Rising Powers, Subordinate Monopolization, and Major Interstate War

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that the association of rising powers with major interstate war is dependent on competition over subordinates. It develops the theory of subordinate monopolization, arguing that when rising powers seek to close and monopolize subordinates, this increases the probability of conflict with other major powers. By contrast, when rising powers pursue openness and common-pool approaches to subordinates, conflict is much less likely. This theory addresses two omissions in the field. Firstly, the failure to treat peaceful rises seriously, which problematizes the pathway between the existence of a rising power and revisionist approaches to the international order. Secondly, the absence of subordinates from accounts of major power politics, despite their value. Subordinate monopolization is compared and contrasted with three alternative approaches: the realist focus on relative power between major powers, the need for status recognition and reform of distributional and institutional structures, and locating foreign policy within a domestic political context. Through quantitative examination of rising power disputes between 1816 and 2010, and two pairs of case studies of rising power disputes in the long nineteenth century and early Cold War, robust evidence for the theory is found which is more consistent than for any of the alternatives. This leads to the conclusion that rising powers should be understood in terms of their interactions with subordinates, as well as with the major powers.

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Patrick Gill-Tiney

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Introduction

In 1901 intense diplomatic activity between Russia and Japan attempted to stave off war. Marquis Itō Hirobumi, the former Japanese Prime Minister, had embarked on a world tour following his resignation to recuperate from the stresses of leading a divided government, and was tasked by his successor, Marquis Katsura Tarō, to negotiate unofficially with the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, in St Petersburg to divine their intentions in East Asia. Itō's telegrams to Katsura are revealing. Following his 2 December meeting, Itō wrote that he made the argument to Lamsdorf that 'The Korean question is in practice a matter of life and death for Japan as an independent state…The Russian government ought as soon as possible to acknowledge that Japanese interests in Korea are from now on paramount' (Nish 2003, 54). Lamsdorf's reply was that 'Russia has never had any ulterior motives in Korea. But she would decidedly reject any use of Korean territory by another power for military purposes' (Nish 2003, 54) and went on to say that 'if Japan were to construct bases on the Korean littoral, this would threaten communications between Vladivostok and Port Arthur; and Russia could not disregard it on grounds of self-defence' (Nish 2003, 55).

This laid out grounds for war: Japanese militarization of Korea. Yet the peninsula was understood by Japan's leaders to be crucial to its defence, to stave off the interference of any hostile foreign power controlling the East Asian landmass opposite Japan, and was analogized as a 'a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan' (Duus 1998, 49) by Major Jacob Meckel, a German military advisor to the Japanese military[1]. Itō's mission, to try and negotiate Japanese control of Korea, in exchange for recognition of Russian domination of Manchuria, failed. No agreement was possible. Itō then visited London, laying the foundations for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a mutual defence treaty, signed on 30 January 1902. Just over two years later, Russia and Japan were at war, with the latter taking by force far more than had been offered in peace.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan was a rising power. It was a state experiencing high rates of economic growth and spending increasingly large sums upon its military. These trends suggested that Japan would soon become a major power, that is, a state with superior material capabilities to pursue interests beyond its borders and recognized as having rights and duties within the international system not accorded to others. The causal chain between these material changes and major interstate war is often drawn very directly in international relations. Power transition theory holds that rising powers attack, or are attacked by, other major powers either to maintain or forestall their rise (Organski 1958; Modelski 1987; Modelski and Thompson 1988; Rasler and Thompson 1994; Gilpin 1981). This is a logic which relies on major power policymakers perceiving such a state as a direct threat to their security, often understood to be an implicit threat to home territory and

[1] A parallel can be drawn here with British concerns that if Belgium were controlled by a major power adversary this would directly threaten Britain.

empirically resting on analysis of major power relations in Europe over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Two matters are absent from this account. Firstly, direct territorial threats are rare, not least because a rising power may be far from such home territory. The prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, laid out above, is one such example: Japan cannot credibly be argued to have posed a threat to the core of Russia, located thousands of kilometres away in Europe. Whilst Russia, through the development of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the construction of port facilities in East Asia could more credibly pose a direct territorial threat, an invasion, or even blockade, of Japan would have been impossible[2]. Secondly, what occupies the time of policymakers are not simply assessments of major power contemporaries. Rather, they also engage significant political capital and material resources in their relations with other weaker actors (Hirschman 1945; Copeland 2015), known as subordinates for the purposes of this dissertation. For Japan and Russia, Korea and Manchuria were territories understood to be crucial to their economic and military security. Major power relations, therefore, are significantly shaped by who controls subordinates, how they are governed, and how this might change in the future[3].

[2] Russia, though having permanently based naval forces in East Asia, could reinforce only with great difficulty, since the core of the Russian Navy was based in Europe. When dispatched in October 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War, the heavier units had to embark on a journey of 30,000 kilometres, taking seven months, and facing severe problems to maintain adequate fuel, maintenance and morale. Infamously, nearly the entire fleet would be sunk over the course of the Battle of Tsushima, fought 27-28 May 1905. Blockade, even in a deeply unlikely hypothetical scenario in which Japan was unaware of the massive and ponderous redeployment of Russian warships from Europe to the Far East, would have been partial at best, and vulnerable to Japanese breakout and counterattack since Russian forces would have been concentrated in a small number of ports. However, such a redeployment would likely have altered the regional balance of power, hindering, if not entirely preventing, the ability of Japan to land troops in Korea or Manchuria.

[3] Additional examples of these dynamics include the interwar competition between Germany and the Soviet Union to dominate Czechoslovakia (I. Lukes 1996) and present-day Sino-Indian rivalry over Nepal (Upadhya 2012).

Questions of subordinate monopolization

This dissertation claims that a particularly dangerous pathway via which major interstate war can result is that of subordinate monopolization. Put simply, wars between a rising power and another major power are more likely when the characteristics of relationships between a rising power and a subordinate exclude the interests of other major powers. Japanese influence over Korea meant that Russian economic and security interests could not be pursued in the territory without reference to Japan[4]. This was unacceptable to Russia, and Japanese overtures to settle the division between Korea and Manchuria into respective spheres of influence were rejected. The 'present' was thereby a strong source of friction between Japan and Russia, with the latter resisting a de jure legitimation of Japan's position, with the intention (or perhaps misguided hope) of reversing this through compellent threats. Their interactions also clearly focused upon the future, that is, the status quo – the current means via which a subordinate is governed – informs the future. Japan sought to achieve a dominant position in Korea, to legitimize this through a treaty with Russia, and thereby restrict the economic and security interests of Russia from being pursued in Korea. For Russia, this would make the pursuit of interests dependent upon the munificence of Japan. The probability of major interstate war, therefore, is shaped by the current characteristics of hierarchical ties between a rising power and a subordinate, and the future prospects for this becoming a monopoly.

[4] Japan was not entirely able to exclude Russia from Korea prior to the Russo-Japanese War, in fact, this was exactly the motivation for war. The pre-war diplomacy laid out earlier shows what Japan sought: dominance in Korea. This had not been achieved in 1904, but Japanese political and economic influence was certainly superior to that of any other by this date.

Introduction

This dissertation is motivated by three questions. Firstly, why are some rising powers associated with major interstate war, whilst others are not? Existing answers to this question focus on power and threats, status and prestige, and the intersection of domestic and international politics. However, although these explanations each make contributions to our understanding of rising powers and conflict they are theoretically inconsistent and empirically ambiguous. Instead, major interstate war is cast as a function of competition for access to, and influence over, subordinates. Of the these existing explanations, this dissertation owes its greatest debt to that on power, but rather than understanding major power politics as being discrete, their relations are necessarily dependent upon the other constituents of the international system: subordinates. The theory of subordinate monopolization is summarized in the next subsection of this chapter, with the following chapter fully developing it.

This leads to the second and third questions: how do existing characteristics of relations between a rising power and a subordinate alter the probability of conflict with another major power? Lastly, how does the likelihood of the prospect of monopolization alter the probability of conflict? These questions seek to capture both static and dynamic features of these relationships, with the purpose of understanding their intersection. The argument made here is that the combination of current exclusion, and the likelihood of future monopolization, decisively alters the probability of war. In examining these relationships, a large range of possible features suggest themselves. They could be understood by domain, that is, the issue-areas in which interests focus. Alternatively, the social form of ties could be examined, focusing on the network location of specific subordinates. The characteristics of the relationships – how they are codified and what functions they specify – could be explored, or the relative strength of ties and interests assessed in a dyadic framework. In this dissertation, both domain and the characteristics of relationships are used. Furthermore, this explanation is limited to material variables – economic and security interests – rather than considerations of social function. Such focus is summarized in the next subsection of this chapter and fully specified in the next chapter.

Argument summary

To understand how competition over subordinates can lead to major interstate war, this dissertation develops the theory of subordinate monopolization. All major powers have security and economic interests in subordinates, that is, beyond the territory in which sovereignty is exercised. The rapid accumulation of material resources which rising powers experience leads to two changes in the status quo, one necessary, and one potential. The necessary change is that rising powers develop and deepen interests in subordinates. Rapid economic growth necessitates access to new markets, both for export and import, and generates new investment opportunities. Simultaneously, new security challenges arise since growth and prosperity relies on access to resources and markets beyond the state. These security challenges require increased military spending, which has the additional impact of suggesting military options for problems previously confined to the diplomatic arena[5]. In summary, a rising power, by definition[6], develops and deepens interests beyond its borders, many of which are located in subordinates[7].

[5] Of course, military spending might be directly linked to these existing problems. This is the difference between saying that contemporary Chinese investment in its armed forces is for seizing control of disputed islands in the South China Sea, and saying that the growth of the Chinese military caused by economic growth has allowed Chinese military and civilian leaders to resort to the use of force in the overlapping territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The reality is likely a combination of both, since even in a highly centralized and authoritarian regime competing interests and policy preferences still result in compromise and unintended consequences as Jones and Hameiri have recently argued (2021).

[6] Even definitions relying on social, as opposed to material, criteria effectively make this claim. For example, see Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth (2014), Ward (2017b), and Renshon (2017).

[7] With the balance being located in other major powers, for instance mutual economic entanglement, rivalries, and alliances, or in the global commons, such as the high seas, space, and the cyber domain.

The potential change is to monopolize subordinates, rather than to pursue interests within a collective framework. Developing and deepening of interests in subordinates is not in and of itself a problem. It is plausible for major powers, simultaneously, or even cooperatively, to pursue interests in the same subordinate without this leading to a crisis (Dillon Savage 2021). Far more of the history of major powers is about the (tacit) mutual domination of subordinates than of war between them. In short, interests, even competing interests, in subordinates are rarely sufficient to generate crises, and thereby rarely lead to war. Rather, it is the *mode* of domination which is crucial to understanding how rising power interests in subordinates may lead to major interstate war. A rising power, when seeking to develop and deepen interests may either have a closed relationship with a subordinate, or an open one.

Closure means that the interests of peer competitors – other major powers – cannot be freely pursued in the subordinate. Closure is typically, though not always, underpinned by formal ties based around treaty and/or an international organization, and specialized roles in which the rising power or subordinate provides unique (or difficult to substitute) functions for the other, such as military basing rights, extended deterrence, access to resources, markets, or technology. Closure, therefore, means that the rising power has a pre-eminent role in the subordinate, restricting the pursuit of interests by other major powers, and preventing the development of similar ties or functions with other major powers. *Ceteris paribus*, this increases tensions between the rising power and another major power, increasing the risk of war.

By contrast, an open relationship between a rising power and a subordinate allows the essentially unfettered pursuit of interests by other major powers. Unlike closure, openness is likely to be underpinned by informal and unspecialized roles. This does not necessarily mean that a subordinate is cooperatively dominated. Rather, it means that interests can be pursued with minimal reference to those of other major powers. It also reflects concerns that closure is costly, carrying a real risk of being perceived as revisionist, thereby generating hostility and heightening the risk of war.

Given that war is costly, it would appear logical for rising powers to opt for open, informal and unspecialized relationships with subordinates, since this reduces a significant source of tensions between major powers. For many rising powers, which are aware of their comparative vulnerability whilst rising, this would appear a plausible means of making significant gains in terms of prosperity, security, and status, without facing the spectres of balancing behaviour, containment, or war. Yet, closure is often the position taken by rising powers in the relations with subordinates. The reasoning for this may be diverse – and is not the focus of this dissertation – but broadly falls into concerns about the future: when a rising power fears future attack, then closure is a means of ensuring favourable access and degrading the resources of a potential adversary. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Japan sought to close Korea from the influence of Russia because it feared that Russia would convert its economic position, based upon investment in railways and forest products, into a means of militarily threatening Japan via a network of warm-water ports and dual-use railways.

From the perspective of rising power opponents, closure poses a problem, since it hampers the ability to pursue interests. This is likely to cause friction, but assuming stability in a relationship, may be insufficient to serve as casus belli, since it at least allows some predictability. However, when this is unstable, and particularly when the rising power seeks monopolization, that is, to restrict *further* the ability of other major powers to pursue interests in the subordinate, then this generates significant hostility. To a major power with interests in the same subordinate, Russia in the case of turn of the twentieth century Korea, attempts by a rising power Japan to monopolize the subordinate are unacceptable and are likely to lead to resistance, and significantly raise the probability of war.

The theory proposed does not predict which side initiates conflict, nor does it deterministically predict conflict. Though the theory may suggest that conflict is triggered by a major power reacting to a rising power, monopolization is often a militarized act, up to and including annexation or occupation of a subordinate. This is the difference between arguing that Britain and France triggered World War Two by declaring war on Germany, or arguing that the war began when Germany[8] invaded Poland – in short, both are necessary conditions and neither sufficient.

The prediction of war is also couched in probabilistic terms. The argument is not that the closure of a subordinate and the attempt to monopolize it are sufficient for major interstate war to result. Rather, this increases the probability of the onset of serious conflict with another major power to a substantively significant degree. Many variables shape the onset of conflict, including power relations, concerns about status, domestic political motivations including nationalism and the role of veto players, the number of dispute participants, as well as issue linkage[9]. Moreover, the proximate trigger, which moves a dispute from

[8] As the Soviet Union only invaded Poland after the Franco-British declaration of war on Germany, it would be inaccurate to claim that the war began through joint German-Soviet military action, though of course, from a political and diplomatic standpoint, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was crucial to shaping how the war began.
[9] In two primary forms, firstly, that the issue area of a subject, for instance control of a territory, may – and rarely does not – become linked to other issues that dispute participants jointly engage in, for example, trade. This may be sufficient to prevent the original dispute from escalating, by detailing additional costs and benefits,

diplomacy and threats to the use of force, may often be a seemingly minor or even random event (Gartzke 1999). The move from t_1, where force was not being employed against the adversary, to t_2 in which it is, may be a conscious decision taken on the part of policymakers, military leaders, or low-ranking officers or officials, or it may be accidental. These proximate causes of war are important to understand, but it is the ramping up of tensions which makes such causes possible, that is, in the absence of tensions, an accidental engagement of troops can be de-escalated more readily. This dissertation, therefore, makes the claim that the closure and monopolization of subordinates makes the onset of major interstate war significantly more likely. It is then a particularly dangerous pathway for rising powers, and their would-be adversaries, to tread.

Existing explanations

Existing explanations, though insightful, offer only partial explanations. The major reason for this is that much of the literature misses that while several high-profile rising power cases – interwar Germany, Italy, and Japan – are associated with major interstate war[10], far from all rising powers are. In fact, though rising powers may on average be associated with greater rates of dispute onset and higher dispute severity, the differences between an average rising power and any other (presumably enduring[11] or declining) major power are less striking than

though it can also deepen tensions between dispute parties. Secondly, a dispute between states A and B, may be unrelated to a parallel second dispute between states A and C in terms of the issues (perhaps the first being a fishing rights dispute, and the second concerning a dispute border). However, for state A, the two are linked, since military and diplomatic resources must be devoted to both. Moreover, states B and C may plausibly see A as a mutual adversary, and so coordinate their actions to strengthen their bargaining positions.

[10] Although this dissertation shows that these three cases are relatively average rising powers in terms of how conflict prone they were.

[11] That is, a state which is clearly still a major power, but is neither rising, nor declining, relative to the collective positions of all other major powers. If we do not theorize the existence of such states, then this implies a very high degree of volatility in the ranking of the major powers, something that might suggest the absence of any idea of the status quo, and indeed, infers a higher degree of change in the states which make up the major powers than has been seen over the past several hundred years.

the similarities. The study of rising powers requires an explanation for why some rising powers are associated with major interstate war whilst some are not. This is commonly tacitly addressed in media commentary on the rise of China and the risk of a Sino-American war (Winger 2021; Hasan 2020; Houghton 2020). Such analyses are often deeply atheoretical and show only a thin understanding of history, rarely venturing beyond comparisons of contemporary China and interwar Germany and Japan (B. Jones 2021; Dodwell 2019; Reuters 2021; The Sunday Times 2020). Yet, they do tend to argue that the pathway from material change, through revisionist policymaking, to war, is a branching one.

Too much attention is placed on systemic and deterministic factors which fail to address the crucial question of how rising powers vary in terms of the threat they pose to the existing international order. This dissertation makes its major theoretical and empirical contribution in this space, arguing that it is the treatment of subordinates by rising powers which explains a significant proportion of this variation – in short, allowing revisionist rising powers to be sorted from those that favour the status quo, thereby allowing for an explanation as to why some, but not all, rising powers are associated with major interstate war.

Methodological approach and findings

A multi-method approach is utilized to examine the explanatory power of subordinate monopolization as a pathway to major interstate war. The predictions generated from the theory are tested against both quantitative and qualitative data on rising power cases during the 1816-2010 period. The next chapter specifies these predictions, formalizes them as hypotheses, and explains the case selection process. In Chapter II, logistic regression is used to assess how subordinate closure and monopolization predicts the onset of major power violent disputes. Statistically and substantively significant effects are shown to exist. The data generation, and particularly the coding scheme processes are also explained in this chapter. This chapter also utilizes descriptive statistics to aggregate the variables created by rising power, revealing differences between the cases. Notably, the common association of interwar Germany, Japan and Italy with major interstate war is shown to be rather flimsy.

Chapters III and IV are case studies of two pairs of rising power disputes in the long nineteenth century and early Cold War respectively. These assess the theory in five ways. Firstly, to examine the theoretical predictions in different systemic and social contexts; secondly, to hone in more directly on the causal mechanism; thirdly, to provide a more detailed assessment of alternative explanations; fourthly, to address the selection problem which attenuates the incisiveness of the quantitative analysis, and fifthly, to explore the potentially endogenous relationship between conflict and subordinate monopolization. Chapter III compares the 1898 Spanish-American and 1904-5 Russo-Japanese wars, whilst Chapter IV examines the 1956-58 Syria Crisis and Soviet threats during the 1967 Six-Day War.

Chapter I: Theory of Subordinate Monopolization and Major Interstate War

The relationship of rising powers with major interstate war is seemingly well established in the field of international relations. Rising powers alter the relative balance of power, and when this does not adequately translate into distributional or institutional benefits, or higher social status, war casts its shadow. There are two problems with this, admittedly sweeping, characterization of the existing literature. Firstly, it assumes that rising power interests are fixed on the major powers. Secondly, it ignores that many rises are relatively peaceful meaning the causes of revisionism must be explained.

Major powers are potential threats to rising powers, since they could seek to contain or militarily defeat them, but can also offer social recognition and material benefits. However, some rising powers are already major powers, and are instead rising relative to their peers, rather than rising from below the major powers. This suggests that social recognition is less consistent across cases, or that it comes in two different forms, recognition of major power status, and recognition of hegemony[1]. More generally, though major powers may be sources of distributional and especially institutional benefits[2], they are not the only sources. Weaker states – subordinates – are crucial to prosperity and security. They can provide markets, raw materials, alliances, military basing rights, technology, and social recognition[3], and since they are far more numerous, and militarily inferior, offer opportunities for aggrandizement that the major powers cannot. However, as subordinates provide the same opportunities to all major powers competition for influence is continuous and often intense. The crucial dynamic associated with rising powers, therefore, is not a dyadic struggle between rising and major powers, rather, it is competition for access to, and influence over, subordinates.

The association of rising powers with major interstate war is driven by a focus upon a few high-profile cases. Using the outcome of wars as the starting point, this analysis works backwards, and then finds rising powers to be a common feature. This naturally misses cases where rising powers exist, but wars did not result. A better approach is taken by Allison (2017), but his definition of a rising power is not fixed, relying instead on contemporary descriptions by other states. At best then, this is about perceptions, not material reality. Yet, if the origin of concerns about rising powers is material change – either economic or militarily, but likely both – in the relative balance of power, then some semblance of assessing cases by these metrics must be made. Otherwise, any state may be understood,

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[1] Meaning, that the other major powers recognize the superior position of the rising power. Black provides an authoritative overview of hegemons since 1500 (2008).

[2] For instance, the permanent members of the UN Security Council play a crucial role in reform of this organization. Any expansion of the permanent membership would require the acceptance of all five.

[3] The most complete example of such recognition being the Non-Aligned Movement. During the Cold War, this allowed China to claim to be leading the interests of the developing world. Further examples include alliances and imperial relations which may also provide such recognition. NATO provides the United States with a ‘supply’ of – Iraq War apart – diplomatic support for foreign policy initiatives, and signifies American leadership.

misperceived, or deliberately miscast, as a rising power, in order to advance a particular foreign policy agenda. Not only does this stretch credibility, it also blurs the distinctions between academic assessment and policymaking.

In fact, rising powers are less conflict prone than commonly understood. Several rising powers from across the past two centuries are not associated with major interstate war at all, including the United States during the late nineteenth century, and Cold War West Germany and Japan. Meanwhile, even prominent cases that are associated with systemic wars – wars involving multiple, if not all major powers – such as interwar Germany, Japan and Italy, rose over several decades, and though involved in crises and militarized disputes, were rarely engaged in major interstate wars[4]. This suggests the standard account linking rising powers to major interstate war to be inadequate. Given this, a new interpretation of rising powers in the international system is proposed and this chapter, firstly, lays out the theory of subordinate monopolization, secondly, discusses the relevant existing literature, thirdly, defines key concepts, fourthly, develops testable hypotheses, and finally, explains the methodologies used.

Theory of subordinate monopolization and war

This dissertation argues that a crucial pathway via which the existence of a rising power can lead to major interstate war is through competition for subordinates. Subordinates, whether smaller independent states or imperial possessions, provide valuable material and non-material resources to major powers. The leaders of rising powers, as the relative balance of power moves in their favour, seek greater access and influence over subordinates, with a

[4] That is, most years of their rises did not involve fighting against other major powers.

view to sustaining their rise and ensuring that should the rise stall, that they have locked in gains. Two particularly crucial issue-areas concern the twin demands for prosperity and security, issues which themselves drive changes in the relative balance of power. Seeking to sustain and enhance prosperity and security, which relies on subordinates, crystallizes around two ideal-types: monopolization or common-pool.

Monopolization means access to, and influence over, a subordinate at significantly higher levels than that of any other major power, that is, any peer competitor and potential adversary. In many cases, this means that other major powers are unable to pursue their own interests within the territory of the subordinate. The form that this may take varies in three ways: spheres, era, and time. Two spheres dominate the material interests of rising powers, prosperity (economic) and security (political-military). Monopolization of economic activities means that the economy of a subordinate is shaped to serve that of the rising power, meaning, for example, that trade preferences are established, that specific markets are closed to foreign competitors, that businesses of the rising power are given special treatment, or currencies are pegged or otherwise externally controlled. Monopolization of military activities means, for example, that exclusive defence guarantees are made, basing rights granted, integration of their respective militaries, and the purchasing of military equipment from the rising power. The institutional form that monopolization takes also varies by era. Over the past 200 years, formal empire has waxed and waned as an acceptable form of hierarchy. Post-1945, formal imperial hierarchies rapidly diminished, and today only disputed remnants in the shape of overseas territories remain. Finally, time is an important variable. At the start of a rise, a rising power will already have interests in subordinates, which may either be open or closed to other major powers. This sets the context for friction with these competitors during a rise. However, the further expansion of a hierarchy, to new subordinates, and/or to further monopolize an existing subordinate is a second distinct aspect of competition. In summary, monopolization takes place in two distinct spheres, the economic and politico-military, changes institutional form over time, and is both a static and dynamic point of contention.

Common-pool approaches to subordinates emphasize openness to the interests of others, meaning that a rising power does not seek to exclude other major powers from pursuing their interests in the territory of the subordinate. Once more, the form that this takes varies. Economic openness means that, for example, states trade freely – or at least with the same set of restrictions – within the subordinate. Political-military openness means that alliance and defence guarantees are either not made, or they are made collectively. Similarly, basing rights are either extended to multiple states, or not at all. The form that common-pool hierarchies take also changes by era, largely due to the end of formal empire. For instance, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, China hosted military forces of multiple major powers, which were concentrated in territorial enclaves akin to colonies. Though the presence of these territories was agreed by China through treaty, they were clearly arrived at through coercion, and it is doubtful that China could have expelled them had it chosen to assert its sovereignty[5]. By contrast, Djibouti today hosts military bases from France, the United States, Japan, China, and Italy, with other states often rotating temporary units through as well. Should Djibouti seek to remove some or all of these, it seems doubtful, though not impossible, that the reaction would be to occupy the country. Time also shapes

[5] The Boxer Rebellion being a popular attempt, with the initially tacit, and later explicit, support of the Chinese government to expel foreigners from the country. This of course failed, with significant military forces deployed to reassert control and punish the Chinese government by a coalition of eight states, and led to the Boxer Protocol which collectively imposed a series of further restrictions on China.

common-pool approaches, since at the outset of a rise, relationships with subordinates may be open to the interests of others, but over the course of the rise, the rising power may seek further subordinates, and do so whilst not infringing the interests of others.

The pathway from monopolization to major interstate war incorporates a novel understanding of revisionism. The monopolization of subordinates challenges norms concerning the governance of subordinates, which leads to perceptions of revisionism, and therefore, increased hostility from major powers which increases the probability of war. This conceptualization of revisionism, as being a challenge to norms of appropriate subordinate governance, is specific to this context, that is, it focuses on competition over subordinates. Of course, other forms of revisionism also exist, and may also raise the probability of war. Most importantly, the status dissatisfaction literature argues that state leaders which perceive their state's social positon to be lower than its material one, and which view the current order as preventing a narrowing of this gap, may turn to war as a means of achieving change. This dissertation argues, therefore, that monopolization increases the probability of major interstate war because it is perceived as challenging norms of subordinate governance.

The decision to monopolize a subordinate is one that can directly infringe upon the economic and strategic interests of other major powers. This is a potential pathway to war, that is, if these interests are valuable enough, then a military response is triggered. However, that argument made in this dissertation is that the probability of war is also increased, though by a smaller amount, even when those interests are not particularly valuable, or are even absent. In all cases of subordinate monopolization norms of subordinate governance are challenged, which leads to greater hostility to a rising power, increasing the probability of war. Moreover, this can lead to negative feedback, whereby, monopolization becomes the answer to increasing major power hostility since it secures resources. Yet, this demonstrates continued disregard for the existing order, resulting in deepening hostility. A downward spiral in relations between a rising power and the other major powers therefore occurs.

Infringing the interests of other major powers is a short and sharp theoretical pathway to war. A specific major power, whose leaders consider monopolization to challenge their interests, issues compellent threats. When these are not heeded, further militarization, and war, results. This is an important component of major interstate wars which result from disputes over access to, and influence over, subordinates. Most importantly, it allows focus on specific major powers, and their responses to monopolization, and suggests that it is major powers with the most at stake in any subordinate which should be most likely to respond, and therefore participate, in any subsequent war.

This explanation, though important, does not adequately explain major power responses to rising power monopolization. Often, interests in subordinates are far from being crucial. That is, their loss is difficult to portray as swinging the relative balance of power dramatically against them. Most interests are somewhat fungible, and crucially, are substitutable, meaning that alternative subordinates can provide the same or similar benefits. This suggests that the stakes may only be enough to trigger war in a minority of cases, where the economic interests in a subordinate are extremely high, perhaps because the subordinate provides difficult to substitute strategic raw materials[6], or that the strategic position of the subordinate permits a unique ability to control a region or network[7].

The more general pathway from monopolization to major interstate war requires additional components. When a rising power monopolizes a subordinate, this means that the interests of other major powers cannot be freely pursued in its territory. Rather than a strictly material argument as above, this dissertation instead argues that this restriction is itself sufficient to generate hostility from major powers, which increases the probability of war. This is because beyond prosperity and security, major powers also seek order, and this order relies upon shared behavioural expectations, or norms. The prevailing norms of subordinate governance are comparatively open, allowing multiple majors to pursue their interests in the same subordinate simultaneously.

There are three norms, and assumptions, which interrelate. Firstly, that subordinate may only rarely be governed exclusively by single major powers. Secondly, that major powers may interfere in the domestic political landscape of subordinates. Thirdly, that the major powers have the function of upholding international order. Together, they combine to mean that major powers may utilize military force to prevent monopolization from replacing the status quo of comparative openness. These are discussed in turn.

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[6] For example, beyond Japan's interwar reliance on American oil, Japan relied extensively on trade with subordinates in the Asia-Pacific. As Best explains, Britain's introduction of the Imperial Preference in 1932, followed by Anglo-American efforts to restrict Japan's trade with territories they controlled, contributed to the dominance of hardliners in Japan's government as well as the decision to use force against states other than China in late-1941 (1995).

[7] For example, the German invasion of Belgium in 1914 was viewed by Britain's leaders as totally unacceptable since control of this state suggested the potential for invasion of the British Isles, and would allow control of trade in the English Channel.

The emergence of a norm of open subordinate governance, which allows multiple major powers to pursue their interests within a subordinate, originates in practice rather than in norm entrepreneurs. The origin of this is pre-state interaction of diverse political units. Though this is, in effect, the history of everywhere, that is, all regions of the world comprised a diverse set of polities prior to the spread of (largely European) overseas empires and the subsequent decolonization processes, it is European experience which created these norms. This is because of the creation of the international system by European states through colonialism (Keene 2002), and the long dominance of this system by powerful European states[8]. Prior to the emergence of states, polities were diverse in terms of their functional form, and it is this diversity which generated the practice of openness.

Functional variation between political units creates heterarchical, as well as hierarchical, relationships. This is significant for openness, because the variation in functions of these units means they simultaneously carried out their roles, and pursued their interests, in the same territories. This should not be understood as a pacific or cooperative endeavour. Clearly competition between political actors was fierce, but as well as creating the well-known competitive pressures which led to the increasingly superior political unit of the sovereign state (Spruyt 1994; Tilly 1992), it also created and embedded norms of subordinate governance. Open competition, that is, the ability of major powers to pursue interests in subordinates, was generated by the pre-sovereign world. It was maintained, even

[8] European dominance was eroded slowly in the late nineteenth century by the emergence of Japan and the United States as major powers. This decline sped up through the interwar era, and post-1945 ceased to be a feature of international relations, though tensions between the Soviet Union and United States ensured that as a region it remained central to the system. In the contemporary world this is also no longer accurate, since neither the United States nor China are European major powers, and their competition focuses on Asia and the Pacific.

as the sovereign state began to spread post-1555[9], and especially post-1648, since these historical processes ensured that some political units, and therefore some of these states, were much more powerful than others. In summary, open governance of subordinates exists as a norm because of prior practice in a non-state world. It remained even after the emergence of sovereign states since, for the most powerful, it allowed them to continue to pursue their interests in subordinates.

This leads to the second of these entangled norms, that major powers have the right to interfere in the sovereign affairs of subordinates, even those that are their legal equivalent. Though the near demise of non-state polities in the post-1945 era has challenged this norm, since treaty law formally recognizes the equal function and rights of both powerful and weak states, interference continues. As Jackson (1990) and Krasner (1999) articulate, external recognition of equality is not matched by political practice. Rather, powerful actors, motivated by diverse reasons[10], continue to interfere in the domestic affairs of subordinates.

Finally, the third of these entangled norms is that major powers understand their position in the international system to be functional superior to other states. These functions include the right, or necessity driven duty, to uphold the international order (Bull 2012; Wight 1978), meaning that serious aberrations from this must be opposed, often with military force[11].

[9] The Treaty of Augsburg, which delineated territory by Christian denomination, therefore creating the nascent idea of non-interference.

[10] Jackson notably focuses on the inability of many developing states to provide public goods and protect human rights, necessitating the involvement of external actors (1990).

[11] This is an international order which privileges the powerful, since what is ‘good’ for the powerful is essentially ‘good’ for the maintenance of international order. Perhaps the most significant element of the international order is to ensure that the most powerful do not devote themselves to total war against each other, and thereby, institutions which reduce this risk, even if they infringe the sovereignty of the weak, are accepted. That this acceptance is granted by the powerful – but not the weak – clearly demonstrates that the rules of the game are written, justified, and enforced by the same actors.

Once more, despite the post-1945 era, as epitomized by the United Nations, embracing the idea of sovereign equality, the reality is quite different. This was most clearly demonstrated during the Cold War, where the United States and Soviet Union exerted significant control over subordinates in Latin America and Eastern Europe respectively (Triska 1986), including deposing regimes unfavourable to them, the basing of troops, and directing their foreign policies. Though competition between the two was fierce, tacit acceptance of the rights of the other to intervene, with the purposes of ensuring systemic stability, existed. Only in the most serious cases, for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, did opprobrium become shrill, and this because the invasion was understood as a threat to international order, not merely to Afghanistan. Moreover, even this era of theoretical functional equivalence and political equality is underpinned by the Security Council, which elevates five of its members to a position no other can attain. This is a recognition that authority in international relations is derived from both power and prior practice, and this practice is that major powers will intervene.

Norms of subordinate governance have remained largely intact despite two seismic shakeups of the political landscape. Firstly, European overseas colonial empires created a new practice: that territory not claimed by other Europeans could be occupied, annexed, and monopolized. Secondly, that the gradual dominance of the sovereign state and the demise of near all other forms of political organization.

European knowledge of other regions grew dramatically as explorers, merchants, and missionaries spread across the globe from the mid-1400s onwards[12]. These new links revealed huge wealth in the Americas, Asia and Africa, as well as the comparative technological sophistication of European (Diamond 1997). Though competition between European states certainly occurred as they scrambled to seize territory and control lucrative trade routes, small leads – being the first to a region and having the capability to follow up – and the relatively large number of potential new territories, allowed exclusionary practices to be pioneered[13]. Those slightly later to the game – particularly England and France – would establish their own exclusive spheres of control, and gradually supplanted the early movers – Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands – as their relative power grew. Two elements of this history ensured that a degree of openness remained, and that it was not supplanted with closure: new territory to colonize continued to become available until well into the nineteenth century, and in two notable cases – the weakly controlled territories of the Ottoman Empire, and China – open norms of subordinate governance were embraced.

That new territory continued to become available for European empires to colonize meant that all the whilst exclusionary control continued to flourish, that the promise of new resources to exploit prevented the established norms of open subordinate governance from conflicting to greatly with the new practice. Moreover, that exclusionary control was largely practiced in regions far from Europe, meant two systems essentially existed in parallel. One, centred on Europe, saw major powers pursue their interests in subordinates simultaneously

[12] Often called the 'Age of Discovery', though this clearly ignores that the peoples living in these regions already knew of their existence.
[13] Most clearly, Spanish and Portuguese control in much of the Americas during the 16th and 17th centuries, and Dutch control of the East Indies in the same period.

(though not always pacifically). The other, comprising much of the territory of the rest of the world, whether directly controlled, or existing as newly independent states[14]. Therefore, established norms remained intact, and though the tension with newer practices clearly was incongruous, only on the margins did this lead to uncertainty.

Furthermore, and as Dillon Savage (2021) argues, colonialism and overseas empire building occurred not only through monopolistic control of territory. Rather, common-pool hierarchy also emerged as a means of allowing major powers to pursue their interests simultaneously, and even cooperatively, in the same subordinate. Moreover, and with particular relevance for this dissertation, he concludes that ‘In China, the ability to adopt cooperative forms of hierarchy may have allowed the great powers to better manage the pressures of imperialism, reducing overall conflict’ (Dillon Savage 2021, 720). Three factors explaining open forms of overseas imperial subordinate governance, as opposed to monopolistic approaches, firstly, the extent to which subordinate institutions can incorporate outside actors (Dillon Savage 2021, 716), which becomes more complex when the number of relevant political actors in the subordinate increases. Secondly, when the goals of major powers have longer time horizons, then they should have greater restraint. Thirdly, when the interests of major powers in a subordinate are economic, rather than political, strategic or prestige, then common-pool hierarchy is more likely (Dillon Savage 2021, 716–17). Despite the rapid proliferation of overseas empires, and the potential this posed for challenging established open norms of subordinate governance, they therefore remained intact, since competing systems emerged for governance.

[14] Particularly important for the Americas, given the early independence of the United States, Brazil, and most of the former territories of the Spanish Empire.

A corollary to this is the question of whether the clear demarcation of subordinates exclusively controlled by a major power can reduce tensions between major powers. Existing literature on the territorial peace, discussed in more depth in the literature review, suggests that clear boundaries reduce conflict. However, this literature largely focuses on home territory, that is, the territorial disputes that form the core of this argument are those centred on territory considered by at least one state, and typically two, to be part of their home territory. The governance of subordinates is a different phenomenon. Rather than reducing hostility between major powers, Dillon Savage (2021) argues that the late nineteenth century 'scramble for Africa' and subsequent Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 inflamed tensions in Europe, that is, the supposed settlement of colonial boundaries fed into nationalist narratives and imperial rivalries. Rather than reducing hostility between major powers, the demarcation of exclusive spheres of influence generate new grievances, and reinforce existing ones.

The spread of the sovereign state, particularly in the interwar and Cold War eras, led to the end of empire as a mode of political organization. Instead, homogenization occurred, with the state being the only option for most former colonies[15]. Though a seismic change, leading to the reordering of international society and self-governance for hundreds of millions of people, this did little to challenge norms of open subordinate governance. In fact, it may have bolstered it, since it placed greater onus on the domestic institutions of subordinates to

[15] There is some minor variation on this point, with some colonies becoming part of the metropole (for example, French Guiana), and others becoming self-governing overseas territories (for example, the Falkland Islands). However, the far more common outcome, and the outcome that the vast majority of formerly subject peoples inhabit, is the state.

shape their interactions with the powerful, many of which were wary of relying too heavily upon a single major power.

Monopolization and closure as revisionism

Monopolization challenges norms of open subordinate governance by making the pursuit of interests by other major powers dependent upon the fiat of the monopolizer. Access, and influence, can be reduced, or even ended, as the monopolizer sees fit. This means that even in the absence of concrete steps to prevent the pursuit of interests, a latent threat remains. Of course, in many cases monopolization is an egregious abuse of the interests of others, and involves the adjournment of the pursuit of interests by others, because the actual form monopolization takes is frequently militaristic. Even a peaceful takeover over a subordinate, perhaps engineered through court intrigue or through regime change, is likely to be opposed by other major powers. This is because, beyond the curtailment of interests, norms of open subordinate governance are challenged. This challenge is a revisionist one, and when perceived as such[16] raises the probability of war between major powers.

Monopolization of a subordinate is a change to the status quo relationship between a rising power and a subordinate. However, the status quo relationship can also vary. Subordinate governance prior to monopolization varies between being relatively open, and relatively closed. Though the term open and closed imply absolutes, the reality is typically one of degree, that is, in an open subordinate, some restriction on what interests can be pursued is

[16] There are scenarios under which monopolization may be perceived as far less problematic. For example, serious domestic unrest in a subordinate prevents the pursuit of economic and security interests since order has been stripped away. Therefore, a major power which successfully monopolizes – and thereby imposes order – may be welcomed. Should this monopolization then result in the resumption of the pursuit of their interests, then the other major powers are likely to be relatively unthreatened, since the action appears to have been taken with the common good in mind.

likely to remain – and may even be limited by the subordinate itself. A closed subordinate, meanwhile, may still permit other major powers to pursue their interests, but a single state is able to restrict this, should they wish to. In the case of a closed subordinate, therefore, monopolization would be a further tightening of control, and a further restriction on the ability of other major powers to pursue their interests.

The status quo governance of a subordinate is also important for the probability of major interstate war. Status quo should be understand to mean the pre-dispute state of affairs, but should not be understood as acceptance. That is, political actors may object to the status quo. For subordinate governance, this means that closed subordinates are a greater source of tension than open subordinates, for largely the same reasons as explained for monopolization. Closure curtails interests and challenges norms of open subordinate governance. Closure, like monopolization, is perceived as a revisionist approach to international order. It is, however, a less acute manifestation, and therefore, has a lower probability of resulting in major interstate war than monopolization. The longer that a subordinate has been closed, the less likely it is that a major interstate war will result, since the passage of time does confer tacit acceptance. However, moves to monopolize a subordinate already closed results in a greatly heightened risk of war. This is because perceptions of revisionism, based around the norm-challenging closure of a subordinate already exist. In such a scenario, monopolization essentially confirms existing suspicions: closure was insufficient, monopolization is the chosen path of the rising power, and therefore, is more likely to be militarily opposed.

