as being 'of' or 'about' things. *In toto*, the intentional scope theory proves to be eminently plausible. We may reasonably endorse, then, a consequence of that theory – that all moods are intentional. Moods are not counterexamples to the claim that all mental phenomena are intentional (MI).

§1.3 The intentional mode theory of sensations

§1.3.1 The classical challenge

In defence of the thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional (MI), I have maintained that all phenomenal properties are intentional (§1.1) and advanced a novel account of moods (§1.2). The class of moods is one of two classes of states that are alleged to be paradigmatically nonintentional. The other class is that of sensations – such somatosensory feelings as pains, itches and tinglings. I here develop and propound a theory according to which sensations are intentional.

I first delineate the classical challenge levelled against an intentional picture of sensations by McGinn, Rorty, O'Shaughnessy and others. I find reasons for disputing the force of this challenge and flag considerations which suggest that sensations are intentional. Having motivated the most frequently endorsed intentional account of sensations – the perceptualism of Tye and Bain – I present and bolster challenges from Crane, Mendelovici and others which reveal its implausibility. Yet also implausible, I argue, are such theories of sensations as the psychofunctionalism of Aydede and Fulkerson, according to which sensations are nonintentional. Reclaiming an intentional account, I outline a little-discussed proposal from Crane according to which sensations represent bodily regions. From this proposal I construct what I dub the 'intentional mode theory' of sensations. Drawing upon discussion from Seager, Bourget, Chalmers and Farkas, I broach the *prima facie* credibility of this theory. I maintain that it is phenomenologically plausible, explanatorily powerful and free from the chief difficulties that beset competing accounts of sensations.

The classical challenge to the view that sensations are intentional attends to a difference between them and perceptual states. As I noted above (§1.2.1), it is sometimes supposed that a state *S* is intentional only if *S* is 'about' or 'of' some object

(Searle 1983: 1-2). When we ask of a sensation or perceptual state 'what is it about?' no object is found in either case: such states are not 'about' anything. But upon asking what such states are 'of' a contrast emerges. Though my visual experience of a daffodil is 'of' the daffodil, parallel remarks cannot be made *vis-à-vis*, say, pain in my fingertip experienced upon touching a hot surface: we do not describe the pain as 'of' the hot surface or 'of' the fingertip. It does not appear to be 'of' anything at all. We may speak of a 'sensation of pain' or an 'experience of pain'; but the 'of'-construction here, I suspect, merely specifies the type of state experienced, just as it does in the expression 'experience of sadness'. And just as an experience of sadness does not take sadness as its intentional object, an experience of pain, we may think, does not take pain as its object. McGinn accordingly disputes whether sensations have intentional objects (1982: 8), noting that '[w]e distinguish between a visual experience and what it is an experience of; but we do not make this distinction in respect of pains'. Similar considerations have led Rorty (1980: 22), O'Shaughnessy (1980: 169-70) and perhaps Reid (*EIP*: 253) to deny that sensations are intentional.

§1.3.2 Attention, perceptualism and alternative proposals

I find the foregoing challenge unconvincing. I wish to dispute the contention that the failure of a state to be 'of' some object is good evidence for its being nonintentional. My earlier discussion provides a first reason for doubting this contention: it was found that though moods are neither 'about' nor 'of' anything, they are intentional.

Further grounds for rejecting the above test for intentionality can be discerned upon considering a second contrast between sensations and perceptual states – a contrast that is overlooked in the literature. Note that when a subject is in a mental state, there is often some object to which she attends in virtue of being in that state. In virtue of having a visual experience of a daffodil, say, a subject may attend to

the daffodil, and such attention may be evidenced by the way in which she causally interacts with the daffodil. The object to which a subject attends in virtue of being in a perceptual state typically is not the sensory organ which gives rise to that state: one's visual state, say, usually does not lead one to attend to one's eyes. Instead, what we may dub the 'attentional object' of the state is (or is amongst) what the state is 'of': the subject attends to that (or something amongst that) which she (perceptually) represents. Contrastingly, I submit, the attentional object of a sensation is *not* what we say the state is 'of': the sensation is not 'of' anything. Rather, the attentional object usually *is* the organ responsible for the state, the bodily region in which the sensation is felt: in virtue of pain in one's fingertip, say, one's attention is typically directed upon one's fingertip.

I wish to stress the following observations: (i) though there is nothing sensations are 'of', they often have attentional objects; (ii) the attentional objects of perceptual states are usually amongst what they are 'of'; and (iii) perceptual states are 'of' their intentional objects. From (ii) and (iii), it follows that the attentional objects of perceptual states are usually amongst their intentional objects. We may accordingly wonder whether attentional objects tend to be amongst the intentional objects of states in general, and thus whether the fact that sensations have attentional objects indicates that they have intentional objects. Contemplation of certain intentional states, I think, suggests that this is so, and indicates that a state's failure to be 'of' something does not indicate that it is nonintentional. Note that when a subject consciously entertains a propositional attitude, she typically attends to the object of that attitude: a subject who regrets that she spilt her tea, say, may attend to the fact that she spilt her tea. In this case, the attentional object is the intentional object of the state, but the subject's state is not described as being 'of' anything. Whilst propositional attitudes are not 'of' something, their attentional objects are their intentional objects.

These remarks may be made *mutatis mutandis* for emotions and desires: though a subject's sadness or desire is not 'of' anything, it has an intentional object, and the subject experiencing the sadness or desire typically attends to that object.

It appears, then, that many states fail to be 'of' anything and are nevertheless intentional. Further, the objects to which we attend in virtue of being in these states are typically, if not always, amongst those states' intentional objects. Whilst the failure to be 'of' something thus seems to be poor evidence for a state's being nonintentional, that a state has attentional objects ostensibly evidences its intentionality. Though sensations are not said to be 'of' anything, then, that they take bodily regions for their attentional objects indicates that bodily regions are amongst sensations' intentional objects. And if sensations have intentional objects, they are intentional.

P1. When we attend to x in virtue of being in mental state S (such as a perceptual experience, emotion, propositional attitude or desire), S typically, if not always, has x amongst its intentional objects and is correspondingly intentional.
P2. In virtue of experiencing sensations, we attend to bodily regions.

C. Plausibly, sensations have bodily regions amongst their intentional objects and are correspondingly intentional.

My 'attention considerations' above, then, suggest not only that sensations are intentional, but that their intentional objects are those bodily regions which are their attentional objects. I accordingly advance below a theory according to which sensations are representations of bodily regions. First, though, we may assess the usual way of accommodating the intentionality of sensations. This is to assimilate sensations to perceptual experiences. According to 'perceptualists' like Tye (1995a; 1995b; 1996; 2006a), Bain (2003) and Harman (1990: 40), sensations are somatosensory experiences representing physical conditions of parts of one's body. A pain, say, is standardly taken to represent damage or disturbance to a body part – that part in which the pain is felt.[32]

[32] This proposal first appears in Armstrong (1962).

Perceptualism has some advantages. First, it successfully distinguishes between types of sensations through its appeal to represented physical bodily conditions. Not only are pains distinguished from, say, itches since only the former represent bodily damage, but pains with differing phenomenal characters are distinguished by the sort of damage that they represent (Tye 2006a: 101):

> A throbbing pain represents a rapidly pulsing disorder. […] In the case of a pricking pain, the relevant damage is represented as having a sudden beginning and ending on the surface or just below, and as covering a very tiny area. A racking pain […] represents that the damage involves the stretching of internal body parts (e.g., muscles).

This appeal to represented damage also allows perceptualists to account for pain's apparent *function* – to alert a harmed organism to bodily damage (Crane 2009: 488). This function sometimes fails to be properly performed, as is so in the case of phantom limb pain – pain felt in a limb that a subject no longer has. Such pain is explained by the perceptualist: the subject experiences this pain in virtue of representing damage to a limb that in fact is not there (Bain 2003: 508).[33]

Despite these advantages, the perceptualist account, I contend, lacks credibility. Tye (2006b) addresses challenges from Aydede, Block, Maund and Noordhof;[34] but concerns remain. A key problem for perceptualism is that it appears to be phenomenologically implausible (Crane 2009: 488; Mendelovici 2010: 125). Though pain experiences are often attended by the belief or suspicion that there is bodily damage, there are many instances in which pain does not phenomenally seem to be an experience of damage, such as when we bite into something cold or endure

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[33] Sensations are thus likened to 'perceptual experiences' (Crane and French 2015), which may be veridical, illusory or hallucinatory.

[34] Many of the objections seemingly rest upon misunderstandings of perceptualism. For instance, Aydede goes to great lengths to challenge the thesis that perceptual reports like 'I see a dark discolouration on the back of my hand' warrant similar semantic treatment to sensation reports like 'I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand' (2006: 123-4; 2009a: 532-48). It appears to me, though, that since perceptualists treat sensations as akin to *perceptual experiences* (and not perceptions), a better analogue for a sensation report would be 'I have a *perceptual experience as of* a dark discolouration on the back of my hand'.

a headache. Were the perceptualist to insist that pain in these cases consists in representation not of damage but of mere disorder, she seemingly would abandon that which enables her to mark pain apart from itches, tinglings and other sensations.

To this challenge, I wish to add another: I suspect that the perceptualist cannot explain certain intersubjective differences between the phenomenal characters of sensations. We may think that differences between subjects – say, with respect to how bodily regions are neurally connected to the brain, or with respect to how stimuli are processed by the brain – may be such that their pain experiences differ in intensity, although they represent the same tissue damage.[35] We may note, following Gligorov (2018), that the neuroscientific literature indicates that a subject's 'attention, expectation, learning, and reappraisal can influence the felt intensity of pain' (181). But since the dominant perceptualists (to account for the multiplicity of possible phenomenal characters of sensations) take the content of sensations to be nonconceptual (Tye 1995a: 236; Crane 2009: 480),[36] it is doubtful that they can account for the influence of cognitive states upon that content.[37] It appears, then, that in virtue of (say) a difference in subjects' expectations, their pain experiences may differ in intensity despite representing the same damage.

What account might take the place of perceptualism? One might first suggest that we explicate sensations in terms of nonintentional phenomenal properties or 'qualia'. Since our phenomenology ostensibly reveals sensations at least to be attended by representation of those bodily regions in which the sensations are felt, the qualia theorist may maintain that sensations have both an intentional component and a qualia component: an experience of pain in one's fingertip, say, may consist in

[35] Block makes a similar but distinct proposal (2006: 140).
[36] By appealing to Fregean modes of representation, Bain foregoes the need to construe the content of sensations as nonconceptual (2003), but also incurs insuperable difficulty (Mendelovici 2010: 127-8).
[37] See Macpherson (2015a).

a representation of the fingertip alongside a nonintentional 'painful colouring'. Against this view may be mounted my earlier objections to qualia theories (§1.1.3). And we may further observe, following Farkas (2009: 43), that the view is rendered implausible by its inability to explain the fact that it is the *fingertip* that hurts: it does not seem merely that hurting is present, alongside awareness of one's fingertip.

