Rising powers, subordinate monopolization, and major interstate war

Thesis

This dissertation argues that the association of rising powers with major interstate war is dependent on competition over subordinates. It develops the theory of subordinate monopolization, arguing that when rising powers seek to close and monopolize subordinates, this increases the probability of conflict with other major powers. By contrast, when rising powers pursue openness and common-pool approaches to subordinates, conflict is much less likely. This theory addresses two omissions in the field. Firstly, the failure to treat peaceful rises seriously, which problematizes the pathway between the existence of a rising power and revisionist approaches to the international order. Secondly, the absence of subordinates from accounts of major power politics, despite their value. Subordinate monopolization is compared and contrasted with three alternative approaches: the realist focus on relative power between major powers, the need for status recognition and reform of distributional and institutional structures, and locating foreign policy within a domestic political context. Through quantitative examination of rising power disputes between 1816 and 2010, and two pairs of case studies of rising power disputes in the long nineteenth century and early Cold War, robust evidence for the theory is found which is more consistent than for any of the alternatives. This leads to the conclusion that rising powers should be understood in terms of their interactions with subordinates, as well as with the major powers.

Authors: Gill-Tiney, P

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-mz8epznzr
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: rising powers; revisionism; war; subordinate monopolization; norms; major power relations
• Subjects: International relations; War; Security, International