Iteration

The relationship between closure and monopolization, that is, the status quo and dynamic components of subordinate governance, suggest the important for iteration. That is, beyond an immediate dispute over a subordinate, prior interactions are also likely to play a role in shape major power perceptions of the revisionism of a rising power, and rising power perceptions of the hostility other major powers have to it. Clearly this raises the issue of endogeneity, since prior conflict may shape monopolization and responses to it. This is directly addressed on pages 82-88. Before moving to consider the effects of iteration, the basic theoretical relationships between closure and monopolization must be clearly specified across their four possible permutations, that is, closure followed by monopolization, closure followed by no monopolization, openness followed by monopolization, and openness followed by no monopolization.

The first of these permutations is the most likely to result in major interstate war. A rising power with a closed subordinate means a perception of revisionism is already likely to exist. When major powers perceive a rising power as possibly harbouring revisionist intentions, suspicion and scrutiny of their foreign policy intensifies. In turn, this increases the perception of threat for the rising power. The decision to monopolize a subordinate is taken with the intention of securing control of a subordinate with the purpose of bolstering security. Unfortunately, and as in the security dilemma, this results in a decrease of security, since the response to monopolization is a heightening of suspicion, the issuance of threats, and an increased probability of major interstate war.

In contrast to this, when a rising power has a closed subordinate, but opts against monopolization, then the status quo remains. This means that the other major powers continue to perceive the rising power as potentially revisionist, but the absence of steps to deepen this means that this perception fades over time. That is, the longer that a subordinate is closed, the less likely this will result in major interstate war, unless monopolization triggers renewed suspicion and hostility.

The third permutation is when a subordinate is open, but the rising power subsequently monopolizes it. The initial status quo is one where major power interests can be pursued in the subordinate, and the rising power does not directly control the subordinate, meaning there is no latent threat of interests being curtailed. Therefore, the major powers have little reason to harbour suspicions, and perceive the rising power's behaviour as maintaining the international order. The decision to monopolize the subordinate, therefore, is a shock, and may trigger major interstate war. The transition from an open to a monopolized subordinate is the largest potential change in subordinate governance possible, however, it does not result in the highest risk of war. This is because of the prior perception of the rising power as maintaining the international order.

In the fourth permutation, the subordinate is open, and the rising power does not seek to monopolize it. As a result, the major powers have little reason to consider the rising power revisionist. This also means that the rising power faces less hostility. This results in a low probability of major interstate war.

These scenarios do not exist in isolation, that is, it is not plausible that a dispute over a subordinate in the recent past would not impact one in the present. Similarly, disputes involving different subordinates may also inform behaviour. This occurs in two ways. Firstly, by altering major power perceptions of the rising power. An absence of closed relationships with subordinates and of monopolization attempts builds a reputation for the rising power as being supportive of international order since norms of open subordinate governance are respected, and maintained by their practice. By contrast, closed relationships, and prior attempts at monopolization, will develop a reputation for revisionism. In the former case, therefore, major interstate war should be very unlikely. This means future perceptions of the rising power, when a dispute arises, are likely to comparatively benign, since there is not a prior history of revisionism and interstate war. In the latter, the reverse is true, that is, prior conflict is likely to have resulted, which will deepen and strengthen suspicion and hostility in the future when a dispute arises, making war more probable.

Secondly, rising power perceptions of the hostility they face will evolve. Rising powers that embrace open governance of subordinates should receive little hostility in turn, thereby allowing them to pursue their interests, and entrenching the prosperity and security gains made. This means that major interstate war is unlikely to have previously been triggered, implying a the relative absence of threats from major powers. In contrast, closure and monopolization will likely have led to hostility, threats, and war in the past, which will inform future decision-making. Notably for the rising power, this may increase the likelihood of monopolization, since if war is believed to be a likely outcome, then it becomes rational to seek the means of maximizing success in the coming struggle.

Returning to the four permutations examined above, it is logical to consider how each of these impacts future disputes. When the subordinate is closed, and subsequently monopolized, major interstate war is relatively likely to occur. As explained, this is because the major powers perceive closure as revisionism, and are thereby primed for hostility. If monopolization then occurs, then war is relatively likely. Major interstate wars resulting from closure and monopolization are likely to be particularly dangerous, since both sides are suspicious of the intentions of the other, and therefore, are prepared for large scale fighting. War aims are likely to be relatively total, that is, for the rising power, seeking security by defending their control of the subordinate, and for the major powers, forcing the rising power to concede such control. Should these aims be difficult to achieve, then war aims may escalate further: the total defeat of the other. If the latter has occurred, and results in the defeat of the rising power, then there is little prospect of this informing the future since future disputes between the rising power and major powers are unlikely. Plausibly, such defeat ends a rise, and would likely involve regime change, if not outright occupation. If war short of this maximalist version is the result, and some bargain is possible, then it is likely that both sides will nurse deep suspicion of the other. This suggests that when faced with a new dispute over subordinate governance that the major powers will be likely to view foreign policy behaviour of the rising power as revisionist, and so, will be more likely to respond with hostility. For the rising power, prior war has confirmed suspicions that the other major powers are hostile to it, and therefore, is more likely to seek monopolization as a means of preparing for war.

When a subordinate is closed, but no monopolization occurred, then it is relatively unlikely that major interstate war will occur. Assuming this to be the case, then future disputes will be informed by this absence of conflict. Firstly, the major powers will be less likely to perceive the rising power as revisionist, and secondly, the rising power will be less likely to perceive the major powers as hostile. Therefore, in a future dispute, it is less likely that a rising power will opt for monopolization, since the argument that war is inevitable and subordinates must be exclusively secured, is unpersuasive. Of all of the permutations, it is this which offers the greatest possibility for reform of the international order. This is because the rising power has demonstrated commitment to norms of open subordinate governance, by opting to not advance from closure to monopolization. In turn, this may generate goodwill on the part of the major powers, potentially enabling the rising power to achieve its goals: to secure its rise and be accepted as a major power.

If a rising power seeks to monopolize a subordinate, when this subordinate was previously open, then this may trigger war, though at lower rates than if the subordinate was previously closed, since the major powers were not primed for hostility. Irrespective of whether a war results, or not, future disputes are likely to be more conflictual, since the major powers will be wary of being taken advantage of. That is, even if in a future dispute the rising power has open relations with the subordinate, its prior monopolization will generate a perception of revisionist intent. The major powers will be suspicious and hostile, which is more likely to result in monopolization, further heightening the risk of war.

Finally, when a subordinate is open, and a rising power does not seek to monopolize it, then suspicions of the rising power are diminished. It has demonstrated support for norms of open subordinate governance through its actions, and therefore, in future disputes the other major powers are more likely to assume a benign intent. Therefore, war is less likely in a future dispute irrespective of whether the subordinate is open and closed, and whether monopolization is sought. It is plausible, therefore, for a rising power that has developed a reputation supportive of norms of subordinate governance to utilize this positive reception to monopolize in the future. That is, the relative goodwill cultivated by being perceived as an upholder of the international order means that monopolization is less likely to trigger major interstate war, since the other major powers are not primed to perceive its actions as revisionist. For the rising power, this may allow future use of monopolization, though repeated instances are unlikely to be viewed benignly, since its reputation for upholding the international order will be severely diminished by monopolization.

Existing literature

Six literatures are particularly important to this dissertation: power politics, status dissatisfaction, bargaining failures, the steps to war, domestic political institutions, and hierarchy. The first four of these each offer explanations for war, whilst domestic political institutions can constrain or enable actors with preferences for war. Finally, and in contrast to the other literatures, hierarchy offers insights into the relationships between dominant and subordinate states. The power politics literature argues that shifts in the relative balance of power generate fear and suspicion, raising the probability of war. The status dissatisfaction literature argues that the disconnect between material standing and markers of social status can lead states into aggressively seeking status through war. The steps to war literature suggests that causal complexity is core to understanding war, and that multiple pathways are possible. Work on domestic political institutions, and their roles in shaping foreign policy, suggest that structures and rules which prevent political power from concentrating on specific actors, which allow scrutiny of decision-making, and that foster compromise are associated with a lower probability of war. Finally, the hierarchy literature encourages examination of the heterogeneous make-up of actors and relationships in international relations, and how this shapes the roles actors perform.

Power politics

The balance of power and power transition are alternative theories which both claim to explain the behaviour of major powers through examination of changes in the relative balance of power. They differ in which actors are relevant. For the balance of power[17], it is all major powers, for power transition, it is only the dominant state and challenger. Whereas the former predicts that the major powers take actions to balance a growth in military capabilities (M. A. Kaplan 1957; Levy 2003; Levy and Thompson 2005; Haas 1953; Lobell 2012)[18], or hostility, from another, and so suggests an (almost[19]) self-correcting systemic response which maintains the status quo, power transition suggests that unless the dominant state takes steps to forestall the challenger, it will be supplanted. Though inaccurate to see the former as having defensive or peaceful predictions, particularly given the contributions of offensive realists (Mearsheimer 2001; Monteiro 2014; Layne 2002), and the latter as having violent predictions, it is accurate to see the latter as being inherently more open to change, whether this a peaceful transition, or through war. This difference becomes clearest when a bipolar system is examined, a situation which forces a balance of power logic to consider the two-player setup of power transition. Here, the work of Waltz is particularly instructive, arguing that such systems are stable, and war unlikely, since the significant complication of external balancing is removed (1979; 1964)[20]. By contrast, power transition

[17] This section primarily focuses on neorealist treatments of the concept. It is also a core concept in classical realism (Aron 2003; Morgenthau 1978; Carr 2001) and is an institutional feature of international society emphasized in English School approaches (Bull 2012; Watson 2009; Wight 1966; 1978). Moreover, balance of power is often used both to describe a state of affairs in Europe (Gulick 1982; Wright 1975; Dehio 1962) but also to refer to theoretical models to explain the behaviour of states (Sheehan 1996; Little 2007; Jervis 1997; Claude 1962).

[18] Blainey significantly problematizes this relationship between the balance of power and war, arguing that wars occur when there are disagreements about the balance (1988).

[19] Almost, rather than always, because of the divergence in expectations with regards the balance of power theorized by different varieties of realists. Neorealists essentially leave no role for human perception, and assume that information on the balance of power is largely knowable (with uncertainty over intentions remaining). This means shifts in the relative balance of power are theorized to lead to countermoves in an almost clockwork fashion. By contrast, classical, and neoclassical, realists place greater emphasis on state leaders, who must gather information, interpret it, and then act. Notably, this allows for theories of misperception (Jervis 1976; Wohlforth 1993), underbalancing (Schweller 2006), overbalancing, and on the timing of balancing (Levy 2004). The clear theoretical problem with this being the relatively inconsistent manner in which domestic variables are utilized (Walt 2002).

[20] Christensen and Snyder indirectly draw attention to the simplicity of bipolarity in their explanation of alliance formation under multipolarity (1990).

theorists, though accepting that stability could result – presumably if the dominant state is able to continue to internally balance, or the challenger self-limits their behaviour to avoid confrontation (Yongping 2006) – predict significant breakdowns of international order. This can be either due to the increasingly risk-acceptant behaviour of a dissatisfied challenger (W. Kim and Morrow 1992; DiCicco 2018; DiCicco and Levy 1999; Greve and Levy 2018; Sample 2018), an attempt by a hegemonic state to prevent a challenger from surpassing them (Lemke 2003; Levy 1987; Rosecrance 1987), a combination (Organski 1958), or a systemically determined event (Modelski 1987; Modelski and Thompson 1988; Rasler and Thompson 1994).

A brief examination of the Cold War, the most prolonged period of bipolarity, provides empirical evidence for both approaches. The Cold War was stable, in that major interstate war, that is, war between major powers did not occur[22], suggesting support for balance of power logics. Yet, the 'challenge' posed by the Soviet Union to the United States led to containment, proxy wars, and a series of near-misses. Perhaps war was only avoided through chance, because the Soviet challenge evolved post-1970 to become a solely military one[23], or due to the role of nuclear weapons. This points to some of the difficulties in empirical evaluation which trouble the field more generally, since the relevant sample and population for any phenomenon are often disputed, but also outlines some of the blind spots of these approaches. This is clearest in how non-major powers are excluded.

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[22] Though this claim looks a little more doubtful when the Korean War is considered. Though Soviet and American forces were generally careful to avoid direct engagement, each experienced significant combat losses of aircraft to the other. Moreover, depending on how China is classified, it may be considered a major power already. Certainly during World War Two it was treated as a major power by the Allies and Soviet Union, and was expected to play a significant role in the post-war international order, most obviously as one of Roosevelt's 'Four Policemen'.

[23] That is, Soviet economic, technological, social, and ideological achievements looked increasingly jaded and stagnant.

This is a significant flaw for three reasons, firstly, it assumes that the political roles of these other actors are irrelevant to major power relations, secondly, it ignores that these actors can meaningfully contribute economic and military capabilities, and thirdly, forgets that many of the disputes which arise between major powers centre on these actors. In the Cold War, the foreign policies of Britain, France, West Germany, and China, meaningfully altered the foreign policies of the United States and Soviet Union, at times restraining, at others emboldening behaviour, as well as substantively altering the content of policy[24]. Clearly each of these states – and many others – contributed significant economic and military capabilities to their respective superpower allies[25]. One of the central considerations of the Cold War was to which superpower Western European[26] states had allegiance to, since their populations, economic activity, and military capabilities could shift the balance between the superpowers. Moreover, the age of empire, a long period of often intense competition for control of territory beyond the metropole, explicitly recognized the importance of non-major powers to their politics. Non-major powers – small states, colonies, and territories – are meaningful for the balance of power between major powers, and their absence from power politics accounts leads to significant oversights in understanding the behaviour of major powers, including rising powers, and for the probability of major interstate war.

[24] For example, West Germany's pursuit of *Ostpolitik* under Willy Brandt led to a substantial reduction of East-West tensions in Europe (Hanhimäki 2010). Soviet policy altered, since West Germany officially recognized the borders of Eastern Europe and renounced the use of force, key demands stemming from fear of a future revanchist West Germany. American policy also altered, since a less confrontational approach could yield positive results.
[25] In some cases, and particularly with regards most of the members of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, this might be more accurately termed vassalage.
[26] Over the Cold War, other regions, particularly East Asia and the Middle East would increasingly be understood in similar terms, though never quite as totally as Western Europe.

Power transition theory, by focusing on relations between the dominant and challenger state, means that it is not suitable for understanding the rises of states below the threshold of potential hegemons. Applied to the contemporary system, China and India are both commonly labelled as rising powers[27], yet, they are of quite different types. Despite protestations to the contrary, China is, by any material metric, a major power, and has been so for some time[28]. Today, it is the second most powerful state, and by some projections will rival the United States in terms of conventional military capabilities, economic reach, and nuclear weapon number and sophistication over the short to medium term, to say nothing of the possible technological edge established in missile technology and cyber weapons[29]. Power transition theory assesses this without problems: China is the challenger to the dominance of the United States. By contrast, India is clearly not *the* challenger to the United States. At best it is *a* challenger, but this terminology is far from satisfactory, given that India does not meaningfully rival the United States (yet) in any conventional type of material, or non-material, power. Rather, India is rising from below the threshold to be considered a major power, and as such, may join their ranks[30]. Power transition theory has

[27] The gap to the 'next' rising power, that is, the next most likely candidate to either join the ranks of the major powers, is substantial. Brazil is typically thought of as this state, and certainly it is on a rising trajectory, however, it is not obviously more powerful than some non-major powers – Italy, Turkey, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Indonesia – or only is so to a limited extent. The case selection section in this chapter deals with this question directly.

[28] Obviously an exact date does not exist. At the latest though, China was clearly a major power by the early 2000s, but much earlier than this, its economic size, military capabilities, nuclear weapons, and permanent position on the UN Security Council likely already made it one.

[29] Given the clandestine nature of such weapons, which perhaps share more with espionage than conventional military capabilities, given that they must remain hidden and unknown (if feared) to remain potent, it is of course very difficult to assess cyber capabilities. A recent report from the Belfer Center attempting to quantify state cyber capabilities in the National Cyber Power Index ranks the United States as having the most complete capabilities, followed by China (Voo et al. 2020, 11). More striking, given typical media coverage, is that Russia is ranked fourth, behind Britain, and that the rest of the top-10 comprises Western democracies. Whilst the gap between the material capabilities of these states and non-Western rivals may be more substantial, implying relative gains in the cyber domain, superiority looks doubtful. The report is clear though that information on capabilities and intentions varies greatly between states (2020, 16–18).

[30] India, at least in terms of conventional military capabilities, economic size, and through its nuclear weapons, is already approximately as powerful as the weakest of those typically considered to be great (or at least major) powers: Britain, France, Germany, or Japan. The debate over India's status tends to focus on social and

little to say about such changes. Of course, the theory does not set out to do so, but, an additional major power is of systemic importance, and the underlying processes of rising from below the major powers, or rising within them, are clearly comparable. Both are about the rapid and significant growth of material power relative to other major powers, the difference may be scale or consequence. It is dangerous though to simply assume that only those rising from within the major powers could be associated with major interstate wars, systemic wars, or a collapse of international order. Neither interwar Italy nor Japan were potential hegemons[31] but both contributed to the onset of the collapse of the interwar order, and did so long before they were allies of Germany. Moreover, they did so by seeking to dominate or annex the territory of non-major powers, most notably Ethiopia for Italy, and China for Japan.

In summary, in understanding the association between rising powers and major interstate war purely as a function of major power relations, whether this be the balance of power or power transition theory, a significant analytical and empirical straightjacketing occurs.

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institutional recognition, rather than in terms of material capabilities. A potentially crucial marker would be if the UN Security Council reformed to make India a permanent member (presumably, though not necessarily, also with veto power). Of all potential candidates for permanent membership, India's is the most compelling, given its size, trajectory, and non-Western culture. The other claimants, all part of the G4 which mutually support each other's membership, are Western states (Germany and Japan) meaning that their interests are typically well-served by the P3, or have a far less robust material claim (Brazil). If India continues to rise, and the Security Council is not reformed in its favour, then this could spell disaster, since in such a scenario a materially powerful state, with significant interstate disputes with neighbours (Pakistan and China), would have less stake in the international order, and greater incentive to unilaterally seek to alter the status quo.

[31] Though Germany is often classified as a potential hegemon, it should be remembered that in order for Germany to dominate Europe that this necessitated the defeat or subservience of *four* other major powers. Harrison shows that in 1938 German GDP, in 1990 international dollars, was $351 billion, with a population of 69 million (1998, 3). The same metrics for the other European major powers were: Britain ($284 billion; 48 million), France ($186 billion; 42 million), Italy ($141 billion; 43 million), and the Soviet Union ($359 million; 167 million), excluding overseas empires (1998, 3–7). Based on these values, Germany did not appear poised to become a European hegemon. That it came close to doing so during World War Two has coloured analysis and is ex-post reasoning. Examined in the mid-1930s, such a goal appeared highly unlikely to be achieved. It took a diplomatic revolution in the shape of the collapse of the Stresa Front in 1935, and the 1939 Pact of Steel and Nazi-Soviet Pact, for a German path to victory and European domination to open up.

Rising powers are a phenomenon broader than power transition theory allows, and both approaches are dismissive of the roles of non-major powers in major power relations. Rather, these actors are significant, even to a dyadic analysis of major powers, because they alter the bargaining between them, because they form the subject and content of disputes, and because these actors themselves are political actors. Though their influence may be less than that of a major power, it is rarely zero, meaning that the foreign policies of major powers are shaped by the wants and needs of others.

Status dissatisfaction

Rather than material balances between states shaping threat perceptions, or material benefits incentivizing war, instead, conflict may centre on self-image, that is, state foreign policies may be shaped around what their leaders believe their state should aspire to (Larson 2018; Larson and Shevchenko 2014; Ward 2017b; 2020a; 2020b; Renshon 2017; 2016). This literature predominantly centres on non-rational individual concerns about identity which scale to the level of the state, largely through the actions of state leaders. The threat posed by rising powers is thereby understood as dissatisfaction not merely with the distribution of material goods (though this is important), but also with the rules which underpin that distribution, as well as their role in creating, maintaining, and enforcing these rules. The literature on status, as relevant to rising powers, seeks to explain the origins of revisionism (Davidson 2006), and so moves beyond characterizations of all rising powers as being revisionist, an issue which the literature on power tends to gloss over.

Furthermore, war may be the result of status dissatisfaction, that is, states that have lower social rank than they believe they are due, or those that believe their rank to be imperilled, may utilize war as a means of improving or maintaining their rank (Galtung 1964; Onea

2014). Status dissatisfaction is shown to have a positive effect upon the onset of war by a large number of studies including Wallace (1971), Midlarsky (1975), Volgy and Mayhall (1995), Lebow (2010), Maoz (2011), and Renshon (2017); though Ray (1974) finds no relationship. Barnhart, meanwhile, argues that military humiliation can call a state's status into question, and thereby, contribute to risky and aggressive foreign policy with a view to reasserting a claim to a higher status (2017; 2020; 2021)[32]. The implications for rising powers are clear. Rising powers tend to accumulate material power faster than they are accommodated by the other major powers, leading to a disjuncture between their material position and social rank. When diplomatic means of resolving this inconsistency are unsuccessful or ignored, then such states may turn to war, with the goals of demonstrating their superior capabilities, and gaining social status by forcing other major powers to engage with them at higher rates than previously. Conversely, dominant actors may be perceive their privileged social position as being in jeopardy, and thereby utilize war as a means of reasserting their position. Despite these important insights, questions remain, particularly in terms of the level of analysis, and generalizability.

The level of analysis problem concerns how an analyst moves from an individual's ideas about the identity of a state, and presumably the degree to which this identity is recognized by others, to the level of the state. In a highly centralized authoritarian regime this problem is reduced: the causal mechanism is clear, since the distinction between a dictator such as Stalin and the foreign policy of the state is relatively small. Such cases are rare, and it is implausible to assume that state identity, and the resultant foreign policy (that is, the degree of dissatisfaction and a decision to make war) does not involve multiple individuals, with

[32] This also suggests a potentially cyclical relationship between war and status dissatisfaction.

potentially competing ideas about state identity[33]. Therefore, an aggregation process – 'the politics of making policy' (Ward 2017b, 47) – and an explanation for how a coherent narrative emerges, is required.

Ward offers such a process, saying that: 'Unlike other accounts that posit status as an interest that unitary actors pursue strategically, I argue that status concerns often influence policy through pressure on leaders from those outside the regime, and that status immobility serves as a potent weapon for hard-liners to deploy against moderates' (2017b, 6). This not only provides an account of how views may be aggregated – through domestic competition[34] – but also provides an important link between the international and domestic, that is, how elites in a rising power react to the inability, unwillingness, or ignorance of the major powers to accommodate their distributive and normative demands[35]. Ward suggests that there are 'two kinds of leaders – moderates, who prefer policies of pragmatic caution; and hardliners, who prefer more aggressive expansionist policies' (Ward 2017b, 24). Each must win the support of other elites and the public to enact their policies, and hardliners are advantaged

[33] A particularly helpful critique on this point is provided by Ward who is critical of the poor applicability of 'social identity theory' by Larson and Shevchenko (2003; 2010; 2014) to states, since this is 'a social psychological framework…intended to explain how individuals manage status anxiety originating in group membership' (2017b, 47) not to explain how states manage status concerns. See also Ward (2017a) for further critique of the uses of social identity theory in international relations.

[34] A parallel may be drawn here with Snyder's influential account of how domestic political competition culminates in over-reach due to logrolling of interests (1991), the crucial difference being that for Ward, the origins of aggression and revisionism are attributable to specific individuals (or interest groups), whereas for Snyder, they are the largely unintended by-product of forming ad hoc domestic coalitions to advance (often) private interests.

[35] Though Ward applies his theory to rising powers, since these states are more likely to have normative and distributive demands based around changes in the relative balance of power, the theory may be applied more generally. This is both a strength and a weakness. It allows analysis of revisionist states, like contemporary Russia, which are not in any material sense rising powers. However, it also suggests that revisionism could emerge in almost any state and at any time, as long as the starting condition of status dissatisfaction exists. Being a rising power is one potential origin for such dissatisfaction, but is very plausibly not the only one. Adler-Nissen and Zarakol, for example, have recently argued that part of the challenge to the liberal international order, centred on democracies, is driven by the need for recognition by semi-peripheral autocracies (2021).

because status immobility favours their nationalist appeals (Ward 2017b, 48). The process via which status concerns coalesce into an expansionist foreign policy is clear, though the assumption of hardliners versus moderates is quite strong, with little space for domestic issues which may compete with foreign policy, nor for different foreign policy objectives intragroup[36].

The extent to which theories of status can be generalized is well recognized by some within the subfield. Ward notes that the 'literature on status in IR has not developed a comprehensive account of variation in the salience of status concerns' (2017b, 39), that is, what explains when and why status is causally related to some outcome of interest. The recognition of this issue is helpful in showing the current limits of theory. Many findings appear to be quite specific, in some cases coming close to being detailed descriptions of state foreign policy behaviour in some tightly defined context. This does not mean that the insights drawn are necessarily flawed – though they often rely on inductive reasoning, meaning the empirical support provided is not an evaluation of a theory, but rather, has driven it – but does mean it is difficult to apply the theory derived to other cases. It is often unclear what another case would even be, that is, what is the broader generalizable political phenomenon that is under study[37]. Nevertheless, the broad collective finding that status dissatisfaction is associated with the onset of war is an important contribution.

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[36] An important example of this is that though interwar Japanese policymakers (both civilian and military) can be grouped as moderates and hardliners, the hardliners can be further subdivided, particularly by the objectives they prioritized. The Army and its supporters favoured invasion of China, likely pitting Japan against the Soviet Union, whereas the Navy favoured targets in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, challenging the United States and Britain. Arguably, it was the disputes between different types of hardliner which had the greatest role in shaping foreign policy, rather than with moderates (Beasley 1989; Naraoka 2014; Mitani and Duus 1989). Notably, Japan attempted to achieve both Army and Navy objectives, with the result that resources were stretched, and enemies more numerous, and suggesting the importance of logrolling, domestic political coalitions, and institutional structure for explaining what appears to be a suboptimal policy outcome.

[37] Larson and Shevchenko's works on Russia and China (2010; 2003; 2014) fall into this category of work on status: highly detailed, but unclear as to the implications beyond these cases.

Bargaining failures

The foundation of this approach is Fearon's argument that as war is costly to both winners and losers, it is puzzling that adversaries are unable to reach a settlement pre-war (1995). The core insights from this are that bargaining failures occur for rational reasons: policymakers have incentivizes to misrepresent information, one or both parties cannot credibility commit to peace over the longer term, or that the dispute issue is zero sum. Fearon is dismissive of the latter, arguing that no issue is truly indivisible, since, even in seemingly intractable disputes – like control of Jerusalem and administration of holy sites – creative solutions can be found which effectively do divide the disputed good (in this case, joint sovereignty, shared control, or third party management), or side payments to provide compensation for the 'loss'. The result of Fearon's scepticism has been much greater emphasis upon information and commitment problems than issue indivisibility, though a notable literature has developed concerning psychological attachments to territory (Johnson and Toft 2013; Goddard 2006)[38].

The core of the information problem is that the dispute parties are incentivized to exaggerate and obfuscate their military capabilities and resolve to maximize their share of the disputed good (Slantchev and Tarar 2011; Morrow 1989). A bargaining failure occurs when the two sides are unable to locate a focal point for negotiation, meaning that the two sides do not agree on their relative military standing. Obfuscation occurs when, rather than seeking to

[38] An alternative approach has focused on specific issues as drivers of conflict, in essence to examine whether different disputed issues have a greater propensity to lead to militarized disputes, to escalate to war, and how intractable they are. The Issue Correlates of War project is notable here (Hensel and Mitchell 2007) which examines how territorial, maritime, and riverine disputes vary across these features. The essential argument being that issues matter for conflict, meaning that different mechanisms are more or less important or possible for generating and resolving war. This literature is discussed in more depth below under the steps to war.

exaggerate strength, one or both sides have strategic reasons for lulling their adversary into a perception of relative weakness. This is typically understood to be because revealing information about relative strength would allow negation by an adversary over some relatively short time span (Meirowitz and Sartori 2008).

Whereas the information problem is about today, the commitment problem concerns tomorrow. It emerges in two scenarios, with both focusing on problems of credibly showing that peace will be favoured over the longer term. The basic problem concerns changes in the relative balance of power (Chadefaux 2011; Tarar 2013). The side relatively rising seeks to reassure that no future renegotiation will take place, but since future intentions are unknown, even a sincere leader may find it impossible to convince a weaker adversary that they will not renege. The more specific issue concerns how the division of the disputed good itself affects the relative balance of power. If this disputed good has strategic value, perhaps due to the economic resources it contains, the population within it, or its location, then the balance of power will shift further in favour of the more powerful state. The weaker side thereby fears salami slicing, that is, that the additional advantage that the more powerful side has will be put to use in a renegotiation in which it is rational to concede further, in a process that ends with the more powerful side gaining all of the disputed good, or even annexing the weaker side entirely. This leads to a determination to fight today, since the balance of power is as favourable as it will ever be for the weaker side.

Weisiger (2013) argues forcefully for the role of commitment problems in creating particularly long and deadly wars, but that it comes in two different forms. Firstly, the situational commitment problem, explained above, which generates long and deadly wars since any outcome short of total defeat for the relatively declining state, or very high costs to the rising state, implies that the status quo balance of power remains, which is unacceptable to the declining state. The second type of commitment problem he identifies is the dispositional commitment problem. Here, one of the conflict parties perceives the other as not being deterred by the costs of war, meaning no credible commitment exists. Weisiger argues that when a state attacks another claiming a pre-emptive need, and the target had no such intention, then the target concludes that ‘the stated justifications are simply rhetorical cover for a preference for naked aggression’ (2013, 4). By contrast to these long and deadly struggles, wars driven by the information problem, or by domestic politics, are resolved comparatively swiftly and with less destruction, because the information revealed by fighting allows the updating of bargaining positions and enables citizens to press for leadership change.

The observable implications of these alternative mechanisms are important to delineate to allow adjudication[39]. Not only must standard measures of relative power – based on size of economies, military spending, or personnel – be clearly diverging, but policymakers, particularly in the relatively declining state, must be shown to be acting on this information. In addition for Weisiger’s dispositional commitment problem, evidence is required that policymakers in the aggressor were both convinced that they would be attacked if they did not act pre-emptively, and also that other interests[40] in the dispute were not present, or were at least secondary.

[39] It should be noted that substantial scepticism exists about whether these causal mechanisms can be observed (Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; Gartzke and Poast 2010; Powell 2020).
[40] For example, that control of a specific territory is sought for economic, strategic, or symbolic reasons.

Clearly, however, the commitment problems outlined above are well suited to the study of rising powers and war. The starting point for the situational version of the mechanism are concerns about relative power, and this reaches its apogee in the study of rising powers, since not only are relative growth rates very large, but the absolute capabilities that can be deployed are also amongst the highest for any state. Given a source of friction between a relatively rising, and relatively declining, state, the result is likely to be an inability to solve it through negotiation. The exhaustion of peaceful processes makes war more likely. Two further points are important here. Firstly, the difference between the situational commitment problem and power transition theory, and secondly, the lack of a trigger which actually leads to conflict. Power transition theory hypothesizes that the cause of war is change in the relative balance of power, whereas for the situation commitment problem the cause is some issue in dispute, which the relative balance of power prevents resolution. This is an important difference: for the former relative power is the cause of war, whereas for the latter relative power prevents the satisfactory resolution of disputes which leaves war as the remaining option.

The dispositional commitment problem also offers insight into rising powers and war. This is chiefly because pre-emptive attack is a possibility for great powers, and fear of such an attack an oft-hypothesized concern for rising powers. This means Weisiger's starting points – of war pre-emptive attack because war is feared – is plausible. Though he applies his theory to a broader range of cases, it seems particularly suited to the interaction of rising powers and great powers. The second element of this theory, that war aims shift toward total victory, the removal of leaders, and the remaking of domestic society, as the attacker is understood to be nakedly aggressive and thereby cost insensitive, applies less convincingly. This is because it relies on the target state having no intention to attack the aggressor, which leads to the conclusion that they are the target of naked aggression. Yet, relations between a rising and declining power are unlikely to be without friction, rather, it is highly likely that over the years – even decades – that a rise takes place that both sides place faith in rearmament and allies. Clearly, to the adversary, this looks like hostile behaviour, even if justified in terms of security concerns.

The steps to war

Whereas explanations for which rely on bargaining failures, status dissatisfaction, power politics, or domestic politics, rely on single factors[41] to explain variation in war and peace, the steps to war literature argues for causal complexity. The aim of theorists located within this approach is to build links between different factors, which may operate at different levels of analysis, and thereby provide a larger understanding of war. In practice, this has meant a focus on specific issues, as a core claim of the research agenda is that issues condition conflict behaviour. Much of the literature has focused on the issue of territorial disputes, and how a pathway opens up via which war is a plausible outcome.

Territory is important to states due its strategic value, economic resources, or symbolic importance (Vasquez 1993; 2009), and war is understood as being appropriate[42] in certain circumstances as a means of regulating relationships. Due to the high political salience of territorial disputes, peaceful resolution is rare (Dreyer 2010; Hensel et al. 2008; Owsiak and

[41] Though typically conditioned on other factors, or limited by scope conditions.
[42] The logic here relies on English School understandings of international society which argue that institutions exist to limit the disorder implied by anarchy and allowing states to pursue interests via means other than military force (Bull 2012; Butterfield, Wight, and Bull 1966; Wight 1978). At least three different categories of institutions constrain and enable behaviour, firstly, international law, secondly, the dyadic interaction of states which generates expectations about future behaviour and its appropriateness, and thirdly, domestic institutions which influence foreign policy by adjudicating between interests and channelling resources and attention (Owsiak 2018).

Mitchell 2019)[43]. The failure of peaceful negotiation – bargaining failure – results in a reliance on coercive threats (Gibler 2012; Hensel 1996; 2000; Hensel et al. 2008; Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Owsiak 2012; 2019; Tir and Diehl 2002), which make escalation to war more likely (Holsti 1991; Toft 2014; Vasquez and Henehan 2001). Meanwhile, at the domestic level, repeated hostile interactions lead to a perception of rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Vasquez and Leskiw 2001) with the result that hardliners come to dominate (Hutchison 2011; Leng 1983; Miller 2013; Vasquez 2009), which further enhances the need policy of threat making and reinforces rivalry. Due to the high level of militarization, rivalry, and bellicose domestic political environments, both states seek allies (Kang 2017; Senese and Vasquez 2008) and invest in their militaries (Rider 2013; Rider, Findley, and Diehl 2011; Sample 2002), creating a security dilemma. In summary, the steps of having a territorial dispute, the emergence of rivalry, the development of arms races, and making common cause with allies, significantly increase the risk of war[44].

The steps to war clearly apply for linking rising powers to war, since territorial disputes, rivalries, alliances, and arms races are all possible for rising powers. Moreover, the theory plausibly allows examination of how competition over subordinates provide a mechanism for war with other major powers. Rather than beginning with a territorial dispute between

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[43] In an important development to this research agenda, Huth, Croco, and Appel (2011; 2012; 2013) show how international law can be used provide a focal point for bargaining, and how third-party arbitration processes can mitigate the domestic political costs of conceding in a territorial dispute. It should be noted, that arbitration is entirely voluntary, as is submission to the International Court of Justice (where admissible), meaning that these processes do not necessarily conclude.

[44] The extent to which these steps are taken in order, or not, is disputed by theorists. Though Owsiak (2018) concludes that there is not a determinative series of steps to war, he also notes that the starting point for Senese and Vasquez (2005; 2008) is a territorial dispute, and the final step prior to war is an arms race, meaning that only the ordering of rivalry and alliances is left unspecified. Sample (2014) argues not only do territorial disputes frequently provide the justification for a pre-determined war (a topic developed more fully by Weisiger (2013), and examined above), but also that many wars occur in the same year that a territorial dispute emerges. This suggests insufficient time has passed for the 'steps' to have taken place (most obviously, the development of rivalry, but also alliances and arms races).

two states, instead, the issue in question is influence over subordinates by rising and major powers. When this is in dispute, because a rising power has sought to limit the access of other major powers, then a potential pathway to war emerges. Rivalry between a rising and major power can emerge when the subordinate is either a state, or a non-state polity (most importantly, a colony). Anglo-Russian tensions during the Great Game, in which the expansion of Russia into Central Asia during the late nineteenth century lead to concern for British control of India, and Soviet-American tensions in Europe in the early Cold War largely conform to descriptions of interstate rivalry. Not only were there repeated disputes, many of which were militarized, but diplomacy appeared to have failed, leaving coercive threats, and the strengthened domestic political positions of hardliners[45]. In neither case, however, did outright war result[46], though wars were certainly fought by Britain[47] and Russia in the late nineteenth century, and by the United States and Soviet Union in the early Cold War.

Alliances and arms races could also form steps in this pathway to war. The prelude to World War One features elements of both, most notably the creation of the two alliance blocs, and the Anglo-German naval arms race. Yet, disaggregating whether this was driven by competition for subordinates, threats to home territory, or by a reaction to the rapidly shifting balance of power, is clearly difficult. It is likely that for different states, different threats

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[45] For example, the Second Red Scare in the United States during the late 1940s and 1950s, clearly led to the persecution of those sympathetic to communism and socialism (as well as many merely suspected of this) and created a political climate hostile to anything but a strong response to the Soviet Union and communism.

[46] Britain and Russia did fight in the Crimean War (1853-56), but this was comparatively early in the Great Game. In this dissertation, Russia is classed as a rising power 1860-90, and Britain from 1816-56. Analysis, therefore, would need to focus on how Britain, as a rising power, contributed to rivalry with Russia in Central Asia, culminating in the Crimean War. However, since rivalry arguably intensified post-1856, it seems rather that war contributed to rivalry, rather than rivalry leading to war.

[47] For example, Britain fought the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), Russia fought the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78), the United States fought the Korean War (1950-53), and the Soviet Union fought the Hungarian Revolution (1956).

mattered more, but that the simultaneous rise and entanglement made diplomacy particularly difficult to pursue. For example, the rise of Germany, though certainly upsetting the European balance of power, and posing a direct threat to the home territory of France and Russia, had a significant impact upon Britain because of the potential threat to the British Empire. The construction of the *Hochseeflotte* in conjunction with *Weltpolitik* challenged British naval supremacy, which if lost, would allow Germany to isolate Britain from its empire, which was a critical component of British power, since it supplied raw materials, gave markets for exports, furnished overseas bases, and provided soldiers.

The above reinterpretation of the steps to war literature to consider subordinate monopolization rather than territorial disputes provides insight into the topic of this dissertation, yet, the core argument of this literature is for causal complexity. In contrast to the theory of subordinate monopolization, which focuses on a specific pathway to war, the literature articulates multiple pathways. Therefore, the theory section of this chapter articulates a potential pathway from subordinate monopolization through to war, which is then empirically evaluated in the case study chapters.

Domestic political institutions

Competition for power and for the distribution of goods at the domestic level occurs in all regimes. Liberal theorists have consistently argued that the origins of foreign policy preferences are located in domestic interests and institutions (Moravcsik 1997; Milner 1997; Simmons and Goemans 2021), meaning that to understand war means a theoretical understanding of the roles of institutions and the foundation of these domestic interests. The primary second image literature in international relations is that examining the role of regime type in shaping war decisions. Though this literature emerged to explain the dyadic democratic peace – that is, that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against each other[48] – it has since evolved to become a comprehensive account of how different domestic political institutional structures constrain and enable conflict behaviours. Theories come in two primary forms, firstly, the monadic claim that democracies are more peaceful in their foreign policies than non-democracies, and secondly, the dyadic claim that democracies are more peaceful in interaction with other democracies but not with other regime types.

Significant theoretical work, and empirical evidence, suggests that variation in regime type – both structure and norms – shapes foreign policy by defining interests, framing threats, supporting cooperation, and demonstrating credibility (Russett and Oneal 2001; Doyle 1986b; Maoz and Russett 1993; Huth 1999; Huth and Allee 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Siverson and Bueno de Mesquita 2018; Weeks 2014; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Claar and Ripsman 2016; Christensen 1992). However, despite many compelling arguments, little consensus exists[49], and significant opposition to the importance of regime type to international conflict remains[50]. Findings that democracies are more likely to use

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[48] As well as debatable cases where democracies have fought each other – the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States, 1812-14; the Cenepa War between Ecuador and Peru, 1995; and the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, 1999 – Rosato (2003) has argued that democracies have regularly interfered in the domestic politics of other democracies with the intention of supporting rebels, fomenting coups, and deposing governments. However, recent work by Grauer and Tierney (2022) find that democracies are actually very unlikely to support rebel groups fighting against democratically elected governments.

[49] An additional problem with much of the (broadly defined) democratic peace literature is that empirical findings are typically dyadic, for example, that democracies are more peaceful in interaction with other democracies, and yet, theoretical explanations are typically monadic, for example, that accountability to the electorate who bear the costs of war constrains the use of force by leaders. For recent criticism of this, see Gill-Tiney (2022, 421–22).