A third, 'functionalist' view of sensations characterises sensations or certain components of sensations functionally (Farkas 2009). According to the psychofunctionalism of Aydede and Fulkerson (2014; forthcoming), for instance, the 'affective' character of pains – their unpleasant, to-be-avoided phenomenal character – is explicated in functional terms. At first, this view appears to secure credibility by providing a simple explanation of the fact that this phenomenology motivates us to behave in certain ways (say, to end painful experiences): our affective phenomenology is motivational because it is determined by functional relations between our sensations and our desires, beliefs and behaviours.

This account of the motivational profile of certain sensations leads to a familiar difficulty. The difficulty comes into view upon considering the functionalist's explanation of one's desire for an experience of pain to end (O'Sullivan and Schroer 2012: 743-4):[38]

> According to functionalism, [the pain] is unpleasant because, among other effects, it causes you to desire for it to stop. But this gets the explanatory direction the wrong way around. […] [I]t is not unpleasant because you want it to stop. […] [T]he felt quality of pain, or at least its affective dimension, explains the desire. But the functionalist wants the desire to explain the affect.

Rather than making the functionalist account plausible, the functionalist's explanation of the motivational profile of certain sensations renders her theory counterintuitive.[39]

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[38] See also Levin (2018: §5.2).

[39] For further reason to deny that functionalists can explicate the normative or motivational profile of unpleasant pains, see Corns (2018: 748) and Bain (2013). *Cf.* McDowell (1994: 26).

Not only does functionalism provide a counterintuitive account of the affective-motivational aspect of certain pains, but, *a fortiori*, I suspect that it struggles to account for instances in which pains lack this feature. A mounting body of evidence, much of which is detailed by Grahek (2007: esp. 41-94), indicates that there are cases of 'pain asymbolia', in which subjects detect painful stimuli, report experiencing a 'pain' and determine their sensation's location, quality and intensity, despite manifesting no withdrawal behaviour and even reporting that they are not bothered at all by the pain. If we take these subjects at their word, they experience pains but do not mind them. I doubt that the functionalist can easily account for pain asymbolia; for on her view, a subject's mental state is pain only if it stands in certain causal relations to behaviours that the pain asymbolic does not exhibit.

My final challenge to functionalism concerns the felt location of pains. According to such functionalists as Aydede, when experiencing certain sensations, 'our immediate and spontaneous interest [...] is in the experiences themselves [...], rather than in what objects or conditions these experiences represent' (2009a: 541). In support of this contention, Aydede presents considerations which suggest that pain reports such as 'I feel a pain in my leg' are reports of mental states and not of represented physical conditions of body parts (532-41). Though I agree that such statements do not report bodily conditions of damage or disturbance, I do not think that this establishes that our interest when experiencing pain is fixed upon our mental state. Certain pain reports do not suggest an interest in one's mental state. A common way of reporting pain is through use of an expression of form '*x* hurts', which is naturally understood to indicate the speaker's attention to the body part or region *x*. Second, we may observe that subjects experiencing pain often look to, grip and exhibit other behaviours with respect to the bodily regions in which pain is felt, and this suggests that their attention is directed upon those regions. Our attention

appears to be directed not upon experiences but upon bodily regions; and my earlier attention considerations then indicate that these regions are amongst pains' intentional objects, *pace* the functionalist.

§1.3.3 The intentional mode theory

The difficulties that beset perceptualists should not lead us to abandon a view which attributes intentional objects to sensations. I propose that we adopt a theory of sensations that accounts for sensations' felt locations and which avoids the complications faced by qualia theorists and functionalists.

I earlier distinguished between the intentional content and mode of a mental state (§1.1.2). Though a hope, a regret and a belief could each be directed upon the same proposition, these attitudes would nevertheless be distinct and differ not in content but in *mode* (Husserl *LI*; Searle 1983; Crane 2009). I have used 'intentionalism' to designate the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes upon intentional content. Yet we may distinguish between this thesis and the claim that phenomenal character supervenes upon content and mode taken together – the 'complete intentional nature' of a state (Crane 2009: 481). Let us use 'pure intentionalism' to pick out what I have dubbed 'intentionalism', and dub 'impure intentionalism' the thesis that the phenomenal character of a state supervenes upon its complete intentional nature (Chalmers 2004; Crane 2009: 478-81). The 'intentionalist' commits to at least one of these theses. In what follows, I motivate impure intentionalism and show that upon accepting it, a credible account of sensations can be secured.

A first advantage of impure intentionalism is that it explains phenomenal differences between states which seemingly have the same intentional content. For instance, according to Crane (2009: 481), seeing that it is raining has a different phenomenal character to hearing that it is raining because seeing and hearing are

differing intentional modes. Similarly, the phenomenal difference between seeing that one's hand is damaged and feeling that it is damaged may be explained in terms of a difference between seeing and feeling.

It appears, however, that the pure intentionalist can explain some of these phenomenal differences. One may claim that the states in these pairings differ phenomenally because they represent different properties (Dretske 2000: 458; Tye 2006a: 112-3).[40] When seeing that it is raining or that one's hand is damaged, say, one represents properties that are not disclosed through hearing or feeling – properties of colour, texture and shape.

Unfortunately for the pure intentionalist, though, this strategy fails to yield a response to certain counterexamples. Most strikingly, it seems that certain nonconscious states can have the same intentional content as conscious states, and thus differ phenomenally from those conscious states without differing in content (Chalmers 2004: 158-9; Farkas 2009: 40). For instance, standing beliefs, desires and intentions ostensibly have the same content as their occurrent, consciously-entertained counterparts. And less controversially,[41] there appear to be instances of nonconscious visual representations with the same content as conscious visual states:

> If you close one eye […], then open the other and close the first, you will note a difference caused simply by the locations of your eyes. It seems that, under conditions of normal vision, the brain somehow combines or links the contents of these two ocular viewpoints into the 3-D view that informs consciousness. This would mean that we lack consciousness of the individual components even though the individual representations remain active in the system […]. (Seager and Bourget 2017: 281-2)

To this case we may add, I propose, instances of blindsight.[42] Subjects with a damaged primary visual cortex sometimes have 'blind' areas of their visual fields such that when

[40] *Pace* Leeds (2002: 107).
[41] It is sometimes maintained that so-called standing states are mere (nonintentional) dispositions to give rise to intentional states (Mendelovici 2018: 160-92); and some claim that thoughts are never conscious (Crane 2013b).
[42] *Cf.* Block (1995).

stimuli are presented in those areas subjects report seeing nothing there. Nevertheless, some of these subjects display signs of visually representing stimuli in these areas: they reliably suggest the locations of the stimuli and the nature and direction of their motion, discriminate between colours to a certain degree and even shape their hands appropriately when asked to grasp objects positioned within their blind field. The most natural way of describing such cases, I think, takes phenomena that are usually represented consciously (by subjects with intact visual cortices) to be represented unconsciously, and thus countenances cases in which the same content is attended by differing phenomenal characters. The impure intentionalist readily explains blindsight: in blindsight, one represents through a nonconscious intentional mode what is usually represented through a conscious intentional mode.

A last motivation for impure intentionalism employs my discussion of the effects of cognitive states upon the intensity of sensations. Through having different expectations, I suggested, subjects may experience pains of differing intensity, despite representing the same bodily damage. We may doubt that the pure intentionalist can explain the difference: if these states represent the same damage and bodily regions, it is unclear how their content may differ. Yet impure intentionalists, I propose, *can* explain the phenomenal difference here. According to Gligorov (2018: 173), a cognitive state can influence pain intensity because it 'alters how nociceptive stimuli are processed throughout the sensory and discriminative pathways of the brain'. My suggestion is that this difference in processing yields a difference in intentional mode. The states then differ in intensity because their modes differ.

We may reasonably contend, then, that a sensation's intentional mode partially determines its phenomenal character. When we accept this claim, the theory of sensations that I consider to be the most plausible emerges. A version of this theory has been sketched by Crane (2003a; 2009: 487-9), who focuses upon pain.

I now develop the account in greater detail and present several overlooked considerations that confer plausibility upon it.

According to what I here dub the 'intentional mode theory' of sensations, sensations are intentional and take as their intentional objects those regions or parts of the body in which they are felt. Whenever a subject experiences pain in her fingertip, say, she represents her fingertip. (*Pace* the perceptualist, sensations need not represent *conditions* of body parts.) Sensations are then distinguished from states of other types (such as propositional attitudes and perceptual states) and from each other in virtue of their intentional modes, which at least partially determine their phenomenal characters. Pains, for instance, have a type of intentional mode in virtue of which they are pains, and by having a mode of this type a given pain experience has the characteristic phenomenology in virtue of which it is classed as an experience of pain. (When experiencing pain in one's fingertip, one represents one's fingertip in a certain 'hurtful' way.) Itches have another type of intentional mode in virtue of which they are itches, and parallel remarks apply for tinglings and other species of sensations.

Sensations of the same species which do not differ with respect to intentional object (felt location) can nevertheless differ phenomenally, and this, I propose, is explained in terms of their *specific* intentional modes. Though two pain experiences are both pains because they have intentional modes of the same type, those pains may differ in intensity, and this is explained by the difference between their specific intentional modes. By accounting for intensity in this way we can accept the intuitive claim that states with the same content can differ in intensity.[43]

Those non-perceptualist accounts of sensations that treat sensations as intentional have gone largely ignored in the literature. Correspondingly, their

[43] Vivid and dull imaginative states, say, may differ in intensity whilst representing the same objects and properties.

advantages have not been discerned. Upon considering its advantages, I contend, the intentional mode theory proves to be the most credible theory of sensations.

I have flagged a first advantage of my theory. Since on my view the intentional mode of a sensation affects its phenomenal character, we can account for cases in which sensations with the same content differ in character. Some such cases, I have claimed, are instances in which cognitive states influence a sensation's intensity.

A second consideration supporting the intentional mode theory employs my attention considerations. I argued that those objects to which we attend in virtue of being in a mental state are typically amongst the state's intentional objects. As I have also maintained, sensations direct our attention upon their felt locations. We have reason, then, to believe that the felt locations of our sensations are amongst their intentional objects, in accordance with my account.

This second advantage of my theory relates to another. Unlike the functionalist, the intentional mode theorist readily explains sensations' felt locations. Our sensations feel located upon certain bodily regions because those regions are represented by our sensations.

More generally, the intentional mode theory is phenomenologically highly plausible. As well as accounting for sensations' felt locations, it explains why these locations are always phenomenally salient whilst bodily conditions sometimes are not. We can accommodate the fact that when experiencing sensations it does not always feel as if bodily conditions like damage or disturbance obtain: on our view, no sensation must represent such conditions.

The intentional mode theory does not only explicate these phenomenal facts. It also accounts for phantom limb pain (Crane 2009: 489). When pain is felt in a body part that is not there, this is, we say, because our mental state (under a pain-type mode) represents that body part even though it does not exist. Also explained is

a type of inference failure identified by Tye (2006a: 103-4). Inferences like the following are invalid:

> P1. The pain is in my fingertip.
> P2. The fingertip is in my mouth.
> ———
> C. The pain is in my mouth.