[50] For example, the counterarguments that the effect of democracy is really the effect of the 'territorial peace' (Gibler 2012; Gibler and Tir 2014; Owsiak 2012; Huth, Croco, and Appel 2013; Hensel 1996), dangerous dyads (Buhaug 2005), nuclear weapons (Waltz 1990), alliances (Kydd 2005; Spiro 1994), the relative balance of power (Layne 1994; Rosato 2003), major power political settlements (McDonald 2015), or that it has a substantively insignificant effect (Desch 2002). Additionally, a large body of work suggests that regime type is at best a partial explanation, and that other factors matter more, or are critical, including economic ties (Gartzke 2007; Schneider and Gleditsch 2010; McDonald 2009; 2010; N. K. Kim 2014; Hegre 2000; Mousseau 2013; Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal 2003), contractual relations (Mousseau and Xiongwei 2018), and

force or to target civilians can be contrasted with the opposite (Downes 2008; Reiter and Stam 2002). Similarly, onset, escalation, military effectiveness, and the resolution of conflict appear to be uncertainly related to regime type (Reiter 2009; Sullivan 2012; Talmadge 2015; Henderson and Bayer 2013; Reiter and Stam 1998; McNabb Cochran and Long 2017; Desch 2008). Other work has suggested that certain subsets of the democracy-autocracy dichotomy are particularly conflict prone, variously termed as anocracies, consolidating democracies, revolutionary states or competitive authoritarian regimes (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2005; Walt 1996; Levitsky and Way 2010; Colgan and Weeks 2015; J. L. Snyder 2000)[51]. Overall, the relationships between regime type and conflict behaviour are multifaceted, but the core claims most relevant to this dissertation concern the macro claims that regime type shapes participation in war. Therefore, the rest of this section particularly examines the monadic, and especially dyadic[52], claims and their relevance to rising powers.

Regime type may alter the likelihood of a rising power entering into a war in either a monadic or dyadic pathway. The core theoretical claims in a monadic pathway revolve around a combination of veto players[53], audience costs[54], and an expectation that compromise is normal, favouring peaceful resolution of disputes. This means that

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intergovernmental relations (Appel 2018; Kinne 2013b; 2013a; Prorok and Appel 2014; Poast and Urpelainen 2018).

[51] Walter has recently similarly argued that countries most prone to civil war are also located between the extremes of democracy and autocracy, since in the former individuals have less cause to rebel (and alternative venues for political expression exist), and in the latter repression deters and prevents rebellion (2022). Overall, therefore, it may be that such states are consistently more conflict prone, no matter the type of conflict examined. Contrary to these findings, Thompson and Tucker find that democratic transitions do not heighten conflict risk (1997).

[52] Dyadic claims have far greater empirical support than monadic claims (Oneal and Russet 1997; Quackenbush and Rudy 2009; Hegre 2014; Müller and Wolff 2004).

[53] Bellicose executives are constrained by legislatures which tend to control budgets, and in some cases may also have control over war making powers (for instance, calling up reservists). Courts and the media can also provide further constraint, by querying and scrutinizing the march to war from legal and normative standpoints.

[54] Leaders that seek re-election are wary of unpopular policies, and wars tend to become unpopular due to the costs they impose through death and treasure.

democracies are more likely to be peaceful in their foreign policies relative to non-democracies. The core claims of dyadic pathways are essentially modifications of this: that these mechanisms apply when there is recognition of a shared democratic identity, and that otherwise, coercive threats will be relied upon.

This suggests two possible observable implications. Firstly, if the dyadic democratic peace holds, then leaders of democratic major powers should make references to the rising power being democratic, and furthermore, claim that this is positive. More bellicose voices in democratic major and rising powers should be constrained by other actors highlighting the ability to compromise. By contrast, if the rising power is non-democratic, then in a dispute with a democratic major power, policymakers in the latter should not make positive reference to its regime type, and instead suggest the difficulty of bargaining. Secondly, and in contrast, if shifts in the relative balance of power overcome the dyadic democratic peace, veto players should make similar arguments with regards the need to respond with threats in a dispute, meaning regime type has no impact upon the probability of war.

Though political entrepreneurs can emerge in any state, rising powers may be more prone to this, since the abundance of material resources, and nationalist forces unleashed[55], may create more opportunities for personal advancement. Schweller argues that 'emerging powers, which, though expected to show competitive international faces, are more inward-looking, if not wholly distracted by domestic politics, than outwardly focused…[because]…sudden and dramatic national growth induces massive social and

[55] Schulz explains that during the wave of unrest and revolution which spread across Europe in the 1848-51 period that policymakers in France, Prussia and Austria struggled to contain the nationalist forces unleashed, and were deeply concerned that they might force war with another major power (2003).

political dislocations' (2015). The argument made here is clearly analogous to those made by Mansfield and Snyder (2005; 1995), Walt (1996), and Colgan and Weeks (2015) on revolutionary and democratizing states. Plausibly, therefore, the effect of dyadic democratic peace may be subsumed by domestic political instability which could allow bellicose leaders to issue threats, and even start wars.

A monadic effect may also be observed in non-democracies. Weiss and Wallace theorize that core to the foreign policy of China is the degree to which an international issue impacts the prospects for governmental survival. Foreign policy, then, is less about the national interest, and more about the Chinese Communist Party, the Politburo, and especially Xi Jinping. Though it is far from surprising that policy is driven by personal interests[56], the implications for bargaining are potentially important. Similarly, Pu argues that domestic political calculations have driven China's leaders to take more assertive stances in international diplomacy (2017, 147–48). Recognition that a core motivation of an adversary is private interests, rather than public, may alter the tone and content of negotiations. In particular, it may be possible for a compromise to be structured around reassurances on regime, or personal, security and prestige[57]. Again though, it is unclear that this is something unique to rising powers, and Chiozza and Goemans (2011), Goemans (2000), and Croco (2015; 2011) examine related phenomena from the perspective of all states, and find important differences by regime type and institutional structure.

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[56] It is worth noting the clear relationship between Weiss and Wallace's arguments, which are largely applied to political economy, have to a similar literature on the relationship between regime security (or incumbent election prospects) and war, particularly, Chiozza and Goemans (2011), Goemans (2000), and Croco (2015; 2011).
[57] In very high stakes disputes, a dictator may find themselves stuck between a low chance of military victory and presumed continued personal security, and a high chance of irregular removal potentially resulting in death. Offering these leaders an 'out' may avoid unnecessary war, or the continuation of a war.

Hierarchy

Though the hierarchy literature does not articulate an argument for explaining the link between rising powers and war, it offers important insights into the diversity of units within the international system, and thereby, has informed the theory developed in this dissertation. The hierarchy literature challenges the assumptions of anarchy and sovereignty common to much of the field of international relations. Rather than interstate interactions being between like units, this literature instead argues that the units that comprise the international system are functionally heterogeneous (Donnelly 2000; 2017). This is theorized in a number of ways.

Firstly, that avowedly non-state actors can have causally important roles in international relations, be they NGOs, MNCs, international organizations (Stroup and Wong 2017), other groups, or individuals. This approach has largely sought to challenge the standard historical account of the emergence of the states-system which argues for the primacy of states in international relations since 1648, driven by their superior means of generating prosperity and providing security (Tilly 1992; Spruyt 1994). Instead, the roles of private actors are detailed, often acting as quasi-sovereigns (Srivastava 2022), and attention is drawn to the enduring existence and roles of empire (Hobson and Sharman 2005; Phillips and Sharman 2015; Nexon 2009; Chong 2012)[66]. Secondly, even amongst actors of the same class – states – significant variation exists in the functions they perform (Krasner 1999; Jackson 1990;

[66] At the very least, these accounts are correct in noting that it was only in the interwar period, and more likely post-1945, that the majority of the world's population lived in states. Moreover, during the nineteenth century, many European states were simultaneously states as well as metropoles for substantial overseas empires.

Cooley 2005; Cooley and Spruyt 2009; Pouliot 2016)[67]. Thirdly, functions within any specific territory may be shared (Dillon Savage 2021; 2020), or divided and cross-cutting (Mattern and Zarakol 2016; Goh 2008; 2013; 2014). Fourthly, arguments vary on the extent to which functional variation is driven by sovereignty transfers, processes via which states agree through treaty to one state having rights and duties within the territory of another (Lake 2007; 2009), or via threat and coercion (Triska 1986).

Collectively, these insights inform the conceptualization of relationships between powerful states, rising and major powers, and less powerful actors, subordinates, in the international system. In particular, this dissertation claims that rising and major powers frequently claim rights to functions not granted to others, for example, military basing rights and control of economic resources in subordinates. The emergence of such relationships between a rising power and a subordinate is frequently part of monopolization, and leads to contestation by other major powers, heightening the risk of war.

The literature has very broad applicability within international relations, enabling examination of a very wide range of phenomena and of actors[68], but crucially, does not offer

[67] Sharman is a notable sceptic of this conclusion, arguing that even contemporary micro-states and self-governing territories closely approximate the functions of states, leading to the finding that there is surprisingly little hierarchy in the international system (2017).
[68] The insights for the study of rising powers are varied, but have tended to focus on the ability of non-Western states, often also viewed as being culturally distinct, to be recognized as part of the 'club' (the major powers, the liberal international order, or a more specific formulation like the G7). Commonly, therefore, a singular hierarchy is assumed, in which actors are networked, with nodal actors being superior in function and number of connections (Suzuki 2008; Naylor 2019, 154; Nayar and Paul 2003). This approach to hierarchy oversimplifies several related aspects of the international system. Firstly, and as Suzuki argues, multiple subaltern sources of social legitimacy may exist, allowing actors to seek recognition from different hierarchies and in different ways (2017). In practice, this means subordinate states may seek recognition from the United States, China, Russia, Europe, or a combination thereof. Secondly, the common focus on social recognition misses that whilst subordinates have some agency, that the material needs and wants of major powers in competition with each other also shape the contours of hierarchies. Thirdly, and building on Dillon Savage,

a clear explanation for war. However, both Cooley (2005), and especially Lake (2009) suggest how hierarchies might impact wars. Cooley explains that the organizational form that colonial and occupational hierarchies take are influenced by ‘competitive external pressures, including war and other forms of external security threats’ (2005, 30). This dissertation reverses this relationship, instead arguing that functional form of relationships between rising powers and subordinates influences the onset of wars with other major powers. Lake meanwhile notes that post-1945 subordinates of the United States spent less on defence than they otherwise would have (2009, 148–49), suggesting that the former was providing security against external aggression from the Soviet Union/Russia. In addition, he explains how when Britain declared war in both world wars, that its colonial subordinates were also at war[69] (2009, 58).

Definitions and concepts

Rising powers and major powers

Definitions, conceptualizations and operationalizations of what a rising power is remain remarkably absent from many academic works on the topic. Without clear definitions the field continues to rely on ‘common sense’ or broad collective agreement as to which countries are rising powers with the obvious problem that the field may be talking past itself and distancing policymakers from conclusions. In this section, the conceptual problem is

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some subordinates may exist in multiple hierarchies simultaneously, that is, multiple major powers may jointly dominate (2021).

[69] Interestingly, this looked quite different in 1939 than in 1914 as a result of the 1931 Statute of Westminster. Four of the Dominions – Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa – independently declared war on Germany in September 1939. Arguably, this signalled stronger support for Britain and British security than in 1914 when these states lacked control of foreign and security policy. Newfoundland, the fifth Dominion, was being administered directly, following public finance crises during the 1930s, and so lacked the right to declare war. In addition, and somewhat surprisingly, India, and more intriguingly, Tonga, a British protectorate and monarchy, also separately declared war, though the former was formally at war due to Britain’s declaration.

outlined before proposing a conceptualization and operationalization which focuses on relative capabilities which identifies 13 rising power cases between 1816 and 2010.

Recent works on rising powers by Goddard (2018)[74], Edelstein (2017), Allison (2017) and Paul (2016), and on rising regional powers by Montgomery (2016), devote little or no space to such definitions. Works on international order and unipolarity by Mearsheimer (2018), Monteiro (2014), and Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) hint at definitions, and certainly rely on the concept for explaining the behaviour of major powers, but do not directly deal with a definition. Finally, classic works by Gilpin (1981), Kennedy (1989), and Mearsheimer (2001) detail underlying material changes in relative capabilities and how this impacts the interstate bargaining of major powers, without a specific definition of what a rising power is, and is not. This lack of clarity is more than mere semantics since without clear conceptual delineation and operationalization the differences between approaches are obfuscated and the value to policymakers diminished.

I define rising powers by comparing their absolute and relative capabilities to those of the major powers. This is achieved by considering three factors: military spending[75], GDP, and GDP per capita. To be classed as a rising power a state must approximate the level of the weakest major power in absolute terms in at least two[76] of these categories. These factors

[74] Goddard's operationalization is included in the notes to chapter 2 (see p. 205, note 48). In brief, it relies on assessments of relative power derived from GDP estimates and the Composite Index of National Capabilities (taken from the Correlates of War). However, the actual operationalization is unfortunately not shown.

[75] Military spending is the result of a policy choice, which therefore means it inevitably contains some information about a state's foreign policy preferences. Rising powers, by definition experiencing economic growth, have three options for military spending: 1) to hold it absolutely constant, 2) allow it to maintain the same relative share of GDP, or 3) to increase the relative share. This choice is a function of interests, foreign policy preferences, domestic political constraints, and international contest.

[76] Two, rather than all three, since the purpose is to merely exclude states with high growth rates but low absolute levels in all three (for example, Singapore post-2000). This also captures differences between the policy choices of rising powers, particularly with regards military spending.

capture key aspects of rising powers, firstly, in terms of their present military capabilities (military spending), and secondly, in terms of their ability to sustain higher levels of military spending should this be required. This second aspect, sometimes referred to as 'latent' power, is ideally achieved through having both a high GDP and a high GDP per capita, but even being high in only one likely suggests an ability to spend more if required.

This merely suggests a level of capability comparable to the weakest major power. Therefore, in addition to this absolute threshold which must be approximated, a rising power can only be termed as such if the growth rate in these categories exceeds the average of the major powers over at least the medium-term. That is, is the state in question altering the relative balance of capabilities between major powers, or not. This approach has two clear benefits, firstly, it provides a universal, if basic, means of assessing relative capabilities which the field clearly accepts as being a key component of being a rising power, even if this is too rarely spelled out, and secondly, it provides an ability to define time periods more tightly in which certain states were accumulating material resources at faster rates than the average major power.

The second component that any definition of rising powers needs to take account of is whether the state is already considered to be a major power, or not. In the former case, this means that not only does the state have superior military and economic capabilities, but it is also one which has been accepted by others as being intrinsic to the functioning of the international system, oftentimes meaning privileged institutional roles. Whilst these two aspects do not move seamlessly together, as shall be seen below, the relationship is a reasonably tight, though arguably it is when there is dissonance that conflict may be more likely. In the latter case, this is typically a state rising from beneath the level of the major powers in terms of its military and economic capabilities, but looks likely to exceed the weakest of them, as above.

The established literature can be broadly divided into two approaches. Firstly, that which examines how the *addition* of a new major power upsets the balance. This approach utilizes the balance of power (and capabilities) as their core and explore how military build-ups and alliances impact the likelihood of war (Beckley 2015; Saunders 2015; Benson 2012; Leeds 2003; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000; Morrow 1993; Parent and Rosato 2015; G. H. Snyder 1997; 1984; Walt 1987; 1985; 1997). The second approach analyses how changes in the relative capabilities of *existing* major powers alter the likelihood of war (Morrow 1991; Shifrinson 2018; Avidit Acharya and Ramsay 2013; Jervis 1978; Glaser 1997; 1996). The balance of power may still be utilised, but a common alternative theoretical framework is power transition theory, that is, rather than conceptualizing the international system as being dominated by a group of states – the major powers – it is led by a single dominant actor. The rising power in this framework, therefore, is rising not to the level of the major powers, but instead toward the level of the dominant state. The emergence of an additional major power is a different process to a potential change in system leadership. In the contemporary world, China, at least materially, is certainly already a major power, but it is also one which is rising relative to all others[77]. In contrast, India is rising from beneath the level of the major powers but looks likely to join their ranks.

Two datasets, broadly considered to be canonical in their respective fields, are used for operationalization. The variable for military spending is taken from version six of the

[77] Here taken to be the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Japan.

Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), and those for GDP and per capita income are taken from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al. 2018) on comparative economic growth and income. To operationalize major powers the Correlates of War coding for major powers from the 2016 version of the State System Membership dataset (Correlates of War 2016) is utilized. These spells are shown in Figure 1. This is a classification based around scholarly consensus and intercoder reliability that emphasizes global military presence (Russet, Singer, and Small 1968). The most problematic cases are Japan and Germany during the Cold War and China post-World War Two. The former two are only coded as major powers from 1990 onwards, despite their economic capabilities surpassing those of Britain and France much earlier than this. Both are generally understood as being subordinate during the Cold War given the large numbers of foreign troops based in their territories, first as occupiers, and then as allies. It is often argued that it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the two could act independently once more, yet it was 15 years previously when fears of a resurgent Japan emerged in the United States (Keohane 1984). China meanwhile, though fighting impressively during the Korean War so shortly after the end of its civil war, remained far poorer[78] than the poorest major power – Britain or France – until well into the 1990s. Finally, the gap between the superpowers and any third state only widened during the Cold War, until Soviet economic stagnation and Japanese growth narrowed it somewhat. However, this is a classification scheme which largely holds to Waltz's conceptualization, which argued that a state must have ample territory, people, resources, economic power, military capabilities, as well as be both political stable and well governed to be a major power (Waltz 1979, 131).

[78] Though notably, did have significant military capabilities, albeit poorly equipped.

Figure 1: Major powers, 1816 – 2016



Two alternative conceptualizations of major powers require consideration. The first argues that what defines a major power[79] are defensive capabilities, often framed as whether a state could stave-off total defeat if attacked by the most powerful state. In the nuclear age, this means that any state with plausibly deliverable nuclear weapons would be considered a major power, with the result that beyond the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea[80] may also be classed as major powers. This classification is a rather dubious one, particularly when this excludes Japan and Germany, but also because by many material metrics Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are weaker than

[79] Much of the literature uses the term great power, as opposed to major power. The latter is used in the dissertation since the former is quite strongly bound up with status considerations, and may be framed around recognition, civilizational standards, and with important links to empire.
[80] Whether their nuclear weapons are plausibly deliverable is clearly up for debate. India and Israel have the most sophisticated delivery systems, but lack the capability to strike anywhere (though India will attain this capability in the near future by virtue of its nuclear submarine programme). Pakistan and North Korea have less advanced delivery systems.

many middle powers, like Brazil, Turkey, or South Korea. This approach, therefore, may provide useful categorization prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, but does not afterwards, since it is clear that two crucial elements are absent from such an approach: offensive capabilities[81] and political influence.

Monteiro argues that a more incisive definition of major powers is one that focuses on power projection capabilities, that is, 'a great power must possess the ability to engage unaided in sustained politico-military operations in at least one other relevant region of the globe beyond its own on a level similar to the most powerful state in the system' (Monteiro 2014, 44). This leads to his understanding that post-1990 the system is unipolar, since the United States' power projection capabilities dwarf all others[82]. This is not contended, but an alternative cut-point is to argue that any state able to sustain politico-military operations in another region is a major power. Few states have such capabilities, arguably, in addition to the United States, only Russia, China, Britain and France[83]. The coding produced by the Correlates of War is retained, despite the concerns discussed, to avoid accusations of fitting cases to outcomes, the very issue the existing literature has been criticized above for allowing[84].

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[81] Of course, this presupposes that offensive capabilities can clearly be identified (Van Evera 2013; Jervis 1978).

[82] Unipolarity makes balancing alliances impossible or prone to collapse (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; 2008), leaving only 'soft balancing' (Paul 2005; Walt 2009). Layne argues that unipolarity is inevitably fleeting (1993; 2006). Finally, Nye argues that a unipole requires the support of other states to legitimate behaviour (2002).

[83] Germany certainly lacks the requisite naval or aerial capabilities, and Japan may have the former, but likely not the latter. In addition, overseas bases clearly play a role in sustaining such operations, and again, these two lag significantly, though Japan does have such a base in Djibouti.

[84] An alternative coding scheme based around power projection capabilities would yield only limited differences to the Correlates of War list, and would clearly require careful definitions of what such capabilities look like in the age of sail. To this end, the work of Modelski and Thompson (1988) is invaluable, whilst Black provides a historical overview of seapower since 1500 (2009).

Having identified the major powers over the past 200 years, annual growth rates for military spending (Figure 2), GDP (Figure 3), and GDP per capita (Figure 4) can then be calculated for baseline comparison. Two very large single-year spikes in military spending can be seen in 1854 and 1915. The former is driven almost entirely by Britain, which increased military spending from £9 million in 1853 to a staggering £76 million in 1854. By contrast, the next largest expenditure in 1854 was Russia on £31 million, up from £20 million in 1853. The spike in 1915, meanwhile, is accounted for by the huge increases seen across all major powers as a result in World War One. As will be noted, no value is given for 1914 as this is the first year in which Correlates of War records the variable in US dollars instead of British pounds, meaning it cannot be compared to the value for 1913. Outside of these periods, World War Two and the Korean War are clearly identifiable, though intriguingly, the end of the Cold War and the dividend of peace is not obvious.

Figure 2: Major power military spending annual growth rates, 1817-2016



The most pronounced changes in the mean annual growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita are in response to two main things: the addition/reduction of a major power and the outbreak of war. For example, a huge spike can be seen in 1898 when the United States enters the dataset, with a large drop in 1914 being triggered by World War One. The turbulent post-World War One years and World War Two and its immediate aftermath also see dramatic swings as certain states and the number of major powers fell from seven in 1940 to just four in 1946, with only three maintaining their position throughout (Britain, the United States and Soviet Union).

Figure 3: Major power GDP annual growth rates, 1817-2016

Figure 4: Major power GDP/capita annual growth rates, 1817-2016



Having established baselines, the next step is to then compare potential rising powers to the absolute values and relative growth rates. As an example of this process, Figure 5 compares India and Brazil with the lowest major power defence spending, GDP, and GDP per capita, and India and Brazil's growth rates in each relative to the mean value for the major powers, over the 1990-2016 period. In absolute terms, Brazil and India essentially match the defence spending of the lowest major power[85] from 2005. India exceeds the smallest major power GDP[86] from the late 1990s, and Brazil matches it from 2010. Brazil has a higher GDP per capita than that of the lowest major power – China throughout – and though India's increases over the period, the divergence with China is striking. Russia is also included on this chart, as it has the second lowest GDP per capita of the major powers throughout the period, illustrating the large gap with China. In relative terms, India's defence spending annual

[85] China 1990-95, Britain 1996, Germany 1997-2004, Russia 2005-10, and Germany 2011-16.
[86] Britain 1990-94, France 1995-2008, and Britain 2009-16.

growth rate is higher than the average major power for most of the post-1996 era, though dips below in 2001-3, 2006, and 2010. Brazil’s is more volatile and is not consistently higher than that of the average major power. India’s GDP annual growth rate is higher than that of the average major power very consistently, but Brazil’s is again volatile. Finally, post-2000, India’s GDP per capita annual growth rate is consistently higher than that of the average major power, whilst Brazil’s is volatile, with some very notable periods of much lower growth in 1997-2005, and again from 2012.

Figure 5: Comparison of India and Brazil with the major powers, 1990-2016



Note: Panel 2, defence spending growth, starts at 1991 rather than 1991 as Brazil's value for 1990 is -403% due to a huge drop from 1989. To enable readability, this year is removed.

Summarizing this, India meets or exceeds the absolute threshold of the lowest major power for both defence spending and GDP, but not for GDP per capita. In relative terms, India exceeds the annual growth rate of the average major power for all three, leading to the conclusion that India is a rising power. By comparison, Brazil meets the absolute threshold for defence spending, GDP, and GDP per capita. However, none of the three annual growth rates, when compared with the average major power, are consistently higher, leading to the conclusion that Brazil is not a rising power[87]. The question for India, therefore, is over what time period it should be considered a rising power. There is clearly some ambiguity here, since a range of possibilities can plausibly be argued. The year 2000 is used here, since after this year India very consistently exceeds the annual growth rates for all three measures.

Applying this approach over the past 200 years yields 13 cases across eight states between 1816 and 2010, which are shown in Table 1 and Figure 6. As can be seen, rising powers are actually quite common, with only the years 1857-59 lacking any cases. Moreover, there are clear clusters of cases around the turn of the twentieth century and in the 1960s and 70s. This is likely because the method used here means that low (or even negative) growth rates in the major powers will result in the baseline for classifying a state as a rising power falling. In short, the turn of the twentieth century was a period of relative British decline, with the 1970s being the same for the United States. However, given that the concern here is relative change, and averages are being used, this means the data are not falsely capturing decline. An alternative specification examining decline in terms of lower than average growth rates amongst existing major powers would certainly produce a different series of cases and spells, though some overlap would be expected.

[87] Though, it is close to being classified as one. The clear issue is that Brazil's growth rates are inconsistent and volatile.

Table 1: Rising powers, 1816-2010

Rising power	Time period	Rising from
Britain	1816-1856	Within
Russia	1860-1890	Within
United States 1	1865-1900	Below then within
Germany 1	1880-1914	Within
Japan 1	1890-1937	Below then within
Italy	1900-1940	Within
United States 2	1920-1960	Within
Germany 2	1933-1939	Within
Soviet Union	1950-1970	Within
West Germany	1950-1990	Below
Japan 2	1960-1990	Below
China	1975-2010	Within
India	2000-2010	Below

Figure 6: Rising powers, 1816-2010



The spells identified in which states were rising powers in terms of the growth in their material capabilities relative to the major powers should not be understood as absolutes, that is, alternative means of conceptualizing and operationalizing what is meant by a major and rising power are possible. The start and end years are especially open to debate and so should not be understood as hard cut-offs, but instead as identifying periods in which cases were active. Crucially, however, the method outlined here passes a common sense test, that is, the cases identified are not surprising, nor are the omissions. This does suggest that this reasonably simple means of conceptualizing and operationalizing has recognized the core underlying concepts of interest.

Closure and monopolization

Hierarchical ties inform understandings of the threat posed by rising powers. A large, and recent, body of literature has established various important observable features of hierarchies. This project examines four features split between two points in time, firstly, closure and its components: formality and role specialization. These three variables characterize relations between a dominant state and a subordinate prior to any dispute onset, and capture the status quo relationship. Secondly, monopolization is examined, that is, the intention to alter relationships toward further closure.

The existing literature details a range of ways for conceptualising hierarchy. Distinctions may be made on the degree of control exerted, ranging from weak influence over a specific foreign policy, through full control of foreign policy, to full control of all policy. This captures a range which may be conceived as varying from effective independence (or just short of), through vassalage, to empire (or annexation if the polity is incorporated into the home territory of the dominant partner). Variation can also be found by issue-area. The degree to which a subordinate may have ties with other powerful states is also crucial, that is, is the tie which has been established open or closed, and does this depend on the issue-area. Finally, how many subordinates does the dominant state have, and does it attempt to foster links *between* subordinates (for example, by establishing a free-trade area)? Hierarchy is heterogenous and therefore potentially difficult to generalise, but patterns may be detectable for specific classes of states, specific regions, and in different time periods.

Three temporal changes should be noted over the past 200 years. Firstly, formal empire has diminished from its peak around 1900 to being largely irrelevant today[88]. The direct use of military force to annex, occupy and control territory is only rarely considered to be acceptable practice. Secondly, though not a linear trend, both state-to-state and cross-border sub-national economic, social and political ties have increased. This has been driven by technological advances which have made transport and communication cheaper and faster, diffusion of wealth, and the rapid growth of international institutions (formal and informal, including both public and private international law). Thirdly, the number of states in the world has increased greatly through a dual process of decolonisation and extending membership of international society to non-Western polities (Keene 2002). The formal sovereign equality of states, with the exclusive right to control specific territories that this implies, now covers nearly all territory globally (Atzili 2012)[89].

The technological and normative changes described above suggest important secular changes in the expected form of hierarchies. States have greater international economic interests than previously, that is, trade as a share of gross domestic product has increased

[88] Russian attempts to conquer Ukraine notwithstanding.
[89] Of course, not all territory is part of a sovereign state, Antarctica being a clear example. The overseas territories of Western states also fall into a quasi-statehood category, though the question of competency across issue-areas is generally clearly spelled out in their relations.

over time. However, though strategic raw materials – metal ores, fuels and foodstuffs – retain great importance to war fighting capabilities, they are today less significant as drivers of economic growth[90] as the service sector has increased its share of global economic output. Assessing the international security environment is more difficult. External threats to territory may have decreased as a result of enhanced normative prohibition of the use of force in international relations (Fazal 2007), yet, it is clear that militarily powerful neighbours still pose significant threats[91]. In any case, though interstate war *may* be less likely today[92], cross-border conflict may not be, meaning that states must still consider threats emanating from outside of their borders. The major change over time in terms of international security is the proliferation of nuclear weapons[93]. Whilst major powers have only rarely feared invasion of their home territories, those with nuclear weapons arguably no longer do so[94]. Moreover, the development of nuclear weapons by weaker states – Israel, Pakistan and North Korea[95] – means that for the first time in history relatively weak actors may be able to deter the foreign intervention of major powers in their territories, and potentially further afield, that is, to offer extended deterrence[96] (Huth 1988; Benson 2011).

Closure is the extent to which other major powers are excluded from pursuing their own interests within the territory of a subordinate. These restrictions may be entirely informal,

[90] This does not make them irrelevant, far from it. Rather, they simply occupy a lower share of economic output than previously, though it is important to note the deeper interdependency of primary products, manufactured goods, and the service sector. This change should not, therefore, be overemphasised.
[91] For example, Ukraine is unable to make foreign policy without considering the reaction of Russia.
[92] The well-known finding that interstate war has declined may be caused by fewer international disputes, fewer disputes escalating, or be erroneous.
[93] For a detailed study of the cause of proliferation, see Debs and Monteiro (2017).
[94] More generally, the effect of nuclear weapons upon interstate conflict is disputed. See: Bell (2015), Bell and Miller (2015), Betts (1988), Goldstein (2003), Jervis (1988), Mueller (1988), Narang (2010), Posen (1991a), Sechser and Fuhrmann (2013) and Waltz (1990).
[95] India is not included here as it is classed as a rising power.
[96] Conventional extended deterrence, however, can also look like bandwagoning (Handel 1990; Walt 1987, 29–30; Labs 1992; Schweller 1994), so care must be taken to understand the reasons for an alliance.

through pressure placed on a subordinate to favour their interests over others, but are commonly formalized and involve role specialization. Formality refers to the extent to which the subordinate is bound via political ties to the dominant state. This includes both treaties, legal agreements which demarcate the parcelling of sovereignty, and international organizations, be these economic, political, cultural or military. Role specialization means that either the subordinate or rising power provide functions that are unique or very difficult to substitute. This ranges from access to strategic raw materials, and exports of goods and services to captive markets, through to the extension of security guarantees and the basing of troops. Evidence of formal ties, and role specialization, are clear indications of closure. As this is a characterization of the status quo, that is, prior to a dispute, this may be acceptable to other major powers, but will provide information about the type of rising power it is, with closure suggesting revisionism, and its opposite, openness, suggesting support for the status quo.

Whereas closure examines the pre-dispute status quo, monopolization examines change, seeking to capture the policies and aims of a rising power with regards to access of other major powers to a specific subordinate. Monopolization means one of three things, all of which relate to the status quo. Firstly, that the rising power seeks to close a previously open subordinate, likely a subordinate where the rising power already has interests, but plausibly the interests are new. Secondly, that it seeks to further close a subordinate which is already partially closed, meaning that the economic and security interests of other major powers are further challenged and curtailed. Thirdly, when a subordinate is already totally closed, meaning a relationship where the agency of a subordinate is almost entirely absent, monopolization here means that the rising power simply seeks to maintain this posture in the future.

Subordinates and subordinate agency

Subordinates are all territories outside of the home territory of a major power, most of which exercise some level of political control over the territory. This conceptualization relies on three criteria, firstly, a low threshold for understanding control, secondly, a high threshold for separating major powers from other actors, and thirdly, strong assumptions about the relative lack of agency subordinates enjoy. The term control is used here, rather than sovereignty, whether de facto or de jure, for two reasons. Firstly, sovereignty would mean that all subordinates are states, just states with weaker material capabilities than major powers. Whilst these states are subordinates, the scope of this dissertation is broader than the states-system, which after all, has only been global since decolonization in the 1960s[97]. Most colonies have some level of local administrative control, that is, it is rare for colonies to be completely governed remotely. In some cases, colonies or imperial territories may be integrated into the metropole. This is more common when such territories are contiguous to the metropole, but even overseas colonies may be integrated, for example, French Algeria, which from 1848 until independence was considered (by France) to be part of France[98]. Despite the lack of local political control in French Algeria, it is still classified as a subordinate, since the territory is not part of the metropole.

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[97] Earlier dates for the global spread of the states-system are 1945/47, that is, the embrace of sovereignty by the United Nations and independence of India, the interwar period, which saw a swathe of new states in Europe, or, if one argues that overseas empires are reducible to their metropoles, the late nineteenth century. Any date – or time period – prior to the independence of British and French colonies in Africa would be ignoring an entire continent in its understanding of the states-system, which is both empirically and normatively dubious.

[98] A relationship matched in the contemporary era by the status of French Guiana. France is somewhat of an outlier for such direct colonial control, though Portugal and the Netherlands have also employed similar structures, albeit on a lower scale. The long-term consequences of different forms of colonial control have been the subject of significant debate, with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) finding that the form of institutions shapes long-term economic growth, and Müller-Crepon finding significant variation in the survival of pre-colonial institutions (2020).

All polities that are not major powers are potential subordinates, with the exception of those classed as rising powers. This means that definitions for major powers and rising powers provide the definitional structure and thereby must be as rigorous as possible. Above, it was argued that rising powers exist in two forms, but that both types are undergoing the same rapid economic and military transformation processes. The threshold for determining the difference between a subordinate and a rising power thus rests on whether the state is experiencing this rapid transformation or not. In the contemporary system, India is the sole example of a state rising toward the major powers, with China rising from within. Brazil has substantial military capabilities and a large economy, but has struggled to sustain high growth rates in either category. Therefore, it is not currently a rising power. Brazil is, however, the state with the clearest material credentials for becoming a rising power, and demonstrates the threshold between major/rising power status and being a subordinate. As is clear from the discussion of Brazil, subordinates vary greatly in terms of their material capabilities, size, population, domestic institutional structure, and degree of sovereignty. At one extreme, subordinates are states, with de jure and de facto sovereignty, a large economy, and significant military capabilities. At the other, are territories small in population and area, lacking all but the most basic of local administrative capacities. Subordinates are heterogeneous, but share a subaltern position within international society due to the presence of more actors who compete to control the benefits they provide and to influence the policies they make. This poses the important question of their agency.

The ability to choose, to bargain, and to deter coercion, varies markedly across time, space, and polity type. Ideally, this variation would be explored, to develop a fuller understanding of rising power hierarchy construction and the competitive dynamics this encourages. There are clear examples of subordinates rejecting the influence or patronage of one major power in favour of another, for instance, Egypt under Nasser and Sadat, which sought to extract concessions from the Soviet Union and United States by seeking the friendship of the other, and of subordinates following foreign policies at odds with those articulated by the major power dominating them, for example, Cuba's intervention in Angola, 1975-91, which challenged Soviet ideological leadership of the communist world, and led to significant Soviet support being sent to maintain appearances[99]. Incorporating subordinate agency into the theory would lead to a significantly more complicated model, which would divert attention from the focus on rising power conflict with other major powers.

In this project two things are assumed about subordinate agency. Firstly, that when dominated by a single major power, even one which does not seek to monopolize, that an independent foreign policy is unlikely. This means an elemental component of any hierarchical relationship between a major power and a subordinate is that the latter is significantly constrained in their ability to pursue foreign policy interests which run contrary to the interests of the major power. Apparently independent action, therefore, is confined to issues which do not challenge dominant state interests. Secondly, it is difficult for even sovereign states to extricate themselves from the influence of a major power. Rather, in a scenario where a smaller state seeks to reassert its sovereignty, the major power will deploy

[99] Whilst Cuba, and then the Soviet Union, supported the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in their struggles against Portugal, South Africa, and domestic rivals, China (and the United States) supported the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The FNLA and UNITA (initially a Maoist group) cooperated with the MPLA in the fight against Portugal, but then fought against the MPLA in the subsequent internationalized civil war. The Sino-Soviet split meant that the Chinese challenge for leadership of global communism was overt, and support for the FNLA and UNITA was intended to demonstrate China's far clearer ideological and material support for revolution in the developing world.

material incentives or coercion, as well as make claims purporting to the legitimacy of their current relationship, to prevent a loss of access[100].

Of course, subordinates, can, and do, assert their independence. The conditions under which this is possible, and the pathway that this takes, range greatly. Decolonization and independence attest to hugely important processes, both peaceful and violent, via which subordinates have successfully asserted their sovereignty. Though this dramatically altered the international order, diminished the influence of the colonizers, and enhanced the freedom of choice for the new polities, they remained subordinate. Less subordinate certainly, but economic, military, and diplomatic pressure, as well as institutional inertia and the maintenance of former ties (for instance, through organizations like the Commonwealth of Nations and International Organization of La Francophonie), means that de jure sovereignty is not matched by reality. Furthermore, decolonization often led to new external influence in many, though not all, former colonies in the shape of American, Soviet, and Chinese ideological and material support. Escape from subordination means becoming a rising power, and this is rare, given the significant absolute and relative material changes this necessitates.

Over the past 200 years, the list of states that moved from being subordinates, to becoming rising (and then major) powers, is quite short. Four transitioned from being subordinates to being major powers[101]. The United States started the nineteenth century as a (reluctant, and

[100] Of course, the very fact of renegotiation suggests a certain degree of agency on the part of the subordinate. However, any bargain is expected to remain skewed towards the interests of the major power, even if concessions are granted to the subordinate.
[101] In addition to these four, three major powers have periods outside of major power status, though all rapidly returned. The Russian Revolution led to Russia all but exiting the international order, but it re-emerged as a major power, as the Soviet Union, within a decade. German military defeat and economic exhaustion in World

peripheral) British subordinate, reliant on its former imperial ruler for access to markets, and to its navy for policing the Monroe Doctrine. Post-Civil War, the United States was clearly a rising power, and at the close of the century was a major power. Italy, through a combination of rising nationalism, longstanding predation by Austria-Hungary and France, and Piedmontese military victories over the other Italian states, unified to become a major power[102]. Japan, post-Meiji Restoration sought to modernize its economy and military, leading to its military victories against China and Russia around the turn of the nineteenth century, demonstrating its major power credentials to all. Finally, China, post-1949, emerged as a major power by approximately 1970, and has continued to rise relative to the other major powers since. In addition to those that moved from subordinate status to becoming major powers, India has clearly – perhaps decisively – become a rising power over the post-Cold War era, and is well on track to become a major power[103].

Major interstate war

This dissertation aims to understand the conditions under which rising powers are associated with major interstate wars. These are conflicts which can lead to significant changes in the international order, since major powers may be eliminated, and new institutions created to govern international society (Ikenberry 2001). The consequences of conflict between a rising power and another major power can therefore be systemic, with ripples spreading out

War One and Two led to two periods of occupation and subordination. However, Germany, and West Germany, re-emerged as major and rising powers within a 10-15 year period of defeat. Finally, Japanese defeat in World War Two led to occupation, and it was only after significant economic growth that Japan became a rising power once more.

[102] Though generally considered to be a major power, its material position was far weaker than any other claiming such a status (Lowe and Marzari 2002; Bosworth 1979; Braumoeller 2012, 81).

[103] Based on its material capabilities, this may already have been attained, though per capita GDP, and so societal prosperity, state capacity, and level of development, does remain much lower than any other major power.

from the conflict parties to impact neighbours and even all states through changes in the relative balance of power and in the content of institutions. Major interstate war is defined in this dissertation as being disputes between a rising power and at least one other major power which escalated to the use of military force. In short, this means disputes that are violent. This definition has two components, firstly, major power opposition, and secondly, escalation to violence.

Major power opposition is self-evidently a necessary condition for major interstate war. This does not mean that conflict between a rising power and non-major power – a subordinate – is unimportant, it certainly could be hugely consequential for both parties. However, the involvement of an opposing major power raises the stakes further for both material and non-material reasons. By definition, major powers have military capabilities superior to those of subordinates, and so, their involvement increases the potential for destruction, and necessitates that a rising power devote greater resources to win. Moreover, the involvement of a major power means that the dispute has systemic importance, since victory for the rising power will lead to significant reassessments of the balance of power, as well as changes in status for both the rising and major power. For the major power, involvement places their reputation (and status) on the line, with only victory reaffirming them[105].

The second criteria is that the dispute is violent. Most disputes do not escalate to the use of military force, instead peaking at threats or displays of force. Violence, however, is not war. A higher threshold could be used such as battle deaths in excess of some value. This has the

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[105] This means that for major powers, the risk of involvement is not only defeat (and the subsequent material costs this implies), but also of reputational damage. The decision to militarily oppose a rising power thus comes with reputational risks, but little obvious reputational benefit.

benefit of sorting low-level skirmishing from total war – which are clearly quite different in nature. However, this has two distinct disadvantages. Firstly, the commonly used 1,000 battle death criteria for 'war' clearly also categorizes dissimilar events together. For instance, both the Falklands War and World War One are wars according to the Correlates of War. The former barely meets the 1,000 threshold[106], whilst the latter grossly exceeds it with 8.6 million battle deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Secondly, the pathway from interstate violence below such a threshold to above it is not pre-determined. Significant randomness accounts for escalation, but the probability of reaching higher levels of violence are much higher once military force is being employed.

Endogeneity

The theory of subordinate monopolization is challenged by two forms of endogeneity, firstly, that monopolization might be a response to major power hostility or to prior conflict, and secondly, that both monopolization and major interstate war might be caused by a third factor. These pose both theoretical and empirical problems and require careful attention to minimize. These two forms of endogeneity, and the theoretical and empirical elucidations are discussed in turn.

Monopolization could be understood as a solution to a potentially hostile environment since it offers exclusive access to the benefits a subordinate can furnish, and may therefore increase the probability of winning a subsequent war. However, the decision to monopolize a subordinate makes war more likely, potentially realizing the negative scenario threatened

[106] In fact, some data suggests it scrapes under the 1,000 threshold, with the Correlates of War claiming 1,001 deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), so it truly is as marginal a case as can be imagined.

pre-monopolization. Rising power policymakers, therefore, certainly must take threats seriously, but, should they over-react by monopolizing a subordinate, then the probability of war and therefore greater insecurity – the very outcome they wish to avoid – is made more likely. Of course, it is plausible to imagine that major power hostility are extremely credible, that is, the environment inhabited by the rising power is so dangerous that monopolization of a subordinate is unlikely to further increase the probability of war. It is much more common, however, for threats to be significantly below this extreme. Therefore, monopolization will make major interstate war more probable in all but the most dangerous of environments.

As explained above, prior disputes and conflict are likely to shape responses in a future dispute over subordinate governance. This effect may transfer across time and space, that is, to impact disputes over other subordinates. In essence, this concerns reputations and prior precedent, meaning that for the actors involved in a dispute, information gaps, particularly with regards the intentions and resolve of other actors, are likely to be plugged with data from what previously occurred. This can lead to war being made more likely, or more unlikely. Though this is inevitably a circular set of interactions, each dispute does retain its own trigger, and this remains the form of subordinate governance operated by the rising power.

To empirically address both the standalone and iterative versions of prior conflict causing monopolization, the case studies in Chapter III are designed to assess the effects of prior conflict. The prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, were disputes over control of Korea and Manchuria, which primed the Russian state to refuse negotiation with Japan. In turn, this pushed Japan toward monopolization, since alternatives were not possible, leading to war with Russia. In contrast to this, the United States avoided monopolization of subordinates in Latin America and East Asia in the late nineteenth century, instead preaching the importance of political and economic openness. The decision to monopolize the Philippines, therefore, was – Germany aside – met with less hostility than expected. In these case studies, prior wars and forms of subordinate governance are examined, with the purpose of demonstrating how this can alter perceptions in the future. Similarly, the case studies in Chapter IV hone in on the core theoretical mechanism, exploring how the monopolization strategies of the United States and Soviet Union contributed to the onset of the Syria Crisis, and why a major power violent dispute did not result despite Soviet threats during the Six-Day War.

The second form that endogeneity may take is a third factor simultaneously triggering both monopolization and major interstate war. Changes in system polarity or the distribution of capabilities are both plausible drivers. Changes to the distribution of capabilities, likely due to a rising power investing into its military, may feed into a cycle of suspicion between other major powers and the rising power. If major powers become more hostile, due to a rising power increasing its share of military capabilities, then this makes major interstate war more likely. This also makes monopolization more attractive, since if war appears inevitable, securing control of subordinates appears prudent. Here, monopolization is complementary to existing explanations. Certainly, the accumulation of military capabilities by a rising power is likely to raise suspicions, but monopolization is also a crucial piece of information about a rising power's position on the international order. Moreover, it is important to query why a rising power would expand its military, that is, this is likely to be in relation to the hostility of major powers (as discussed above), or because of other foreign policy goals, namely, to secure control of subordinates. Therefore, whilst changes in the distribution of capabilities can inflate the likelihood of monopolization and of major interstate war, this also does not occur in isolation. Rather, this is a policy decision of a rising power, which is plausibly framed around the necessity of monopolization.

System polarity could also drive both monopolization and major interstate war. Mearsheimer prominently, and cogently, argues that unbalanced multipolar systems, that is, those containing a potential regional hegemon, are more prone to major interstate war (2001) than balanced multipolar or bipolar systems. Therefore, if unbalanced multipolar systems are also more prone to witness monopolization, then this may explain both major interstate war and monopolization of subordinates. However, the theory of subordinate monopolization predicts monopolization to be more common under bipolarity than multipolarity. This is because multipolarity disincentives monopolization. As major power alliances are possible, rising powers must be more cautious about triggering a balancing coalition. The monopolization of subordinates could lead to such a coalition forming. By contrast, under bipolarity competition alliance formation plays a much less important role in shaping security, since there are no peer potential allies to compete for. This pushes geostrategic competition toward subordinates, and since competition is zero-sum, monopolization is a potential means of isolating and confronting a rival. To empirically evaluate this form of endogeneity the statistical analysis of disputes includes variables controlling for the balance of military capabilities, the number of major powers, and system polarity. The Appendix also includes alternative operationalizations of these concepts further to reassure the reader that this form of endogeneity is of limited concern. In addition, the case study chapters provide paired comparisons of disputes with the purpose of minimizing the variation in alternative explanations. Specifically, by focusing on cases drawn from comparable times, and geographies, the distribution of capabilities and system polarity play only a background role in explaining the differences between the cases.

Origins of closure and monopolization

Monopolization and closure are both independent variables in this dissertation and are used to explain the probability of major interstate war. An explanation for both of these is required due to the possibility of endogenous relationships between conflict and monopolization. As explained, major interstate war might lead to monopolization, or both may be caused by a third factor, for example, changes to the balance of capabilities or system polarity. The origins of monopolization and closure are discussed in turn.

Closure assesses the current state of affairs, that is, pre-dispute, it captures whether major powers can freely pursue their interests in the territory of a subordinate, or whether a dominant state restricts the pursuit of these interests. Closure may not be something that is acted upon necessarily, that is, a dominant state may have preeminent influence over the governance of subordinate, but not use this to restrict the interests of others. Prior to the interwar period, much of the British Empire essentially conformed to this, that is, with the imperial power having the ability to restrict the interests of other major powers, but in practice allowing the pursuit of economic, though not security, interests in its colonies. Following the Depression, and in response to sluggish British economic growth relative to Germany and the United States, the Imperial Preference was introduced in 1932, with a view to stimulating intra-empire trade and thereby limiting that of external actors[107]. The latent

[107] Since this was enacted after the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which granted Dominion status to Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, each of these agreed in concert with Britain to introduce the Imperial Preference. Notably, four of these – the exception being Newfoundland – had already

threat of restrictions became the reality. Though closure may be the current state of affairs, this does not necessarily make it acceptable to others. Rather, it still challenges established norms. The difference is that the longer closure exists for, the greater the acceptability by virtue of it being an established practice. However, this need not mean that established norms of open subordinate governance are weakened. Given that closure predominantly arose with overseas empires, in effect, two sets of norms existed in parallel, with the colonial context being a subset of the wider phenomenon.

Dillon Savage argues that common-pool hierarchies, in which major powers pursue interests in a subordinate in a non-exclusive, and potentially cooperative, manner emerge when local actors are involved in governance and the time horizons for their interests are long, in effect meaning economic interests. By contrast, exclusion emerges when interests are 'security-oriented or political or status-related goals' (2021, 721). This suggests that the interests of major powers are the determining feature of subordinate governance, and if closure is the result of security interests, this suggests endogeneity. However, in addition to interests, the competition of others also matters. As argued on pages 23-27, early colonialism was frequently uncontested, or at least, conflicting claims to territory far from Europe could often not be enforced due to the absence of power projection capabilities. This period, therefore, saw exclusive hierarchies emerge, since competition was limited. This created a new type of practice: that colonial hierarchies would typically be exclusive. Notably, the arbiters of the international system – essentially the major powers – saw little hypocrisy in this, despite

introduced a similar policy pre-World War One. The situation in Ireland was more complex, the sixth Dominion. It did not adopt the Statute of Westminster, since its government already considered it to have self-governance, originating in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. In effect, the Statute of Westminster was recognition of Ireland's independence by Britain and the other signatories.

established open norms of subordinate governance in Europe, since their distinguished between the civilized and uncivilized world. Colonialism is not the only type of closure that has emerged, though it is the most extensive, given the vast swathes of territory controlled exclusively by mainly European overseas empires. Closed subordinates also existed in Europe, though these appear rarer, and significantly for the theory presented here, were frequently contested.

Monopolization is the attempt to further restrict access to a subordinate, is a dynamic process, and occurs over the short-term. Its origins are somewhat distinct from closure, primarily because it is inevitably layered upon this prior practice. That is, some primordial time may exist in which a subordinate was essentially free of outside political interference, but this is not something that can be assumed. Rather, the opposite is true. Subordinates are assumed to be subject to the influence and interests of more powerful actors, and this creates closed or open governance. Monopolization is the choice, by a rising power, to upend this prior practice, and to either exclude others, or further exclude others, from the governance of a subordinate. As explained on pages 83-84, monopolization is likely to be influenced by prior wars. This is because the theory expects iterative effects, that is, prior behaviour and outcomes influence major power perceptions of the rising power, and rising power perceptions of their insecurity, in the future. A core dilemma is that monopolization stimulates hostility, and a solution to hostility is to seek monopolization. This relationship is clearly endogenous, but the trigger for war remains the decision to monopolize.

Hypotheses and mechanisms

This dissertation argues that major interstate war is more likely when rising powers have closed relationships with subordinates, and when they seek to monopolize subordinates in the future. This increases the probability of major interstate war for two reasons. Firstly, major power interests in the subordinate are directly curtailed, which itself raises tensions. Secondly, closure and monopolization provide information to the major powers that the rising power has revisionist preferences, since they seek to exclude others from pursuing their interests within the territory of the subordinate. These two components operate in slightly different ways, but the effect is the same. The challenging of interests in a specific subordinate leads to specific responses, including compellent threats, displays of force, and the prepositioning of troops. However, policymaker perceptions of the rising power are also altered, with the rising power understood to be revisionist and aggressive, which impacts future interactions. Closure is essentially static, that is, capturing the status quo relations between a rising power and a subordinate in the time before any dispute onset. Monopolization is dynamic, and captures the any change in the posture of the rising power[108]. The presence of both is particularly dangerous, as the effects are additive.

This leads me to my hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 1**: The closure of a subordinate by a rising power increases the probability of the onset of major interstate war.

> **Hypothesis 2**: Seeking to monopolize a subordinate increases the probability of the onset of major interstate war.

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[108] As the focus is on escalation, this is assessed in the immediate period prior to the onset of a dispute, and, in effect, considers what the war aims of the rising power are with regards the subordinate.

Hypothesis 3: The combination of subordinate closure and seeking monopolization, increases the probability of the onset of major interstate war more than either variable alone.

Above, it is argued that the combination of closure and monopolization is particularly dangerous, which raises the question of their relative magnitudes. Monopolization has a greater effect than closure because it is proximate and because it is negative change. Proximity matters because over time, in the absence of a dispute arising, the status quo gains authority. This means that the longer a rising power has maintained the closure of a subordinate, the less impact this has on dispute onset and escalation. Monopolization has a greater effect because it is a policy which is occurring now, or in the near future. It is also a negative change, with the interests of major powers either directly curtailed, should they have existing interests in the subordinate, or indirectly, should they not[109].

The two mechanisms via which major interstate war may occur are the direct challenging of interests in a subordinate, and more general perceptions of a rising power as having revisionist preferences. In this first case, closure and monopolization reduce or remove the ability of another major power to pursue its economic and/or security interests in the territory of a subordinate. This leads to diplomatic protest, the issuance of threats, and the potential mobilization of troops. These steps increase the risk of both intentional and unintentional war, since they are likely to be mirrored by similar militarization on the part of the rising power. Intentional war implies that one of the two sides determines that pre-emptive attack

[109] In any given subordinate, it is unlikely that no major power has interests, though this is possible. Such cases are clearly less likely to be conflict prone, though they add to policymaker perceptions of revisionism and aggression, so potentially impact other cases.

is likely to successfully defeat the other, and is capable of securing interests. In such a scenario, the attacker determines that peaceful resolution is unlikely, due to the information and/or commitment problems[110]. Perhaps more likely is miscalculation or accident, that is, troops from the rising and major power engage each other not due to a decision taken by their respective leaders, but because of actions taken lower down the chain of command.

The second mechanism is less direct and concerns policymaker perceptions of the rising power. Closure and monopolization provide information about the foreign policy of the rising power, and suggest that it favours change over the status quo. Irrespective of interests directly curtailed in the specific instance of closure and monopolization, a more general effect is likely, that is, the perception that the rising power is likely to act similarly in the future, essentially meaning the rising power gains a reputation for revisionism and aggression. This will undoubtedly alter strategic interactions, at the least making the major powers wary of the intent of the rising power's foreign policy, and potentially meaning that future disputes are more likely to escalate since informational gaps may be filled with by the perception of aggression. Ultimately, this means that the major powers are more likely to bolster their positions, be alert to intelligence suggesting rising power hostility, seek cooperation with each other, and issue deterrent threats. This raises the stakes, and means should disputes occur, they are more likely to escalate[111].

[110] Plausibly also that an issue is indivisible, that is, control of the subordinate is zero-sum. This could occur, in a similar manner to that hypothesized by Fearon (1995), because the institutional structure of the state allows only one side access, for instance, a monarchical system with rival claimants favouring different external backers, or because the interests themselves are mutually exclusive, for example, the basing of troops (though contemporary Djibouti and China during the Century of Humiliation both suggest that this need not be exclusive).

[111] It also likely implies a greater chance of failure on the part of the rising power to achieve monopolization.

Scope conditions

Several elements serve as scope conditions to the theory: the conventional balance of power, the availability of power projections capabilities, system polarity, time, and geography. These are delineated in turn, though the interrelationships between them should also be noted. Specifically, that power projection capabilities have evolved over time, impacting regional interrelationships to create a global, as opposed to a regionally fragmented, system.

Given the focus on rising powers, the conventional balance of power is necessarily in flux. The relative accumulation of material resources, both economic and military, is core to the conception of rising powers used in this dissertation. This accumulation of resources has two impacts upon these states, firstly, it gives their leaders a ready supply of resources which can be dedicated toward a foreign policy objective, which may be monopolization of subordinates. Secondly, a rapidly growing economy needs resources to feed it, markets to sustain it, and military capabilities to defend it. Therefore, rising powers take a greater interest in the governance of subordinates than previously, since they find themselves increasingly reliant upon the resources they provide.

The pathway to major interstate war explained in this dissertation is through this competition for access to, and influence over, subordinates. This is distinct from changes in the conventional balance of power leading one or more major powers concluding that the rising power poses a direct threat to their home territory. It is this that distinguishes the arguments made here from those made by realists. An important problem for the realist explanation is that though rising powers always alter the balance of power, war is not always the result. The theory presented in this dissertation helps to explain this gap. Rising powers with closed relationships with subordinates, and particularly those that seek to monopolize, tip major power perceptions of a rising power toward the conclusion that it is revisionist, and therefore, should be militarily opposed. A negative feedback loop may be triggered, whereby the decision to monopolize a subordinate reinforces the perception of revisionism, which leads to greater hostility from major powers, and in turn, rising power policymakers conclude that monopolization is the answer to this hostility, since it secures resources.

Though rising powers always alter the relative balance of power, and major powers pay close attention to this balance, what matters more for this dissertation is their ability to project power. Though major powers with only limited power projection capabilities have a systemic role, and can indirectly shape power projection, particularly through alliances, these states clearly have a more limited role in regions far from their own than states with significant power projection capabilities. The focus on subordinates, and the on disputes over their governance, means that though some subordinates are located close to major powers, many are quite distant. At a minimum, from the perspective of scope conditions, this means the set of relevant actors varies according to the subordinate and the relative power projection capabilities of rising and major powers. More geographically isolated subordinates, both in terms of distance and the terrain, have fewer major powers competing for access and influence.

Technology also impacts power projection capabilities, meaning that the proportion of major powers with the ability to militarily intervene in disputes over subordinate governance far from their home territory has increased over time. Most significantly, airpower and missiles allow many states to strike at targets beyond their direct neighbours, and even extra-regionally. These capabilities were previously restricted to states with large navies, since to project power on land beyond direct neighbours means marching through them, drastically increasing the difficulty since this implies additional enemies and long supply routes. However, technological change can be overemphasized. Though airpower and the use of long range ballistic and cruise missiles, fired from submarines, aircraft and ground launchers, have undoubtedly made it faster to strike at targets far from home territory, the control of territory still requires ground forces. This means, at a minimum strategic airlift capabilities, and more likely, significant sealift capabilities to transfer large numbers of soldiers, along with equipment and supplies. Whilst this equipment looks greatly different in the contemporary world to the wooden sailing vessels of much of the nineteenth century and earlier, the purpose remains similar, as does the means of providing it.

The number of major powers, and their constellation, provides an important set of scope conditions for the theory. Self-evidently, the theory of subordinate monopolization assumes that there are major powers to contest rising power monopolization of subordinates. Systems that lack this, therefore, cannot result in major interstate war. Similarly, systems dominated by hegemons cannot suitably be examined using the theory of subordinate monopolization since such polities lack peer competitors. However, in the period studied in this dissertation, 1816-2010, these criteria are little violated. The only period in which debate may exist is in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when the demise of the Soviet Union left the international system with a single superpower, the United States. This characterization of the Cold War as bipolar, and of the immediate post-Cold War as unipolar, assumes either that the other major powers – Britain, France, China, Germany, and Japan – were too weak to challenge[112] or because of their political alignments, were merely accessories to the

[112] Often operationalized as querying whether a state could prevent occupation by the most powerful system member, or could impose very high costs upon such an invader.

United States policy positions. Prior to 1816, systems dominated by a single major power were more common, since distance was more difficult to overcome. This allowed Rome, for example, to dominate the Mediterranean and much of Europe and North Africa, for the two centuries post 27 BC. Though Rome certainly had adversaries, both external and internal, during this period none could be regarded as peer competitors.

The literature on polarity and the balance of power argues that bipolarity generates greater stability than a multipolar system. This is because external balancing is no longer possible, which removes significant uncertainty from bargaining processes. However, this has two important affects as far as disputes over subordinates are concerned. Firstly, multipolarity allows buckpassing in scenarios where more than one major power, in addition to a monopolizing rising power, have interests in a subordinate. Each hopes that another major power will feel compelled to confront the rising power, and only rarely does collective action occur. When collective action does occur, this is due to the subordinate being of particularly high value, and/or because the addition of this subordinate to the rising power might give it hegemonic status, preventing a future alliance from challenging it. Secondly, and in contrast, when the number of major powers is smaller, and particularly when the system is bipolar, international relations becomes zero-sum. The loss of access to, and influence over, a subordinate is a gain for the other. In contrast, under multipolarity, though this is still a 'loss' it is one shared by a set of major powers which retain the ability to ally and oppose the monopolizing rising power. This means that delaying a response is less costly than under bipolarity, exactly because external balancing is of limited importance. The theory of subordinate monopolization, therefore, suggests that system polarity may impact the probability of major interstate war, but predicts bipolar rather than multipolar systems to be more prone to violence.

The theory of subordinate monopolization as a pathway to major interstate war is intended to be applied at the system level, that is, it is not bound by a specific geography. However, this does not mean it is universal. Rather, its core theoretical insight, that competition for control over subordinates can lead to major interstate war, relies on a subordinates to compete over, and major powers to oppose a monopolizer. As explained above, this means that regions, and eras, dominated by hegemonic powers cannot be effectively analysed. In addition, the initial development of overseas European colonial empires in the 15th and 16th centuries was marked by intense competition over certain territories (for example, late 15th century Portuguese and Spanish competition in the Americas), and much less competition elsewhere. In many cases, the absence of competition was because the territory was only known, and settled, by a single European state, thereby removing direct competition between major powers[113] for control from the equation.

Research design and methodology

This dissertation employs mixed-methods to examine the effect of rising powers closing and monopolizing subordinates upon the probability of major interstate war. It does so through statistical analysis of 368 Militarized Interstate Disputes (Palmer, McManus, et al. 2020; Palmer, D'Orazio, et al. 2020), hereafter referred to as MIDs or disputes, involving all rising powers in the 1816-2010 period (Chapter II), and two pairs of case studies which utilize

[113] This clearly assumes that the non-European polities challenged by the arrival of European explorers, merchants, missionaries, and militaries were not major powers. Though many polities existed of very large population and sophistication, and frequently being able to field very large militaries, the technological imbalance – particularly in terms of power projections capabilities – is important to remember. Though European colonizers could send warships to the Americas, Asia, and Africa, the reverse was not possible. This reinforces the idea that major powers have the capability to project military force extra-regionally, as discussed on pages 64-65.

process tracing to provide detail on disputes from the perspective of closure and monopolization, on the alternative explanations of power, status and domestic politics, and on the causal mechanism (Chapters III and IV). The different analyses provide alternative lenses for understanding the phenomenon under study, giving a fuller picture, and providing corroboration for the conclusion, that closure and monopolization are of substantive importance for the probability of major interstate war.

The crucial questions that any research design must consider are: 'What do you want to find out? How are you going to find it out? And above all, how would you know if you were right or wrong?' (King, Keohane, and Verba 2010, 101)[114]. The choice of methodology should reflect the answers to these questions, rather than simple personal choice, since different methodologies are better suited to address some questions, rather than others. Mixed-method research is a logical approach since different approaches provide different insights. In this project, large-*N* statistical analysis is paired with case study research, which 'combines the strength of large-*N* designs for identifying empirical regularities and patterns, and the strength of case studies for revealing the causal mechanisms that give rise to political outcomes of interest' (Fearon and Laitin 2011, 1168). This allows more complete answers to the questions posed by King, Keohane and Verba (KKV) to be given than a narrower approach.

KKV argue forcefully that social science is about theory evaluation, and thereby, the role of theory is to generate observable implications which allow a researcher to distinguish

[114] For a second important, and related, set of questions, Freedman asks: 'How should a study be designed? What sorts of data should be collected? What kind of a model is needed? Which hypotheses should be formulated in terms of the model and then tested against the data?' (2010, 190)

between evidence which points to both theoretical support, and rejection (2010, 102; 1994). This approach to research design embraces a rationalist and positivist position on knowledge creation, which naturally rejects many qualitative approaches, and narrows their remit. In particular, this ignores empirical work designed to stimulate theory creation (Brady and Collier 2010; Brady 2011), that is, it is unclear where theory comes from if not from empirical work. It is clearly incorrect – and extremely inefficient – for research in any area to be conducted by someone entirely ignorant of the subject matter. Though this means that any theory created can be used entirely deductively, it is deeply unlikely that the hypotheses posed, and theoretical explanation, would bear any resemblance to the social phenomena studied. A more likely standard is for past empirical findings to shape theory, since this ensures that the theory is created prior to being evaluated. However, it is often also common practice for research to incorporate a plausibility probe – a stripped-down empirical analysis – which then informs theory and empirical evaluation in the main part of the study (Freedman 2010, 190). By contrast, interpretivist approaches are led by the empirics, and seek to understand a social phenomenon from within, something which more naturally endorses ethnographic and archival methodologies than quantitative approaches[115].

The use of quantitative methods and case study analysis seeks to leverage the strengths of the two approaches whilst reducing the weaknesses. Specifically, 'large-*n* methods tell us more about whether hypotheses hold than why they hold. Case studies say more about why they hold' (Van Evera 1997, 55). Despite seeking to 'advise qualitative researchers on how best to approximate good models of [quantitative] descriptive and causal inference' (Tarrow

[115] Particularly because, to utilize quantitative data in an interpretivist manner would lead to criticism that this was data mining, or fitting the theory to the empirics.

2010, 93), KKV do not say much about the integration of different methods. Van Evera's approach is helpful, if a little vague on the use of case studies. The critical roles for case studies are, firstly, to test whether a relationship identified in quantitative analysis between two (or more) variables operates as suggested in specific cases. This means examining reverse causality, as well as omitted variable bias. Secondly, specifying the pathway via which change in the independent variable is thought to lead to change in the dependent variable, that is, detailing and testing the causal mechanism. This is because, and as Seawright argues:

> 'the results of regression analysis routinely are fragile and grounded in what are often hard-to-defend statistical assumptions. For this reason, scholars should react with some skepticism to the frequently-articulated position that regression analysis should do the heavy lifting in multi-method work… Instead, qualitative and case-study research should be seen as making a fundamental contribution to these designs' (2010, 211)

The statistical approach utilizes a logit model to assess the onset of major interstate war, more details of which can be found in Chapter II. This is an inherently observational approach, it being clearly implausible for this topic to be studied in an experimental setting. Though causal inference could be used to allow causal claims to be made, this typically relies upon either random assignment between treatment and control groups, or the existence of an instrumental variable. Neither are credible options in this project, and require further modelling assumptions. Given the use of a logit model, simultaneous equations can be used to model the treatment and the outcome, but this relies on the exclusion restriction: 'at least one variable in W [modelling treatment] must be legitimately excluded from X [modelling the outcome]' (Lauretig and Braumoeller 2018, 140). It is not clear that a *legitimate* claim can be made in this project, and it would be more problematic to select such a variable knowing that no legitimate reason for exclusion exists, rather than to use a descriptive technique and recognize the limits of what this allows.

The independence of observations, that is, the stable unit treatment value assumption that 'subject *i*'s treatment does not affect subject *j*'s outcome, and vice versa' (Lauretig and Braumoeller 2018, 141), is also something which we may be sceptical of[116]. To qualitative scholars, this is likely startlingly obvious, that is, case A is not truly independent of case B, in fact, such inter-relationships are often the focus of analysis, since it is this interactive – strategic – effect which makes outcomes difficult to predict, and thereby makes the case for deep contextual analysis of specific cases. Statistical approaches can factor in network effects, though they require assumptions about which observations are related to each other, and which are not. If these effects are grouped, then a multilevel model can be used (Gelman and Hill 2007), though this requires the analyst to make a decision about which observations are in which group, and this may not be clear. For this project, the logical option for grouping is by rising power. However, such an approach requires a very large dataset, far larger than that used here, unfortunately ruling out multilevel modelling. Instead, standard errors are clustered by rising power, to take account of the fact that these observations are related to each other. The statistical approach used, therefore, is descriptive, in that it 'describe[s] the correlation between a dependent variable and some vector of independent variables' (Lauretig and Braumoeller 2018, 134). This analysis allows generalizable patterns to be identified, but does not allow causality to be established, meaning additional methods must be used.

The second empirical component of this dissertation comprises two pairs of case studies. This builds on the quantitative analysis by utilizing process tracing to explore the

[116] Not merely in this project, but more widely in quantitative approaches to conflict.

mechanisms via which something occurred. In particular, this allows examination of a smaller number of cases in greater detail than large-*N* statistical analysis, meaning that factors missing from the statistical analysis can be identified and probed. This is because case studies 'preserve the texture and detail of individual cases, features that are often lost in large-*N* cross-case analysis' (Gerring 2011, 1135). Moreover, they allow for the identification of mechanisms, something critical to making causal claims (Gerring 2011; George and Bennett 2005), and addressing the core of Lauretig and Braumoeller's concerns that observational statistical models are often incorrectly used to make causal claims (2018).

Three issues require further explanation, firstly, the importance of case selection and selection bias, secondly, the problem of endogeneity, and thirdly, the role of causal mechanisms. To provide deeper insight into the causal mechanisms, that is, the theoretically predicted steps between the independent variables and dependent variable (Checkel 2008), the case studies utilize process tracing. This involves three steps. Firstly, the observable implications of the theory must be specified. This means considering the choices actors have, and how they can be distinguished, as well as thinking carefully about how alternative explanations may generate alternative pathways, thereby allowing explanations to be distinguished. In this dissertation, each of the case studies includes a section delineating what the observable implications of the theory are in the context of the cases. Secondly, a wide range of historical data and narratives are gathered to provide the basis for empirically evaluating the theoretical claims made (George and Bennett 2005). This dissertation relies primarily on secondary sources, supported with some use of primary documentary evidence. As the cases examined are relatively well known to the field, the cases are not designed to reveal entirely new evidence to the reader, but instead show the role of subordinate monopolization, and how it can contribute to a fuller understanding of rising powers and major interstate war. Thirdly, and in addition to allowing comparison between different explanations, process tracing can reveal factors, and connections between them, which were previously occluded, thereby providing additional insight and stimulating further theoretical development in an abductive manner, that is, moving between deductive arguments and inductive insights to provide a fuller account (Finnemore 2003, 13). In this dissertation, this proved particularly important for understanding and outlining the evolution of norms of subordinate governance[117].

The cases chosen for analysis in Chapter III were chosen according to a method of difference approach. This means the cases differ in terms of the dependent and independent variables, but that other variables – alternative explanations – are held constant. This allows focus on the pathway between the independent variables and the observed outcome. Of course, in observational research control variables cannot be held constant, and instead, an argument is put forward to convince the reader of the relatively high level of comparability between the cases. The cases in Chapter IV were also chosen by reducing as many other variables as possible. However, the cases in this chapter are not designed to assess the overall theory. Rather, the 1956-58 Syria Crisis is used to examine the different monopolization strategies the United States and Soviet Union took. Since these two risings powers differed in approach, the different effects can be examined within the context of the same dispute. The second case, Soviet threats during the 1967 Six-Day War, allows examination of iteration,

[117] Especially, the decline of the social acceptability of formal empire. However, this also encompasses a broader set of changes, with regards the desirability of statehood, the growth of self-determination (and nationalism), and systemic changes in the balance of power (leading to the decline – even death – of major powers). The two case study chapters each focus on a different time period, firstly, the multipolar and imperial late nineteenth century, and secondly, the bipolar, increasingly statist, and ideologically charged early Cold War.

and as a ‘hard test’ of theory, since a major power violent dispute did not occur, despite the presence of the independent variables.

Secondly, the dissertation claims that subordinate monopolization is an important pathway to major interstate war across time and space. Therefore, the cases were chosen to reflect this temporal and spatial diversity (Klotz 2008). In Chapter III, the cases are drawn from the end of the long nineteenth century, and both take place in the Asia-Pacific region. In Chapter IV, the cases are drawn from the early Cold War, and both take place in the Middle East. That the central theoretical claims appear across these diverse cases suggests that the core theoretical claim is indeed an enduring feature of major power politics.

Thirdly, in each pair of cases, there must be variation in the independent and dependent variables. In Chapter III, the Spanish-American War is not a major power violent dispute, whereas the Russo-Japanese War is, providing variation in the dependent variable. These cases also vary in the independent variables. The United States had an open relationship with the Philippines prior to the war, though it did seek monopolization. By contrast, Japan had closed relations with Korea, and sought monopolization. Moreover, these cases vary in terms of prior disputes. Russia and Japan had previously contested control of Korea and Manchuria, though it had not led to war between them, whereas the United States had not previously sought to control the Philippines. In this chapter, therefore, the core theoretical claims are evaluated.

Chapter IV serves a subtly different purpose through its comparison of the 1956-58 Syria Crisis with Soviet threats during the Six-Day War. As in Chapter III, there is variation in the dependent variable, with the former being a major power violent dispute, and the latter not meeting this threshold. These cases also vary in term of the independent variables. In the earlier crisis, two rising powers took different approaches to monopolization, and therefore there is important intra-case variation to explore here. This points to an important caveat for the theory: that a dispute involving multiple rising powers has a singular outcome, but potentially multiple approaches to subordinate governance. In the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union continued again pursued monopolization. This case points toward important additional contextual factors including the roles of prior disputes, that is, interactions in 1967 were predicated on prior actions and responses to disputes in the region. In addition, the role of nuclear weapons should not be overlooked, given that this contributed to a sudden de-escalation of tensions. Finally, this dispute is important for demonstrating the limits of major power agency, and the potential for significant subordinate agency, since the dispute saw the superpowers struggle to exert control over their subordinates, and led them to being dragged toward a war that neither saw benefit in pursuing.

Causal mechanisms provide the link between change in an independent variable and change in the dependent variable. They are crucial to establishing a causal relationship since statistical relationships alone are typically descriptive. A theoretical causal mechanism must plausibly link variables, with case study analysis providing detail on whether it is observable, and the extent to which it functions as theorized. An important consideration is how representative any case study is of the wider population. As Tarrow writes, this is something that can 'never be wholly assured until the cases become so numerous that the analysis comes to resemble quantitative research' (2010, 97). This is typically not plausible since to provide adequate depth on a large number of cases means 'losing its particular properties of depth, richness, and process tracing' (Ibid.). Too narrow a focus not only impacts generalizability, but also means that the contextual differences between the functioning of causal mechanisms may be missed entirely, and this is a crucial element of case study analysis, to discover additional theoretical elements relevant to the topic. In this project, the core of the causal mechanism is a recognition by policymakers that a rising power with closed subordinates and seeking monopolization is revisionist, and thereby, should be deterred rather than accommodated. It is plausible that how this functions changes depending upon the social acceptability of formal empire[119], the regime type of rising powers and other major powers[120], the extent to which foreign policy is driven by private as opposed to public interests[121], and the balance of power[122]. A balance between these considerations is necessary.

Endogeneity is a common feature of research. In this dissertation, endogeneity poses two empirical questions. Firstly, whether prior wars might cause monopolization, a reversal of the theory proposed. Secondly, that both monopolization and major interstate war could be caused by a third factor, for example, the balance of capabilities or system polarity. On pages 83-86 this is discussed in depth. Here, how endogeneity shapes case selection for Chapters III and IV is examined.

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[119] Meaning that as the form of influence and control which major powers exert over subordinates changes, this may impact perceptions of closure and monopolization. Clearly formal empire is an explicit claim of closure, whilst imperial projects have no 'natural' bounds (Spruyt 1994; 2005; Darwin 2009; 2007; Doyle 1986a) meaning that monopolization may be implied.
[120] Since veto players and the number of individuals and institutions involved in decision-making alter identification of interests and threats (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Siverson and Bueno de Mesquita 2018; Weeks 2014; Talmadge 2015; Reiter and Stam 2002; Walt 1996).
[121] Until the late nineteenth century, a significant portion of the reach of empire was driven by private interests – merchants and missionaries – with the state following behind. In the post-1945, and particularly post-Cold War, eras, multinational corporations shape foreign policy through second-image reversed pathways (Jensen 2003; Jensen and Shin 2014; Nölke et al. 2015), and are commonly also at the forefront of defining regulation and governance in new technologies and areas of trade (Abbott, Green, and Keohane 2016).
[122] At its most basic the number of major powers, and the relative standing between them, impacts how behaviour is perceived, and changes the menu of policy responses (Mearsheimer 2001; Monteiro 2014; Wohlforth 1993; Buzan 2018; Kennedy 1989; Rasler and Thompson 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1988).

To minimize the effects of both forms of endogeneity, the case studies seek to do two things. Firstly, other variables are held constant, or at least, as stably as can reasonably be attained outside of experimental work. Therefore, in Chapter III which compares the Spanish-American War with the Russo-Japanese War, their proximity in time – just six years between them – and in geography (the Asia-Pacific, with the focus of the Spanish-American case being the Philippines), ensures that major power capabilities and system polarity remain relatively static. Whilst the Spanish-American War did not become a major interstate war, since the United States did not engage the military forces of any other military power, the Russo-Japanese War was one from the outset. By focusing on these two disputes, the comparison reduces variation in other variables, allowing a focus upon variation in the main independent variables and tracing their impacts through to these difference outcomes. Of course, the rising power in question, Japan in the former and the United States in the latter, is different. Though it is possible to focus on disputes concerning a single rising power, thereby reducing variation in domestic determinants of policymaking, this generates a second problem: that former disputes might be the cause of later ones. Chapter III shows that Japan and the United States do indeed differ in this regard, but this difference is something expected by the theory, that is, previous disputes and conflict are expected to increase the likelihood of major power hostility to a rising power, and increase the likelihood of a rising power seeking to monopolize a subordinate. The differences between Japan and the United States, therefore, are an important part of the theory requiring empirical evaluation. The theory expects an iterative effect of monopolization and prior conflict upon the future. However, the act of monopolization remains crucial to substantially increasing the probability of war over the short-term.

Chapter IV similarly attempts to minimize the effects of other variables by focusing on two disputes in the Middle East, that concerning Syria, 1956-58, and Soviet threats during the Six-Day War, 1967. These disputes also both involved the United States and Soviet Union, with the former being a rising power in the first dispute, and the Soviet Union in both. Whereas the Syria Crisis was a major power violent dispute, Soviet threats during the Six-Day War did not involve violence. In part, therefore, this chapter seeks to explain this difference. However, these cases also allow a deeper comparison of the effects of iteration, since the major power adversaries – the United States and Soviet Union – remain the same, as do many of the subordinates. In this chapter, therefore, the role of endogeneity, that is, to what extent prior conflict begets monopolization, can be more clearly assessed.

Plainly these cases are not the only ones which could have been chosen. There are two reasons for doing so. The approach to comparative case study analysis used in this dissertation is the method of difference, that is, examining cases where alternative explanations can be eliminated since the outcome differs. Instead, a method of agreement approach could have been used, whereby cases are compared which vary across a range of independent variables. Though this has advantages, since rival explanations can be pitted against each other, and the case heterogeneity provides a difficult test of a proposed theory, this comes at the cost of potentially obscuring testing of the proposed theory and its mechanisms. Moreover, given the concern that a third factor – the balance of capabilities or system polarity – might cause both monopolization and major interstate war, it is prudent to compare cases where these can be minimized. However, it is also important to provide a hard-test for the theory, and Soviet threats during the Six-Day War provide this, since the presence of the independent variables mean the theory predicts a major power violent dispute, contrary to what occurred. Therefore, these cases were chosen to address endogeneity, whilst also providing a credible test of the theory against alternative explanations.

Chapter II: Quantitative Analysis of Rising Power Disputes, 1816-2010

This chapter examines the relationships between monopolization, closure, and the onset of major interstate wars. It does so through statistical analysis of 368 rising power disputes, between 1816 and 2010, involving 13 rising power cases. The chapter has two aims, firstly, to test the hypotheses laid out at the end of Chapter I. The data suggest that monopolization and closure have statistically and substantively significant effects upon the onset of major interstate wars. Secondly, variation between the 13 rising power cases is examined, to elucidate why some rising powers are associated with major interstate war, whilst some are not. Intriguingly, it is not those typically associated with war – interwar Germany, Italy and Japan – which are the most conflict prone, which suggests that this idea, common to the literature, may be driven more by their defeat in World War Two, rather than theoretical insight.

Method

Logistic regression is utilized to estimate the effects of closure and monopolization upon the likelihood of violent disputes with other major powers. Substantive significance from the logistic regression models is assessed by estimating predicted probabilities. Standard errors for the primary model in each section are robust and clustered by rising power. This is to take account of within-cluster correlation related to unobservable characteristics of the rising power cases. An alternative is to cluster standard errors by year, but this is much less of a problem than the within-case correlation since few years are repeated in the dataset. Robustness checks using clustering by year does not yield substantially different results.

The sample

The dataset is based on the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset (Palmer, McManus, et al. 2020; Palmer, D'Orazio, et al. 2020) taking this as the population of relevant interstate disputes. Three restrictions reduce the dataset to a sample. Firstly, determining which states, and for what years, are rising powers. Inevitably, any reasonable methodology used to select these cases may differ slightly on start/end points of rises, as well as whether a specific state is 'truly' a rising power, or not. Nevertheless, the methodology used here – assessments of relative and absolute economic and military power – are common to definitions of rising powers. Whilst disagreement likely remains on the operationalization, the conceptualization is relatively uncontroversial. Secondly, disputes are dropped if they only involve major powers, that is, the mechanism examined here is one which focuses on competition over subordinate states. Care was taken to check whether those disputes considered by COW to have only major power participants in fact involved subordinates, whether states or colonies. When subordinates were found to be involved, the case was not dropped. Thirdly, in four disputes details were too sparse to code. This is a problem that Gibler's efforts to write narratives for every dispute has substantially improved (2018), since COW's own narratives and bibliographies are frequently haphazard, making it difficult to find information about a purported dispute. Reducing this number to four is a major achievement, and undoubtedly without the existence of *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives* far more disputes would have been lost from this project. For the 1816-2010 period, and across the 13 rising power cases, 372 disputes exist, 368 of which are included in the dataset.

Selection on the dependent variable

The dataset described selects on the dependent variable, that is, the COW MIDs dataset records instances of interstate militarization. This is a problem for inference, since it is unknown whether there are systematic differences in the relations between rising powers and subordinates which did not lead to a dispute. That is, it is possible that when rising powers close off subordinates and seek monopolization that this may not lead to any militarized response. Such cases are missed in this dataset. Three arguments defend the approach taken, despite the inference problem caused: the lack of plausible alternative empirical approaches, the focus on the onset of war rather than the lower threshold of dispute, and the extensive use of comparative case study analysis in two further chapters.