On my view, (P1) reports a state representing one's fingertip under a pain-type mode, whilst (C) reports a state representing one's mouth under a pain-type mode.[44] But it does not follow from (i) the fact that body part *A* is represented under mode *M* and (ii) the fact that *A* is in body part *B* that (iii) *B* is represented under mode *M*. My view appropriately classes the above inference as invalid.

The intentional mode theory secures explanatory power and phenomenological plausibility without incurring those difficulties faced by competing accounts. The proponent of the intentional mode theory avoids drawbacks associated with commitment to the existence of qualia: the phenomenal character of any sensation is said to be exclusively determined by its complete intentional nature. Also avoided are problems that arise through assimilating sensations to perceptual experiences or by explicating their affective character functionally.

One challenge that must be met by intentional mode theorists is that of explaining the affective and motivational characters of such sensations as unpleasant pain. But *any* theory of sensations must meet this challenge, and we lack grounds for thinking that the intentional mode theory cannot do so.[45] One way such a theorist might explain (say) the unpleasantness and motivational profiles of certain pains would be to maintain that they are attended by representations representing one's mental state of pain in a certain way (for instance, as bad or to be avoided).[46]

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[44] I have some sympathy for Lowe's adverbial theory of sensation reports (2000: 114-6).
[45] We may however think that functionalists and qualia theorists cannot meet this challenge. See O'Sullivan and Schroer (2012).
[46] The account could draw close to one of those advanced by perceptualists. *Cf.* Bain (2013).

According to my view, though, such representational content will not figure essentially in any sensation. We can therefore countenance cases of pain asymbolia, in which pain arises without the typical affect.

The intentional mode theory evades objections levelled against competing accounts of sensations and appears to face no challenge of its own. Furthermore, it is phenomenologically highly plausible and explanatorily powerful. It is, I contend, the most plausible theory of sensations. And since it entails that all sensations are intentional, we may reasonably maintain that this is so.

§1.3.4 The mental as intentional

Sensations, like moods (§1.2), and like emotions, perceptual states, intentions and propositional attitudes (§1.1.3), are intentional. The picture which emerges here is that intentionality is a feature of *all* mental states. Furthermore, the principal challenge levelled against the claim that all mental properties are intentional has been countered (§§1.1.3-1.1.4). Ultimately, the thesis that all mental states and features are intentional (MI) proves to be credible.

In §1.1.1 I delineated the core argument of this thesis. MI, which I have now secured, is the first premise of that argument. In the chapters below, I defend the two remaining premises – (i) that all mental intentionality is nonderivative and (ii) that all nonderivative intentionality is mental. From MI and these claims follows my demarcation thesis – that for all *x*, *x* is mental *iff x* is nonderivatively intentional.

Part II

Nonderivative intentionality

§2.1 Nonderivative intentionality

§2.1.1 Introduction

In Part I of this thesis I have sought to propound *The mental as intentional* (MI), according to which all mental phenomena are intentional. Over the course of my discussion, I have renewed the case for thinking that the phenomenal features of mental states are intentional (§§1.1.3-1.1.4), and I have developed and supported theories of moods and sensations (§§1.2-1.3), defending MI from the principal challenges levelled against it.

It is plausible that the mental is intentional. We may now contemplate the converse claim – *viz.* that the intentional is mental. From this claim and MI, Brentano's thesis follows (*PES*: 92-3):

Brentano's thesis: For all *x*, *x* is mental *iff* *x* is intentional.

That this account of the mental exhibits ideological parsimony confers plausibility upon it and thus upon the claim that the intentional is mental (Cowling 2013). Yet brief contemplation reveals the multiplicity of extramental phenomena which represent: words and sentences represent objects, properties and states of affairs; and parallel remarks can be made for pictures, maps, graphs and diagrams, *inter alia*.

Are we, then, to abandon the project of analysing mentality in terms of intentionality? I do not think that we should; for I contend that we can revise Brentano's thesis so as to avoid classing these instances of extramental representation as mental. How we might do so can be seen upon noting that all such representations are the products of agents with intentional mental states. To explain this fact, one may at least initially suggest that extramental representations acquire their representational powers from the mental states of the agents who produce them. Mental representations, we may think, are the 'source of intentionality'

(Chisholm 1958: 24). Certain extramental phenomena are intentional; but, we maintain, only the mental is *originally*, *nonderivatively* intentional. This view is operative in Searle's discussion of speech acts (1983: 27):

> Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires […] are intrinsically Intentional. […] But speech acts have a physical level of realization, *qua* speech acts, that is not intrinsically Intentional. There is nothing intrinsically Intentional about the products of the utterance act, that is, the noises that come out of my mouth or the marks that I make on paper.

Further, we may think, the nonderivativeness of the intentionality of mental phenomena distinguishes them from extramental intentional phenomena. All and only mental intentionality is nonderivative. We arrive, I submit, at two proposals:

> *Mental intentionality as nonderivative* (MIN): For all x, if x is mental and intentional, x is nonderivatively intentional.
>
> *Nonderivative intentionality as mental* (NIM): For all x, if x is nonderivatively intentional, x is mental.

MIN and our earlier claim MI jointly entail that all mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional. From this claim and NIM the principal contention of my thesis follows – that for all x, x is mental *iff* x is nonderivatively intentional. In this chapter, I propound MIN. I first develop an account of what it is to be 'derivatively intentional'. This account emerges when I formulate precisely my 'derivation thesis', according to which all extramental intentionality is derivative. I turn to vindicate MIN from the view, endorsed by Horgan, Kriegel, Strawson, Tienson and others, that only the phenomenal is nonderivatively intentional. I finally flag considerations that render MIN plausible. This is followed by defence of NIM in subsequent chapters.

§2.1.2 The derivation thesis

According to one thesis that I hope to advance (§§2.2-2.3), there is some relation in which extramental representations stand to mental representations in virtue of which the former represent. Little has been done in the literature to elucidate what this relation might be. At most, attempts are made to explicate the representational

powers of, say, language in terms of beliefs and communicative intentions.[47] I believe that a credible general account of derivative intentionality is secured upon carefully considering the conditions from which originally and derivatively intentional states arise. A useful analysis of the concept *arising* comes from Mendelovici (2018: 22):

> A gives rise to B (or, equivalently, B arises from A) when B is nothing over and above A, e.g., because B is identical to, fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized by A.

When we say that ϕ has its intentionality derivatively, it appears that we are claiming that such intentionality does not merely arise from that which physically realises ϕ. For example, the physical constitution of an ink inscription on a piece of paper, we maintain, does not alone give rise to intentionality: the fact that it represents appears to have something to do with intentional mental states which figure in convention. I defend this contention below (§2.2.3). That the inscription is meaningful and is not a mere arrangement of marks is explained in terms of facts about mental representations. Parallel remarks, I submit, cannot be made with respect to originally intentional representations: the physical basis for such representations suffices for (gives rise to) their intentionality. Since (I contend) all mental states are nonderivatively intentional, my suggestion here is that the intentionality of mental states supervenes upon their physical bases. Why think that this is so?

My proposal that the original intentionality of a representation *R* arises from the physical basis of *R* secures plausibility from a familiar type of thought experiment – that concerning a 'swamp-person' (Davidson 1987: 443-4). It appears (metaphysically and nomically) possible that an atom-for-atom duplicate of an intentional agent *A* could emerge by chance from a swamp (say, through a random quantum event). Our intuitions strongly support the view that when this swamp-person begins to exist,

[47] See, for instance, Grice (1957; 1989), Schiffer (1972) and Lewis (2002).

it has the same mental states as A, and the same mental representations. The intentionality of the swamp-person's states arises, it seems, exclusively from the physical basis for those states. That the states represent is not explained in terms of facts about other representations. The credibility of my claim here is also brought out by seemingly possible cases of envatted brains (Mendelovici and Bourget 2014: 328):[48]

> Suppose that an isolated duplicate of your brain spontaneously appears in a life-sustaining box in space. This brain in a box has no potential for outside interaction. It intuitively seems it will initially have many of the same mental states as you, though your mental histories will quickly diverge […].

My proposal, then, is that the intentionality of originally intentional representations arises from (supervenes upon) the physical basis of such representations alone, whereas derivative intentionality arises (at least in part) in virtue of the obtaining of facts concerning (other) representations.

This proposal and my foregoing claims *vis-à-vis* physical realisation are, of course, contentious.[49] We might wonder whether we can formulate a conception of the distinction between derivatively and originally intentional phenomena without appealing to such concepts as *physical* and *realisation*. I think that we can: we say that for any derivatively intentional representation ϕ, the fact that some other representation ψ represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ represents. My view that all nonderivatively intentional phenomena are mental (NIM) thus entails the following claim, which I hereby dub the 'derivation thesis':

> *The derivation thesis*: For any extramental ϕ that represents, there will be some mental representation M such that the fact that M represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ represents.

Note that my account does *not* imply that if the content of representation R is determined in part by other representations, then R is derivatively intentional:

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[48] See also Horgan, Tienson and Graham (2004: 297).

[49] For instance, my claims regarding swamp-persons and envatted brains stand in tension with tracking theories of mental representation. I believe that such theories are untenable and need not be adopted by ontological or methodological naturalists (Mendelovici and Bourget 2014).

one's visual representational content may be partially determined by properties of a picture that one sees, but since the fact that the picture (or another representation) represents does not make it the case that one's visual state represents, one's visual state is not derivatively intentional. Observe also that it is built into my account that derivative intentionality is explained by nonderivative intentionality: if the fact that *p* makes it the case that *q*, then the fact that *p* explains the fact that *q*. As I explain below, certain theorists who deny MIN cannot account for this explanatory relation.

§2.1.3 Phenomenal intentionality

MIN is denied by those who claim that only phenomenally conscious states have nonderivative intentionality. This view is endorsed chiefly by those invested in what is dubbed the 'phenomenal intentionality research programme' (Kriegel 2013). Adherents maintain that there is a species of intentionality – phenomenal intentionality – which mental states have purely in virtue of being conscious, such that their content is fixed by their specific phenomenal characters (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 520; Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2004: 299; Horgan and Kriegel 2008: 351; Kriegel 2013: 2; Mendelovici and Bourget 2014: 330; Mendelovici 2018: 84-5). Call the thesis that there is phenomenal intentionality the 'Weak Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis' (Mendelovici and Bourget 2014: 330). A 'Strong Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis' is then the claim that there is phenomenal intentionality and all extramental intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality. The added contention, which Kriegel calls '*Basicness*' (2013: 5), is that '[p]henomenal intentionality is a basic kind of intentionality and functions as a source of all intentionality'. *Basicness* appropriately classes words, graphs, pictures and the like as representations with derived intentionality; but with MIN and my claim that all mental phenomena are intentional (MI), it implies that there are no nonconscious mental states: MIN and MI jointly

entail that any mental state is nonderivatively intentional; but according to *Basicness*, all nonderivatively intentional states are conscious. To allow for nonconscious mental states, we must dispense with *Basicness*, MIN or MI. I contend that we ought to deny *Basicness*.

I do not here assess arguments for *Basicness*.[50] Instead, I maintain that it has unacceptable consequences. Each account that *Basicness* theorists give of nonconscious states and their relationship to phenomenally intentional states is implausible.

A first option for the proponent of *Basicness* is to advance eliminativism (Strawson 2008; Mendelovici 2018: 169-90), according to which there is no intentionality other than phenomenal intentionality. The eliminativist need not account for the intentionality of nonconscious states since on her view there are no nonconscious intentional states. The difficulty for this view is the apparent multiplicity of such states. Everyday explanations of behaviour often appeal to standing beliefs, desires, intentions, memories and the like that are not being consciously entertained but which are intentional: my throwing of seeds to birds may be partly explained by my non-occurrent belief that they will eat it. Further, as Kriegel (2011: 192) and Smithies (2012: 354-5) point out, cognitive scientists frequently posit such unconscious representations as Marr's 2.5D sketches (1982) and representations of the environment by dorsal stream states (Milner and Goodale 1995).[51]

The difficulty besetting the eliminativist appears also to afflict 'potentialists' such as Searle (1991: 58), who claim that each intentional mental state is at least

[50] The principal arguments from Searle (1991: 50-3) and Horgan and Tienson (2002: 522-3) are, in any case, problematic (Kriegel 2013).

[51] The eliminativist may hope to maintain that these states are not fully intentional but merely stand in certain tracking relations to features of the environment. An explanation of why this strategy founders comes from Kriegel (2011: 192-3). One difficulty is that the content of dorsal stream states causally influences the content of ventral stream visual states (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003), and this would not be expected were only the latter states to have fully-fledged intentional content.

potentially phenomenally conscious, and that whilst only those states which are actually conscious have original intentionality, nonconscious states represent derivatively through representing what they would represent originally were they conscious. Though I concede that the potentialist may be able to countenance the intentionality of standing beliefs, desires and the like since they credibly can be 'brought into consciousness' as occurrent states,[52] it seems doubtful that certain posits of cognitive science can be accommodated. It appears, say, that the visual states of the dorsal stream are not even potentially conscious (Kriegel 2011: 192).

We contemplate to alternative proposals concerning the way in which nonconscious states derive intentionality from conscious states.[53] Functionalist derivativists take nonconscious states to have derivative intentionality in virtue of standing in appropriate functional relations to actual and potential conscious states (Horgan and Tienson 2002; Graham, Horgan and Tienson 2007; Horgan and Graham 2009; Pautz 2008). Contrastingly, according to Kriegel's 'interpretivism' (Horgan and Kriegel 2008: 354-5; Kriegel 2011: 202-5), nonconscious states derivatively represent that which ideal interpreters would consciously represent them as having through intentional systems theory.[54] Unfortunately for the proponent of *Basicness*, views like these and Searle's potentialism face, I think, a conclusive objection.

Note, following Mendelovici (2018: 165), that not just any relation that a state *S* bears to an intentional state suffices for *S*'s intentionality. Merely being caused by an intentional state, say, will not suffice: nonintentional behaviours, it seems, are regularly caused by agents' intentional states. *Basicness* theorists, then, must explain why their chosen relations can do this work of content conferral. The problem that emerges is that *Basicness* theorists ostensibly lack such an explanation.

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[52] See, though, Crane (2013b).
[53] For further challenges to potentialism, see Horgan and Kriegel (2008: 359).
[54] See Dennett (1987).

The difficulty confronting functionalist derivativists is the most evident. As just noted, it is unclear why standing in certain causal relations to an intentional state would suffice for contentfulness: my dropping of litter into a waste-paper basket may causally result from (amongst other things) my belief that the basket is before me, but my belief does not confer intentionality upon my action.

The potentialist proposes an alternative account of content conferral: she claims that nonconscious states have derivative content because were they conscious they would have phenomenally intentional content. But we are left here without explanation of why these nonconscious states are derivatively intentional and not merely *potentially* intentional: after all, as Mendelovici notes (2018: 166), when a state is potentially conscious, it is not therefore derivatively conscious.

Finally, the interpretivist may too be observed to lack an explanation of content conferral. For interpretivists, the content of derivatively intentional states is ascribed to them. We may think that content can be transmitted in this way. When I stipulate to myself that by some symbol I mean *that tomorrow is Thursday*, the symbol then appears to mean *that tomorrow is Thursday* for me. Likewise, one may suggest like Kriegel that interpretation by ideal interpreters may give content to nonconscious states (2011: 202-5). The problem here is that when I stipulate that by a symbol I mean *that tomorrow is Thursday*, that symbol only comes to have this meaning *for me*: it need not have this meaning for others. Correspondingly, Kriegel's ideal interpreters apparently only confer content upon the relevant states *for the ideal interpreters*: Kriegel does not explain how nonconscious states represent what they do to the subjects of those states.[55]

[55] *Cf.* Mendelovici (2018: 168).

I wish to broach here a contrast between (both conscious and nonconscious) intentional states, on the one hand, and those phenomena which I am claiming to be derivatively intentional, on the other. Intentional mental states represent their content to those subjects who have them: a subject's belief, say, represents a certain proposition to the subject. But the same is not true of words, pictures, graphs and the like: these objects do not represent anything to themselves, and they intuitively seem to be better suited to an interpretivist treatment *à la* Kriegel. The foregoing considerations, then, do not only show the inadequacy of Kriegel's proposal, but underwrite a distinction between the intentionality of mental states and that of other phenomena, in accordance with the proposal of this thesis.[56] This evidence for a difference in type between the intentionality of the mental and the intentionality of the extramental is overlooked in the literature.

Theories that imply *Basicness* incur difficulty: eliminativism is implausible, and potentialism, functionalist derivativism and interpretivism face an explanatory challenge. I propose that we deny *Basicness*. The derivative-nonderivative boundary, we should claim, falls between mental and extramental intentional phenomena, and not between phenomenally intentional states and other intentional phenomena.

§2.1.4 Original intentionality and extended cognition

I have made a proposal concerning how derivatively and originally intentional phenomena are to be distinguished and have vindicated MIN from the claim that only phenomenally conscious states are nonderivatively intentional. I now present a positive case for MIN.

[56] One may ask: in what sense do *nonconscious* states represent to the subject? To answer this, note that the content of nonconscious states is available for use by other mental states. Of course, the content of inscribed words on a page is available for such use; but it is only available once the subject sees and interprets the inscriptions. Nonconscious states represent to the subject, then, since their content is *immediately* available for use by the subject's states.

According to MIN, all mental intentionality is nonderivative. MIN thus rules out derivatively intentional mentality. By doing so, I contend, MIN accommodates the intuitive view that there are no actual cases of extended cognition. It has been maintained by Clark and Chalmers (1998), Gelder and Port (1995: ix) and others that certain cognitive processes spread beyond the brain and body into the environment. It has been suggested, say, that (under certain conditions) a notebook can constitute an extension of one's memory (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 12-6), being part of one's cognitive system which stores and retrieves beliefs. Our common-sense intuitions tell against the view that there are actual cases like this in which cognition extends to notebooks and other tools. (They do not, however, indicate that extended cognition is metaphysically or nomically impossible.) Further, we may worry that upon postulating extended cognitive systems, we incur a problem of 'cognitive bloat' (Weiskopf and Adams 2015: 145):[57]

> Cognitive processing will start cropping up in places where it should not be, and prima facie would seem *not* to be. If cognition takes place in Otto's notebook, or in one's manipulation of beads on an abacus, […] why stop there? Why wouldn't cognition extend into one's calculator, laptop computer, […] or even to servers spread out across the Internet? How could we stop the spread, once we see all of these processes as contributing to our solving cognitive tasks?

Such difficulties are avoided, I contend, if we claim that one property that all mental phenomena have is nonderivative intentionality. For it appears that the intentionality of each putative extended cognitive system is derivative (Adams and Aizawa 2001: 47; 2008: 31-3; Weiskopf and Adams 2015: 150-1): the representational powers, say, of inscriptions in one's notebook are at least partly derived from the representational powers of minds, as I explain below (§2.2). *Pace* Clark and Chalmers, a principled difference can be found between such intracranial cognitive processes as the storage and retrieval of memories, on the one hand, and such extracranial processes

[57] For detailed presentation of this problem, see Sprevak (2009).

as the storage of information in and retrieval of information from a notebook, on the other: the content involved in the former processes is underived.[58] The extended mind hypothesis cannot be motivated on the grounds that there is no principled difference between these processes.

To this first consideration supporting MIN can be added another. I observed above that since subjects represent to themselves whereas pictures, sentences and the like do not represent to themselves, it seems that there is a difference between the intentionality of mental phenomena and the intentionality of extramental phenomena. One advantage of MIN, I submit, is that it helps us to pinpoint this difference. I argue in the next two chapters that in accordance with the view that all nonderivatively intentional phenomena are mental (NIM), the intentionality of nonmental phenomena is derivative. But according to MIN, the intentionality of mental phenomena is *nonderivative*. In this way, the intentionality of mental phenomena is unlike that of extramental phenomena.

Since both MIN and NIM figure in the explanation of the fact that the intentionality of mental phenomena is unlike that of nonmental phenomena, we have support here for both theses. The most compelling case for NIM, though, emerges upon defending it from objection. The principal concern for NIM is that there may be instances of extramental nonderivative intentionality – that is, that the derivation thesis is false. In what follows, I contend that the intentionality of various types of extramental representation is derivative. That the many extramental representations considered are derivatively intentional inductively confirms a consequence of NIM – that all extramental representations are derivatively intentional – and thus supports NIM.

[58] I do not claim that original representation by extracranial phenomena is metaphysically or nomically impossible. The falsity of the hypothesis of extended cognition, I think, is contingent.

§2.2 Extramental representation

§2.2.1 Intentional competence before linguistic competence

In the last chapter, I detailed what it is to be derivatively intentional and advanced the claim that all mental intentionality is nonderivative (MIN). In this chapter and the next, I propound the second thesis introduced in §2.1 – the view that all nonderivatively intentional phenomena are mental (NIM). I defend NIM from the claim that there are nonderivatively intentional extramental phenomena, arguing for the derivation thesis (§2.1.3), according to which all extramental intentionality is derivative. I first maintain that linguistic intentionality (meaning) is derivative. I then explain how my remarks concerning language indicate that the intentionality of graphs, musical scores, flowcharts and other extramental representations is also derivative.