Ideally, a dataset examining the relationships between rising powers and subordinates, and how these relations shape conflict with other major powers, would examine all possible combinations of rising powers and subordinates. It is likely that this would be a dyad-year dataset, that is, each rising power and subordinate dyad would be included for every year that the rising power was classed as ‘rising’. In this project, 13 rising power cases were identified, totalling 420 years. If the number of potential subordinates in any year is 20, this gives 8,200 dyad-years. If 50, this number jumps to 21,000. Even if significant restrictions were placed on such a dataset by tightly defining what a ‘potential subordinate’ is, this number is likely to remain very high. From the perspective of feasibility, it is implausible, without employing a large team of coders, to have created such a dataset.

An alternative would be to take a sample, defined, perhaps through a combination of restrictions relating to time period, geography, and rising power cases. This would have the advantage of avoiding selection on the dependent variable and having greater feasibility. However, the losses are also significant. The assumptions used to define the sample would undoubtedly shape the findings, essentially meaning that rather than speaking to a generalizable phenomenon, instead, the project would relate to a subset. This could be avoided through random sampling, but this may miss cases of particular interest, that is, such a dataset must still address major power war, and there are rather few of these. Those that are included, therefore, are assumed to be representative of the wider phenomenon, which is itself a significant assumption given large variation in the characteristics of wars. The decision to select on the dependent variable certainly has costs with regards inference, but has the benefits of generalizability, of ensuring that it addresses significant cases of interstate violence (that is, major wars), and remains feasible.

The specific problem of inference is further addressed via two additional measures. Firstly, through a focus on the onset of major interstate war, and secondly, through comparative case study analysis. In this project, the dependent variable is not the onset of a dispute, rather, it is the onset of a dispute which is both violent (that is, force is used against an adversary) and the rising power being opposed by at least one major power[2]. Essentially, therefore, the comparison is between the onset of any dispute between a rising power and a subordinate,

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[2] This is explained in more detail below in the section on the dependent variable.

and those which meet the additional criteria of major power opposition and the use of violence. This means that those disputes falling below this threshold are a non-random sample of null cases. They are non-random in that a dispute did arise, but this also means from the perspective of examining the relationships between monopolization, the characteristics of rising power hierarchies, and the onset of major power violent disputes, that a relationship is likely more difficult to discern, since some level of dispute is known to have arisen. These are cases, therefore, that allow a harder test of the hypotheses since the analysis is not exploring the difference between dispute onset and absence, but rather, the difference between dispute onset and the onset of major interstate war.

This can be thought of as focusing on escalation, that is, to explain why some disputes become major interstate wars whilst most do not. However, the theory of subordinate monopolization is not one that proposes a strictly escalatory framework, though it is plausible to imagine the application of the theory to such a dynamic. Again, selection on the dependent variable is a problem for inference, but the analytical focus is structured to make best use of the data and to minimize this problem by examining the difference between all rising power disputes, and those of a particular subset.

Finally, this dissertation has two case study chapters, which examine rising power hierarchy construction and the onset of major power violent disputes in three different eras: that of late empire, the interwar period, and the early Cold War. Each examines rising power hierarchy construction, and the extent to which this led to conflict. This is designed particularly with the selection issue in mind and does so by starting from hierarchy construction undertaken by the rising power, and noting cases where this did not lead to disputes, that is, what is missing in the dataset.

Independent variables

To examine closure and the monopolization of subordinates, seven dummy variables were coded: monopolization, political closure, political formal ties, political role specialization, economic closure, economic formal ties, and economic role specialization. When these variables were present, then a '1' is assigned, with a '0' otherwise. Each of the 368 disputes involves a rising power and at least one subordinate. Some disputes involve multiple subordinates, as well as other major powers. Each of the seven variables were coded according to the relations between the rising power and the subordinate identified at the centre of the dispute. In some cases, this necessitated making a decision as to which subordinate was of primary interest to the rising power. For instance, the Soviet Union engaged in several disputes over the 1950-70 period in the Middle East, with these disputes frequently involving Syria, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. Soviet relations with Syria and Egypt were far more important in all of these disputes than those with Israel or Jordan, and the decision was taken to code relations between the Soviet Union and Syria, rather than those with Egypt, since Syria was both geographically closer and had deeper ties during the period than Egypt.

The coding of rising power-subordinate relations relied upon two main sources, firstly, *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives* (Gibler 2018). This was extensively supplemented with the relevant *Cambridge Histories* where information in the former source was absent. These sources were used since the former provides a consistent approach to disputes, that is, the narrative approach seeks to capture the same data for each dispute. Of course, this is not always possible, particularly for more minor and/or older disputes where records are generally poorer. The *Cambridge Histories* have a similar approach, albeit not limited to these disputes. They are however, written with the idea of providing consistent and sober overviews of events. When these sources provided no information, the independent variable in question was assumed to be absent. This means the data are coded according to positive references to the variables, not according to whether something is explicitly mentioned as not being present. The logic behind this is clear: things that did not occur are only referenced when alternatives were considered, and often no choice was made, leaving a relationship absent of the relevant variable. Of course, when an active choice for informal political ties (for example) was made, then this is also coded as absence of formal ties.

The seven variables were coded as follows. Firstly, monopolization was coded as a '1' if the rising power sought to dominate a subordinate, or to continue dominance, at the outset of a dispute. In some cases, this was readily established, with invasion being a clear-cut example. In others, this was tacitly understood to exist, and this is particularly the case for relations between a rising power and a sub-state polity, often meaning colonies. Secondly, political closure was coded as a '1' if the pre-exiting political relationship between the rising power and subordinate excluded the political or military interests of another major power. Again, in some cases the pre-existing relationship clearly excluded the political interests of other major powers, for instance, imperial relationships. In others, closure was inferred from the context, for example, Soviet relations with members of the Warsaw Pact. Thirdly, economic closure was coded as a '1' if the rising power sought to exclude the public or private economic interests of other major powers from taking place in the territory of the subordinate. In many cases, this amounted to preventing the control or ownership of particular economic assets, preventing investment in specific industries, and/or using the law to harass or exclude the citizens of other states.

The components of political and economic closure – formal ties and role specialization – were coded similarly. Firstly, political formal ties were coded as a '1' if the relationship between the rising power and subordinate was codified in a treaty, international organization, or explicitly governed by the rising power (as in imperial control). Secondly, political role specialization was coded as a '1' if the rising power had an overseas military base in the subordinate or if the rising power deterred an aggressor from attacking the subordinate (extended deterrence). Thirdly, economic formal ties were coded as a '1' if their economic relations were codified in a treaty, underpinned by an international organization, or controlled by the rising power directly. Finally, economic role specialization was coded as a '1' if the subordinate provided unique, or difficult to substitute, economic roles for the rising power, often meaning, either the source of raw materials, or as an important export market for higher-value manufactured goods. Descriptive statistics of all the independent variables, as well as those for the dependent and control variables, can be found in Table 2.

This coding scheme is basic – a series of dummy variables – but reflects two important considerations: contextual change over time and the difficulty of assessing comparative strength of relations. The former is important since this project examines rising powers over a 200-year period in which significant contextual changes occurred, most obviously the decline of formal empire and the growth of the states-system. A coding scheme which sought a fine-grained classification of each variable would more accurately capture these contexts but would miss the similarities of the social structures constructed. In other words, although the means and forms of hierarchies that major powers construct have changed over time, processes of hierarchy construction endure. Secondly, it is not obvious how the relative strengths of an economic formal tie embedded in a treaty, an international organization, or in imperial architecture should be compared. Once more, these formal means are different, but capture a similar process: that of embedding a subordinate in a formalized (legalized) relationship visible to others.

To explain the coding process more fully, the coding for dispute 178 is detailed here. The dispute concerns Soviet-Japanese tensions of Manchuria, between 1932 and 1935. Japan is the rising power in this dispute, with the subordinate being Manchukuo. Political closure is coded as being closed, political formal ties as being formal, and political role specialization as specialized. Similarly, economic closure is coded as closed, economic formal ties as formal, and economic role specialization as specialized. Monopolization is coded as being present, that is, monopolization was sought by Japan in the dispute. In summary, Japanese control of Manchukuo was extensive prior to the dispute, and was deeper and broader than that of the Soviet Union. The dispute itself focuses on Japanese efforts to further deepen its control, and to end the Soviet Union's ability to pursue interests in the subordinate. The description of the dispute in *International Conflicts, 1816-2010*, reads as follows:

> 'The Soviet Union began building up troops in the east in response to the Japanese takeover of Manchuria and the establishment of the puppet state Manchukuo. Tensions continued to escalate, particularly over Soviet control of the major railway in the region. Japanese and Manchukuoan forces arrested and attacked Soviet rail workers on several occasions and exchanged fire with Soviet troops in one incident. The Japanese foreign minister eventually negotiated a transfer of the railway from the Soviet Union to Manchukuo.' (Gibler 2018, 1004)

This description is succinct, but allows coding of several variables. Firstly, monopolization is coded as a '1' on the basis that 'Japanese…forces arrested and attacked Soviet rail workers' (Ibid.). Japanese troops (or rather, the Kwantung Army), therefore, were directed to remove Soviet control over the railway. Secondly, political closure and role specialization are both coded as '1'. This is on the basis that Manchukuo is described as a 'puppet state' (Ibid.) and Manchuria as having been taken over by Japan. This suggests a specialized relationship, that is, that Manchukuo was a political vehicle for Japanese interests, and which is clearly closed to others by dint of occupation (or annexation). The information above does not allow coding of political formal ties, nor of any of the three economic variables. However, two chapters of the *Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6: The Twentieth Century* do allow coding of these variables.

On political role specialization, Hata and Coox write that 'Japanese troops had to advance outside the railway zone where Japan had treaty rights' (1989, 295). These treaty rights are the Japan–Manchukuo Protocol of September 1931, which gave Japan the right to station troops in Manchukuo and outlined a mutual defence treaty, in essence meaning a pledge by Japan to defend its puppet from China and the Soviet Union. This is clear evidence of a political role specialization, allowing coding of the variable as a '1', in that extended deterrence was provided to Manchukuo, as well as the stationing of troops. Moreover, Hata and Coox explain that 'real power was kept in the hands of the commander of the Kwantung Army, who concurrently held the post of Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo' (1989, 298), further demonstrating the tight political control Japan had over Manchukuo, and corroborating the coding of political closure as being closed.

Japan had strong economic interests in Manchuria (Peattie 1989, 223), which amounted to closure (coded as '1') since during the 1930s Japan's leaders 'became convinced that Japan must build its own economic bloc to which the nation must look for its survival. In this perspective the colonies were chiefly seen as productive units of a central economic engine, geared to the creation of a self-sufficient garrison state.' (Peattie 1989, 237). The economic relationship between Japan and Manchukuo was formal (coded as '1'), being based around control of the South Manchuria Railway Company (Peattie 1989, 231) and underpinned by the aforementioned treaty rights which focused on the railway, resulting in 'the notion of a "Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc."' (Hata and Coox 1989, 299). Finally, economic role specialization (coded as '1') existed in two ways, firstly, Manchuria was to supply raw materials for Japan, and secondly, serve as territory for colonization: 'Manchuria was a new frontier where they could fulfill their dreams of fame and fortune. Adventurers and merchants with a desire to get rich quick rushed to Manchuria.' (Hata and Coox 1989, 290–91).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Major power violent dispute	368	0.17	0.38	0	0	1
Monopolization sought	368	0.57	0.50	1	0	1
Political closure	368	0.49	0.50	0	0	1
Political formal ties	368	0.32	0.47	0	0	1
Political role specialization	368	0.44	0.50	0	0	1
Economic closure	368	0.22	0.41	0	0	1
Economic formal ties	368	0.16	0.37	0	0	1
Economic role specialization	368	0.23	0.42	0	0	1
Monopolization X Political closure	368	0.40	0.49	0	0	1
Monopolization X Political formal ties	368	0.21	0.41	0	0	1
Monopolization X Political role specialization	368	0.33	0.47	0	0	1
Monopolization X Economic closure	368	0.18	0.39	0	0	1
Monopolization X Economic formal ties	368	0.12	0.32	0	0	1
Monopolization X Economic role specialization	368	0.16	0.37	0	0	1
Status dissatisfaction	368	4.39	6.63	3	-6	44
Joint democracy	368	0.15	0.36	0	0	1
Rising power polity	368	9.42	7.14	9	0	20
Hegemon/challenger polity	368	15.69	6.37	19	0	20
Military balance, log	368	3.53	0.25	3.56	0	3.80
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	368	0.40	0.49	0	0	1
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	368	0.45	0.50	0	0	1
Unbalanced multipolarity	368	0.14	0.35	0	0	1
Number of major powers	368	6.07	1.09	6	4	8
Dispute participants	368	3.23	3.04	2	2	27
Region dummy	368	0.54	0.50	1	0	1
Dispute duration, log	368	3.48	2.41	4.06	0	8.31

Dependent and control variables

The primary dependent variable is 'major power violent dispute'. This is a dummy variable incorporating two things, firstly, whether the rising power was militarily opposed by a major power, and secondly, whether the dispute involved the use of armed force, or not. To construct it, the COW MID hostility level variable was used. The original variable is a five-point scale, ranging from no use of force (1), through threat to use force (2), display of force (3), use of force (4), up to war (5). Both the use of force and war are 'violent', since they necessitate the employment of military force against an adversary. The participants of the dispute were then examined, coding the dispute as 1 if at least one of the adversaries of the rising power was a major power, and a 0 otherwise. Three alternative dependent variables are examined in Table 38 of the Appendix, firstly, major power war (coded as 1 if the hostility level of the dispute is war (5) and the rising power was opposed by at least one major power), secondly, all wars (coded as a 1 if the hostility level of the dispute is war (5)), and thirdly, violent dispute (coded as a 1 if the hostility level of the dispute is either use of force (4) or war (5)). Of the 368 disputes, 64 are major power violent disputes, 20 are major power wars, 40 are wars, and 254 are violent disputes.

There is good reason to use major power violent dispute as the primary dependent variable rather than major power war. The latter incorporates the arbitrary threshold for determining war: 1,000 battle deaths. Given that the level of battle deaths in conflict varies greatly, and is very positively skewed, this threshold means that cases of similar magnitude are being incorrectly assigned to different categories. Moreover, though there are substantive differences between higher and lower levels of violence in armed conflict, relating to the cost in human lives, economic damage, and degree of societal mobilization, endogeneity is a significant driver of escalation, that is, the move from a lower level of armed conflict to a higher level is inherently bound up with ongoing conflict dynamics. Whilst there are systematic reasons for escalation and de-escalation, the crucial context for all of this is whether a rising power and a major power are already using armed force, and hence, major power violent dispute is a variable which more closely captures the underlying phenomena of interest than major power war.

Controls are used for other explanations of rising power conflict including status dissatisfaction, the regime type of the rising power and major power rivals, the military balance between the rising power and rivals, the possession of nuclear weapons by the rising power and other major powers, system polarity, the number of dispute participants, region, and dispute duration. Status dissatisfaction is operationalized, following the existing literature (Singer and Small 1966; Wallace 1971; Maoz 2011), as the difference between a state's Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) ordinal ranking and its Diplomatic Exchange ordinal ranking (Bayer 2006). States that are ranked higher in terms of their CINC score than their diplomatic network are considered to be dissatisfied, and thereby, more prone to aggressive behaviour to increase social recognition of their material standing (Midlarsky 1975; Maoz 2011; Renshon 2017). For ease of interpretation, this variable is then multiplied by -1 so that positive values are higher dissatisfaction, and negative values are higher satisfaction (that is, ranking of diplomatic network is higher than for CINC score).

Alternative means of operationalizing this concept are examined in Table 34 of the Appendix to this chapter. Firstly, the Diplomatic Exchange data for West Germany in the late-1980s appear to be outliers. In 1986, West Germany had the 9th largest diplomatic network, this fell to 13th in 1987, 29th in 1988, and 77th in 1989. In 1990, the newly reunited

Germany had the 7th largest diplomatic network. It is unclear what accounts for these dramatic changes, and in particular, the drops in 1988 and 1989 appear incredible. Therefore, the data for 1987, 88 and 89 are replaced by the value for 1986 (Model 2, Table 34), which has negligible impact upon the results. Status dissatisfaction presumably impacts future foreign policy, and therefore, one-year lagged versions of both variables are included in Models 3 and 4 of Table 34. Finally, Renshon (2017) standardizes measurement of status dissatisfaction by year, to account for changes in the number of states over time. This is less of a problem here since analysis is confined to rising powers – which by definition are close to the 'top' of any ranking – whereas Renshon's analysis covers all states. In addition, Renshon argues that status dissatisfaction is best conceptualized relative to a community of interest, rather than as a global ranking (2017, 33; 42–44). Therefore, Renshon calculates status dissatisfaction as a global ranking, and relative to the network centrality of each state (2017, 126–29). For the rising powers examined in this project, this makes little difference, since the relevant community remains largely static – all major powers – across time and space. Table 34, Model 5, includes Renshon's community status dissatisfaction variable, and Model 6, Renshon's global status dissatisfaction variable. Neither lagging the variables, nor replacing them with Renshon's standardized alternatives have a large impact on the results.

To control for regime type three variables are used. It would seem logical for analysis to include the regime type of the rising power, as well as that of major power participants. However, the latter poses a logical problem for analysis, since not all of the 368 disputes have major power participants, meaning that the dependent variable – major power violent dispute – is not possible. To address this, the models utilize the regime type of the system leader (or hegemon), and compare it with that of the rising power, arguing that the system leader is consistently relevant to all disputes, since by definition the system leader is military powerful and has global interests, meaning that rising powers must factor it into their strategic choices. Firstly, therefore, a dummy variable controls for whether joint democracy exists between the rising power and the hegemon in the international system[5]. When the hegemon and rising power are the same, the former is replaced with the most significant challenger to the rising power[6]. This variable, therefore, assesses whether joint democracy reduces the likelihood of a major power violent dispute relative to mixed or autocratic dyads. Joint democracy, therefore, has the benefit of assessing dyadic democratic peace, whilst also ensuring that the regime type of major power rivals is included in the regression analysis. Secondly, the polity scores of both the rising power, and of the hegemon/challenger are included. These variables are included to address monadic theories of democratic peace. This is because of a range of formal institutional and normative considerations, including the role of veto players, an independent media, and the norm of political compromise. However, work by Weeks and co-authors (2012; 2014; 2015; 2020) and Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors (2006; 2003; 2004; 2008) have suggested that at the least, the leaders of non-

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[5] Britain is coded as the lead-state from 1816-1918, and the United States as the lead-state from 1919-2010. It is uncontroversial to claim that Britain was the lead-state during the long nineteenth century, and that the United States was post-World War Two. However, the claim that the United States is the lead-state during the interwar era is debatable. The era was marked by instability and a lack of leadership, with the United States becoming isolationist. Nevertheless, the United States was the lead-state because it was unambiguously the most powerful – in 1919 it accounted for 38.1% of CINC, with second place being a distant Britain at 11.1%. Though this share fell over the period, it remained the most powerful throughout. In fact, despite massive German rearmament and mobilization – which hugely boosted Germany's military personnel and military spending scores, and thereby its CINC share – the United States retained a lead in 1939 and 1940 prior to its own mobilization. In short, its isolationism did not prevent it being the most powerful state by some distance, and thereby a (reluctant) lead-state.

[6] As Britain is a rising power, 1816-56, it is compared with its primary challenger over this period, Russia. Tensions between Britain and Russia existed due to their ideological divergence, as well as disputes over their interests in the Ottoman Empire (culminating in the Crimean War, 1853-56) and Central Asia. As the United States is a rising power, 1920-60, the United States is compared with Japan, 1920-45, and the Soviet Union, 1946-60. The claim that the Soviet Union was the primary challenger to the United States in the post-1945 era is clearly uncontroversial. Japan emerged as the primary challenger over the interwar period, with mutual suspicion and fear increasing greatly during the 1930s. The only plausible alternative to Japan as the primary challenger to the United States is Britain, but post Great Rapprochement most areas of serious disagreement had been resolved (Perkins 1968; Murray 2018).

democracies may not be as unconstrained as often argued, meaning differences between regime types may be marginal, or more subtle, than conventional theory suggests. It is notable that in even most dyadic accounts of the democratic peace the theoretical explanations remain monadic, for instance, claims that audience costs restrain leaders. The inclusion of these variables also allows a more fine-grained analysis of regime type, since joint democracy is a dummy variable. It is plausible, therefore, that these variables will identify how more subtle changes in regime type impact the probability of a major power violent dispute.

Regime type can be controlled for in several other ways, which Tables 35 and 36 of the Appendix detail. However, these alternatives are inferior to the measures included in the main analysis for several reasons. Rather than the regime type of the hegemon/challenger, instead the average polity of the major powers can be used, both as a continuous variable (Model 2, Table 35), and to assess joint democracy (Model 5, Table 35). Though a weak negative statistically significant effect is found for the former, the average regime type of a major power is a blunt means of assessing regime type since it does not refer to any specific actor that existed in the international system. The joint democracy alternative, meanwhile, suffers from perfect prediction as no major power violent disputes have taken place under this condition (14 disputes, all India 2000-2010, have taken place under this measure of joint democracy). Instead, the difference in regime type between the rising power and the hegemon/challenger (Model 6, Table 35) or average major power (Model 7, Table 35) could be used, but the theoretical basis linking these variables to the probability of major power violent disputes is weak.

Alternatively, the regime types of major power dispute participants can be controlled for, though again, as an average. This approach has the clear benefit of including major powers that took part in disputes, however, and as previously explained, poses a problem for analysis, since not all of the 368 disputes have major power participants. To create these measures, firstly, the polity scores of all major power dispute participants are required, allowing averages for major power allies and adversaries to be calculated. However, in many disputes prominent major powers are not active dispute participants, despite having both the necessary power projection capabilities, and interests in the subordinate or wider region. In addition, therefore, potential dispute participants are assembled based on these criteria. This allows assessment of how additional dispute participants would alter the contours of disputes.

Of course, this is hypothetical, as presumably there were good reasons for these states to remain non-participants, and for this reason, variables utilizing the variables created are included in the Appendix only. Table 36 of the Appendix details how the average polity of the rising power and its major power allies (Model 1), the average polity of major power adversaries and potential dispute participants (Model 2), the difference between the polity score of the rising power and all other major powers in the dispute (Model 3), joint democracy between the average polity of the rising power and allies vs adversaries and potential participants (Model 4), and joint democracy between the rising power and average polity of all other major power participants (Model 5) alter the results. Notably, none of these variables are statistically significant, nor do they significantly alter the findings for monopolization and political closure.

One control variable is used for conventional military capabilities. The conventional military balance between the rising power and the hegemon/challenger is calculated as the difference in the number of military personnel between the two, taking the data from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset version V. The log of this is then calculated, which first requires that all negative values be made positive, which is achieved by adding the lowest number, plus one, to all variables, making the smallest value one. When a rising power has greater military capabilities it is, firstly, more able to take hostile action (Biddle 2004), and secondly, may be more likely to view this as appropriate. Military personnel is used, rather than military spending, since though the NMC dataset includes a spending variable, the units change from being current-year British pounds (1816-1913) to being current-year American dollars (1914 onwards). As this project examines cases both pre- and post-1914, this alternative cannot be used without conversion, which requires annual currency conversion rates. Though McNabb Cochran and Long (2017) make the compelling argument that capabilities captures military effectiveness rather poorly, data for loss exchange ratios[7] unfortunately do not exist for all of the disputes included in this project precluding the use of this alternative. In addition, dummy variables are included for the nuclear weapons status of the rising power, and for the major powers. The former is coded as a ‘1’ if the rising power had nuclear weapons in the year of the dispute, and the latter is coded as a ‘1’ if any of the major powers had nuclear weapons. This is explained in more detail below.

[7] Defined as ‘the ratio of casualties a combatant suffers to the casualties it inflicts on the enemy’ (McNabb Cochran and Long 2017, 1020). Calculating this measure for multilateral conflicts is particularly difficult.

There are multiple ways of controlling for the military capabilities of the rising power and other major power, which are included in Tables 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 of the Appendix. Table 27 replaces the military balance variable with four alternatives which each use ratios between the rising power and the total for the other major powers. Firstly, military spending (Model 1) utilizing data from the NMC, secondly, military personnel (Model 2) utilizing data from the NMC, thirdly, CINC score (Model 3) utilizing data from the NMC, and fourthly, naval tonnage (Model 4) utilizing data from Crisher and Souva (2014) which runs 1865-2011[8]. Only Model 4 significantly alters the results for monopolization or political closure, with the former no longer attaining any conventional level of statistical significance. Table 28 replicates Table 27, but replaces the military balance variable with the ratio between the rising power and the hegemon/challenger. As before, it is only in Model 4 that the results are significantly altered, with monopolization no longer attaining any level of statistical significance.

Table 29 again replicates Table 27, but instead replaces the military balance variable with the ratio between the rising power and all other major powers in the dispute (including potential major power participants[9]). In each of these alternatives, monopolization and political closure remain statistically significant throughout. Whilst ratios are a useful means of assessing the balance of power, from a statistical point of view they are somewhat problematic. A value of 0.5 indicates that the rising power, for example, spent half of the hegemon/challenger in a given year, whilst a value of 2 indicates that the rising power spent double. From the perspective of ratios, these are the inverse of each, but this means that

[8] This results in the loss of 29 cases: all 27 for Britain, 1816-56, and 2 for Russia, 1860-90.
[9] Again, as without this inclusion, many disputes have no major power participants beyond the rising power.

whereas the former is only a half-unit change from 1 (that is, from equal spending), the latter is a whole unit. This has the effect of meaning that all ratios where the rising power spent less than the state, or states, it is being compared to fall between 0 and 1, whereas for ratios where the rising power spent more, the ratio is potentially infinite. Therefore, ratios are not an effective means of assessing the military balance.

Rather than using ratios, Table 30 uses the logged value for military spending for three different actors, the rising power (Models 1 and 2), the hegemon/challenger (Models 3 and 4), and the total for the major powers (Models 5 and 6). There are two versions for each (that is Model 1 and 2) since the NMC data for military spending 1816-1913 are in current-year British pounds, whereas from 1914 onwards they are in current-year American dollars, which means splitting the data into two time periods. Surprisingly, in all six models, monopolization no longer attains any level of statistical significance, though political closure does in all but Model 2. This is likely to be due, at least in part, to the splitting of the data by time period.

Table 31 examines five variant military personnel variables. Firstly, the absolute difference in number between the rising power and hegemon/challenger (Model 1), Secondly, a standardized and logged version of this variable (Model 2). This is the variable used throughout the analysis named military balance. Finally, the logged number of military personnel for the rising power (Model 3), hegemon/challenger (Model 4), and the total for the major powers (Model 5). In all, bar Model 5, monopolization remains statistically significant at a $p<0.05$ level, whilst political closure remains statistically significant at this level through all five models. The decision to use the standardized and logged difference in military personnel between the rising power and hegemon/challenger is based on two points.

Firstly, to ensure that the military capabilities of other major powers are included in the statistically analysis. Secondly, that the comparison with the hegemon/challenger is more consistent than a similar comparison with the total of the major powers. In the former, comparison is always with a single powerful actor, and whether it is the hegemon or a challenger, in both cases its actions in a dispute are clearly relevant to the rising power. By contrast, in the latter, this is an amalgam of a varying number of major powers, some of which are of relatively little relevance to the rising power or a specific dispute.

Table 32 uses the absolute values for CINC for the rising power (Model 1), hegemon/challenger (Model 2), total for the major powers (Model 3), and the log of naval tonnage for the rising power (Model 4), hegemon/challenger (Model 5), and the total for the major powers (Model 6). Whereas in Models 2 and 3 monopolization and political closure remain statistically significant, in Models 1, 4, 5 and 6 monopolization never attains any conventional level of statistical significance. For the latter three models, this suggests naval tonnage is capturing something quite different to the alternative variables for military capabilities. However, it is unclear whether this is because of the reduced sample, that is, the loss of all British disputes, 1816-56, and two Russian disputes, 1860-9, rather than naval tonnage per se. To examine this, Table 39 of the Appendix examines the effect of dropping each of the 13 rising powers from analysis. Notably, when Britain is dropped, monopolization no longer attains any conventional level of statistical significance. Plausibly naval tonnage provides a better estimation of power projection capabilities than any of the other measures (personnel, spending, or CINC), with naval power being the primary means of sustaining significant military forces far from home territory[10] throughout the period examined[11]. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the data only begin in 1865, and future iterations of this project could seek to address this.

Polarity is controlled with two variables. Firstly, with a dummy variable which assigns a '1' for years in which Mearsheimer (2001, 348) considers the international system to have been both multipolar, and unbalanced, that is, containing a potential hegemon. In the 1816-2010 period, these are the years 1903-18 and 1939-45. Mearsheimer argues that this is a particularly dangerous constellation of power since the potential hegemon is a threat to all other major powers. Polarity is additionally controlled for as a count of the number of major powers in each year, according to the Correlates of War State System Membership dataset.

Alternative means of controlling for polarity can be used based on different theoretical arguments. Table 33 details these findings. Firstly, Christensen and Snyder (1990) argue that multipolarity is dangerous in general, since alliance patterns are complex and shifting. Therefore, all years that are neither bipolar (1945-90) nor unipolar (1991 onwards) are coded as a '1' (Model 2). Secondly, Mearsheimer (2001), Waltz (1964; 1979), and many others, have argued that bipolarity is particular stable (Model 3). Notably here, therefore, the expectation is for this dummy variable to have a negative, rather than a positive, effect upon

[10] Though it should be remembered that not all disputes are in territory in easy-reach of the sea, whilst rising and major powers vary significantly in how vulnerable they are to blockade and attack from the sea. For instance, Ellis (1993, 274) shows that in 1937, prior to the outbreak of World War Two, Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy were largely or entirely deficient in 18, 15, 13, and 12 types of strategic raw materials and foodstuffs respectively (of 24 examined). By contrast, the United States was largely or entirely deficient in 8, and the Soviet Union in 6. This suggests that the former four would be much more vulnerable to trade disruption than the latter two.

[11] Even in the contemporary era, naval capabilities remain crucial for the deployment of large numbers of troops and heavy weaponry. Though air force transport fleets are faster, they are inevitably less efficient, and lack the capacity of naval forces.

the onset of major power violent disputes. Finally, Monteiro (2014) argues that unipolarity, though potentially enduring, is also potentially conflict prone (Model 4). There are several notable findings here. Monopolization remains statistically significant throughout, but political closure is only in Models 1, that is, when variables for multipolarity, bipolarity, or unipolarity are used, political closure is no longer statistically significant. Moreover, the variables for multipolarity in Model 2, and for bipolarity in Model 3 are statistically significant, and contrary to expectations, the former is negative, and the latter positive, that is, multipolarity has an association with a lower probability of major power dispute onset, and bipolarity a higher probability. Unipolarity, as examined in Model 4, leads to perfect prediction: no major power violent disputes have occurred during unipolarity. In practice meaning, that in the post-Cold War era, neither rising power – China and India – have participated in such disputes. The variable for unbalanced multipolarity, as in Model 1, is used throughout the analysis rather than these alternatives, since the argument that this constellation of power is particularly conflict prone, due to shifting alliances and attempts to balance the potential hegemon, is particularly relevant to analysis of rising powers, since a significant subset of them are potential hegemons (that is, rising powers rising from within the major powers, as opposed to from below).

Nuclear weapons are controlled for with two variables, firstly, a dummy variable for whether the rising power is nuclear armed or not, and secondly, a dummy variable for whether any of the other major power are nuclear armed, or not. Debate over the impact of nuclear weapons upon crises continues, but their effects upon international relations are clearly important and hugely relevant to rising powers. An alternative to this approach is shown in Table 33, Model 8, of the Appendix. The number of major powers that are nuclear armed are counted. Various arguments are made by the literature. Firstly, and following Waltz

(1990), that the spread of nuclear weapons should be associated with a reduction in the severity of disputes, since nuclear weapons allow states to attain security[12], meaning they are less fearful of others. Alternatively, Jervis (1979; 1988), Mueller (1988) and Rauchhaus (2009) argue that though nuclear armed dyads might reduce serious disputes, that this increases minor disputes as part of the stability-instability paradox. Finally, Sechser and Fuhrmann (2013) argue that nuclear weapons appear to have no impact upon the success of compellent threats, whilst Bell (2015) argues nuclear weapons have nuanced, and quite subtle, though substantively important, impacts upon foreign policy. Models 6, 7, and 8 assess the independent impact of the three nuclear weapons variables. In each case, monopolization and political closure remain statistically significant. Of the three, both of the dummy variables attain statistical significance ($p<0.1$ for rising powers, $p<0.05$ for rising powers), and have positive coefficients, that is, they increase the probability of onset of a major power violent dispute.

Finally, three variables control for the number of dispute participants, the duration of the dispute, and regional location. Region is controlled for by utilizing the MIDs Locations (MIDLOC) dataset, v2.1, (Bezerra and Braithwaite 2019; Braithwaite 2010) since it details the location at which a dispute began. The United Nations Statistical Division's (UNSD) regional breakdown ('UNSD — Methodology' n.d.) is then used to assign a regional location to each dispute since it is comprehensive and gives an appropriate level of detail. Though the purpose of the UNSD's regional coding differs from that employed here[13], this

[12] Or at least greatly increase their security, particularly when they have second strike capabilities.
[13] To allow the statistical comparison of different areas of the world, particularly in terms of demographic indicators.

is also useful, since it means a more objective means of determining regions[14]. A dispute is coded as being in the same region as the rising power if either their regional locations were the same, or whether it took place in a state (or territory) directly contiguous to the rising power (to take account of rising powers located on the edges of UNSD regions). The closer a dispute is located to a rising power, the greater the probability of higher levels of force being employed, since power projection is more efficient, and since it is closer to home territory, is perceived as being more significant for security than disputes further away. Both the number of dispute participants, and dispute duration, are taken from the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset. A higher number of dispute participants is expected to be associated with a higher probability of the onset of a major power violent dispute, since bargaining is more complex, preventing the location of a focal point for negotiations. Dispute duration is measured in days, and logged to account for the extremely skewed profile of this variable. Longer disputes are expected to be associated with a higher probability of the onset of a major power violent dispute since, if a dispute is not resolved, escalation becomes more likely.

Data structure

As explained previously, a country-year dataset could not feasibly be created due to the excessively large number of cases that would require hand coding. Instead, each of the cases in the dataset are disputes involving a rising power and at least one subordinate. When the same dispute involved more than one rising power, then additional cases were created, and coded according to each of the rising powers' relationships with the subordinate. Each case,

[14] Clearly any means of defining regions is inherently political. Using the UNSD's scheme means that the set of biases and considerations imposed on the data are, at least, unrelated to what is being studied, which avoids the problem of imposing my own biases.

therefore, is a rising power-subordinate dispute-year. This means the dataset was created by selecting on the existence of a dispute. Some additional limitations should be remembered. Specifically, the MIDs dataset is based around interstate disputes. This means that the only disputes involving a subordinate were included. To minimize the omission of disputes over non-state subordinates, that is, colonies and similar territories, the small number of disputes involving only rising and major powers were examined, and when found to have involved such polities, then included in the dataset. This allows the theory to be applied to both subordinates classed as states, and those classed as something other.

Quantitative tests and findings

The theory of subordinate monopolization posed three hypotheses. Firstly, that closure is associated with the onset of major interstate war. Secondly, that monopolization is associated with the onset of major interstate war. Thirdly, that their joint effect is particularly dangerous. Closure is examined in both its political-military and economic forms and is further broken down through analysis of formal ties and role specialization. To explore these relationships, monopolization and each of the six varieties of closure[15] are related to the onset of major power violent disputes. In each of these six analyses, descriptive statistics are first shown, followed by regression analysis, and concluding with assessments of substantive significance. Finally, a seventh analysis examines how the six varieties of closure relate to each other, and how this impacts the findings.

[15] That is, political closure, economic closure, political formal ties, economic formal ties, political role specialization, and economic role specialization.

Political closure and monopolization

The relationship between political closure, monopolization, and the onset of major power violent disputes is shown descriptively in Table 3. In the top-left cell, where political closure is present and monopolization is sought by the rising power, the proportion of disputes which are major power violent disputes is 23.8%. Not only is this 14.8 percentage points higher than the bottom-right cell, but the confidence intervals for the two do not overlap, suggesting that the population values are different, as hypothesized. The remaining two cells, in which just one of political closure or monopolization is present, have values falling between the other two cells, as hypothesized. Moreover, the effect of monopolization appears to be greater than that of political closure, with moves from the bottom two cells to the top two resulting in 9.5 and 11.7 percentage point increases, compared with moves from the right to the left resulting in 3.2 and 5.4 percentage point increases. In summary, the table suggests that monopolization has a stronger impact upon the likelihood of major power violent dispute onset than political closure, but that their combined effect is particularly important.

Table 3: Major power violent dispute rate by political closure and monopolization

		Political closure	
		Yes	No
Monopolization	Yes	23.8% [16.9%, 30.7%] (35/147)	20.6% [10.6%, 30.6%] (13/63)
	No	14.3% [2.7%, 25.9%] (5/35)	8.9% [3.9%, 14.0%] (11/123)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of violent disputes with major powers to all disputes in brackets.

Five models are estimated in Table 4. The first three examine the relationship between monopolization, political closure, and their combined effect including their interaction upon the dependent variable, major power violent dispute onset. This is a useful first cut of the data, and as can be seen, monopolization has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant in both Models 1 and 3. Whilst political closure has a positive coefficient in both Models 2 and 3, it only attains statistical significance in the former. The interaction term in Model 3, though negative, falls short of statistical significance.

Models 4 and 5 include the full set of control variables and cluster standard errors by rising power, with Model 5 additionally including the interaction of monopolization with political closure. Once more, this interaction is not statistically significant, though its inclusion reduces the size of the coefficient for monopolization and prevents political closure from being statistically significant. Model 4, therefore, is used as the primary model for analysis and discussion. In Model 4 both monopolization and political closure attain a $p<0.05$ level of statistical significance, evidence in support of the hypotheses that the presence of monopolization and political closure increases the probability of major power violent disputes.

Seven of the control variables in Model 4 are statistically significant. As status dissatisfaction increases, the probability of major power violent dispute onset also increases, as theoretically expected. When joint democracy ($p<0.1$) between the rising power and hegemon is present, the probability of major power violent dispute onset decreases, as expected. However, as rising power polity ($p<0.1$) increases, the probability of onset increases, that is, as a rising power becomes more democratic, there is an increased probability of major power violent dispute onset. The military balance between the rising power and system rival has a negative coefficient, indicating that as the number of military personnel that a rising power has relative to the system rival increases, that the probability of a major power violent dispute decreases. This means that at higher levels – when the rising power exceeds the number of personnel that the system rival has – major power violent disputes are less likely. By contrast, the probability of such disputes is higher when the two are relatively balanced, but highest when the rising power has clearly lower numbers of soldiers than the system rival. As the number of major powers increases, the probability of major power violent dispute onset decreases, though this is only statistically significant at a $p<0.1$ level. Nevertheless, this is surprising, and contrary to expectations, since a greater number of major powers is thought to generate uncertainty, shifting alliances, and contribute to dispute onset. Less surprisingly, increased numbers of dispute participants, and longer disputes, both increase the probability of a dispute being a major power violent dispute.

Controls for hegemon/challenger polity, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, and region are not statistically significant. The lack of any effect for hegemon/challenger polity is surprising, given the findings reported above for joint democracy and rising power polity, though both of these are only at a $p<0.1$ level. The effect of nuclear weapons, and whether they restrain or embolden, remains an open question in the literature. Here, no effect is found, suggesting, at the least, that their effect on this type of dispute is negligible. Whilst one might expect the region where a dispute is located relative to a rising power to impact the likelihood of violence and major power competition, no effect is found. I suggest that this is because both rising and major powers have power projection capabilities allowing plausible military intervention beyond their home region, thereby reducing the effect of distance. The most surprising finding here is for system polarity, measured here as whether the system is an unbalanced multipolar one, or not, based on

Mearsheimer's (2001) argument that such systems are particularly prone to wars between major powers. Moreover, the finding that an increase in the number of major powers is actually decreases the probability of major power violent dispute onset casts further doubt on this argument.