I cannot here assess the many theories of meaning found in the literature.[59] I instead give reason for thinking that, to be tenable, any such theory must be consistent with the claim that meaning is derivatively intentional. I contend that the representational powers of language are derived from mental states. The *locus classicus* for a defence of such a picture is Grice's (1957) work. I do not here commit to any Gricean analysis of meaning in terms of intention or belief. I suspect that any such analysis is untenable.[60]

My first argument for the derivativeness of meaning is abductive. It concerns abilities to understand language and to use it to represent (linguistic competence) and capacities to have mental states with certain intentional content – what I dub 'intentional competence'. There is, I think, good reason for thinking that intentional

[59] In a more extended discussion, I would attend in particular to the accounts of Dummett and Davidson.
[60] Recent challenges to intention- and belief-based analyses of meaning come from Speaks (2010c), Schiffer (2017) and Strawson (2018).

states can and do occur in organisms which lack language. Our best explanations of the behaviours of certain nonhuman animals attribute to them intentional states (Allen and Bekoff 1997). For instance, the most credible explanation for why an ape reaches for a piece of fruit attributes to that ape states, perhaps including desires, which represent the fruit. Empirical studies regularly attribute intentional states to nonhuman animals. States of anticipation, say, are attributed to squirrel monkeys and western scrub-jays (Naqshbandi and Roberts 2006; Correia, Dickinson and Clayton 2007). There appears to be an asymmetry between linguistic competence and intentional competence. Thus Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002: 1575):

> A wide variety of studies indicate that nonhuman animals and birds have conceptual representations. Surprisingly, however, there is a mismatch between the conceptual capacities of animals and the communicative content of their vocal and visual signals […]. [A]nimals acquire and use a wide range of abstract concepts, including tool, color, geometric relationships, food, and number.

Intentional states can arise in the absence of language, and they do; but linguistic capacities never arise in the absence of intentional competence. Language ostensibly only arises in humans, and linguistic development in humans appears to follow the occurrence of intentional states: pre-linguistic infants manifest desires, fears and emotions, and even employ such simple concepts as *physical object* (Carey 1985).

A credible explanation of these observations, I contend, postulates the derivativeness of linguistic representation. Note first (i) that to understand and use language, one must have some grasp of the meanings of certain sounds, inscriptions or signs. My proposal is then (ii) that the meanings of those sounds, inscriptions or signs are explicated in terms of relations between such symbols and intentional mental states. Accordingly, (iii) grasping the meanings of the sounds, inscriptions or signs plausibly requires that one acquires a 'feel' for these relations: a subject (at least at

first)[61] discovers which of her own intentional mental states match up appropriately with the sounds, inscriptions, signs and the like. But then (iv) getting a feel for the relations, and thus becoming able to understand and use language, requires (at least initially) that one already has certain intentional states. In this way, the thesis that meanings are explained by appeal to intentional states accounts for the fact that intentional competence always precedes linguistic competence.

The observation that organisms which lack language can nevertheless have certain intentional states has been put to work in support of the view that language derives intentionality from *thought* – *viz.* from propositional attitudes (Devitt 2006: 125-41).[62] One may however maintain, following Dummett (1996: 149) and Rescorla (2003: 9-37), that nonhuman organisms and pre-linguistic infants lack fully-fledged thought, having only proto-thought that Rescorla identifies with cognitive activity carrying non-propositional content (37). My abductive case above makes no appeal to thought: my conclusion is that an explanation of the meanings of symbols appeals to intentional states, but I do not claim that such states are exclusively propositional. Some meanings may perhaps be explicated in terms of proto-thought.

My argument above presents those who deny that language is derivatively intentional with a challenge: they must account for the apparent asymmetric dependence between linguistic competence and intentional competence. A further explanatory challenge confronting such theorists is noted by Borg (2018: 249): those who deny that meaning is explicated in terms of intentional mental states will struggle to account for demonstrative reference. The simplest and most natural explanation of the reference of utterances of 'this' and 'that' is cashed out in terms of what the speaker intends (or at least mentally represents). That a speaker's utterance

[61] A grasp of the meanings of an initial stock of symbols can enable a grasp of the meanings of further symbols. One may, say, learn a word's meaning from a definition.
[62] Like Ludlow (2009: 394-7), I suspect that Devitt's reasoning is unsound.

of 'that is attractive' applies to the Radcliffe Camera and not to some other element of Radcliffe Square, say, is plausibly explained either by the fact that the speaker intended to refer to the Radcliffe Camera or by the fact that an ideal observer would attribute this intention to the speaker in the context of utterance.[63]

§2.2.2 Meaning and convention

Even if the foregoing considerations are not thought to be compelling, a certain feature of meaning indicates that it is explained in terms of intentional mental states, in accordance with the derivation thesis. This feature is its *conventionality*. The intrinsic natures of a word and its referent seemingly do not determine the relationship between them: this relationship is arbitrary (Burge 1975: 249; Bunzl and Kreuter 2003: 418; Rescorla 2015: §7). The arbitrariness, say, of the association between the English word 'green' and the colour green can be discerned upon noting the many ways in which this colour is denoted in other languages without use of the word 'green'. As Lewis observes, 'it is a platitude that language is ruled by convention' (2002: 1).

In what follows, I maintain that one consequence of the conventionality of language is that meaning is derivative. This is so because intentional mental states figure in an account of convention. I do not advance any particular theory of convention. I instead display how the most plausible theories of convention analyse it in terms of mental representation and further argue that any tenable theory of convention must do so.

Conventions are not mere regularities. Though all people blink and breathe, they do not do so by convention. One respect in which conventions differ from mere regularities, it appears, is that conventions facilitate interpersonal coordination. The convention associating 'green' with the colour green enables effective communication

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[63] For a case against the possibility of explicating demonstrative reference without appealing to intentional mental states, see Predelli (1998).

about this colour between English speakers, preventing misunderstanding that might arise through differing use of this word. Similarly, the convention by which UK drivers drive on the left prevents collisions between drivers travelling in different directions.

By attending to this last example of convention, we arrive at the most influential theory of convention – that of Lewis (2002). We may identify conditions that seemingly must obtain if the convention of driving on the left is to be sustained. First, it appears that each driver must be aware that there is such a regularity, expecting other drivers to drive on the left. Second, each driver seemingly must have grounds for driving on the left given that others do. These two conditions jointly provide every driver with a reason to participate in the convention. Lewis attends to such considerations in his account (76):

> A regularity *R* in the behavior of members of a population *P* when they are agents in a recurrent situation *S* is a *convention* if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in *P* that, in any instance of *S* among members of *P*,
>
> (1) everyone conforms to *R*;
> (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to *R*;
> (3) everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions;
> (4) everyone prefers that everyone conform to *R*, on condition that at least all but one conform to *R*;
> (5) everyone would prefer that everyone conform to *R′*, on condition that at least all but one conform to *R′*,
>
> where *R′* is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of *P* in *S*, such that no one in any instance of *S* among members of *P* could conform both to *R′* and to *R*.

My intention is not to defend the Lewisian account but to flag that it analyses convention in terms of intentional mental states. Note that Lewis imputes to participants in a convention 'common knowledge'. Crudely stated, common knowledge of a proposition *p* (within group *G*) obtains *iff* everyone (in *G*) knows that *p*, everyone knows that everyone knows that *p*, everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows that *p*, and so forth. We may find this apparent appeal to knowledge surprising: to sustain a convention, we might think, agents' *belief* that

other agents will adhere to the conventional behaviour will suffice (Sillari 2008: 30). Indeed, Lewis' later remarks suggest that by 'common knowledge' he means not knowledge but another sort of belief (1978: 44, n. 13).[64] For our purposes, though, it is enough to observe that Lewis at least postulates common belief in conditions (1)-(5); and belief, to which Lewis also appeals in condition (2), is a paradigm intentional mental state. A further role for mental representation emerges in conditions (3)-(5): convention is analysed in terms of agents' preferences. Like beliefs, preferences appear to be paradigm intentional mental states: a preference of x over y plausibly involves mental representation of x and y. Finally, observe that Lewis ostensibly describes a process of decision-making (Abell 2005a: 186): agents select their actions upon contemplating others' actions. It is credible that decision-making is again intentional: when deciding between actions ϕ and ψ, one represents ϕ and ψ.

Lewis' analysis, then, is struck through with reference to intentional mental states. Lewis takes convention to be understood in terms of mental representation; and since meaning is understood in terms of convention, meaning too is explicated in terms of mental representation, in accordance with my derivation thesis. Lewis' account, of course, has not gone undisputed in the literature,[65] and alternative analyses of convention have been proposed. We may then ask: do these accounts also explain convention in terms of mental representation, and must any plausible account do so? I now defend an affirmative answer to these questions.

I consider the accounts of convention of Gilbert (1989: 367-407; 2013), Miller (2001: 101-22) and Millikan (2005) to be the most credible alternatives to that of Lewis. Both Gilbert and Miller follow Lewis by analysing convention in terms of belief, and thus in terms of intentional mental states. Millikan, however, does not

[64] See Sillari (2008).
[65] Challenges to Lewis' theory are mounted by Burge (1975), Gilbert (1989: 329-66), Marmor (1996), Vanderschraaf (1998), Miller (2001: 95-101) and Millikan (2005), *inter alii*.

explicate convention in terms of belief. She postulates two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for qualification of a behavioural regularity as a convention. A first requirement is dubbed 'Reproduction' (3): to be conventional, a behavioural regularity must be perpetuated through reproduction – that is, conventions 'are handed down'. Such a condition allows us to rule out as conventional cases in which agents independently adopt a behaviour:

> Suppose that we all button our shirts in order from top to bottom, but that we do so quite independently, each having […] discovered for herself that this is the easiest way to get the right buttons into the right holes. This convergence of behavior would not result from our shirt-buttoning techniques being handed down, hence would not be conventional behavior. Behaviors that are idiosyncratic or peculiar seem quite certain not to have been handed down, hence these are the paradigm nonconventional behaviors […]. (3)

Second, Millikan's 'Weight of precedent' requirement specifies the way in which conventional reproduction of behaviour occurs (7-9). Not all behavioural regularities proliferated through reproduction are conventions: though one may learn from a parent to open jars by first immersing them in hot water, this behaviour is not conventional (7). In order to be conventional, a reproduced behaviour must be reproduced *merely because it is a precedent*, and not due to its intrinsic merits. This condition, note, appears to account for the arbitrariness of convention. There is no intrinsic merit, say, to the use of 'green' when referring to the colour green: English speakers use this word because others in their community do so. If not due to the intrinsic merits of conventional behaviours, though, why do we reproduce them and not adopt alternative behaviours? We sometimes do so, Millikan suggests (8), 'merely because it is easier or more natural to copy than to use one's imagination, or because people prefer to do as others do, not wanting to be out of step, or because what is familiar is as such pleasing, or because people feel more secure in the tried and true'.[66]

[66] *Cf.* Burge (1975: 253-5).

Unlike Lewis, then, Millikan does not maintain that agents require rational grounds for adopting conventional behaviours;[67] and the lack of reference to belief or other mental states in her bipartite analysis may lead one to think that her theory makes no appeal to intentional states.

I contend, however, that closer reveals that Millikan's account must in fact explicate convention in terms of mental representation, and that any tenable theory of convention must do so. Considering her remarks noted above, we may concede to Millikan that conventional behaviours are not adopted independently by agents: conventional behaviour is *copied*. Accordingly, whilst the use of 'green' to denote the colour green given that others do so is conventional, and whilst driving on the left given that others do so is conventional, the widespread but uncopied behaviours of fleeing from danger and removing one's hand from searing hot surfaces are not. But we may think that that the copying of behaviour plausibly requires awareness of the behaviour copied. For behaviour of type *T* (*T*-behaviour) to be copied, and for it to be conventional, it will not suffice that several instances of *T*-behaviour are merely causally explained by past *T*-behaviour. The purchasing of a product in a supermarket (say) may lead to it being shelved in a more visible position due to its perceived popularity, and this may lead further people to purchase the product; but the resultant regularity in behaviour is not copied, and is not conventional. A common feature amongst the instances of convention we have considered that distinguishes them from such nonconventional replication is an awareness by participants in the conventions of the behaviours that they replicate. I have found here grounds not only for imputing to Millikan the view that convention involves awareness of certain behaviours, but also for thinking that any credible theory of

[67] To see why this non-rational conception of convention may be problematic, see Cain (2013: 152-4).

convention entails this view. And awareness, like belief, is paradigmatically intentional: one is always aware *of something*. We have reason here for explicating convention in terms of an intentional state – a state of awareness of others' behaviour.

Unfortunately for Millikan, I suspect that she fails to identify another species of awareness, and thus another species of intentional mental state, in which convention partially consists. Not only must convention involve awareness of others' behaviour, but, I propose, the subject must also be aware of her *own* behaviour. That this is so is appreciated upon noting that when subjects participating in a behavioural regularity lack awareness of their behaviour, that regularity fails to be conventional. Many behaviours propagated through mirroring effects, say, are not conventional. Upon viewing someone who angrily clenches her fists, other subjects (without registering that they are doing so) may likewise clench their fists. Though this behaviour spreads through reproduction of observed behaviour and is not adopted due to its perceived intrinsic merit, the contention that the behaviour is conventional is counterintuitive;[68] and one salient difference between this regularity in behaviour and paradigm instances of convention (such as those governing word use) is that participants in conventions are aware of their behaviour.[69]

Not only, then, does each theory of convention surveyed analyse convention in terms of mental representation, but it appears that any tenable account must do so; for convention is explicated in terms of agents' intentional states of awareness of their own and others' behaviour. I have secured here a further case for the derivativeness of meaning: since meaning is explained in terms of convention and convention is ostensibly explained in terms of mental representation, we may reasonably maintain

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[68] Similar remarks can be made with respect to the propagation of birdsong through imitation (Bunzl and Kreuter 2003: 421-2).

[69] I do not claim that participants in conventions must represent their behaviour *as conventional*. Members of a linguistically isolated community could be unaware of the conventionality of their language (Burge 1975: 250).

that linguistic representation is explained in terms of mental representation, in accordance with the derivation thesis.

§2.2.3 From meaning to depiction

I have constructed arguments supporting the thesis that linguistic intentionality is derivative; and since linguistic representations are paradigmatic extramental representations, my arguments confirm the derivation thesis. I now further contend that a case for the derivativeness of the intentionality of graphs, certain diagrams, musical scores and many other extramental representations can be drawn from my remarks above.

I have argued that convention is analysed in terms of mental representation. From this, we seemingly can conclude that forms of extramental representation that are analysed in terms of convention are analysed in terms of mental representation. Linguistic representation thus appears to be derivative. But the arbitrariness that infects language seems also to infect graphs, certain diagrams, musical scores and other extramental representations. Whether a red traffic light tells one to stop or go, say, is an arbitrary matter. Equally, it is a matter of convention whether the symbol on the stave at the beginning of a musical score signals the treble or bass clef, and it is accordingly a conventional matter whether the stave's lowest line corresponds to an E or a G. Further, since the meanings of the words and other linguistic symbols added beside a graph's axes are arbitrary, which relationship the line of a graph represents is correspondingly arbitrary.

It seems, then, that my earlier discussion motivates the attribution of derivativeness to a plethora of forms of extramental representation. I have secured not only considerations conferring plausibility upon the derivation thesis, but reason to attribute derivativeness to the intentionality of language, musical

scores, graphs and other convention-governed representations. This in turn secures inductive support for the derivation thesis.

I anticipate a challenge here: one may retort that certain types of extramental representation are not governed by convention. Figurative paintings, sculptures, photographs and certain maps seem to resemble what they represent, and it is *prima facie* plausible both (i) that the intentionality of these representations is explained in terms of resemblance and (ii) that resemblance is not a matter of convention. In the next chapter, I delineate and rebut a potential challenge to the derivation thesis concerning depiction (pictorial representation). I argue that depiction, like the types of extramental representation considered above, is derivative. I thus complete my defence of the derivation thesis, eliminating the principal challenge to my contention that all nonderivative intentionality is mental (NIM).

§2.3 Depiction

§2.3.1 Pictorial representation

In accordance with my derivation thesis, I have maintained that language and convention-governed representations acquire their representational powers from intentional mental states. A natural thought, however, is that our explanation of the intentionality of language may fail to extend to the intentionality of paintings, drawings, photographs, maps and other pictures – *viz.* to depiction. Pictures ostensibly form a species of representation distinct from that which we have considered: as Hopkins observes (2011: §1), '[a] description of the scene depicted in *Guernica* would differ considerably from the painting, and it is tempting to think that this reflects differences in the forms of representation involved'. Depiction credibly demands independent explanation. I here nevertheless contend that explanations of depiction and linguistic representation share a common core: depiction, like linguistic representation, is derivative. I defend a consequence of the derivation thesis:

> *Depiction through mental representation* (DMR): For any ϕ that depicts, there will be some mental representation M such that the fact that M represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ depicts.

Some pictures do not only represent what they depict. By, say, depicting a blindfolded woman carrying scales, a picture may represent *justice* (Hyman and Bantinaki 2017: §1). In what follows, I focus exclusively upon depiction.[70] Several theories of depiction are delineated. I do not endeavour to determine which is correct. Rather, I argue that each entails DMR. This confers plausibility upon DMR. Building upon discussion from Blumson, Tolhurst, Levinson and others, I secure grounds for

[70] The other type of representation flagged here is that with which theories of artistic interpretation and literary meaning are concerned. Such meaning is explained in the literature either in terms of intention (Tolhurst 1990; Levinson 1992; 2010; Carroll 1992), or else in terms of convention (Beardsley 1958: 17-29; Davies 2006), and accordingly does not threaten the derivation thesis.

endorsing a thesis that I dub the 'hypothesised intention requirement'. In advancing this claim, which places a constraint upon any theory of depiction, I contribute to the debate concerning the nature of depiction. If the claim is true, so too is DMR. My arguments for the claim thus support DMR.

Most theories of depiction explicitly entail DMR. According to experienced resemblance theories of Peacocke (1987), Hopkins (1995; 1998: 77; 2006; 2011: §7) and others, pictures depict because we perceptually experience them as bearing certain resemblances to their objects. A picture ϕ's depiction of object ψ partially consists in a relation between (i) the phenomenal character of an experience of ϕ and (ii) the phenomenal character of an experience of ψ. I have argued that the phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences are determined by their intentional properties (§§1.1.3-1.1.4). That experiences of ϕ and ψ represent, then, is part of what makes it the case that they have their phenomenal characters, and thus is part of what makes it the case that ϕ depicts, according to experienced resemblance theories.

Many other accounts of depiction similarly analyse depiction in terms of perceptual experiences and correspondingly entail DMR. According to illusion theories, such as that which has been (perhaps mistakenly)[71] imputed to Gombrich (1961; 1982: 172-214), pictures represent by causing subjects to have visual experiences as of their objects. Relatedly, Wollheim argues that pictures depict their objects because the latter are seen in the former (1987; 1998); and for Walton (1973; 1990), a picture depicts its object because through a game of make-believe we can imagine that our seeing of the picture is a seeing of the object.

Such experiential accounts entail DMR, and the same is true of the recognitional accounts of Schier (1986) and Lopes (2003; 2004), which explain

[71] See Holton and Bantinaki (2017: §3).

depiction in terms of capacities to recognise objects of certain intentional states: a picture *P* represents ϕ only if *P* can engage the capacity of a suitable perceiver viewing *P* in appropriate conditions to recognise ϕ (Lopes 2003: 641). Finally, my case for the derivativeness of the intentionality of convention-governed representations reveals that accounts which explicate depiction in terms of convention – advanced by Goodman (1976), Kulvicki (2006a; 2006b: 540-5), Blumson (2008) and Abell (2009) – commit to DMR.

The entailment of DMR by many theories of depiction, then, is readily discerned. The same cannot be said of what I dub 'objective resemblance theories' (Hyman 2006: 59-151; 2013), according to which a picture depicts its object because mind-independent resemblances obtain between the two. I now argue that these theories do in fact entail DMR, placing no pressure upon the derivation thesis.

§2.3.2 Objective resemblance and depiction

There are grounds for thinking that resemblance theories of depiction, which explain depiction in terms of resemblances between picture and object, are plausible.[72] First, it appears that every picture resembles its object, at least to some degree and in some respect. Second, as noted above, pictorial and linguistic representation appear to be of different types, and resemblance theories can account for this: depiction is distinctive since it partially consists in resemblance (Hopkins 2011: §1; Kulvicki 2006b: §1). I observed that experienced resemblance accounts entail DMR. But the same, we might worry, may not be true of *objective* resemblance theories: one might think that a tenable theory of depiction can be advanced according to which depiction

[72] Accordingly, they are propounded by Peacocke (1987), Hopkins (1995; 2006), Hyman (2006: 59-151; 2013), Abell (2009) and Briscoe (2016).

is explained in terms of mind-independent resemblances between picture and object, without appeal to mental representation. I now challenge this proposal.

The simplest resemblance theory incurs insuperable difficulty. On this view, ϕ depicts ψ *iff* ϕ appreciably resembles ψ. Goodman identifies two problems for the view (1976: 4). First, whilst resemblance is reflexive, representation is not: since every object perfectly resembles itself, the simple theory entails that every object depicts itself; but this is not so. Second, whilst resemblance is symmetric, representation is not. If ϕ appreciably resembles ψ, then ψ appreciably resembles ϕ; but ϕ may depict ψ without ψ depicting ϕ: Oxford does not depict any picture of Oxford.

Such difficulties only beset theories according to which resemblance suffices for representation (Abell 2009: 186): resemblance theorists could treat resemblance as merely necessary for depiction, and add a condition *C* for ϕ's depiction of ψ such that ϕ need not depict itself and ψ need not depict ϕ. Since representation is neither reflexive nor symmetric, one proposal would be to cash out *C* in terms of a form of representation other than depiction, like mental representation. Were we to add to the simple account (say) the requirement that one must produce ϕ with the *intention* of producing something that resembles ψ, the depictive relation would no longer be reflexive or symmetric: we do not always produce pictures with the intention that they resemble themselves, and the objects of most pictures are not produced with the intention that they resemble those pictures.

We may respond to Goodman's challenges, then, by appealing to intention, and thus to mental representation. Suppose, though, that the objective resemblance theorist successfully avoids construing depiction as reflexive or symmetric without appealing to mental representation. Further difficulties must nevertheless be met.

First, since there are respects in which pictures need not resemble their objects, resemblance theorists need to specify the respects in which resemblance

must hold for depiction (Hopkins 2011: §2): a picture, say, may be flat whilst its object is not, and so it cannot be necessary for depiction that a picture resembles its object with respect to flatness. Further, specification of the relevant resemblance in a given instance of depiction is required because of the ubiquity of resemblance (Abell 2009: 186): pictures resemble their objects, but it appears that a picture will resemble almost anything in at least some respect. Indeed, pictures typically resemble other pictures more than their objects.