Table 4: Political closure and monopolization regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.967***		0.974**	0.456**	0.381**
	(0.311)		(0.444)	(0.217)	(0.158)
Political closure		0.643**	0.529	0.890**	0.735
		(0.283)	(0.577)	(0.402)	(0.500)
Monopolization X Political closure			-0.345		0.208
			(0.684)		(0.582)
Status dissatisfaction				0.062**	0.062**
				(0.027)	(0.026)
Joint democracy				-1.849*	-1.843*
				(1.016)	(1.018)
Rising power polity				0.092*	0.092*
				(0.054)	(0.054)
Hegemon/challenger polity				0.054	0.054
				(0.056)	(0.055)
Military balance, log				-0.758***	-0.762***
				(0.266)	(0.269)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy				-0.117	-0.106
				(0.791)	(0.786)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy				0.593	0.572
				(0.695)	(0.686)
Unbalanced multipolarity				1.907	1.914
				(1.186)	(1.180)
Number of major powers				-0.473*	-0.479*
				(0.273)	(0.270)
Dispute participants				0.432***	0.430***
				(0.146)	(0.143)
Region dummy				-0.253	-0.241
				(0.365)	(0.366)
Dispute duration, log				0.394***	0.396***
				(0.109)	(0.110)
Constant	-2.183***	-1.910***	-2.321***	-2.234*	-2.150*
	(0.264)	(0.219)	(0.316)	(1.295)	(1.181)
Clustered standard errors	No	No	No	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To examine substantive significance, Table 5 shows predicted probabilities of major power violent dispute onset using the Table 4, Model 4 specification. Four alternatives are estimated: when both monopolization and political closure are absent, when one is absent and the other present, and when both are present. It is the comparison of the first and last of these which is particularly important, that is, the move from the absence of both, to the presence of both. In the former case, the predicted probability of a rising power dispute being a major power violent dispute is 5.1%, whereas in the latter case this is 17%, a difference of 11.9 percentage points. However, the confidence intervals for these predictions do overlap.

Table 5: Political closure and monopolization marginal effects

VARIABLES	Predicted probability
Mono. = 0, Pol. closure = 0	0.051***
	(0.012 - 0.089)
Mono. = 1, Pol. closure = 0	0.115***
	(0.033 - 0.197)
Mono. = 0, Pol. closure = 1	0.077***
	(0.037 - 0.118)
Mono. = 1, Pol. closure = 1	0.170***
	(0.078 - 0.262)
Observations	368

95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean value

Political formal ties and monopolization

The relationship between political formal ties, monopolization, and the onset of major power violent disputes is shown descriptively in Table 6. In the top-left cell, where formal ties are present and monopolization is sought by the rising power, the proportion of disputes which are major power violent disputes is 22.8%, compared with 8.4% in the bottom-right cell, where both are absent. This is a difference of 14.4 percentage points, and the confidence intervals do not overlap, suggesting the population values are different, as hypothesized. The remaining two cells have values falling between these two. Moreover, and as hypothesized, the effect of monopolization appears to be greater than that of formal ties, with moves from the bottom to the top cells resulting in 7.4 and 14.5 percentage point increases, compared with moves from the right to the left resulting in -0.1 and 7.0 percentage point increases. As for political closure, this suggests that monopolization has a stronger impact on major power violent dispute onset than formal ties, though notably, the cell where the highest probability of a major power violent dispute is the top-right. Contrary to expectations, monopolization and an absence of formal political ties is associated with the highest onset rates.

Table 6: Major power violent dispute rate by political formal ties and monopolization

		Political formal ties	
		Yes	No
Monopolization	Yes	22.8% [13.5%, 32.0%] (18/79)	22.9% [15.7%, 30.1%] (30/131)
	No	15.4% [4.1%, 26.7%] (6/39)	8.4% [3.4%, 13.4%] (10/119)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of violent disputes with major powers to all disputes in brackets.

Analysis in Table 7 shows that monopolization consistently has a positive impact upon the dependent variable, and with the exception of Model 5, always at the $p<0.05$ level or higher, no matter the model specification and clustering of standard errors by rising power. Political formal ties are never statistically significant, even in Model 2, where it is the only variable. This casts doubt upon its impact on major power violent dispute onset. As in Table 4, the control variables for status dissatisfaction, joint democracy, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are statistically significant, whilst controls for hegemon/challenger polity, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, and region are not. However, whilst rising power polity is statistically significant in Table 4, it is not in Table 7.

Table 7: Political formal ties and monopolization regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.967***		1.175***	0.851**	0.670*
	(0.311)		(0.390)	(0.351)	(0.365)
Political formal ties		0.293	0.684	0.466	-0.071
		(0.286)	(0.553)	(0.457)	(0.561)
Monopolization X Political formal ties			-0.691		0.689
			(0.649)		(0.755)
Status dissatisfaction				0.071***	0.073***
				(0.026)	(0.025)
Joint democracy				-1.638*	-1.599
				(0.985)	(1.004)
Rising power polity				0.071	0.071
				(0.056)	(0.056)
Hegemon/challenger polity				0.043	0.041
				(0.055)	(0.056)
Military balance, log				-0.646***	-0.648***
				(0.239)	(0.236)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy				-0.357	-0.318
				(0.712)	(0.718)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy				0.825	0.779
				(0.645)	(0.655)
Unbalanced multipolarity				1.903	1.875
				(1.298)	(1.260)
Number of major powers				-0.449*	-0.418
				(0.266)	(0.277)
Dispute participants				0.397***	0.426***
				(0.149)	(0.150)
Region dummy				-0.393	-0.375
				(0.375)	(0.368)
Dispute duration, log				0.387***	0.385***
				(0.118)	(0.121)
Constant	-2.183***	-1.658***	-2.389***	-2.219*	-2.343*
	(0.264)	(0.173)	(0.330)	(1.315)	(1.384)
Clustered standard errors	No	No	No	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To examine the substantive significance of the results from Model 4 predicted probabilities are calculated. Table 8 shows these, with monopolization and political formal ties varied across their four possible combinations. When neither are present, the probability of a major power violent dispute is 5.3%, whereas when both are present this increases to 17.3%, a difference of 12 percentage points. However, the confidence intervals for these two predictions overlap, casting doubt on whether such a difference exists in the population. This suggests that despite the findings for political closure, that political formal ties alone are insufficient.

Table 8: Political formal ties and monopolization marginal effects

VARIABLES	Predicted probability
Mono. = 0, Pol. formal = 0	0.053**
	(0.012 - 0.094)
Mono. = 1, Pol. formal = 0	0.082**
	(0.007 - 0.156)
Mono. = 0, Pol. formal = 1	0.116***
	(0.052 - 0.179)
Mono. = 1, Pol. formal = 1	0.173***
	(0.053 - 0.292)
Observations	368

95% confidence interval in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: All predictors at their mean value

Political role specialization and monopolization

The relationship between political role specialization, monopolization, and the onset of major power violent disputes is shown below in Table 9. As can be seen, 28.3% of the cases in the top-left cell are major power violent disputes, compared with just 10.4% in the bottom-right cell, a difference of 17.9 percentage points. Moreover, the confidence intervals for these two values do not overlap. The effect of monopolization is stronger than that of role specialization, though the difference is not quite as pronounced as for political closure. Here, the effect of moving from the bottom cells to the top is an increase of 19 and 5.2 percentage points, compared with the effect of moving from right to left of 12.7 and -1.1 percentage points. In fact, when monopolization is absent, the effect of role specialization is opposite to that hypothesized – in other words, it is a negative effect, though it should be noted that the confidence intervals do overlap.

Table 9: Major power violent dispute rate by political role specialization and monopolization

		Political role specialization	
		Yes	No
Monopolization	Yes	28.3% [20.3%, 36.4%] (34/120)	15.6% [8.1%, 23.0%] (14/90)
	No	9.3% [0.6%, 18.0%] (4/43)	10.4% [4.8%, 16.0%] (12/115)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of violent disputes with major powers to all disputes in brackets.

Though both monopolization and political role specialization attain $p<0.01$ levels of statistical significance in Models 1 and 2 respectively of Table 10, in Model 3, which includes both as well as the interaction between the two, neither attain statistical significance. However, in Model 4 including controls, monopolization attains a $p<0.01$ level of statistical significance once more, though political role specialization remains insignificant. The control variables for status dissatisfaction, joint democracy, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are statistically significant, whilst controls for rising power polity, hegemon/challenger polity, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, the number of major powers, and region are not.

Table 10: Political role specialization and monopolization regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.967***		0.458	0.731***	0.397
	(0.311)		(0.421)	(0.279)	(0.259)
Political specialization		0.739***	-0.127	0.511	-0.229
		(0.280)	(0.607)	(0.379)	(0.560)
Monopolization X Political specialization			0.891		0.938
			(0.703)		(0.573)
Status dissatisfaction				0.072***	0.072***
				(0.025)	(0.026)
Joint democracy				-1.650*	-1.596
				(0.986)	(1.023)
Rising power polity				0.075	0.070
				(0.057)	(0.056)
Hegemon/challenger polity				0.049	0.040
				(0.059)	(0.060)
Military balance, log				-0.668***	-0.669**
				(0.252)	(0.261)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy				-0.437	-0.354
				(0.735)	(0.661)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy				0.852	0.712
				(0.640)	(0.577)
Unbalanced multipolarity				1.849	1.747
				(1.201)	(1.171)
Number of major powers				-0.434	-0.372
				(0.281)	(0.304)
Dispute participants				0.378**	0.409***
				(0.148)	(0.145)
Region dummy				-0.367	-0.300
				(0.364)	(0.364)
Dispute duration, log				0.393***	0.387***
				(0.123)	(0.124)
Constant	-2.183***	-1.929***	-2.150***	-2.324*	-2.363*
	(0.264)	(0.210)	(0.305)	(1.345)	(1.332)
Clustered standard errors	No	No	No	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Substantive significance is assessed by estimating the effect of changing monopolization and political role specialization. Table 11 shows that a move from these variables being absent to being present increases the probability of major power violent dispute from 5.2% to 16.0%, an increase of 10.8 percentage points. However, the confidence intervals for these estimates overlap, casting doubt on whether such a difference exists in the population, as for political formal ties.

Table 11: Political role specialization and monopolization marginal effects

VARIABLES	Predicted probability
Mono. = 0, Pol. specialization = 0	0.052**
	(0.007 - 0.098)
Mono. = 1, Pol. specialization = 0	0.084***
	(0.033 - 0.135)
Mono. = 0, Pol. specialization = 1	0.103***
	(0.036 - 0.169)
Mono. = 1, Pol. specialization = 1	0.160***
	(0.072 - 0.248)
Observations	368

95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean value

Economic closure and monopolization

The relationship between economic closure, monopolization, and major power violent disputes is shown in Table 12. 29.9% of the disputes in the top-left cell are major power violent disputes, compared with just 9% in the bottom-right, a 20.9 percentage point difference, with no overlap of the confidence intervals. This suggests that the effects of economic closure and monopolization are present in the population. In addition, and unlike any of the three political variables, the effect of economic closure is comparable to that of monopolization, with vertical moves leading to increases of 8.5 and 10.6 percentage points, and right to left leading to increases of 10.3 and 12.4 percentage points. This is contrary to expectations and leads to the bottom-left cell having a higher probability of major power violent dispute onset than the top-right, though the confidence intervals do overlap.

Table 12: Major power violent dispute rate by economic closure and monopolization

		Economic closure	
		Yes	No
Monopolization	Yes	29.9% [18.9%, 40.8%] (20/67)	19.6% [13.1%, 26.1%] (28/143)
	No	21.4% [0.0%, 42.9%] (3/14)	9.0% [4.3%, 13.7%] (10/119)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of violent disputes with major powers to all disputes in brackets.

Turning to inferential statistics in Table 13, both monopolization and economic closure attain a $p<0.01$ level of statistical significance in Models 1 and 2 respectively. In Model 3, which introduces their interaction, monopolization retains a $p<0.05$ level of statistical significance, whilst economic closure no longer attains statistical significance, though neither does the interaction term. In Model 4, which includes the full set of controls, as well as clustering of the standard errors by rising power, monopolization attains a $p<0.1$ level of statistical significance, and economic closure a $p<0.01$ level. In Model 5, which includes the interaction, monopolization attains a $p<0.1$ level of statistical significance, whilst neither economic closure nor the interaction are statistically significant. The controls for status dissatisfaction, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are statistically significant, whilst controls for joint democracy, rising power polity, system hegemon/challenger polity, number of major power, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, and region are not. In particular, it is notable that joint democracy, which is statistically significant in all three model estimating political variables, is not for economic closure.

Table 13: Economic closure and monopolization regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.967***		0.898**	0.712*	0.717*
	(0.311)		(0.359)	(0.370)	(0.408)
Economic closure		0.867***	1.011	0.958***	0.980
		(0.299)	(0.713)	(0.273)	(0.878)
Monopolization X Economic closure			-0.453		-0.025
			(0.790)		(0.927)
Status dissatisfaction				0.057**	0.057**
				(0.028)	(0.028)
Joint democracy				-1.826	-1.826
				(1.123)	(1.127)
Rising power polity				0.084	0.084
				(0.058)	(0.058)
Hegemon/challenger polity				0.050	0.050
				(0.055)	(0.055)
Military balance, log				-0.731***	-0.730***
				(0.240)	(0.240)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy				-0.324	-0.320
				(0.844)	(0.789)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy				0.718	0.716
				(0.747)	(0.724)
Unbalanced multipolarity				1.777	1.777
				(1.185)	(1.181)
Number of major powers				-0.437	-0.437
				(0.287)	(0.289)
Dispute participants				0.425***	0.426***
				(0.142)	(0.134)
Region dummy				-0.368	-0.368
				(0.367)	(0.367)
Dispute duration, log				0.376***	0.376***
				(0.115)	(0.114)
Constant	-2.183***	-1.792***	-2.310***	-2.119	-2.127
	(0.264)	(0.169)	(0.291)	(1.388)	(1.424)
Clustered standard errors	No	No	No	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Predicted probabilities are calculated for when monopolization and economic closure are varied. As Table 14 shows, when both are absent, the dispute has only a 5.4% probability of being a major power violent dispute whereas when both are present this is 23.3%, a difference of 18.9 percentage points. Since the confidence intervals do not overlap, it can be concluded that this effect is likely to exist in the population, strengthening the evidence for the hypotheses.

Table 14: Economic closure and monopolization marginal effects

VARIABLES	Predicted probability
Mono. = 0, Eco. closure = 0	0.054***
	(0.017 - 0.091)
Mono. = 1, Eco. closure = 0	0.129*
	(-0.001 - 0.259)
Mono. = 0, Eco. closure = 1	0.104***
	(0.055 - 0.153)
Mono. = 1, Eco. closure = 1	0.233***
	(0.101 - 0.364)
Observations	368

95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean value

Economic formal ties and monopolization

The descriptive data shown in Table 15 examines the relationship between economic formal ties, monopolization, and the onset of major power violent disputes. The top-left cell, where both monopolization and formal ties occur, has a rate of 30.2%, compared with just 8.5% when both are absent, a difference of 21.7 percentage points. In addition, the difference between these two groups is likely to exist in the population since the confidence intervals do not overlap. The effect of monopolization and formal ties can also be compared. Moving from the bottom cells to the top results in a 5.2 and 12.5 percentage point increases, whilst moving from right to left results in a 9.2 and 16.5 percentage point increases. Formal ties, therefore, appear to have a stronger effect upon the likelihood of major power violent disputes than monopolization, contrary to the other findings.

Table 15: Major power violent dispute rate by economic formal ties and monopolization

		Economic formal ties	
		Yes	No
Monopolization	Yes	30.2% [16.5%, 44.0%] (13/43)	21.0% [14.8%, 27.1%] (35/167)
	No	25.0% [3.8%, 46.2%] (4/16)	8.5% [3.9%, 13.0%] (12/142)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of violent disputes with major powers to all disputes in brackets.

The statistical analysis, reported in Table 16, shows monopolization and economic formal ties attain $p<0.01$ and $p<0.05$ levels of statistical significance in Models 1 and 2 respectively. In Model 3, which introduces their interaction, monopolization retains a $p<0.05$ level of statistical significance, whilst economic closure no longer attains statistical significance, though neither does the interaction term. In Model 4, which includes the full set of controls, as well as clustering of the standard errors by rising power, both variables exceed a $p<0.05$ level of statistical significance, providing evidence in support of the hypotheses. In common with the result reported in Tables 7, 10, and 13, controls for status dissatisfaction, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are statistically significant.

Controls for joint democracy, rising power polity, hegemon/challenger polity, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, number of major powers, and region are not statistically significant.

Table 16: Economic formal ties and monopolization regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.967***		0.974**	0.881**	0.752**
	(0.311)		(0.444)	(0.353)	(0.376)
Economic formal ties		0.643**	0.529	0.651***	0.029
		(0.283)	(0.577)	(0.239)	(0.735)
Monopolization X Economic formal ties			-0.345		0.837
			(0.684)		(0.873)
Status dissatisfaction				0.068**	0.068***
				(0.027)	(0.026)
Joint democracy				-1.631	-1.528
				(1.003)	(1.084)
Rising power polity				0.071	0.068
				(0.056)	(0.058)
Hegemon/challenger polity				0.042	0.040
				(0.055)	(0.057)
Military balance, log				-0.649***	-0.670***
				(0.239)	(0.233)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy				-0.418	-0.439
				(0.650)	(0.665)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy				0.803	0.852
				(0.610)	(0.636)
Unbalanced multipolarity				1.800	1.782
				(1.213)	(1.203)
Number of major powers				-0.439	-0.404
				(0.268)	(0.277)
Dispute participants				0.389***	0.409***
				(0.146)	(0.151)
Region dummy				-0.445	-0.483
				(0.375)	(0.365)
Dispute duration, log				0.379***	0.390***
				(0.119)	(0.117)
Constant	-2.183***	-1.910***	-2.321***	-2.085	-2.188
	(0.264)	(0.219)	(0.316)	(1.356)	(1.380)
Clustered standard errors	No	No	No	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Utilizing Model 4 from Table 16, predicted probabilities are calculated for the four possible combinations of values for monopolization and economic formal ties. Table 17 shows that when both are absent, the predicted probability of a major power violent dispute is 5.4%, but that this increases to 21% when both are present, a difference of 15.6 percentage points, with the confidence intervals for the estimates not overlapping. This is a large effect and suggests the two to have a substantively significant effect upon the outcome of interest, adding to the support for the hypotheses.

Table 17: Economic formal ties and monopolization marginal effects

VARIABLES	Predicted probability
Mono. = 0, Eco. formal = 0	0.054***
	(0.017 - 0.092)
Mono. = 1, Eco. formal = 0	0.099**
	(0.007 - 0.192)
Mono. = 0, Eco. formal = 1	0.122***
	(0.062 - 0.182)
Mono. = 1, Eco. formal = 1	0.210***
	(0.098 - 0.323)
Observations	368

95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean value

Economic role specialization and monopolization

The relationship between economic role specialization, monopolization, and the onset of major power violent disputes is shown descriptively in Table 18. When both role specialization and monopolization are present, the probability of a dispute being a major power violent dispute is 33.9%, compared with just 8.3% when they are absent. This is a difference of 25.6 percentage points, and the confidence intervals for the estimates do not overlap, meaning this is likely to also be seen in the population. The effects of monopolization and role specialization can also be compared. Moving from the bottom to the top cells results in an increase of 13.9 and 10.2 percentage points, whilst moving right to left results in an increase of 15.4 and 11.7 percentage points. Role specialization, like formal ties, appears to have a stronger effect therefore than monopolization.

Table 18: Major power violent dispute rate by economic role specialization and monopolization

		Economic role specialization	
		Yes	No
Monopolization	Yes	33.9% [21.8%, 46.0%] (20/59)	18.5% [12.3%, 24.7%] (28/151)
	No	20.0% [4.3%, 35.7%] (5/25)	8.3% [3.6%, 13.0%] (11/133)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of violent disputes with major powers to all disputes in brackets.

To examine these relationships more closely, Table 19 reports the findings from regression analysis. As can be seen, monopolization and economic role specialization both attain a $p<0.01$ level of statistical significance in Models 1 and 2 respectively. In Model 3, both remain statistically significant, at a $p<0.05$ and $p<0.1$ level respectively, whilst the interaction term is not statistically significant. In Model 4, which introduces controls and clustering of standard errors by rising power, both monopolization and economic role specialization attain at least a $p<0.05$ level of statistical significance, notably, in Model 5, which includes the interaction between the two, both retain this level of statistical significance, whilst the interaction is not statistically significant. This provides evidence in support of the hypotheses for monopolization and economic role specialization. As for Tables 7, 10, 13, and 16, controls for status dissatisfaction, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are statistically significant, whilst controls for joint democracy, rising power polity, system rival polity, number of major power, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, and region are not.

Table 19: Economic role specialization and monopolization regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.967***		0.926**	0.861**	1.003**
	(0.311)		(0.378)	(0.371)	(0.446)
Economic specialization		0.979***	1.020*	0.748***	1.073**
		(0.294)	(0.591)	(0.227)	(0.477)
Monopolization X Economic specialization			-0.208		-0.448
			(0.685)		(0.504)
Status dissatisfaction				0.072***	0.073***
				(0.024)	(0.024)
Joint democracy				-1.415	-1.492
				(1.044)	(1.035)
Rising power polity				0.066	0.070
				(0.060)	(0.060)
Hegemon/challenger polity				0.042	0.045
				(0.058)	(0.058)
Military balance, log				-0.618**	-0.618**
				(0.243)	(0.245)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy				-0.397	-0.431
				(0.696)	(0.711)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy				0.654	0.700
				(0.622)	(0.608)
Unbalanced multipolarity				1.891	1.907
				(1.216)	(1.203)
Number of major powers				-0.456	-0.488*
				(0.280)	(0.270)
Dispute participants				0.413***	0.412***
				(0.148)	(0.149)
Region dummy				-0.263	-0.244
				(0.353)	(0.348)
Dispute duration, log				0.368***	0.362***
				(0.121)	(0.123)
Constant	-2.183***	-1.838***	-2.406***	-2.241*	-2.213
	(0.264)	(0.172)	(0.315)	(1.352)	(1.378)
Clustered standard errors	No	No	No	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using Model 4 from Table 19, predicted probabilities are calculated. Table 20 shows that when monopolization and role specialization are both absent, the probability of a dispute being a major power violent dispute is just 5.1%, but that this rises to 21.2% when both are present. This is a large substantive effect – a difference of 16.1 percentage points – and the confidence intervals for the estimates do not overlap, suggesting the effect exists in the population. This adds to support for the hypotheses for monopolization and suggests the importance of economic role specialization to economic closure.

Table 20: Economic role specialization and monopolization marginal effects

VARIABLES	Predicted probability
Mono. = 0, Eco. specialization = 0	0.051**
	(0.012 - 0.091)
Mono. = 1, Eco. specialization = 0	0.102***
	(0.032 - 0.173)
Mono. = 0, Eco. specialization = 1	0.113***
	(0.051 - 0.175)
Mono. = 1, Eco. specialization = 1	0.212***
	(0.106 - 0.318)
Observations	368

95% confidence interval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All predictors at their mean value

Combining political and economic variables

The analysis reported so far examines each of the six political and economic variables in isolation from each other, exploring their relationships with monopolization. It is reasonable to also examine how they impact each other when included in the same model. Table 21 reports three models which examine all of the political variables, all of the economic variables, and then the full set of six political and economic variables. The full set of control variables are used and clustering of standard errors by rising power. Some caution should be used in interpreting these results, since the six political and economic variables are related to each other, and moreover, may capture elements of the same phenomenon. Inclusion of multiple variables therefore may wash out the findings.

Monopolization is statistically significant at a level meeting or exceeding $p<0.1$ across all three models. This is unsurprising, since this variable was consistently highly statistically significant in the prior tables. By contrast, political closure is only statistically significant in Model 1, failing to attain any level of statistical significance in Model 3. Neither political formal ties nor role specialization are statistically significant in any model. Similar results are found for the economic variables. Neither economic formal ties nor role specialization are statistically significant in Models 2 or 3 either. However, economic closure is statistically significant in Model 2, at a $p<0.1$ level. Finally, the control variables for status dissatisfaction, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are statistically significant in all three models, are the number of major powers attains a $p<0.1$ level of statistical significance in Models 1 and 3. The controls for joint democracy, rising power polity, hegemon/challenger polity, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, and region never reach any level of statistical significance. Taken together, these findings for the control variables are in line with those previously reported.

Table 21: Combining political and economic variables regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.454**	0.731*	0.469*
	(0.206)	(0.406)	(0.266)
Political closure	0.841**		0.718
	(0.362)		(0.484)
Political formal ties	0.139		-0.108
	(0.466)		(0.609)
Political specialization	0.002		-0.090
	(0.337)		(0.357)
Economic closure		0.743*	0.346
		(0.447)	(0.583)
Economic formal ties		-0.006	0.169
		(0.559)	(0.512)
Economic specialization		0.351	0.388
		(0.674)	(0.731)
Status dissatisfaction	0.062**	0.060*	0.056*
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Joint democracy	-1.810*	-1.637	-1.700
	(0.999)	(1.172)	(1.122)
Rising power polity	0.088	0.077	0.086
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.054	0.047	0.054
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Military balance, log	-0.755***	-0.699***	-0.755***
	(0.270)	(0.227)	(0.252)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.122	-0.331	-0.153
	(0.806)	(0.801)	(0.791)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.637	0.682	0.567
	(0.727)	(0.750)	(0.794)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.971	1.867	1.980
	(1.280)	(1.218)	(1.263)
Number of major powers	-0.483*	-0.454	-0.493*
	(0.271)	(0.286)	(0.270)
Dispute participants	0.429***	0.425***	0.442***
	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.147)
Region dummy	-0.266	-0.320	-0.239
	(0.353)	(0.326)	(0.331)
Dispute duration, log	0.395***	0.370***	0.379***
	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Constant	-2.183*	-2.114	-2.076
	(1.277)	(1.329)	(1.297)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As explained above, a note of caution should accompany these findings. They appear to offer strong support for monopolization as a driver of major power violent disputes, and little support for the effects of closure. Though the former appears to be robust, it should be remembered that both political closure and economic closure were statistically significant when assessed alone (that is, in Tables 4 and 13 respectively).

Summary of statistical findings

Monopolization is statistically and substantively significant across the models, suggesting that this hypothesis should be accepted. The findings for closure are more nuanced. Though a statistically significant effect is found for political closure, economic closure, economic formal ties, and economic role specialization, one was not found for political formal ties and political role specialization. On the basis that the overarching variables of political closure and economic closure are statistically significant, the hypothesis is accepted. However, it is clear that further research is needed to understand the varied results reported. Finally, the third hypothesis that the impact of both monopolization and closure together is particularly relevant for the onset of major power violent disputes is accepted.

Of the control variables used in the regression analysis, status dissatisfaction, military balance, number of dispute participants, and dispute duration are all consistently statistically significant, with those for hegemon/challenger polity, rising power nuclear weapons, major power nuclear weapons, system polarity, and region being consistently statistically insignificant. Joint democracy is statistically significant at a $p<0.1$ level in all three political analyses (Model 4 in Tables 4, 7, and 10), but not in any of the economic ones. Rising power polity, meanwhile is statistically significant in the model examining political closure (Model 4, Table 4), but in no others. Finally, the number of major powers attains a $p<0.1$ level of statistical significance in the political closure (Model 4, Table 4), political formal ties (Model 4, Table 7), and in Models 1 and 3 of the combined analysis (Table 21).

To explore the sensitivity of these findings to alternative control variables, dependent variables, and model specifications, the Appendix shows how the results for monopolization and political closure (Model 4, Table 4) change. In particular, alternative means of controlling for the military balance, polarity, nuclear weapons, status dissatisfaction, and regime type are examined. In addition, alternative dependent variables, model specifications, and how removing each of the 13 rising powers from the data alter results are explored.

Aggregation by rising power cases

Although the statistical analyses detailed in the previous sections cluster standard errors by rising power, with the purpose of addressing possible relations between their disputes which cannot be controlled for, differences between the 13 rising power cases also require direct examination. In this section the data is explored descriptively, with the variables aggregated by rising power.

The first means of doing so is via description of the 13 cases, as shown in Table 22. Here, the cases are compared in terms of their relative disputes rates, major power violent dispute rates, and the percentage of all their disputes which meet the threshold for being major power violent disputes. In terms of all disputes involving subordinates, by far the highest onset rates are for the Soviet Union and interwar Germany which each have more than two disputes per year. China, and India, occupy the third and fourth highest positions respectively, which is of particular note given that these rises are ongoing. By contrast, Cold War Japan, and West Germany, have the lowest onset rates. However, this ranking is somewhat different for the onset rates of major power violent disputes. Although the Soviet

Union still has the highest rate, this is followed by the interwar and early Cold War United States. In fact, these two cases alone account for 31 of the total major power violent disputes, nearly half of the total (64). This likely reflects the foreign policy priorities of these two states in the early Cold War, and particularly the adoption of containment by the United States. This may also cast some doubt on neorealist conclusions about the stability of a bipolar system – in fact it seems that serious disputes were more common, not less.

Table 22: Rising power disputes with subordinates and relative rates

Case	Rise period	Years	Disputes	Dispute rate	Major power violent disputes	Major power violent dispute rate	Percent of disputes, violent
Britain	1816-1856	41	27	0.66	2	0.05	7.4%
Russia	1860-1890	31	14	0.45	1	0.03	7.1%
United States 1	1865-1900	36	27	0.75	1	0.03	3.7%
Germany 1	1880-1914	35	19	0.54	4	0.11	21.1%
Japan 1	1890-1937	48	34	0.71	10	0.21	29.4%
Italy	1900-1940	41	47	1.15	9	0.22	19.1%
United States 2	1920-1960	41	41	1.00	16	0.39	39.0%
Germany 2	1933-1939	7	16	2.29	1	0.14	6.3%
Soviet Union	1950-1970	21	53	2.52	15	0.71	28.3%
West Germany	1950-1990	41	15	0.37	3	0.07	20.0%
Japan 2	1960-1990	31	9	0.29	0	0.00	0.0%
China	1975-2010	36	52	1.44	2	0.06	3.8%
India	2000-2010	11	14	1.27	0	0.00	0.0%
Average		*32*	*28*	*0.88*	*5*	*0.15*	*17.4%*

Note: China and India have continued to rise post-2010.

For six rising power cases, major power violent disputes account for 19% or more of the total. By contrast, all others have values less than 8%, with two, India, and Japan during the Cold War, recording zero major power violent disputes. Of course, percentage could reflect either a high number of major power violent disputes, or a relatively low number of total disputes, and of the six cases with high percentages, both West Germany and pre-World War One Germany have a low number of total disputes. This metric also reveals the limits of this measurement: interwar Germany has only one major power violent dispute, meaning that despite a high onset rate of all disputes (2.29), it has a low percentage value, yet the major power violent dispute in question was of World War Two.

This also allows a basic plausibility test of the data based on prior assumptions about rising powers, that is, certain cases are typically thought to be associated with major power war, whilst others are not. The data partially bear out these assumptions with the major power violent dispute percentage and onset rate supporting the association of Italy and pre-World War Two Japan with violence. However, both pre-World War One and interwar Germany do not have as clear associations, whilst the Soviet Union and interwar and early Cold War United States are strongly associated with violence. This reveals two things, that rising power spells may be more nuanced than typically understood, with popular assumptions about relative associations with violence (or peace) being driven by perceptions surrounding specific events rather than analysis of rises themselves, but also, and as already noted, major power violent disputes can mask qualitative differences between disputes, meaning some interpretation is still required.

Dispute onset rates

The 13 cases can be compared graphically, allowing comparison of the cases. In the previous section, the onset rate of disputes with subordinates and of major power violent disputes, were discussed. In Figure 7, the two are plotted against each other, with the underlying assumption – all else being equal – that the higher the rate of dispute onset, the higher the rate of major power violent dispute. The data show a positive relationship as expected, that is, as the onset rate of all disputes increases, the onset rate of major power violent disputes also increases. However, the data also show significant variation across cases, with the high onset rates of the Soviet Union and interwar Germany (GE-2) only turning into a high onset rate for major power violent disputes in the former case. It also appears that given both China and India have relatively high onset rates of disputes, that they have (at least currently) historically low relative rates of major power violent disputes. In short, though they engage in quite high numbers of disputes with subordinates, few of these, at present, involve other major powers. There is little reason to suppose that either of these rising powers are systematically different to their predecessors, meaning the low onset rate of major power violent disputes should not persuade policymakers that major interstate war is unthinkable.

Figure 7: Rising powers by subordinate dispute onset rate and major power violent dispute onset rate



Similar comparison is made in Figure 8 between the onset rate of all disputes, and the proportion of disputes which are major power violent disputes. There is only a weak positive relationship, and very significant variation, which suggests that higher onset rates do not lead to an exponential likelihood of major power violent dispute. This means, all things being equal, that it is not expected that rising powers which engage in higher numbers of disputes per year will meet more frequently severe resistance. This is perhaps contrary to expectations, since one might expect that a high propensity for conflict might alarm other major powers and lead them to confront such belligerence more frequently. The data suggest this is not systematically the case, perhaps implying that the specific characteristics of the subordinate, including what is at stake, are more important than dyadic balance of power concerns.

Figure 8: Rising power dispute onset rate and percentage that are major power violent disputes



Monopolization

To examine the relationship between monopolization and dispute onset, Figure 9 plots the proportion of disputes in which the rising power sought to monopolize a subordinate against the dispute onset rate. This measure of monopolization is imperfect, not least because any value could result from greatly different absolute numbers of disputes, that is, a hypothetical value of 0.5 could be because a rising power sought monopolization once and had two disputes involving subordinates, or because monopolization was sought 30 times out of a total of 60 disputes. Here, both scenarios are treated as the same, despite the latter appearing significantly more conflict prone. Of course, since the y-axis here is dispute onset rate, it would be highly likely that even if the two rises were of different lengths, then the latter would have a higher dispute onset rate. Nonetheless, some caution must be used when interpreting charts utilizing this measure of monopolization.

Figure 9: Rising powers by monopolization and dispute onset rate



On average, the higher the proportion of disputes where monopolization was sought, the higher the dispute onset rate, suggesting that monopolization is related to dispute onset rate. Notably, West Germany and Cold War Japan (JA-2) have very low monopolization proportions and dispute onset rates. This reflects their somewhat unusual positions as rising powers, that is, rising during bipolarity, whilst being enmeshed in security architecture directed against the Soviet Union. In short, their abilities to pursue international interests were unusually constrained by other powerful actors. The Soviet Union again appears as an outlier, with comparatively moderate monopolization, but the highest dispute onset rate. Firstly, this suggests that the Soviet Union was, compared to other rising powers, more of a force for the status quo than for revisionism. Secondly, it suggests that its high dispute onset rate is explained by other factors, likely a combination of American containment, and significant suspicion from many other states about Soviet intentions, something not helped by Stalin's opportunistic belligerence, nor Khrushchev's high-profile threats during the Suez and Cuban Missile crises, and the use of force in Hungary. Finally, contemporary China seeks monopolization at comparable rates to pre-World War Two Japan (JA-1) and interwar Germany (GE-2), with a dispute onset rate falling between the two.

Figure 10 compares the proportion of disputes where monopolization was sought with the onset rate of major power violent disputes. As can be seen, the relationship between the two is minimal, with the Soviet Union and United States during the interwar and early Cold War (US-2), having onset rates far higher than any other case, suggesting the era to be unusually violent. However, though the relationship is quite weak, it should be remembered that here each of the 13 rising powers is treated equally, and therefore that this analysis does not take into account the absolute number of disputes, or major power violent disputes, that each rising power engaged in, which the statistical analysis detailed earlier in this chapter does. Notably, the United States and Soviet Union together account for 31 of the 64 total major power violent disputes. Nevertheless, this reinforces the perspective that these two cases may be systematically different from others, given their high rates of major power violent disputes.

Figure 10: Rising powers by monopolization and major power violent dispute onset rate



Political closure

This section examines how political closure varies between rising power cases, and how this variation is associated with dependent variables of interest. In Figure 11, the proportion of disputes in which the subordinate was politically closed is plotted against the dispute onset rate. As with the previous section on monopolization, this approach to political closure means that it is possible for high and low absolute instances of political closure to have the same proportion, and that this is a caveat that should be remembered when interpreting the data. The chart shows that as political closure increases, the dispute onset rate also increases. The 13 cases are distributed widely on terms of political closure, with only the Soviet Union being a significant outlier from the general trend. Once more, its dispute onset rate is far higher than expected given its typical political closure, when compared with the other cases.

Figure 11: Rising powers by political closure and dispute onset rate



In Figure 12, which plots political closure against the major power violent dispute onset rate, it can be seen that the trend is almost flat, contrary to Figure 11. It seems that political closure, at least when aggregated across rising powers, has a very limited impact upon this onset rate, reinforcing the earlier weak statistical findings for this variable. Once more, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent the interwar and early Cold War United States (US-2), are apparent outliers, with much higher onset rates than the other cases. In part, this lack of a relationship is no doubt due to the aggregation of disputes by rising power, and the limits of utilizing a proportional approach. However, it does further reinforce the finding that the Cold War superpowers were systematically different from other rising power cases drawn from across the past 200 years.

Figure 12: Rising powers by political closure and major power violent dispute onset rate



Economic closure

This section follows the same pattern as for the previous section on political closure. Firstly, the proportion of disputes in which economic closure was sought is plotted against dispute onset rate (Figure 13), and then against major power violent dispute onset rate (Figure 14). The broad patterns seen mirror those for political closure, that is, a positive relationship seems to exist for dispute onset rate, but no relationship for major power violent dispute onset rate. Most cases cluster in the bottom left, suggesting rising powers typically have low levels of economic closure, and relatively low dispute onset rates. The Soviet Union, interwar Germany (GE-2), India, and pre-World War Two Japan are exceptions to this. The former two have high dispute onset rates and middling levels of economic closure, whereas the latter two, somewhat surprisingly in India's case, have the highest levels of economic closure and lower than expected dispute onset rates. In Figure 14, the Soviet Union, due to its high major power violent dispute rate, appears systematically different to the other cases, possibly also joined by the interwar and early Cold War United States (US-2).

Figure 13: Rising powers by economic closure and dispute onset rate



Figure 14: Rising powers by economic closure and major power violent dispute onset rate



Political and economic closure and monopolization

In this penultimate section, monopolization, and political and economic closure, are related to dispute onset. Firstly, the proportion of disputes where the subordinate was politically closed is plotted against the proportion of disputes in which monopolization was sought. Figure 15 further displays this data by breaking the possible space into quadrants. The top right are cases where political closure typically existed and where monopolization was sought, the bottom left are cases where political closure and monopolization was less likely. Based on the theory developed, when political closure and monopolization are both high, the probability of major interstate war is also (relatively) high, with the reverse being opposite when these conditions are reversed. The two intermediate cells fall between these extremes. When monopolization is relatively high, and political closure low (as in the top left cell), the risk of major interstate war is significant (though less than when both characteristics of rising power-subordinate relations are high). When monopolization is low, and political closure high (as in the bottom right cell), the risk of major interstate war is higher than when both are low, but lower than the reverse (high monopolization, low political closure), reflecting the importance of change in the status quo.

Figure 15: Rising powers by political closure and monopolization



Many of the rising power cases in the top right cell – where the highest risk of major interstate war is located – are cases typically associated with such wars: pre-World War Two Japan (JA-1) and interwar Germany (GE-2). Italy is a notable omission here and is marginally in the top-left cell. The most surprising finding here is that India is located in this cell, and this suggests that India's rise has been overshadowed by that of China. The analysis presented here suggests more academic attention and policymaker interest should be paid to India, which appears to have adopted an approach to subordinates with the greatest likelihood of leading to major interstate war[17]. The bottom left cell contains two expected cases – Cold War Japan (JA-2) and West Germany – as well as Britain, and surprisingly, the Soviet Union. As already mentioned, the Cold War rises of Japan and West Germany are unusual in that the system structure was bipolar, and because each was an ally of the United States against the Soviet Union, effectively focusing and placing a straightjacket upon their

[17] Of course, India's main major power opponent is China, itself a rising power, complicating analysis of India.

foreign policies towards smaller states[18]. Britain, though building an expansive empire during the period, was also an advocate for comparatively open political and economic relations with small states. The location of the Soviet Union, however, is surprising, given the tightly controlled political relations it had established in Eastern Europe. However, this is offset by the broader systemic role played by the Soviet Union in the period. Whilst the Soviet Union, from Khrushchev onwards, did seek to cultivate protégés, these relationships were rarely strong, meaning little scope for monopolization[19]. Nevertheless, given the Soviet Union's high dispute and major power violent dispute onset rates, it is somewhat surprising to find the Soviet Union in this cell.

For the remaining cases, the nineteenth century United States (US-1) is alone in the bottom right cell, with its high propensity for political closure being due almost entirely to the Monroe Doctrine, via which the United States sought to prevent European states from interfering in the Americas, and to develop a superordinate regional position for itself. Finally, four or five cases, depending on where one locates Russia, are found in the top left cell. As has already been noted, Italy is only just here – and this is a rising power commonly associated with major interstate war. The remaining cases include interwar and early Cold War United States (US-2), pre-World War One Germany (GE-1), and China. Germany is commonly associated with major interstate war, due to its role in the lead up to, and outbreak of, World War One. The evidence presented here suggests its association with war is driven almost entirely by World War One (perhaps understandably given its magnitude, though of

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[18] *Ostpolitik* being an exception to this.

[19] The major exception to this is in the Middle East, where direct deployment of Soviet economic, and especially military, power could be brought to bear, particularly in Syria and Egypt. Beyond this region, Cuba and Vietnam are perhaps the subordinates which the Soviet Union had the strongest ties.

course, the historiography remains deeply divided over the extent of German responsibility for escalation[20]), and suggests the limits of theory presented here, that is, other factors, including alliance systems, arms races, and miscommunication, are also crucial.