Another challenge for resemblance theorists concerns depiction of nonexistent objects. Such depiction seems to be possible: a picture may depict, say, figures from Greek mythology. Yet following Hopkins (2011: §2), one may maintain that resemblance is a relation and that the relata of any relation must exist, such that resemblance must obtain between existing objects. Pictures depicting nonexistent objects then cannot resemble what they depict. This problem apparently only besets objective resemblance theorists. Since one can experience a picture as resembling something that does not exist, no difficulty faces experienced resemblance theorists.

One might resist this challenge. According to Hyman (2013: 134), resemblances *can* hold to nonexistent objects. Hyman argues that 'resembles', 'looks like' and the like have a dual use like that of 'to be', sometimes expressing a relation (in Hopkins' strict logical sense) and sometimes being a copula (129-34). Accordingly, whilst 'resembles' expresses a relation in 'Darwin resembles Socrates', in 'Socrates resembles a satyr' it is a copula (131). We can make statements of resemblance using names for nonexistent objects, 'as long as we are prepared to acknowledge that it is possible to refer to things – such as fictional characters – that do not exist' (134).[73]

[73] The claim that names can refer to nonexistent objects is contentious. Hyman cites Sainsbury (2005) as one proponent of the view, failing to observe that on Sainsbury's negative free logic, resemblance claims containing an empty name are false. Hyman must accept another free logic like that of Dumitru and Kroon (2008) or Orlando (2008).

Supposing that Hyman's proposal is correct, we may inspect his complete account and its consequences for DMR. Hyman posits a distinction between the 'sense' and 'reference' of a picture (2013: 136-40) analogous to Frege's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* (1980):

> [T]wo portraits of the same individual may present him as dark-haired and seated, wearing a black smock […], or as grey-bearded and standing, wearing a white smock […]. […] [I]t is helpful to think of each of these two portraits as designating […] the same individual as the other, while differing in its 'mode of presentation' – in other words, as having the same reference, but a different sense. (137)

Hyman disputes the possibility of explaining both sense and reference in one theory (2006: 149; 2013: 137-8): they must be accounted for independently. The distinction between them, Hyman claims (2013: 137), corresponds to that between the two uses of the verb 'depicts': in the relation-involving sense of the verb, depiction corresponds to reference, whilst through its copula use it corresponds to sense. A picture's reference, Hyman maintains (2013: 138-9), is determined by the intentions of the artist. (This accounts for the correspondence between the reference of a picture and the reference of a proper name in a particular instance of its use.) Pictorial reference, then, is explained in terms of mental representation.

Pictorial sense, however, is not fixed by the artist's intention. Just as the sense of a word or phrase can differ from the utterer's meaning, so a picture can depict (through sense) something other than what the artist intended to depict: a picture, say, 'can depict$_s$ a spruce when the artist intended to depict$_s$ a larch' (139). How, then, is depiction through sense explained? Part of the answer concerns resemblance, which yields sameness of sense (2006: 73-81): Hyman postulates 'a strict and invariable relationship between the shapes and colours on a picture's surface and the objects that it depicts, which can be defined without referring to the psychological effect the picture produces in a spectator's mind' (73). A first relationship is understood in terms of *occlusion shape*, which Hyman characterises thus (75-6):

> Directly ahead of me, through the window […], I can see the bare branch of a lime tree. If I close one eye and look straight at the tip of this branch, making sure that the windowpane is perpendicular to my line of sight, the shape of the mark I would need to make on the windowpane in order to occlude the branch precisely is its occlusion shape […]. […] [T]his shape is relative to my line of sight and not to the particular position of my eye along it.

Hyman's 'occlusion shape principle' employs this concept of *occlusion shape* (81): if *o* is a depicted object and ϕ is the smallest part of a picture that depicts *o*, the shape of ϕ and the occlusion shape of *o* must be the same. The second relationship which Hyman postulates concerns 'aperture colour', the colour that something appears to have when viewed through a reduction screen.[74] According to Hyman's aperture colour principle (2000: 29-33; 2006: 99-104), an area of the surface of a colour picture that depicts some part of the represented subject of the picture will have an aperture colour that matches that part of the subject, so long as the picture is viewed under 'normal' conditions (including standard gallery lighting).

We may worry that Hyman's theory of pictorial sense challenges DMR and the derivation thesis: one may contend that there is a form of depiction that is explained exclusively in terms of objective relationships like Hyman's posited resemblances. This contention, I now maintain, is implausible. Accordingly, Hyman makes no such claim: indeed, though he denies that the artist's intention determines pictorial sense, he suggests that an intention to depict may be necessary for depiction to arise (2006: 138; 2011: 141-2) and claims that alongside his resemblance rules 'a comprehensive theory of representation in art will also refer to psychological factors, to the artist's intentions, [and] to customs and conventions' (2011: 150).

An account aiming to explain depiction through sense solely in terms of objective resemblances will be inadequate. Sameness in sense, I contend, cannot suffice for representation. Though the instance of 'The evening star' in this sentence

[74] A reduction screen eliminates colour from the environment (such as the colour of ambient light) which may influence the perceived colour of viewed objects.

shares its sense with all other instances of this expression and with itself, it represents neither those other instances nor itself. Correspondingly, though (say) a print of an artwork may exactly resemble another print of the same artwork and itself, it depicts neither that other print nor itself. Furthermore, it need not depict the infinitely many possible objects that share its occlusion shape and aperture colour. (To see that there is this multiplicity of possible objects, note that objects resembling a picture may differ with respect to properties other than shape and colour.)

Distinguishing depiction through sense from depiction through reference, then, does not eliminate Goodman's identified problem concerning reflexivity: resemblance, and so sameness of sense, is reflexive but representation is not. The problem concerning symmetry also persists: if sameness of sense sufficed for depiction, then not only would a painting depict a spruce that it suitably resembles, but the spruce would depict the painting. The 'direction' of depiction must be explained.

Further conditions must be added to the objective resemblance account to rule out certain instances of resemblance as instances of depiction, and to fix the direction of depiction. Such conditions seemingly will not merely concern sensuous properties of a picture; for, as Lopes notes (2004: 18),

> Prints from the same plate, photographs from the same negative, expert forgeries of old masters, and photographic reproductions share with each other whatever visual properties could be considered salient for representation […] but they typically do not depict what they reproduce.

I argue below that there is merit to the proposal that an appeal to intention is required in an explanation of depiction. Though an artist's intention may not be realised, such that her work depicts a spruce and not a larch, such depiction may still be explicated in terms of intention: I contend that the work depicts the spruce because suitably informed perceivers would hypothesise that the work was produced with the intention to depict a spruce. This proposal solves the problems flagged above.

Since an artist who produces picture ϕ need not have imputed to her the intention to depict ϕ, the depictive relation is not reflexive; and since she may have imputed to her an intention to depict ψ through ϕ, but not an intention to depict ϕ through ψ, the depictive relation is not symmetric.

This appeal to intention, I submit, also rescues objective resemblance theories from a difficulty concerning the depiction of properties that pictures do not have. Following Newall (2011: 74-5), we may stress the difficulty of reproducing hues and shades of colour that appear in nature. It does not seem possible, say, for the brightness of pigments, under typical gallery lighting, to replicate the intensity of light from surfaces illuminated by natural sunlight. Yet such intensity ostensibly may be depicted. This is so, I propose, in Turner's *St Benedetto, Looking towards Fusina* (1843), which depicts light reflected in the Giudecca Canal. Were we to suppose that the brilliance of regions of a picture must match the depicted brilliance of the corresponding parts of the represented scene, we would seemingly need to suppose that *St Benedetto* depicts something duller than what Turner had in mind. This suggestion is counterintuitive: no such thing appears to be depicted.[75] How might we explain Turner's depiction of brilliant light?

I propose that upon viewing such works as *St Benedetto*, visual cues left by the artist and our knowledge of depicted objects lead us to deny that less intense hues are depicted. When interpreting Turner's work, we enlist knowledge of the appearance of sunlight on water and our awareness of Turner's use of greater contrast and broader brushstrokes with which he indicates the light's intensity. Such use of visual cues, I submit, is significant: we appear to use them to determine what an artist *intends* to depict; and this suggests that depiction is explained in terms of artists' intentions.

[75] As Hyman explains (2007: 676-7), his account evades this challenge.

My proposal below appeals to such intentions: on my view, *St Benedetto* depicts intense rather than dull light partly because suitably informed perceivers would attribute the intention to depict intense light to Turner.

§2.3.3 The hypothesised intention requirement

I have identified difficulties that render untenable objective resemblance theories that fail to entail DMR, and I have outlined how an appeal to intention eliminates these difficulties. What I have established, I think, reflects a need for the concept of *intention* in an analysis of depiction. In this section, I argue that there is such a need, postulating what I call a 'hypothesised intention requirement' upon depiction. If there is such a requirement, I explain, DMR is true.

Many considerations render credible the proposal that depiction is explained in terms of intention. First observe that if object *o* that resembles and that can be seen in picture ϕ comes into existence *after* ϕ is produced, ϕ typically will not represent *o*. Suppose, for example, that a 19th-century artist paints a portrait of Queen Victoria. A century later, a visitor to the gallery in which the portrait is hung may closely resemble the painting: she may better resemble the painting than Victoria. Nevertheless, we will not judge that the painting depicts the visitor: it ostensibly depicts, and only depicts, Victoria. We might explain this by appealing to intention: the painting depicts Victoria and not the visitor because the artist intended to depict Victoria and not the visitor.

A related observation concerns found objects. Contemplate, with Blumson (2014: 53-4), a case in which an artist finds driftwood resembling a spade and displays it in a gallery. In such a case, it seems that the driftwood may come to represent a spade although it did not do so before presentation. How might we explain this? No change in the driftwood's visible properties has occurred. There has been,

though, a change concerning intention: the driftwood has now been presented with the intention of representing a spade. An explanation of the representation here, I suggest, is given in terms of this intention (and I return to this case below).

Alongside these initial considerations of mine, observe that a need for the concept of *intention* in an analysis of depiction is exhibited in the literature. We have seen that an appeal to intention solves problems which otherwise beset resemblance theories. I now attend to other theories.[76] Consider first Wollheim's seeing-in account of depiction (1987; 1998). As Wollheim acknowledges (1998: 225-6), it will not suffice for ϕ's depiction of ψ that ψ can be seen in ϕ: objects can be seen in clouds or stains without thereby being depicted; and an object other than that depicted by a picture may be seen in the picture (as is so in my example of the portrait of Queen Victoria). To secure sufficiency in the account, Wollheim appeals to intention, claiming that 'the experience of seeing-in that determines what [a picture] represents […] is the experience that tallies with the artist's intention' (226).

In Wollheim's account, then, intention isolates experiences that are relevant to depiction. Intention has this role in other experiential theories of depiction too. Just as ϕ may be seen in ψ without depicting ψ, so may ϕ meet conditions of other experiential accounts for depiction of ψ without depicting ψ: in accordance with the illusion view (Gombrich 1961; 1982), ϕ may cause a visual experience as of ψ; in accordance with the make-believe theory (Walton 1973; 1990), ϕ may be such that through a game of make-believe we can imagine that our seeing of ϕ is a seeing of ψ; and in accordance with the experienced resemblance view (Peacocke 1987; Hopkins 1995; 2006), we may experience ϕ as bearing certain resemblances to ψ; and each of these conditions can be satisfied without ϕ depicting ψ. When ϕ and ψ are visually

[76] I focus upon experiential accounts; but as Hyman and Bantinaki note (2017: §2), a need for intention is also found in Goodman's conventionalism (1976).

indistinguishable photographic prints of the same painting, say, all of these conditions are met without depiction arising. To secure sufficiency in each case, we may think, an appeal to intention is required. A condition given in terms of intention allows us to distinguish (i) the experiential relation between one of the photographic prints and the painting it depicts from (ii) that between the two prints. According to one simple proposal, only the former experiential relation is attended by depiction because the artist only intended to represent the painting.

In toto, there are compelling grounds for postulating an intention requirement on depiction. But what precisely is this requirement? A simple suggestion, flagged above, is the following:

> *Actual intention requirement*: For ϕ to depict ψ, ϕ must be produced with the intention to depict ψ.

On this view, each instance of depiction accords with the artist's actual intentions. This would explain the failure of the foregoing accounts, when stripped of conditions given in terms of intention, to provide sufficient conditions for depiction: though the various experiential relations stand between photographic prints ϕ and ψ, ϕ does not depict ψ because ϕ was not produced with the intention of depicting ψ.

Although the actual intention requirement offers this explanation, and although it accounts for the difficulties considered earlier concerning reflexivity and symmetry, I do not think that it is true. There appear to be many instances in which pictures represent objects other than those the artist intended to represent. A red-green colour-blind painter who intends to depict autumn leaves as red might depict them as green by mistakenly selecting green paint. A cartoonist intending to produce a caricature depicting Tony Blair might depict Gordon Brown if the caricature better resembles Gordon Brown. And a picture might depict a spruce though the artist intends to depict a larch (Hyman 2006: 137; 2013: 139).

The object of depiction, then, need not be the object the artist in fact intends to depict. The actual intention requirement is false. What other intention requirement might there be? An answer to this question, I submit, comes into view upon noting that though in each case of depiction just considered the artist's intention is not realised, the object of depiction is that which subjects observing the picture would *expect* the artist to have intended to depict. Upon viewing the depiction of leaves in green paint, say, subjects will be disposed to attribute to the artist the intention to depict those leaves as green.

Parallels can be drawn between the account emerging here and a theory of literary meaning from Tolhurst (1990) and Levinson (1992: esp. 223-5) – that of hypothetical intentionalism. On this view, the meaning of a work (its 'message') is determined by the best hypotheses that an appropriately informed audience – one aware of the publicly accessible evidence relating to the author's intentions – would form about the author's intentions. Our condition on depiction, we may think, might similarly be given in terms of hypothesised intentions:

> *Hypothesised intention requirement*: For ϕ to depict ψ, it must be the case that the best hypotheses of an appropriately informed audience (*viz.* one aware of the publicly accessible evidence relating to artists' intentions) would entail that ϕ was produced with the intention of depicting ψ.

Why endorse this view? First, a requirement given in terms of postulated intentions accounts for the occasional failure of artists to realise their intentions: the best hypothesis *vis-à-vis* the intentions responsible for the painting of the leaves completed in green paint entails that the artwork was produced with the intention of depicting the leaves as green.

Second, in accordance with the condition that the audience must be aware of the publicly accessible evidence relating to artists' intentions, we find such evidence does indeed influence depictive content. Consider the case in which an artist produces

a picture that better resembles a spruce than a larch. Though *ceteris paribus* observers of the work would hypothesise that this picture depicts a spruce, I suspect that this would not be so, say, were the work entitled 'Larch', or were the artist to publicly declare her intention to depict a larch.

Third, my hypothesised intention requirement explains why the experiential relationships considered above cannot alone suffice for depiction. It explains, say, why photographic print ϕ fails to depict photographic print ψ of the same painting, despite ϕ causing a visual experience as of ψ and standing in the various experiential relations considered above: the best hypothesis *vis-à-vis* the intentions of the subject who produced ϕ does not attribute to her the intention of thereby depicting ψ.

My hypothesised intention requirement also explicates difficulties confronting resemblance theories of depiction. We noted that whilst resemblance is reflexive, representation is not. Through our requirement, we can explain why objects can fail to depict themselves, despite resembling themselves: the best hypothesis concerning an artist's intentions in producing ϕ might not attribute to her the intention to depict ϕ. We also saw that whilst resemblance is symmetric, representation is not. Again, my condition explains this fact: the best hypothesis concerning an artist's intentions may attribute to her the intention to depict ψ through ϕ, but not the intention to depict ϕ through ψ.

Finally, my hypothesised intention requirement draws credibility from its handling of examples discussed above. The portrait of Queen Victoria, we can say, fails to depict the gallery visitor because the best hypothesis concerning the artist's intentions does not attribute to the artist the intention of depicting the visitor. Turner's *St Benedetto* does not depict the scene as dull since the best hypothesis concerning Turner's intentions does not attribute to him the intention of depicting the scene

as dull. And before presentation in the gallery, the driftwood does not depict a spade since the best hypothesis would not (at that time) posit an intention to depict a spade.[77]

The hypothesised intention requirement has not been advanced in the literature. But my foregoing considerations reveal its plausibility. We have here an overlooked constraint upon theories of depiction and a potential avenue for research: we may hope to develop a 'hypothetical intentionalist' theory of depiction.

The hypothetical intention requirement, I contend, entails DMR. Strikingly, this is not so because depiction is analysed in terms of intention. My condition does not imply that the fact that a picture ϕ depicts is made the case in part by the fact that subjects have certain intentions. Rather, it implies that the fact that ϕ depicts is made the case in part by the fact that certain subjects *would hypothesise* that ϕ was produced with certain intentions. That is, the fact that ϕ depicts is made the case in part by the fact that certain subjects would have *beliefs* with certain contents. That these beliefs represent, then, is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ depicts. There is a mental representation M (a belief) such that the fact that M represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ depicts.

§2.3.4 Depiction as derivative representation

In this chapter and the last, I have defended the thesis that extramental representation is derivative (§2.1). One worry for this view is that there may be extramental representation that is not explained in terms of representational mental states. In the case of depiction, the worry is that DMR is false. We can now cast off this concern.

DMR secures initial plausibility through its entailment by every theory of depiction extant in the literature. I have now offered grounds for thinking that

[77] Consideration of this case may lead us to suggest that the relevant intention is not always an intention with which an object is produced, but may be an intention with which it is *presented*.

any tenable theory of depiction *must* make this entailment: my hypothetical intention requirement is plausible, and from this claim follows DMR. Pictures, we may reasonably contend, acquire their representational powers from mental states. In this respect, pictures and other extramental representations are alike.

§2.4 Conclusion

Early in this thesis I identified intentionality with the property exhibited by such states as perceptual experiences, propositional attitudes, desires and emotions in virtue of which we are disposed to describe these paradigmatically intentional states as being 'about', 'of' or 'directed upon' things (§1.1.2). That so many mental states are intentional, I observed, makes *prima facie* plausible the claim that intentionality belongs to *all* mental phenomena. In Part I above, I propounded this claim, dubbing it 'The mental as intentional':

> *The mental as intentional* (MI): For all *x*, if *x* is mental, then *x* is intentional.

MI, I maintained (§1.1.3), is safe from the objection that there are nonintentional phenomenal properties or 'qualia'. Views which posit qualia incur theoretical costs, and my argument from pervasive assessability supports the claim that all phenomenal properties of perceptual experiences are intentional (§1.1.4).

I also defended from objection the consequence of MI that moods and sensations are intentional. *Pace* Searle, Kind and others, I argued (§1.2.2), moods do not differ from emotions in virtue of lacking content. According to my intentional scope theory of emotional states, moods differ from emotions solely through their greater intentional scope (§§1.2.3-1.2.5).

As part of my defence of an intentional picture of sensations, I articulated 'attention considerations' which suggest that sensations are intentionally directed upon bodily regions (§1.3.2). My 'intentional mode theory' of sensations responded to these considerations and to Crane's account of pain (§1.3.3): on my view, sensations represent bodily regions, have their phenomenal characters partially determined by their intentional modes, and are differentiated from each other

and from other types of states by those modes. I identified overlooked advantages of this theory.

Part II of my thesis began with the presentation of two further claims concerning mental and intentional phenomena (§2.1.1):

> *Mental intentionality as nonderivative* (MIN): For all x, if x is mental and intentional, x is nonderivatively intentional.
>
> *Nonderivative intentionality as mental* (NIM): For all x, if x is nonderivatively intentional, x is mental.

These claims have proven to be credible. Having characterised derivative intentionality (§2.1.2), I vindicated MIN from the contention that only phenomenally conscious states are nonderivatively intentional and presented considerations rendering MIN plausible (§§2.1.3-2.1.4). In support of NIM, I then advanced my 'derivation thesis':

> *The derivation thesis*: For any extramental ϕ that represents, there will be some mental representation M such that the fact that M represents is at least part of what makes it the case that ϕ represents.

Through abductive reasoning and considerations concerning convention, I maintained that linguistic intentionality (meaning) is derivative (§§2.2.1-2.2.2) and further that *all* convention-governed representations are derivatively intentional (§2.2.3). In the last chapter above, I argued that depiction is also derivative. Contributing to the debate concerning the nature of depiction, I defended my 'hypothesised intention requirement' which entails that part of what makes it the case that a given picture depicts is the fact that certain beliefs represent (§2.3.3).

That the paradigm extramental representations considered are derivatively intentional inductively confirms NIM. Ultimately, all of the claims MI, MIN and NIM appear to be credible. But from MI and MIN, it follows that all mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional; and from this claim and NIM it follows that all and only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional. My discussion secures the premises of a valid argument for my 'demarcation thesis':

P1. MI: For all *x*, if *x* is mental, *x* is intentional.
P2. MIN: For all *x*, if *x* is mental and intentional, *x* is nonderivatively intentional.
P3. NIM: For all *x*, if *x* is nonderivatively intentional, *x* is mental.

———

C. *The demarcation thesis*: For all *x*, *x* is mental *iff* *x* is nonderivatively intentional.

The demarcation thesis has noteworthy consequences. It entails that all extramental representations are derivatively intentional. This constrains theories of depiction and meaning. An explanation of phenomenal consciousness is also constrained. The demarcation thesis implies that all mental properties, including phenomenal properties, are intentional. No acceptable explanation of phenomenal consciousness, then, appeals to qualia.

Most strikingly, the demarcation thesis may support an analysis of the concept *mental*. The simplest explanation for the fact that all and only mental phenomena are nonderivatively intentional is that mentality *consists in* nonderivative intentionality. Neither this proposal nor my demarcation thesis has received defence in the contemporary literature. My foregoing discussion suggests that both claims are credible and deserve philosophical attention.

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