Economic closure and monopolization are examined in the same manner in Figure 16, once more with quadrants overlaid. All but one cell is populated, but the cases clearly cluster to the left, that is, the proportion of disputes where economic relations with a subordinate are closed is almost always less than 50%. This is notable in its own right, but the differences with political closure are substantial (this is explicitly addressed below). By contrast with closure, the cases are far more varied in terms of monopolization, with five cases being below, and eight above, the 50% line. It appears that it is uncommon for rising powers already to have established economically closed relationships with a subordinate, but that seeking monopolization is comparatively common.

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[20] Classic works, particularly that of Fischer (1967), emphasize Germany's culpability, whilst more recent scholarship, for example that of Clark (2013), has apportioned blame between the major powers more evenly.

Figure 16: Rising powers by economic closure and monopolization



The cases located in the bottom left cell are those with comparatively open economic relationships, and which do not tend to seek monopolization. Four of these cases are unsurprisingly found here – Cold War Japan (JA-1), West Germany, nineteenth century United States (US-1), and Britain. With the exception of the United States, these cases are all found in the same cell in Figure 15. These are all cases typically associated with economic openness, whether this is as part of the post-1945 liberal international order, or nineteenth century free trade. However, the Soviet Union is also located in this cell, as it was in Figure 15, reinforcing the finding that contrary to the received wisdom, the Soviet Union, at least during the first half of the Cold War, was, when compared with other rising powers, more inclined toward the status quo than revisionism. The top left cell includes six cases, and combines economic openness with a tendency toward monopolization, that is, these are rising powers which have tended to move from openness to exclusive ties with a subordinate. These cases are pre-World War One Germany (GE-1), interwar Germany (GE-2), Russia, Italy, China, and the interwar and early Cold War United States (US-2). What particularly characterizes these cases is the attempt to monopolize a subordinate, and it is unsurprising therefore to find so many cases associated with revisionism or bids for regional hegemony. The partial exception to this is the United States, which is often understood to have embraced economic openness, and to have fostered a competitive economic environment, as it had in the nineteenth century. Yet, a critical change occurred, particularly post-World War Two, in that the United States identified the Soviet Union as being not only a security threat and economic rival, but a radical challenge to the economic underpinnings of American prosperity. Therefore, economic relationships with states in Europe, Eastern Asia, and the Middle East, were understood in zero-sum terms, that is, to be aligned with the American model, or to be excluded. Though states within this system could freely compete, they did so in an environment sculpted almost entirely by American rules and bolstered by American material power and normative authority[21], resulting in an attempt to monopolize subordinates.

Both India and pre-World War Two Japan (JA-2) are located in the top right cell, meaning that relations with subordinates tend to be economically closed and that they typically sought monopolization of subordinates in disputes. This is unsurprising for Japan, given efforts to dominate Korea and China both pre- and post-World War One, and to expand direct territorial control in the interwar period. That India is located here is surprising, and as for political closure and monopolization in Figure 15, reinforces the idea that an Indian

[21] Britain might be considered a partial exception to this general rule, in that a strong preference for free trade had long been held by government, and British economists had significant input into the creation of the Bretton Woods system. However, reliance upon loans from the United States, both bilateral and under the Marshall Plan, significantly reduced the ability of British governments to deviate from this economic orthodoxy (though of course, it remains unclear the extent to which preferences existed to actually do so had dependency upon American loans not existed).

challenge to the status quo is not well appreciated, or understood, likely because of the myopic attention China receives. The data snapshots that Figures 15 and 16 provide suggest that India's approach to subordinates – closure and monopolization – should be of concern, since this provides heightened potential for major power opposition, and war.

The differences between Figures 15 and 16 are striking, with economic closure being far less common than political closure. What is also clear is the significant diversity between rising powers on these variables, with some holding very similar – or even the same – positions on both, and others seeing large differences. However, in no case is economic closure more common than political closure. This can be interpreted in a number of ways, firstly, that political closure might precede economic closure, and may be a necessary condition for the latter. Secondly, that economic closure is of lower importance than political closure, meaning that security interests are prioritized over economic interests. Thirdly, and building on insights from Snyder (1991) and Copeland (2015), it is plausible that different domestic political actors champion political and economic interests, with a potentially crucial distinction between public and private actors. This would suggest that in regimes where this distinction is less meaningful, for instance, the Soviet Union or contemporary China, that we might expect to see more similar positions for both political and economic closure.

Regime type

Table 4 of the statistical analysis suggested that the regime type of rising powers is related to the onset of major power violent disputes, and that contrary to expectations, the more democratic a rising power is, the higher the probability of such disputes[22]. To examine the relationship between regime type and the key independent and dependent variables, this section relates the average Polity V score of each rising power to these variables. There is significant variation in the average rising power Polity V score, as Table 23 shows. This allows examination of how democratic, autocratic, and anocratic[23] regimes relate to monopolization, hierarchy, and dispute onset, with a polity score of 6+ used to indicate democracy, of 6- to indicate autocracy, and what falls in between, anocracy. The cases also vary in terms of whether, and the extent to which, regime type changes over their rise, though only Italy's variation is significant enough for it to change regime type during its rise, becoming an autocracy.

Table 23: Rising powers and regime type

Rising power	Time	Average Polity V score	Minimum score	Maximum score	Direction of change over time	Classification over rise	Chart code
Britain	1816-1856	0.4	-2	3	Increasing	Anocracy	a
Russia	1860-1890	-10.0	-10	-10	Static	Autocracy	b
United States	1865-1900	8.5	7	9	Increasing	Democracy	c
Germany	1880-1914	-0.3	-4	2	Increasing	Anocracy	d
Japan	1890-1937	1.0	1	1	Static	Anocracy	e
Italy	1900-1940	-4.1	-9	-1	Decreasing	Anocracy to Autocracy	f
United States	1920-1960	9.0	9	9	Static	Democracy	g
Germany	1933-1939	-9.0	-9	-9	Static	Autocracy	h
Soviet Union	1950-1970	-7.3	-9	-7	Increasing	Autocracy	i
Germany	1950-1990	10.0	10	10	Static	Democracy	j
Japan	1960-1990	10.0	10	10	Static	Democracy	k
China	1975-2010	-7.0	-8	-7	Increasing	Autocracy	l
India	2000-2010	9.0	9	9	Static	Democracy	m

[22] A positive relationship is found in Tables 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, and 21, but it only attains any level of statistical significance in Table 4.

[23] Alternatively called hybrid regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes, consolidating democracies, or illiberal democracies, depending upon the approach, but essentially labelling the same thing: that a state has institutions and norms which are a mix of democratic and autocratic 'ideal' types.

The average polity scores are plotted against a series of variables in Figure 17. Panel A relates polity score to the proportion of dispute-subordinates in which monopolization was sought. B examines political closure, C economic closure, D the difference between these two, E to the dispute onset rate, and F to the major power violent dispute onset rate. Two points are immediately clear, and require explanation, firstly, that the regime type of a rising power does appear to be related to both independent and dependent variables, with more autocratic states being more likely to monopolize, have closed political and economic relationships, and higher overall and major power violent dispute onset rates. Secondly, there is a series of apparent outliers: pre-World War Two Japan (e) and India (m) in panel C, the nineteenth century United States in panel D (c), and the Soviet Union (i) and interwar and early Cold War United States (g) in panel F.

Figure 17: Relationship between regime type and key variables



X-axis: regime type (Polity V)

Key: a=Britain, b=Russia, c=USA 1, d=Germany 1, e=Japan 1, f=Italy, g=USA 2, h=Germany 2, i=Soviet Union, j=West Germany, k=Japan 2, l=China, m=India

Autocratic rising powers are more likely to monopolize and more likely to have closed political and economic relationships. In turn, they also have higher total and major power violent dispute rates. This is in line with theoretical expectations, that is, that autocratic rising powers are more likely to monopolize and engage in disputes, since they cannot credibly commit to an open world order. However, the relationships shown in Figure 17 are clearly quite variable, so we cannot conclude from these charts that regime type has a specific and decisive effect upon monopolization, the characteristics of hierarchies, or upon disputes.

However, Table 4 found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the regime type of the rising power[24]. In other words, being more *democratic* increases the likelihood of major power violent dispute onset. This apparent contradiction is due to two issues. Firstly, the data are aggregated differently. In the statistical analysis, each observation is a dispute, whereas in Figure 17, each data point is a rising power. Secondly, the statistical findings tell us that as states become more democratic, they have higher major power violent dispute onset rates, but a single unit change on Polity V does not mean that a state has changed regime type. In fact, only one of the 13 rising powers, Italy, changed regime type classification during its rise as Table 23 shows. Furthermore, when the 368 disputes are examined by the regime type of the rising power involved, as in Table 24, we see that the confidence intervals overlap across all three regime types, suggesting that the regime type of rising powers has no impact upon the probability of a dispute becoming a major power violent dispute.

[24] Tables 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, and 21 have positive coefficients for this variable, but it does not attain statistical significance.

Table 24: Disputes by regime type

		Major power violent dispute	
		Yes	No
Regime type	Autocracy	15.3% [9.7%, 20.9%] (24/157)	84.7% [79.1%, 90.3%] (133/157)
	Anocracy	19.0% [11.5%, 26.6%] (20/105)	81.0% [73.4%, 88.5%] (85/105)
	Democracy	18.9% [11.4%, 26.3%] (20/106)	81.1% [73.7%, 88.6%] (86/106)

Note: 0.95 confidence intervals in square brackets. Ratio of disputes to all disputes by regime type in brackets.

Examining the data shows the importance of outliers. Of the 106 involving democracies, 68 are the United States (1865-1900: 27; 1920-60: 41). The remainder are Cold War West Germany (15) and Japan (9), and contemporary India (14). The two periods in which the United States was a rising power, therefore, accounts for two-thirds of the democratic rising power disputes. Across these two periods, the United States accounts for 17 of the 64 total major power violent disputes (1865-1900: 1; 1920-60: 16), with the other three democratic rising powers accounting for just three (all West Germany). The United States is the real driver of the statistical findings reported. Using political closure to show this, Table 25 shows how the statistical results change when the nineteenth century United States, twentieth century United States, and both, are removed from the dataset. Notably, when the twentieth century United States is removed (Model 3), rising power polity is no longer statistically significant, though the coefficient remains positive. Intriguingly, the removal of this case also results in the coefficient for political closure becoming larger and with a much higher level of statistical significance, whilst also reducing the size of the coefficient for monopolization, which no longer attains statistical significance. This reinforces the suspicion that this rising power is particularly influential upon the results. The regime type of a rising power, therefore, does not appear to be related to the probability of major power violent disputes, rather, this is an artefact of the particularly conflict prone behaviour of the United States during the early twentieth century.

Table 25: The effect of the United States

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.456**	0.531**	0.428	0.631**
	(0.217)	(0.244)	(0.316)	(0.294)
Political closure	0.890**	0.836*	1.408***	1.345***
	(0.402)	(0.430)	(0.385)	(0.392)
Status dissatisfaction	0.062**	0.062**	0.063*	0.060
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Joint democracy	-1.849*	-2.655**	-1.563	-15.762***
	(1.016)	(1.225)	(1.417)	(1.848)
Rising power polity	0.092*	0.105*	0.031	0.054
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.085)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.054	0.057	0.080	0.068
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Military balance, log	-0.758***	-0.705***	-0.950***	-0.877***
	(0.266)	(0.254)	(0.294)	(0.284)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.117	-0.563	-1.542	-15.442***
	(0.791)	(0.979)	(1.365)	(1.503)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.593	1.058	1.504	15.706***
	(0.695)	(0.902)	(1.705)	(1.945)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.907	1.829	1.281	1.192
	(1.186)	(1.203)	(1.317)	(1.332)
Number of major powers	-0.473*	-0.463*	-0.351	-0.267
	(0.273)	(0.279)	(0.421)	(0.396)
Dispute participants	0.432***	0.435***	0.389**	0.395**
	(0.146)	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.167)
Region dummy	-0.253	-0.178	-0.300	-0.240
	(0.365)	(0.379)	(0.516)	(0.543)
Dispute duration, log	0.394***	0.375***	0.442***	0.427***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.144)	(0.146)
Constant	-2.234*	-2.582**	-2.474*	-3.335**
	(1.295)	(1.308)	(1.288)	(1.381)
Sample	Full	No C19 USA	No C20 USA	No USA
Observations	368	341	327	300

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Returning to Figure 17, a number of outliers were noted, specifically pre-World War Two Japan (e) and India (m) in panel C, the nineteenth century United States (c) in panel D, and the Soviet Union (i) and interwar and early Cold War United States (g) in panel F. Given the prior analysis of the regime type, and the conclusion that the United States, particularly during the twentieth century, is an outlier, it is unsurprising that it again features here. Panel C shows that pre-World War Two Japan and India both have very high average economic closure rates. Of all the panels, this one has the weakest relationship, though on average democratic rising powers less frequently economically close subordinates than autocracies do. Over the course of the early twentieth century, and particularly during the interwar period, Japan's foreign policy became increasingly driven by economic imperatives[25], and this may explain the exclusionary approach taken towards the economic relationships with subordinates[26]. By contrast, India is a more puzzling case. Of course, its rise is ongoing, and it is possible that over a longer period it would no longer be an apparent outlier. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that economic closure is being pursued as a means of preventing other states – most notably China – from making inroads into subordinates India considers crucial. Given that huge use of economic power by China in the Indo-Pacific, an open approach by India would likely lead to its influence being dwarfed, necessitating, perhaps, closure as a means of preventing a loss of influence. This is also an unusual position for a rising power to find itself in, that is, rising powers tend to be the actors with material

[25] This is perhaps a curiously circular series of arguments. Controlling resource-rich subordinates in the Asia-Pacific was understood to be necessary both to reduce the effectiveness of any potential economic blockade and also provide the country with required strategic raw materials (foods, fuels, and ores) to allow its military to operate. This would prevent the United States, Britain, Russia, or any other major power adversary, from compelling, or deterring, Japan from pursuing its foreign policy objectives. Yet, it was exactly these efforts to secure control of the Asia-Pacific which led to heightened tensions, particularly with the United States and Britain. The solution pursued to ease Japan's strategic quandary increased the probability of major power war, since the means via which Japan sought security were indistinguishable from outright aggression.
[26] It should be noted that economic closure was invariably paired with political closure by Japan.

resources available for extending influence relative to established and status quo states. Yet, India's rise, impressive whether examined in isolation or in historical comparison, is dwarfed by that of China. In this way, India's position may share some of the strategic problems that Italy faced during its rise, that is, being hemmed in not only by the interests of status quo actors, but also squeezed by competition from a more potent rising power[27].

The Soviet Union has a much higher major power violent dispute onset rate than any other state, as panel F shows. Though the Soviet Union also has the highest total dispute onset rate (panel E), other rising powers, including interwar Germany, have comparable rates. It seems, therefore, that given a dispute the probability of this becoming a major power violent dispute is high for the Soviet Union. This has already been examined in this chapter and was attributed both to foreign policy under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, which emphasized the importance of influence and control in the developing world, but was also due to the actions of the United States (and allies) in seeking to contain the Soviet Union. The United States took the position that irrespective of the realities of Soviet interests in a subordinate it should be opposed, with the result that major power violent disputes were more frequent (this also helps to explain the high onset rate for the United States in this period too). Nevertheless, even when both the twentieth century United States and Soviet Union are removed, regime type appears to still impact the onset rate of major power violent disputes, as Figure 18 shows.

[27] Notably, in Italy's rise competition with Germany developed during the 1930s over their relative influence over Austria, and to a lesser extent in the Balkans too. This would be settled through Italy backing down over Austria, and the later rapprochement between the two dictators giving Mussolini a free-hand in the Balkans, a move which due to the exigencies and necessity of their alliance, somewhat ironically led Germany to commit significant military resources to the (joint) conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece.

Figure 18: Polity score and major power violent dispute onset rate, without the Soviet Union and twentieth century United States



The final outlier to examine is the United States during the nineteenth century (c) in panel D. This chart shows the difference between the proportion of rising power-subordinate relations which were political closed and those which were economically closed. Whilst all 13 rising power cases use political closure more frequently than economic closure, in this case, the difference is extremely large. Relations between the United States and subordinates were rarely economically closed but were invariably politically closed. This is due to the Monroe Doctrine, and the regional focus of disputes of the United States in the Americas during the late nineteenth century. Over this time period, the United States developed the requisite naval capabilities to deter credibly European states from seeking to establish formal or informal empires in the region[28]. Yet, this was an essentially political stance only, with

[28] The most significant aberration to this general pattern was the attempt by France to establish a client state in Mexico over the 1861-67 period, ostensibly due to the large debts owed to creditors in France, Spain and Britain. Notably, this began during the American Civil War, preventing the United States from acting. However, prior to the Civil War, the American army and navy were exceedingly small compared with those

economic relationships with subordinates remaining open. In many ways, this period of American history echoed earlier British assertions that free trade must be allowed, albeit in this case, explicitly regionally defined.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the relationships between closure, monopolization, and the onset of major power violent disputes. The results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 26. The findings for monopolization, closure, and the joint effect of monopolization and closure, are strong, allowing rejection of each of the null hypotheses.

Table 26: Quantitative results summary

Hypothesis	Finding
Monopolization	H_O rejected, $p<0.05$ in all save economic closure where $p<0.1$
Closure	H_O rejected, though results mixed. Political closure $p<0.05$, economic closure $p<0.01$
Joint effect	H_O rejected, consistently stronger together

As the coding of cases deployed here uses dummy variables, variation is flattened: subordinates are either closed (or monopolized), or they are not. It is thus plausible that a fine-grained analysis would reveal more nuanced associations between the independent variables and major power violent disputes, and this is part of what the case study chapters

of the other major powers, so it is far from clear that the United States would have been able to deter the invasion. French losses in supporting the puppet regime of Maximilian I against the Republican forces, combined with threats from the United States during the 1865-67 period, led to French withdrawal and the restoration of the Mexican Republic.

seek to achieve. It has also examined alternative explanations, including military capabilities, status, regime type, the number of dispute participants, and relative location. When a rising power has greater military capabilities, or a higher polity score, or when a dispute has more participants, the onset of a major power violent dispute is more likely. However, status and location have no effect on the dependent variable.

Chapter III: Openness and Imperial Expansion in the Long Nineteenth Century

The long nineteenth century was not a period of peace. True, Pax Britannica avoided system-wide wars between the major powers, but major power wars certainly occurred[1]. Moreover, imperialism reached its zenith, culminating in the major powers controlling near all of Africa and Asia, in addition to their home territories. Peace is always relative, rather than an absolute, and so, assessed from the perspective of a major power, and with the assumption that only system-wide wars have systemic consequences, the period was unusual. Assessed from the perspective of the weak, the period continued business-as-usual, with the strong doing what they can, and the weak suffering what they must.

This chapter compares two disputes from the end of the time period, firstly, the Spanish-American War, 1898, and secondly, the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. The former dispute

[1] Levy lists four 'great power wars', that is, wars involving great powers fighting against each other, between 1815 and 1914: the Crimean War, 1853-56, the (Second) War of Italian Unification, 1859, the Austro-Prussian War, 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71 (1983, 73). Levy considers Japan to be a major power only from 1905, that is, after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 (1983, 48), however, the Correlates of War consider Japan to be a major power from 1895, following the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-5. This dissertation relies on the latter classification, which results in five major power wars between 1815 and 1914.

did not result in a major power violent dispute. Though military forces were certainly engaged, the United States was not opposed by a major power, though German intervention during the 'Manila Incident' brought this very close. American foreign policy in the late nineteenth century largely articulated a position of openness, with political and economic closure of subordinates opposed. The monopolization of the Philippines – which was annexed following the defeat of Spain – stands out as an aberration from this previous pattern. This chapter argues that the prior practice of the United States toward subordinate governance generated a perception amongst the other major powers, and especially in Britain, that even direct control of the Philippines would not impinge upon their interests. In turn, this greatly reduced major power hostility to the monopolization.

In contrast, the Russo-Japanese War was a major power violent dispute, since Japan was opposed by a major power, Russia. This case helps to elucidate two components of the theory. Firstly, it allows comparison with the United States' approach to the Philippines, since Japan's approach to Korea and Manchuria was quite different: Japan sought a closed and exclusive relationship with these subordinates. In 1904, Japan sought to monopolize these subordinates and sought to expel Russia from the region to achieve this end. Secondly, this case study allows an examination of iteration, since Russian and Japan had previously clashed over control of the region, most notably, in 1894-94, when Russia (in conjunction with France and Germany) forced Japan to withdraw from control of Manchuria won through war with China. In 1904, therefore, Japanese and Russian policymakers undoubtedly understood their respective approaches to subordinate governance in part through the lens of this history: prior attempts at monopolization, and prior hostility.

This chapter proceeds to first examine how norms of subordinate governance evolved over the long nineteenth century. In particular, this shows how the reliance upon formal empire, a means of exclusive governance of subordinates, generated significant friction between major powers once ‘new’ territory to expand into was exhausted. Rather than overseas expansion providing a pressure valve for tensions between major powers it instead gave new sources of antagonism and rivalry. An examination of the multipolar nature of the international system then follows. The chapter then moves to examine the implications of the theory and evaluates the empirical evidence. Firstly, the 1898 Spanish-American War is described, with the evidence for monopolization and reputation discussed, and comparison made with alternative explanations. Secondly, the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War is dissected utilizing the same approach. The conclusion to the chapter summarizes the findings, which are supportive of the theory.

Norms of subordinate governance at the close of the long nineteenth century

The relationship between major powers and subordinates during the nineteenth century was, with minor exceptions, a story of empire and colonialism (Barkawi 2010; Barkawi and Laffey 2002). Though the major powers continued to value empire, it was also a mode of political organization which looked increasingly inefficient as a means of driving and sustaining economic and military power[2]. Two quite different issues had begun to strain it. Firstly, empire, and particularly overseas territorial concessions and their exchange, had

[2] Doyle defines empire as ‘a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society’ (1986a, 45), this definition essentially being a maximalist transfer of political authority from one actor to another. However, both formal and informal empire are more heterogeneous than this implies as the work of Darwin (2007; 2009; 2012), Stern (2011), and Phillips and Sharman (2020) have highlighted, not least due to the importance of private actors (Srivastava 2022), treaty making and bargaining with local political actors (Hebie 2015; Belmessous 2014) and significant variation in governance structures (Müller-Crepon 2020). In turn, this suggests multiple imperial alternatives existed for the pursuit prosperity and security.

been used as a crucial means of easing tensions between the major powers (Wight 1978, 43). Until the late nineteenth century the supply of 'new' territory was largely sufficient to meet the demand. But, territory was finite, and particularly more valuable territory, with the result that such exchange and balancing was increasingly a zero-sum game. Secondly, though empires had of course succumbed in the past to internal division, secession, and war, with the exception of the ends of the first British Empire[3], Portuguese control of Brazil, and nearly all of Spain's presence in the Americas, this was not yet a feature of overseas empires. However, calls for reform, revolution, autonomy, and independence were increasingly strong, and could be heard not only in the colonies, but also in the metropoles (D. Bell 2007)[4]. Although major power hierarchies continued to focus on empire, increasingly they had to contend with systemic and domestic stresses.

These developments altered the form of rising power hierarchies that were possible, and consequently shaped the contours of major power competition and conflict. The end of new areas to colonize and control meant that territorial bargaining between the major powers became zero-sum. No longer could unclaimed or disputed areas be used to re-direct competitive dynamics. The demands for independence (or self-government), and that for imperial reform, were simultaneously complementary and countervailing. It was possible to imagine self-government within a wider imperial project, and yet, this recognition of political rights would also open the pathway for independence. From the perspective of rising powers seeking to develop and protect overseas interests, a recognition of subordinate agency by a metropole suggested an opportunity for developing ties, and even to prise away

[3] That is, the empire centred on colonies in what would become the United States.
[4] Polarizing between calls for reform and political rights to forestall more serious division and the threat of collapse, or for a re-doubling of efforts to maintain imperial control.

these territories. It also offered the possibility for external intervention, opening an additional pathway for major powers to be drawn into disputes with each other, as seen most sharply in the Boer War, 1899-1902, in which Germany vocally advocated for the rights of the Boer States against Britain, and the Spanish-American War, 1898, in which the United States intervened in the anti-Spanish Cuban War of Independence, 1895-98, and Philippine Revolution, 1896-99.

Wars of redistribution

The Spanish-American War was, to paraphrase Lenin, the first war for redistribution of territory already distributed amongst the powerful (Popkova 1999, 124)[5]. Until 1898, powerful states had been able to annex territory, particularly in Africa and Asia, which no other major power yet controlled. This had served as a means of satisfying the late-comers to colonialism and empire-building, which was most acute in trying to satiate the recently united, and materially powerful, Germany. After this point, attempts to satisfy rising powers through the award of territory and concessions, without taking something from another state, were all but impossible. From the perspective of avoiding tensions between the major powers, this was ominous, since the late nineteenth century was a period of clear change in the relative balance of power, with the rises of Germany and the United States, and the relative decline of Britain, as well as Russian expansion in Central and East Asia, Japanese claims in East Asia, and increasing Italian interest in North Africa. Expansion and compensation, therefore, relied upon redistribution.

[5] A similar observation was made by Mackinder, who motivated his development of heartland theory by stating that ‘there is scarcely a region left for the pegging out of a claim of ownership, unless as the result of war’ (1904, 421).

The future of empire: independence, federalism, or compulsion

Calls for the autonomy – even independence – of colonies became an important political issue in the late nineteenth century. Typically, these calls were made by settlers, rather than colonized peoples, largely because the former had political access, voice, and power. Those in the metropole heeded these calls, but reached different conclusions. Empire could be replaced (at least in part) with federation, which would re-commit disparate peoples to a common enterprise. Alternatively, autonomy could be awarded piecemeal, or the calls ignored and centralization of policymaking retained or even enhanced[6]. It was in the British Empire, and Britain[7], that these calls were most seriously debated, reflecting, the context of having a very large number of overseas settlers[8], as well as a fragmented and *sui generis* structure comprised of multiple different political relationships between Britain and its colonies (Darwin 2009; 2012).

The British debate concerned two issues, firstly, around the issue of autonomy for Ireland, and secondly, whether a more general political settlement was needed for the Empire. In the first case, Home Rule was proposed as a means of placating calls for independence by enabling comparatively moderate voices such as Charles Stewart Parnell, whose party, the Irish Parliamentary Party, was crucial to British governments in the period. Opposition came from multiple sources, most obviously Unionists (like Joseph Chamberlain, who thought

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[6] This approach was taken by France, that is, overseas colonies were considered to be integral to the metropole. In Algeria's case, formal legal distinction was made between settlers and colonized, but in 1865 this was significantly altered, as France moved toward assimilating the colonized, promising French citizenship in exchange for abandoning their religion and culture. In turn, this met with significant resistance from the settlers, for fear of weakening their own position in Algeria. This approach, of understanding overseas territories as being integral parts of France, continues through to today.
[7] Including, perhaps most significantly, in Ireland.
[8] By 1890 there were more than 1.5 million British-born people living in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Ember, Ember, and Skoggard 2004, 47). Notably, a further 3.2 million were living in the United States (Ibid 2004, 51). Over the course of the nineteenth century more than 1.6 million British-born people moved to Australia alone (Ibid 2004, 52).

Home Rule a step toward independence), but also to many who envisaged practical considerations relating to taxation, tariffs, and the fiscal vitality of a Dublin government (Bogdanor 1979)[9]. Imperial Federation was championed by Chamberlain, and proposed that a single imperial parliament based in London, would control defence, foreign affairs, and internal trade, with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland, South Africa and Ireland gaining self-government over all other issues. The rest of the empire would continue to be ruled directly. Opposition came from multiple sources, with perhaps the most critical concerns relating to the functioning of a proposed combined military and customs union[10].

This illustrates that by the late nineteenth century, significant voices – from within the metropole – were calling for imperial reform. It suggests an awareness of problems which empires would increasingly face, that of nationalist self-determination movements (Harper 2020), and for this thesis, suggests that formal control was increasingly doubted as viable long-term means of subordinate control. To monopolize, and impose a formal, closed and specialized series of relations, gave short-term dominance, but generated hostility. Despite this, the dwindling of new territories to expand into triggered a sudden boom of subordinate monopolization.

[9] The issue of tariffs was resolved when Britain and Ireland joined the European Economic Community, but has returned with a vengeance post-Brexit.
[10] With a similar project, Imperial Preference, being introduced in 1932 post-Depression, and lasting until 1947.

The multipolar imperial context

The end of the long nineteenth century was the highpoint of competitive imperialism[11]. It was also a multipolar system, in which the number of major powers grew, through the additions of Japan and the United States, in which rising powers were many (Japan[12], the United States[13], Italy[14], and Germany[15]), balancing behaviour overt through alliance formation, and British relative material decline clear. Systemic instability, therefore, had many sources. The outlet for tensions between major powers had been territorial exchange, which over the nineteenth century typically relied upon the transfer of overseas territory to the exclusive control of a major power. This process challenged established open norms of subordinate governance and also lit a long fuse. While new territory was available, tensions could be more easily accommodated. Once this territory was exhausted, the result, as explained above, was the need for redistribution, a process rarely undertaken willingly and without at least the threat of military force being employed.

However, multipolarity brings with it an additional complication beyond the relative rises and declines of major powers. Mearsheimer writes that multipolarity, and particularly unbalanced multipolarity, leads to major powers seeking to shift the responsibility for opposing an aggressor (2001, 157–59). This is true in terms of threats, but also in terms of problematic behaviour more broadly understood. Whereas monopolization had previously been understood as a social bad, and therefore, something to be opposed, particularly by the

[11] The result of World War One was not only the end of several empires – the German, Russia (though rapidly reborn as the Soviet facsimile), Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman – but also of significant imperial rivalry as a feature of international relations.
[12] 1890-1937.
[13] 1865-1900.
[14] 1900-1940.
[15] 1880-1914.

system leader but also collectively, multipolarity in the late nineteenth century increasingly became a race to the bottom in which bad behaviour went unchecked, encouraging further transgressions, and encouraging to mimicry. The culmination of this was that in the late nineteenth century subordinate governance increasingly embraced monopolization, and yet resistance was less robust.

Even states which most frequently advocated for openness, including Britain and the United States[16], embraced monopolization by the end of the century, and were less likely to oppose the monopolism of others[17]. Dillon Savage (2021) argues that 'common-pool hierarchy' was established by the major powers in both Africa and China, and yet, by the end of the century, this had begun to break down: borders replaced overlapping claims and collective domination in Africa as a result of the Berlin Conference, 1884-85, whilst Japanese and Russian policy toward Korea and Manchuria clearly aimed for exclusive spheres of influence[18]. In turn, major interstate war was made more likely, since interests increasingly clashed. Conversely, the conditions under which monopolization led to war became less predictable, since the number of transgressions and transgressors increased, meaning decisions had to be taken on which interests to prioritize and protect, and which to allow a monopolizer to control[19].

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[16] Despite substantial agreement over norms of subordinate governance between Britain and the United States, differences remained, most clearly in the acceptability of using force to collect debts and protect nationals.

[17] Less, perhaps, a reflection of the acceptability of subordinate monopolization, and more a result of limited resources to oppose it.

[18] The last action of collective domination of China was seen during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1901, in which the collective military forces of the imperial powers were used, firstly, to protect their citizens and what remained of their assets, and secondly, to punish China.

[19] For example, in the late 1890s, British attention was split between disputes over the status of the Boer in South Africa, tensions with France over control of Fashoda, a boundary dispute with Venezuela which led to American diplomatic intervention and eventual arbitration, as well as reacting to the actions of other major powers including the Spanish-American War, German expansion in China, and rivalry during the Second Samoan Civil War.

System instability led the major powers to seek alliances. In theory this would deter aggressive behaviour, provide greater certainty, and thereby serve as a source of stability. However, two factors meant these gains were limited to specific states in specific time periods, and had little effect on the international system. Firstly, and most obviously, rising powers may continue to rise. The United States, Germany and Japan all continued to rise relative the other major powers, and Italy would begin its rise from 1900. This means that an alliance aimed at checking one of these powers – the Franco-Russian Alliance and Germany for example – may prove inadequate. On creating this alliance over 1891-94, Germany was overmatched. By the early 1900s, and particularly the period immediately following the disastrous performance of the Russian military in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, this position had been reversed. Therefore, the stability and deterrent effect desired weakened over time. Secondly, and most crucially for the theory of subordinate monopolization, the two rival alliance systems which formed, consisting of France and Russia on the one hand[20], and Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy on the other[21], prevented the major powers from collectively acting against any of these states. This meant that subordinate monopolization was unevenly and inconsistently checked.

Observable implications of subordinate monopolization in the long nineteenth century

The theory of subordinate monopolization argues three related points on the relationship between subordinate governance and major interstate war. Firstly, when subordinates are

[20] Britain would join with these two by concluding the Entente Cordiale in 1904 with France, and the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907.
[21] The Triple Alliance, concluded in 1882, and superseding the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary concluded in 1879.

closed to the interests of others, meaning that restrictions are placed on the economic and security interests which may be pursued in a subordinate, then major power violent disputes are more likely. This is observable as informal interference, that is, by exerting pressure on the political authorities in a subordinate to favour the interests of the dominant state, and/or to impose costs on those of other major powers. This sort of friction is likely to be somewhat ad hoc, arising as a reaction to the interests of others, as well as the interests of the dominant state. However, closure may also be underpinned by formal institutions, of two general forms. Subordinates may be bound to a dominant state through treaty or international organization. Though this has the advantage of stipulating the rights and duties of a dominant state, which should make bargaining with another major power more straightforward by providing a focal point for negotiations, this also ensures friction since this very same focal point bluntly lays out the disparity in rights enjoyed. A dominant state may also enjoy a relationship that embodies specialized roles, meaning that the subordinate, or dominant state, provides goods or services that are difficult or impossible to substitute.

The second set of observable implications relate to monopolization. Whereas closure, formality, and role specialization are features of the status quo pre-dispute, monopolization captures how these features are changing as a result of an attempt by a powerful state to gain exclusive control of a subordinate. Monopolization exists in two forms, firstly, when a major power already has interests in a subordinate then this captures a deepening of control. Secondly, when a major power seeks to develop interests in an exclusionary manner in a subordinate where it previously had no interests.

Finally, the third set of observable implications rest on the prior pattern of interactions between a rising power, subordinate, and the other major powers. In summary, prior attempts at monopolization by a rising power, that is, an established reputation as a state which favours closed as opposed to open subordinate governance, is likely to alter perceptions of their behaviour in the future. A reputation as a monopolizer means that the other major powers are unlikely to give the benefit of the doubt about a rising power's intentions, and thereby, are more likely to oppose the rising power. By contrast, a reputation for openness means that the benefit of the doubt is more likely. It is this which characterizes the reaction to the United States' monopolization of the Philippines: Germany aside, no other major power offered opposition, and even German opposition was essentially opportunism rather than a concerted effort to uphold open subordinate governance. Britain, meanwhile, the major power with both the most significant existing economic interests in the Philippines, and the greatest naval power projection capabilities, essentially welcomed American control, seeing it as unlikely to impinge upon British interests anything like as much as Spanish rule had done. Prior interactions also shape rising power approaches to monopolization: if the rising power expects to be met with hostility, then openness is unlikely to be embraced, rather, monopolization is likely to be embraced and pursued, since close control of valuable subordinates gives a rising power a better chance of defending itself.

In the late nineteenth century, these observable implications of the theory particularly focus on empire and imperial rivalry. Closure, formality, and role specialization were relatively common, tending to take on the institutional form of treaties between a major power and subordinate polity via which the major power was given a preeminent role in governance, and often specifying particularly roles, for example, colonial protection agreements. The alternative to this essentially bilateral form are multilateral agreements between major powers on the distribution of territory. For major interstate conflict, these agreements, particularly bilateral ones, can result in resentment and tensions, since this exclusionary division inevitably leads to the interests of others being challenged, ignored, or removed.

Though closure may be sufficient to trigger disputes, that is, a major power may seek to assert its own rights in and over a subordinate, attempts to monopolize a subordinate trigger a more hostile response up to and including war. In the late nineteenth century, monopolization was relatively common, and in conjunction with multipolarity, led to a series of challenges to international order with a relatively inconsistent response from the major powers. The characteristics of closure in this period were to assert privileged interests in a subordinate, to utilize military force to subjugate the subordinate, and to annex it. Prior to overseas colonial expansion, and post-World War Two, legitimation strategies for monopolization typically rested on at least a veneer that a domestic political actor in the subordinate sought the protection of the monopolizer. In pre-1789 Europe, this often encompassed a religious component, as well as rival claimants in the order of succession. By contrast, post-1945 these arguments have typically been made by reference to shared nationality or kinship, shared adversaries, or the need to uphold order[22]. During the late nineteenth century legitimation of monopolization was typically framed in terms of major power interests, and status. For example, Germany sought 'a place in the sun' as part of *Weltpolitik*, which rested on both a material need for overseas expansion[23] but also on the idea that major powers deserved empires. Similar ideas were used to legitimate the

[22] Itself a longstanding argument legitimizing the foreign policy of the strong against the weak to potential rivals, and having morphed from a shared understanding of the social superiority of the major powers to instead (theoretically) recognizing the sovereign equality of states.
[23] Or rather, the perception that overseas expansion was required.

expansion of the other rising powers in the late nineteenth century: Japan, Italy, and the United States.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, therefore, are not only notable for the large number of rising powers, but also for the tensions generated by monopolistic approaches to subordinate governance. The idea that major powers needed and deserved exclusive spheres of interest coincided with an unstable balance of power and the near-total distribution of subordinates into exclusive spheres. For rising powers seeking to develop and deepen relationships with subordinates, this necessitated challenging existing monopolies. For the other major powers, this meant an abundance of threats, and an inability to adequately oppose them all. Therefore, the end of Pax Britannica saw threats to international peace and security ramp up significantly, but attempts to deter challenges to the status quo become piecemeal and increasingly driven only by national, as opposed to international, interests. The result was uneasy peace, in which tensions ramped up, punctuated by sharp periods of violence, which culminated in a system-wide war.

This also impacts the observable implications of the theory in iteration, that is, how prior disputes over subordinate governance impact subsequent ones. If, as argued above, monopolization was less likely to be opposed, due to a combination of multipolarity and the greater social acceptance of monopolization, then this is likely to impact both perceptions of hostility and of revisionism. Similarly, as closed imperial hierarchies were normal, at least as far as overseas subordinates went, then this may similarly have re-shaped perceptions. Despite the ubiquity of empire, closed forms of subordinate governance did not become entirely socially acceptable. Whilst the social processes of imperialism were acceptable, after all, the major powers were simultaneously empires, exclusionary subordinate governance remained largely unacceptable. Outside of multilateral agreements, epitomized by the Berlin Conference, 1884-5, in which major powers committed to a specific territorial distribution, attempts to close subordinates generated significant tensions, for example, the Fashoda Crisis in 1898 between Britain and France. Common though empire was, and despite the potential for negotiated settlements, closure continued to generate significant friction between major powers.

The relationship between prior disputes and future disputes, therefore, is perhaps weaker than in any other time period. Monopolization did not trigger hostile responses from the other major powers anywhere near as consistently as prior, or after, this period. Monopolization had become more common, weakening norms of open subordinate governance, whilst multipolarity, in conjunction with the large number of rising powers and a declining system leader, ensured that responses were selective, partial, and often weak. In turn, this had the effect of emboldening rising powers to monopolize, since prior instances had seemingly not led to the ire of the major powers. Yet, this was a gamble, since closure remained, at root, a source of tension. It challenged material interests, and sat uneasily alongside long held norms of open subordinate governance. Therefore, the responses of major powers became less predictable, but only rarely accepting of monopolization.

Spanish-American War

The war led to the United States acquiring the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico, as well as significant influence over a theoretically independent Cuba[24]. It was triggered by the

[24] In the Teller Amendment, 20 April 1898, the United States Congress asserted that as a condition of American intervention in Cuba, that the United States 'disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island [Cuba] except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination

sinking of the *USS Maine* in Havana, an event that remains unexplained[25], but galvanised public opinion in the United States, allowing those championing an expansionist imperial policy to seize the initiative. The broader reasons for the war, at least as far as Cuba was concerned, were the disruption to trade that the Cuban War of Independence had triggered, as well as humanitarian concerns over Spain's policy of *reconcentrado* which led to mass civilian suffering as rural civilians were driven off their lands (McKinley 1995, 393; Proctor 1995, 391). However, fighting also took place in the Philippines (which, like Cuba, had a significant ongoing insurgency), as the United States sought to eliminate the Spanish navy[26]. The Cuban revolutionaries were suspicious of American intentions, given that by the time of the intervention Spanish forces had been largely isolated, and similar concerns were expressed in the Philippines[27].

From the standpoint of the other major powers, the future of the Philippines was the critical issue, with much less concern being expressed about Cuba or Puerto Rico, which were already considered to fall under an American sphere of influence, as articulated by the

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when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people' (Paterson and Merrill 1995b, 394). Nevertheless, less than three years later, in the 1901 Platt Amendment, Congress stated that 'Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers' (Paterson and Merrill 1995a, 395), 'Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty' (Paterson and Merrill 1995a, 395), and 'Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations' (Paterson and Merrill 1995a, 395). In 1903 Cuba and the United States entered into a treaty, called the Cuban-American Treaty of Relations, with essentially the same terms.

[25] Initially, the dominant theory was that an external explosion, caused by a Spanish mine or torpedo, sank it. However, spontaneous combustion of firedamp leaching from coal was suspected as having ignited a magazine, a theory which now appears to have the greatest support.

[26] Elizalde concludes that the war expanded to the Philippines because the United States wished to secure the islands as future base in Asia to protect economic interests in the region, and/or as a means of pressuring Spain, arguing that the 'threat' posed by the Spanish naval forces to the western United States was a fiction given the weakness of the forces available (1999, 139). However, this is not the same as claiming that annexing the Philippines was a war aim of the United States, rather, this was only arrived at after the cessation of hostilities.

[27] German Vice-Admiral Otto von Diederichs reported to the German admiralty that given the likelihood that the Filipino insurgents would reject American rule that the Spanish soldiers are 'actually fighting for the United States of America' (Schult and Wionzek 2017, 146).

Monroe Doctrine (Musicant 1998, 107; Popkova 1999, 120; Van Alstyne 1960, 164)[28]. This was due to a combination of factors. For Britain, the chief concerns were economic. Britain and its empire accounted for 50% of the trade with the Philippines (Burigsay 1941, 18; Elizalde 1999, 134), and moreover, control of the Philippines by a rival major power could threaten British trade with China and Britain's colonies in southeast Asia (Burigsay 1941, 80; Musicant 1998, 616–17). France meanwhile had close economic ties with Spain (Burigsay 1941, 62), whilst Austria-Hungary saw America's hostility to a fellow monarchy as being an affront (Offner 1992, 160). Germany, though theoretically neutral, was supportive of Spain (Offner 1992, 160), but as the future of the Philippines came into question, was keen to acquire new territory (May 1961, 228). Japan was anxious that should the United States not retain the islands that they should gain them (Burigsay 1941, 58). Finally, Russian interest was limited to desiring that Britain should not gain the islands (May 1961, 235), but was distracted by competition with Japan in East Asia (Musicant 1998, 616–17).

Despite these concerns, the major powers utterly failed to coordinate themselves. This is attributable to three reasons. Firstly, the general belief that the United States would not retain the islands. Secondly, that despite general opposition to the United States; Germany, Austria

[28] Britain had accepted that the United States had a right to intervene in the affairs of other countries in the Americas during the 1895 Venezuela boundary dispute, since the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Julian Pauncefote, was eventually authorized by the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, to accept American arbitration (Gibb 2005, 49). The significance of this was recognized by President Cleveland, who wrote that 'It has established the Monroe Doctrine on lasting foundations before the eyes of the world; it has given us a better place of respect and consideration of all nations, and especially Britain' (Cleveland 1904, 280). Intriguingly, Blake, writing with the benefit of access to a wide variety of historical sources, concludes that had Cleveland failed to act forcefully, and conflict had broken out between Britain and Venezuela, then 'any prolonged struggle would have created a state of affairs perilously like that which involved us in war in 1898 [that is, the Spanish-American War]' (1942, 276). This, once more, highlights the importance of subordinates to major powers, and places contestation of subordinate governance at the forefront of their disputes.

and France were ‘unwilling to take the lead’ (Burigsay 1941, 48) and hoped for British intervention. Thirdly, few of the major powers actually had the requisite naval capabilities to intervene. Once it had become clear that Britain largely supported the United States in its war against Spain, and would also accept American control of the Philippines, military intervention became much less likely. Nevertheless, the Manila Incident did bring the possibility of major power war between the United States and Germany. Ultimately, the Philippines transferred to American control. From a British standpoint this was viewed comparatively benignly, since in negotiations between Britain and the United States, continuing freedom of trade had been assured (Elizalde 1999, 143), highlighting the role of iteration and reputation in these processes.

Evidence for the theory of subordinate monopolization

A major power violent dispute was avoided, and yet the United States did annex the Philippines, seemingly challenging the theory of subordinate monopolization. However, prior American relations with the Philippines were open. More important than this, the United States had established a reputation for openness, which led to the other major powers, and particularly Britain, concluding that the United States was unlikely to seize the islands permanently, and that American control would not hinder their economic interests.

The theory hypothesizes that when a rising power has open relations with a subordinate prior to a dispute, but seeks to monopolize, that the probability of a major power violent dispute is less than when closure is combined with monopolization but more than when openness is combined with no monopolization. This case, therefore, has a moderate risk of major power violent dispute. The evidence suggests that this threshold was met, but three issues led to such a dispute being avoided. Firstly, the pathway of subordinate monopolization to major power war was comparatively weak in the late nineteenth century due to a combination of the relative normalcy of formal overseas empire and multipolarity. Secondly, the reaction of the other major powers was – Britain aside – initially hostile to the United States. This was taken the furthest by Germany, since a substantial fleet was sent to Manila. Thirdly, Britain tacitly, and then relatively explicitly backed America in the war, and then also looked favourably upon American control of the Philippines. This was due to two factors, firstly, the end of isolationism and a desire to cultivate positive relations with the United States, and secondly, that Britain had been reassured that American interests in the region were largely in line with their own.

The norms of open subordinate governance, which would allow the relatively unfettered pursuit of interests in the territory of a subordinate, had been substantially weakened over the course of the nineteenth century. The pattern set in the creation of overseas empires, and then explicitly endorsed through agreements between the colonizing powers, was one of exclusivity. However, a strong undercurrent of openness remained, and this was not limited to Britain and the United States, that is, this was not simply an Anglo-American phenomenon centred on free trade[29]. Rather, France suggested that the Philippines be governed by ‘a shared administration with the other Great Powers’ (Elizalde 1999, 137), however, ‘not one of the powers recurred seriously to the thought of uniting against an American peril’ (May 1961, 238). The preference for open – even shared – governance was not, therefore, backed with any substantial effort to prevent the annexation.

[29] Rather, in the 1890s, and in response to economic problems and relative decline, Britain threatened to impose imperial preference on its empire, which would significantly impact the other major powers which traded extensively with British colonies (Herring 2008, 302).

It is not the case that the Philippines was simply not valuable enough to stir a response. Multiple states sent warships to Manila. In addition to the American fleet, Germany sent a large fleet (examined below), whilst warships from Britain (three), France (one), Japan (one), and even Austria-Hungary (one, the obsolete sail powered *SMS Frundsberg*) were also present in Manila harbour at various points in the days following the destruction of the Spanish fleet. Clearly, there was interest in the Philippines. Rather, the major powers appear to have been restrained through an understanding that this was business-as-usual, particularly since ‘the world began to expect the partition of China’ (Chamberlain 2003, 159) following that of Africa. In addition, and ominously, the other major powers were deeply suspicious of each other, fearing that the vacuum created by the defeat of Spain in the Philippines might be replaced with an adversary. British concern focussed on Germany, Russia, and to a lesser extent, France. None of these saw further expansion of the British Empire favourably either. Moreover, France and Russia had signed the anti-German Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, a clear indication of where they identified their enemies. Japan, with significant tensions with Russia over Manchuria and Korea, and fresh from the embarrassing forced revocation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had begun to draw closer to Britain. In summary, though the Philippines were identified as being of economic and strategic value, the estrangement of the major powers, and that none saw the United States as their primary rival, ensured no collective response was possible.

Instead, two major powers took quite different approaches. In early May 1898 a German naval force commanded by Vice-Admiral von Diederichs assembled in Manila harbour, the bulk of which comprised the German East Asia Squadron based in Qingdao, seized the previous year[30]. The appearance of the squadron was regarded with suspicion by the commander of the American fleet, Commodore Dewey, whose forces had annihilated the grossly inferior Spanish Pacific Fleet on 1 May, ending any hope of defending the Philippines from American intervention. Complicating matters was the on-going war being fought between Spain and Philippine rebels, who not only besieged Manila, but also demanded independence for the colony[31]. Contact between the German fleet, and both the insurgents[32] and Spanish authorities in the islands, often via locally based German intermediaries, was regarded as being subversive since it suggested an interest in intervention. However, the power of the German fleet, which was superior to that of the American (Wionzek 2004, xiv), was sufficient in itself to cause alarm, particularly in Washington. At the height of these tensions, a British warship positioned itself between the two fleets with the purpose of reducing tensions (Burigsay 1941, 42).

German investments in naval capabilities, and the search for overseas bases, were well underway when the issue of the Spanish sovereignty over its Caribbean and Pacific colonies reached its zenith. In short, the Philippines, and to a lesser extent the other Spanish possessions, were highly attractive to Germany, 'and there can be no doubt that Germany would have sought some role in the Philippines had the US decided not to conquer the islands' (Schult and Wionzek 2017, 11). Vice-Admiral von Diederichs wrote in a report

[30] The German naval presence in Manila was 'at one point twenty percent greater than that of Dewey's naval force' (Wionzek 2004, xiv).
[31] Despite the parallel obvious with the American War of Independence, and the existence of the rebellion being used as justification for American intervention in the Philippines (as in Cuba), no serious consideration was given to independence for the colony.
[32] Wionzek reports that 'during the Katipunan Revolt of 1896, the revolutionaries had, according to German sources, proposed the establishment of a protectorate to Rear-Admiral Alfred Tirpitz, then commander of the East Asian Squadron' (2004, xvi). The suspicions of the Americans, and other major powers, were not entirely without foundation.

dated 25 June 1898 on the situation in Manila to the Commanding Admiral in Berlin that 'European merchants, apart from the few Spanish traders, favour any government other than the incumbent' (Schult and Wionzek 2017, 126) given the significant restrictions the Spanish placed on trade. The islands were also viewed as being ideally suited to constructing an overseas naval base, which would ease German logistical and communication problems by reducing reliance upon British bases for coaling, maintenance, and access to telegraphs[33].

The German fleet left Manila on 21 August ending the Manila Incident, but the action was that of an aggressively expansionist and opportunistic power. Germany sought to press its interests strongly, although Clark concludes that German naval documents show 'there is no evidence…that Germany ever considered contesting the claims of the United States, much less resorting to military action' (Wionzek 2004, xviii). Rather, the German policy was 'to wait for opportunities in order to demand a share through compensation. The reasons for this policy were, on the one hand, Prussia's and Bismarck's Europe-centred policy, which aimed at avoiding colonial conflicts, and on the other hand, the absence of a comprehensive program for *Weltpolitik* under Wilhelm II' (Schult and Wionzek 2017, 60). Whilst Germany may have had no intention to resort to armed intervention, the fleet was large and well provisioned compared to the American, and was clearly designed to press claims for territory.

In contrast to Germany's partial intervention, Britain, though neutral, backed the United States in the war with Spain, and was ambivalent about the annexation of the islands, preferring this outcome to one where a rival might control them. This is surprising, since

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[33] Though this reliance clearly demonstrates that dyadic ties whilst suspicious, were surprisingly cordial.

British economic interests in the islands were substantial. Three points help to explain this. Firstly, Britain was reassured that the United States would not infringe upon British interests in the islands, and would be supportive of broader goals vis-à-vis East Asia. Secondly, British policymakers sought, if not alliance with the United States, then at least cordial relations. Gone were the days of splendid isolation. Thirdly, the decision to annex the islands came quite late on. None of the major powers understand the United States to have the war aim of securing the Philippines. The decision to annex was driven by a variety of issues, but chief amongst these were a powerful domestic argument for the war to yield tangible gains, the concern that anything short of annexation would lead to other major powers staking claims, and the reality that Spanish control of the islands was limited due to the strength of the Philippine Revolution. That the solution to this conundrum was an American Empire is clearly somewhat illogical, but, the idea that the United States could govern the islands better than any alternative was persuasive to President McKinley.

Taking these points in turn, the pre-war British position, though friendly to the United States, was in line with all other major powers, which presented their collective voice to President McKinley on 6 April 1898 to call for ‘a continuance of peace’ (Benton 1908, 89). This was a moderate censure of the United States, with any idea of a threat or diplomatic protest stripped out by the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Julian Pauncefote, who was ‘widely known to favour American policies’ (Morgan 1965, 58). As the war began, American aims in the Philippines were – at their maximal – control of ‘Luzon, coaling stations, and the ‘open door’ doctrine in the commerce of the entire archipelago’ (Benton 1908, 242), with control of the rest presumably remaining with Spain. This was essentially understood by the other major powers which did not believe the United States sought annexation of the entirety of the Philippines (Burigsay 1941, 56–57). Therefore, for Britain, and the other major powers, the initial omens raised only minor ire, and since a war aim of the United States was to open the islands to trade, it might even seem that they would benefit from new openness in the islands, a position Britain had long advocated for (Burigsay 1941, 5).

However, on defeating Spain, it rapidly became clear to America's political and military leaders that a limited annexation would be insufficient. Dewey's 'smashing victory' (Offner 1992, 235) stimulated a national embrace of imperialism (May 1961, 262). Annexation appeared to give the public what they wanted (Offner 1992, 223). War aims evolved rapidly from limited territorial aggrandizement and imposing economic openness to annexing the entire archipelago. This no doubt led to re-evaluation by the major powers, but, American suzerainty was far more acceptable to Britain than any alternative. In fact, America's Ambassador to Britain, John Hay, relayed to McKinley that should America opt to not retain the islands, then Britain would seek to buy them (Musicant 1998, 557; Offner 1992, 213) to prevent a rival from doing so.

Limited annexation, collective major power rule of the islands, or the continuance of Spanish rule, was unacceptable to the United States for two reasons. Any of these options would result in major power squabbling (Morgan 1965, 74). More importantly, following the Treaty of Paris, 1898, which end the war between Spain and the United States, it was unclear whether the United States would ratify the treaty, since it essentially created an American empire. The question of the future of the Philippines, though of course of interest to the major powers, was of greatest significance to the population of the islands, whose revolutionaries had isolated the Spanish garrisons prior to American intervention. Tensions rose as independence, even self-governance, appeared to have been dropped from debate.

Felipe Agoncillo, who represented the Filipino nationalists to the US Senate pointed out the hypocritical position of the United States, which denied its allies (France and Spain) during its war of independence any right to acquire territory in the Americas from Britain through conquest. He stated that: '[w]e deny similarly the right of the United States to acquire Philippine territory by cession from Spain while the Filipinos were yet at war with that power' (Agoncillo 2014)[34]. On 4 February 1899, American soldiers and Filipino revolutionaries fired on each other leading to a 'long and bitter guerrilla conflict' (Morgan 1965, 108–9), and for McKinley to lament that 'How foolish these people are. This means ratification of the treaty; the people will insist on ratification' (Ibid.). Annexation, therefore, came about quite quickly, with the domestic support necessary to carry it, only emerging after the armistice, and solidifying in response to a new conflict: the Philippine–American War.

Annexation was not seen as a threat to Britain. Rather, it might advance British goals in East Asia, as well as further develop positive relations between the two. On this first point, Britain 'volunteered concessions in return for American good will' (May 1961, 238–39), essentially supporting annexing, in return for aligning on China. The two issued the Open Door Notes, which committed the United States to the protection of equal trading rights for all in China, and to the preservation of its territorial and administrative integrity (Smith 1993, xv). In practice, this meant a restraining hand being placed on those seeking expansion at China's expense, chiefly, Russia, Japan, and Germany, as well as a commitment to economic

[34] Similar misgivings were raised in Cuba by the revolutionaries. José Martí, who had returned to Cuba from exile in the United States in April 1895 was acutely aware that the United States could replace Spain in Cuba. In a letter sent shortly before his death on 19 May 1895 he wrote that he had 'the duty of preventing the United States from spreading through the Antilles as Cuba gains its independence' (Marti 1995, 387).

openness. That the United States had guaranteed continued freedom of trade with the islands (Elizalde 1999, 143), a credible position given its longstanding approach to subordinate governance and because the blockade of the Philippines was lifted immediately following the armistice (Benton 1908, 232), was clearly reassuring to Britain.

British interests went beyond the Philippines, however. On 13 May 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, called for an alliance with the United States (Burigsay 1941, 44). Though this would not come to pass, the Open Door Notes were a step in this direction. Moreover, this highlights the core of British foreign policy during the war. Rather than British policy being shaped by their interests in the Philippines, instead, British interests in the Philippines were used as a means of gaining American friendship, regarded as crucial to shoring up British positions in East Asia at a time when Britain was (self-)isolated diplomatically, and facing significant challenges in multiple locations simultaneously. This was clearly informed by the changing balance of power in Europe, and globally, as a result of the plethora of rising powers: Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United States. Since all of these sought overseas expansion, it was imperative for Britain to find allies.

The role of iteration

A crucial element in the lack of major power resistance to the United States was that the major powers did not believe the United States would annex the Philippines. At the outset, this was not the American aim, and yet it became the outcome. Even then, Germany apart, no opposition emerged. As argued above, that the United States had so long advocated for openness, particularly in its economic form, and in prior disputes over subordinate governance had not sought to monopolize, gave this position credibility. In summary, the major powers were reassured that the United States would not monopolize based on its history.

In the decade prior to 1898 the United States had participated in nine disputes involving subordinates. Of these, just one was not in the Americas. Both the American, and non-American, disputes offered the major powers important information about American foreign policy preferences with regards subordinate governance. Collectively, these disputes suggested that the United States would robustly prevent subordinates in the Americas from being monopolized by other, essentially European, major powers. Outside of Europe, a similar, though subtly different, political position was taken. In Samoa, the United States reached a tripartite pact with Germany and Britain whereby political control was shared, economic activities unrestricted, and the fiction of Samoan independence retained. However, these disputes also show a significant preference for economic openness and free trade, a position supported by the major powers[35]. Most importantly, from the point of view of the other major powers, in none of these disputes had the United States sought to monopolize a subordinate, that is, even whilst upholding the Monroe Doctrine which prevented the formal political domination of American subordinates by other major powers, economic openness continued to be a core feature of American foreign policy. In turn, though the United States did face major power opposition in some of these disputes, in none was a major power violent dispute triggered. In summary, the prior record of the United States suggested strong preferences for open subordinate governance. As the other major powers acquiesced to the Monroe Doctrine, and agreement was found over Samoa, the

[35] Of course, some would rather a closed monopoly, but if the choice was between an American monopoly and open economic governance, then the latter was clearly preferable.

United States had little reason to perceive the other major powers as being especially threatening to its interests.

The eight disputes in the Americas involved six subordinates: Haiti (three times), Chile, Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia. Haiti, independent since 1804, was a frequent subject of American foreign policy in the Americas, leading to American warships being sent to their a staggering 19 times between 1857 and 1913 (Easterly 2006, 330–31). Moreover, in annexation of Hispaniola (the island location of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic), had been advocated in 1868 by President Jackson, but rejected due the imperialism this would embrace. The rejection of monopolization of Haiti was mirrored in the Dominican Republic and Cuba. Disputes involving Colombia and Mexico involved the flexing of American military and political power, but involved no threat of monopolization. The most serious of these disputes was that concerning Chile, and therefore, is that which provided the major powers with the clearest understanding of American foreign policy preferences with regard subordinate governance.

The backdrop of the dispute was the Chilean Civil War of 1891, in which President Balmaceda and the Chilean army were confronted by the Chilean Congress and navy. The United States backed Balmaceda, who sought to limit British influence in Chile (Blakemore 1958; 1965), whereas the Congressionalists were backed by Britain. The war ended with a victory for the latter in September 1891, and though the United States did recognize the new government (and even released a Congressionalist ship it had detained in San Diego), tensions remained high. The support for Balmaceda was driven by a determination to erode ties between Chile and Britain, which for much of the nineteenth century had been strong and based around the nitrates industry and naval relations[36]. Blakemore explains that the American minister in Santiago sought to replace Britain as the leading commercial actor in Chile (1958, 106). The threat of American military intervention was taken seriously by Chile, and alarmed British policymakers, who based the British Pacific squadron in Chilean waters and smuggled weapons to the Congressionalists via the Falkland Islands (Blakemore 1958, 105–6). Once more, however, the United States did not seek monopolization, and the quick end to the war, along with concessions granted to the United States, prevented further conflict. The disputes, therefore, demarcated the limits of American foreign policy: a clear indication that it wished to expand economically, even at the expense of other major powers, but no interest monopolizing a subordinate.

This leads on to the only non-American dispute, that over Samoa, 1887-89. Here, American interests in the islands conflicted with those of Britain, and especially Germany. Both the United States and Germany valued the islands as naval bases and for economic interests, which in Germany's case were actively supported by the state following economic problems in 1880 (Pflanze 1990, 120). The core of the dispute was, firstly, that the United States and Germany supported different factions in the First Samoan Civil War, 1886-94[37], and secondly, that German military intervention aiming at annexing the islands (Baker 1934, 203) led to damage to American property. Fletcher notes two important features of the dispute from the perspective of the United States, firstly, that 'nowhere else in the world during this period did the United States openly confront both Britain and Germany' (1995,

[36] Chile's post-independence navy was significantly developed by Lord Cochrane, a British admiral, who heavily recruited anglophile officers (many of whom were themselves British), with the result making ties between the Chilean and British navies close.
[37] With a second fought in 1898.

381), and secondly, that overseas American expansion was supposedly driven by economic incentives, but these were curiously lacking in the case of Samoa (Ibid.). As tensions rose, the three German and three American warships present in Apia were destroyed by a cyclone in March 1889[38], avoiding 'a serious outcome' (Baker 1934, 203). In the aftermath, diplomacy led to a tripartite treaty on 14 June 1889, via which Samoa would be subject to a condominium, which preserved the rights of the three major powers involved and established 'recognition of the independence and neutrality of the Samoan Islands' (Dunning 1890, 357). Notably, the United State was 'offered opportunities by the native authorities functioning in Samoa to assume separate control of the group but declined' (Baker 1934, 202). Once more, this demonstrated a clear rejection of monopolization by the United States, opposing the efforts of Germany, and not seeking this.

The prior pattern of American foreign policy was clear: monopolization as a form of subordinate governance was opposed and not sought. In the case of the Philippines, therefore, the shift post armistice toward embracing annexation was undoubtedly a surprise, though also one which was viewed, at least in London, as the best outcome. That the United States had long advocated for open subordinate governance meant that opposition was likely less than it otherwise would have been. Britain feared for the security of Malaya should Germany control it, but had no such concerns should the United States, since it had previously demonstrated little interest in monopolization, and rather, consistently promoted openness.

[38] The only British ship present, *HMS Calliope*, managed to make it out to sea.

Alternative explanations

Three sets of alternative explanations each add to our understanding of the Spanish-American War, and particularly the annexation of the Philippines. A power politics explanation helps to shed further light on Britain's acquiescence. In short, the end of isolation and the search for new partners had led London to embrace Washington, particularly in East Asia and the Americas, the regions of greatest interest to the United States. A domestic politics explanation allows two conclusions to be reached, firstly, that the role of the yellow press in shaping American foreign policy was rather limited, and secondly, that President McKinley's decision to annex was made with clear reference to public opinion. Finally, a status account elucidates the importance of non-material motivations for American foreign policy, particularly the difference drawn between the United States and other major powers. Ultimately, these alternatives provide important additional explanatory power, complementing the evidence supporting the theory of subordinate monopolization.

Power politics

The German fleet which assembled in Manila harbour was more powerful than the American, which had also expended much of its ammunition already. Had the two sides engaged each other, whether deliberately of accidentally, the consequences would have been severe. It is unlikely that in such a scenario the other major powers would have remained completely neutral, particularly Britain, which with a larger fleet than either, as well as a network of bases crucial to supply and communications[39], would have played a critical role

[39] Particularly in Asia, where both the United States and Germany were seeking to expand, but relied on British controlled ports.

in shaping the resulting conflict. It seemed, therefore, that the United States, whilst numerically inferior locally, would have had the backing of other major powers, especially Britain, which meant that the deliberate use of force by Germany was risky[40]. German military intervention, therefore, had to consider the possibility that the British support for the United States would, at the least, impose severe impediments on the ability of the German fleet to engage the American. Notably, despite being neutral during the Spanish-American War, the British authorities in Egypt refused to sell coal to a Spanish fleet attempting to reinforce the Philippines from Europe, essentially preventing the reinforcement (Burigsay 1941, 43). A similar 'neutrality' in a war between Germany and the United States would similarly hamstring attempts by the German Navy to reinforce from Europe.

There is no doubt that the major powers observed the Spanish-American War and annexation of the Philippines through a lens distorted by the systemic, and regional, balance of power. As noted above, Britain sought to ensure that rivals – particularly Germany or Russia[41] – would not control the Philippines (Musicant 1998, 557), and the other major powers similarly sought to prevent rivals from expanding (Burigsay 1941, 65). The core issue for

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[40] Though again, accident was plausible. The Manila Incident reflected German attempts to take advantage of opportunities, and the collapse of the Spanish Empire was one such. The resentment felt toward Germany amongst United States (and British) policymakers though often presented as being concern at German offensive action, may really be fear that German policymakers were playing a high-stakes bluffing game, in which attack was unlikely but accident very possible, and it was Germany's policies making such accidents more likely.

[41] With the benefit of knowing the disastrous performance of the Russian Navy during the Russo-Japanese War, it seems a fantastic concern that Russia would seize the islands. However, in 1898, the Russian Navy remained powerful with a fleet of 352,000 tonnes, making it the third largest after Britain (1,249,000 tonnes) and France (577,000 tonnes), and placing ahead of Germany (288,000 tonnes), the United States (288,000 tonnes), and Japan (133,000 tonnes). See Crisher and Souva's *Naval Data Project* (2014) for further detail. A similar pattern is seen in the number of pre-Dreadnoughts the major powers operated in 1898: Britain had 29, France 14, Russia 6, Germany 4, the United States 4, and Japan 3 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 76). However, during the crisis Russia displayed little interest as it was distracted by its competition with Japan over Korea and Manchuria (May 1961, 235).

Britain was seeking, if not alliance with the United States, then a reduction in the issues which had led to antagonism, allowing friendly relations to flourish and mutual interests to be pursued. For Britain, this meant seeking support toward enforcing the status quo in East Asia (for a similar reason, friendship, and then alliance, with Japan was sought), to allow Britain to focus its attention and resources elsewhere, particularly upon Germany, but also France and Russia which had conflicting interests in Africa and Asia respectively. Given the alliance between France and Russia concluded over 1891-94, and the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy (1882), Britain was isolated. Since it faced multiple rising powers, threats to its empire in multiple locations, and appeared to be declining relative to both Germany and the United States, cultivating friendly relations was pursued, with the United States and Japan being the focus of British efforts.

Moreover, the East Asia region was a focus for rising powers other than the United States. Germany seized Qingdao in 1897-98, immediately prior to the Spanish-American War, whilst Japanese victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, saw annexation of Taiwan, and Korea and Manchuria fall under Japanese control via the Treaty of Shimonoseki[42]. These actions were perceived by policymakers in Britain, Russia, and France[43] as more significant than the annexation of the Philippines, since they directly challenged interests in China.

[42] Against which collective action was taken by Russian, France and Germany, though Britain, notably, remained outside of this grouping, since it saw Japan as a means of balancing Russian expansion in the region. Both British and German policymakers sought to reduce the threat of Russia to their interests, but reached different conclusions on this could be achieved. Britain supported Japan, and became allies in 1902 ending ‘splendid isolation’ (Charmley 2009; Lowe 1967), whilst Germany encouraged Russia to counter Japanese expansion in Manchuria. The conventional view is that this alliance ended British isolation, and was a sign of significant decline, however, MacDonald and Parent consider the alliance to be a far less dramatic departure from prior British policy characterizing it as ‘a modest attempt to lighten the burden of protecting distant interests through the assistance of a local partner’ (2018, 104) as part of a measured policy of retrenchment.
[43] The other major powers with significant interests in the region. Though Italy and Austria-Hungary (as well as several smaller European powers, including Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium) had interests in the region, especially in China, these were less significant than the other major powers, and lacked the support of significant military capabilities.

Collective action against the United States was improbable, since the major powers were wary of the rapidly changing balance of power, increasingly eyed each other with suspicion, and had begun to form alliances which reduced diplomatic flexibility.

Two further power political points require consideration. Firstly, whether the United States deterred the other major powers from military intervention. Secondly, if the alliances noted above impeded the ability of the major powers to impose their will upon the United States. The first of these is dealt with easily. Though the United States was certainly materially powerful, much of this remained economic, and thereby latent. Compared with the other major powers, its navy was a peer competitor, but no match for the British or French (see footnote 39 for detail). Moreover, the United States was not perceived as a martial power. For example, 'France believed in the incompetence of the American army and navy; and when Dewey defeated Spain in Manila Bay, France believed it was an accident' (Burigsay 1941, 63). Finally, during the Manila Incident, the German fleet was clearly superior. All of this suggests that the United States alone was not in a position to deter intervention.

By contrast, the alliances, and rivalries, between the other major powers undoubtedly impeded a collective response. It is here that a power politics explanation offers its greatest contribution. The other major powers certainly sought opportunities in the Philippines which might arise as a result of America's victory, but the more general position taken was to evaluate how the war and annexation might impact the systemic game being played. This helps to explain the British response, in combination with American reassurance that interests would be respected, as well as the longstanding foreign policy positions of the United States on open subordinate governance.

Domestic politics

Ultimately domestic political processes provide the mechanisms linking policymaker perceptions about international affairs to policy outcomes. Therefore, the perceptions and roles of different actors are important to understand for explaining variation in outcomes. Such a focus provides insight into the absence of a major power violent dispute over the Philippines despite American monopolization in three ways. Firstly, that the domestic debate over the war and annexation was meandering, with the result that the ultimate outcome – annexation – only became apparent late on in the crisis. Plausibly this is attributable to the regime type of the United States, that is, multiple actors, veto players, and audiences needed to be considered which slowed the march to war and annexation, perhaps resulting in a more time for the leaders of other major powers to come to terms with an American empire. Secondly, support for the United States amongst both British voters and elites was high (though arguably for different reasons). That these two aligned, and mattered for decision-making, sent a strong signal that Britain would not intervene and could be trusted by the United States. Thirdly, negative perceptions of the United States, particularly in France of American military prowess, and in Germany of the acceptability of the United States defeating a fellow monarchy, fed into the conclusions reached about the crisis.

The role of public opinion is important to understanding the decision to use force against Spain. In particular, the *reconcentrado* generated huge hostility publically and in the Senate (Proctor 1995, 391). President McKinley similarly emphasized that ending *reconcentrado* was the core aim of the war (McKinley 1995, 393). However, significant debate exists over the exact domestic drivers of American foreign policy. For Offner, domestic politics made the war inevitable, so excited was popular opinion (1995), driven by a combination of humanitarian concerns for Cuba, and the public-press nexus, a view shared by Smith (1993, xiv–xv). In contrast, Smythe is dismissive of the effects of the 'yellow press' upon discourse, arguing that Hearst's *New York Journal* and Pulitzer's *New York World* had limited circulations and were 'hardly believed because of the sensationalism and inaccuracies' (2003, 191). Finally, LaFeber concludes that rather than these humanitarian concerns, instead, the crucial domestic driver was 'war as a means of opening overseas markets in order to alleviate domestic distress caused by overproduction' (1995, 397). Crucially, this explanation is able to explain why the war expanded to the Pacific, and eventually encompassed annexation of the Philippines, namely, that this would provide strategic bases for expansion into Asian markets (LaFeber 1995, 398–403)[44]. This meandering path was of course, by virtue of being a democracy, played publically. For the other major powers, rather than annexation being understood as the purpose of war, rather, it was understood as the logical progression of events (Offner 1992, 59).

In Britain, both elites and voters were broadly supportive of American foreign policy during the crisis. As has been explained above, the British governments of the late nineteenth century sought to end isolation, and reduce the many regional commitments Britain had by virtue of its empire. In particular, positive relations with Japan and the United States were cultivated, with a view to reducing threats to British interests in the Pacific. However, support for the United States also came from a broad swathe of society. Notably, British sailors cheered the departure of Dewey's fleet from Hong Kong (Musicant 1998, 201). Moreover, British officials provided encouragement to American naval officers and diplomats in the Pacific, and ensured that Dewey could remain in contact with Washington

[44] A similar point is raised by Perez Jr on Cuba, arguing that the United States did not intervene to support the Cuban rebels, rather, it was for their own economic interests, hence, once in Cuba the United States cultivated ties with conservative Cuban elites (1995, 413).

via the cable service run through Hong Kong, despite Britain having previously stated that belligerents would lose such access (Musicant 1998, 556). Finally, popular support for the United States was expressed in Australia and in New Zealand in the form of pro-American demonstrations (Burigsay 1941, 37–38). This largely united pro-American stance ensured Britain would not oppose the United States, and clearly showed the other major powers that British policy was firmly behind the United States.

In contrast, Kaiser Wilhelm’s influence over German foreign policy was large, and sought intervention on the basis that monarchy as a system of government was under threat (Burigsay 1941, 47) and that Germany deserved part of the Philippines (May 1961, 228). Burigsay goes on to quote Wilhelm as saying that ‘If I had a large fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck’ (Burigsay 1941, 48), implying that only the balance of power prevented a German military intervention. Wilhelm was not an absolute monarch, but he was also not a mere figurehead: it was he that ordered von Diedrichs take his fleet to Manila (Ibid.). These clumsy manoeuvres would isolate Germany, antagonizing the United States and Britain without any tangible reward, and left the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Richtofen, to explain that far from opportunism, von Diedrichs sailed at the behest of public opinion which demanded the protection of German subjects in Manila (Burigsay 1941, 52). In summary, the crucial actors in shaping German foreign policy during the period, the Kaiser, Chancellor, and navy, appear to have little coordinated between themselves, resulting in the Manila Incident. In summary, domestic political division in Germany led to a piecemeal response which clumsily challenged the United States without the full backing of the German state.

Status

The prestige and status of the United States were also at stake, at least as perceived by a subset of domestic political actors. Those advocating for overseas expansion of the United States saw war with Spain as a means to an end: to establish the United States as a major power and to allow it to pursue interests in East Asia. In particular, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, naval theorist and officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, united to campaign for war and the annexation of the Philippines (LaFeber 1995, 397)[45]. Murray argues that the crucial means of understanding the pursuit of higher status, in this case of major power status, is through ‘symbolic material practices’ (2018, 7), in this case meaning the ‘acquisition of particular military capabilities’ (Ibid.). Chamberlain concludes that in the late nineteenth century, ‘imperial possessions once again came to be regarded as the hallmark of a Great Power’ (Chamberlain 2003, 151). Though the pursuit of status is a reasonable explanation for why certain actors saw value in the war, and annexation, it is less persuasive for explaining why a major power violent dispute was avoided, since this rests on how the United States was perceived by the other major powers. Whilst Britain essentially recognized the United States as having status quo foreign policy goals, this assessment does not extend to the other major powers, and moreover, the British assessment rested on the lack of prior monopolization of subordinates by the United States and the need to develop friendly relations. Notably, even after the annexation, Anglo-American relations continued to improve, suggesting that despite behaviour that was essentially revisionist other considerations over-rode it.

[45] Note, this explanation for the Spanish-American War, and the subsequent annexation of the Philippines, is considered weaker than economic interests by LaFeber who argues that the ‘colonial expansion lobby’ was largely unique to 1898 and has never reappeared, making it a worse explanation than the more generalizable economic interests argument (1995, 397).

Murray's argument that rising powers gain recognition by existing major powers when they act in accordance with existing norms is initially a compelling explanation for why Britain perceived little threat from the United States in the late nineteenth century (2018, 13). The disputes that the United States engaged in during the decade prior to 1898, examined above, suggest a rising power that was keen to maintain established norms of open subordinate governance, with the result that British leaders perceived the United States as adhering to the 'club rules'. Murray builds on this further, to argue that the United States was understood as sharing a collective Anglo-Saxon identity (2018, 173)[46], and that nascent American imperialism served British interests (2018, 176). Yet, annexation of the Philippines, even with the guarantees made that the substantial British economic interests in the islands would be respected, was a turn away from prior practice. Moreover, a shared Anglo-Saxon identity suggests a different mechanism, that is, rather than a pathway in which the United States essentially mimicked the behaviour of major powers, and supported established norms, instead, this suggest a cultural argument, where a shared history, language, and domestic norms spill over into the international. Finally, it is unclear why other major powers – most notably Germany – would not similarly recognize the major power status of the United States. If the recognition of a major power rests on the perception that the state is carrying out the practices of the powerful, then a similar reaction should be observable across other major powers. In the case of Britain, it is difficult to divorce concerns about status – surely valid – from material power and threat perception.

[46] The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, made a public speech on 13 May 1898 in which he called for alliance with the United States, and justified it in terms of the shared language, kinship, history, and norms, concluding that 'the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance' (Burigsay 1941, 44). Perhaps crucially, the speech was made after Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay, 1 May 1898.

For German leaders, the United States was perceived quite differently. Notably, Kaiser Wilhelm saw the United States as an upstart which was challenging the established international order and place of monarchism within it (Burigsay 1941, 47–48)[47]. By contrast, in von Diederich's account of the action, published in 1913, 'he analogizes the United States' and Germany's international positions as young, dynamic powers which have had to struggle to gain the respect of the established imperialist players' (Wionzek 2004, xx). Once again, this points to the significant differences of opinion that German leaders had during the crisis, but neither of these understandings suggests recognition of the United States as a major power. Rather, Wilhelm's actively denies it, whilst von Diedrich clearly suggests that such a status had not been reached. In summary, recognition that America was now a major power by virtue of its material capabilities and support for established norms, fails to explain Germany's foreign policy.

Russo-Japanese War

Russia was defeated with the result that Japan was uncontested in its efforts to monopolize control of Korea and Manchuria. The war officially began with a surprise attack launched by the Japanese Navy against the Russian Pacific Fleet based at Port Arthur (now Dalian, China). The war was a shock to Russia's leaders, who though aware of the significant tensions with Japan, had not considered that the latter would resort to war, largely because they perceived Japan as being far weaker[48]. However, Russia had anticipated that tensions

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[47] Glossing over, perhaps, that France – a major power – was itself not a monarchy.
[48] A point that illustrates the numbers are insufficient to understand relative military power. In 1904, Russia had 10 pre-Dreadnoughts and Japan had 6 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 76). The Russian fleet totalled 538,000 tonnes, compared with 238,000 tonnes for Japan (Crisher and Souva 2014). Of course, the Japanese fleet was concentrated in East Asia, whereas the Russian was divided between the Pacific, Black Sea, Baltic and Northern fleets.

would deepen and 'orders to the Russian fleet to attack any Japanese war vessel north of the 39th parallel had already been issued and were probably in transmission' (Malozemoff 1958, 249) when the Japanese attack began.

What was at stake were economic and security interests in Korea and Manchuria. The settlement of the war, the Treaty of Portsmouth, gave Japan much of what it had sought: recognition by Russia of its control of Korea, the removal of Russian troops from Manchuria, and the ceding of bases in Southern Manchuria – notably Port Arthur – to Japan (Minohara 2019, 55)[49]. As a result of the war, Japan found itself in an essentially dominant – and unchecked – position in East Asia, and gained further recognition of its status as a major power[50]. For Russia, the disastrous defeat contributed to the failed 1905 Russian Revolution, and led to foreign policy re-focusing on the Balkans (Chamberlain 2003, 173).

Notably, tensions between the two had increased, essentially incrementally, over the prior decade. This, in conjunction with the mobilization both sides took, leads White to characterize the war as 'one of the least accidental of wars' (1969, 359), a conclusion reached on the basis that clear instructions to engage the other side were issued almost simultaneously. The build-up of tension between the two was driven by their rivalrous interests in the region and are best understood through a series of militarized disputes and

[49] Despite victory and the gains made, the Japanese public perceived this to be too little, being unaware that the war had actually severely strained the Japanese military, whereas Russia was able to send more troops to East Asia from Europe. Podalko explains that by 'the time the peace treaty was signed, Russia's forces outnumbered Japan's in Manchuria, and Tokyo had almost run out of reserves and was precariously close to fiscal collapse' (2016, 275).

[50] The issue of social recognition would continue to play a role in Japanese foreign policy, notably re-emerging in the negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles, where Japan's proposal for the treaty to recognize the equality of all races was blocked (Shimazu 1995). This reinforced the widely held perception that status in international society rested on cultural foundations not only on material ones.

diplomatic crises. Four stand out, which are briefly detailed here in chronological order. Firstly, Japan and Russia had a long-running territorial dispute over the large, though sparsely populated, island of Sakhalin, which Japan had been forced to abandon as a result of Russian pressure in 1875 (Connaughton 1988, 2). As the island lies just 42km north of Hokkaido across La Pérouse Strait, Russian control posed a potential threat to Japan. Secondly, the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany, against Japan once the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-5, became known. Thirdly, the Russian occupations of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula in 1897-8 – Chinese territory coveted by Japan and which they had been forced to withdraw from due to the Triple Intervention – and the occupation of the entirety of Manchuria in 1900-1 during the Boxer Rebellion. Fourthly, that following this occupation, Russia essentially ignored Japanese concerns, repeatedly agreed to withdraw and failed to (Goldfrank 2005, 95), and instead seemed to enhance its position in the region through the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to Port Arthur, which could host warships year round. These points are picked up in more detail in the section on iteration, below.

The other major powers played important supporting roles in the war, particularly Britain and the United States (Steinberg 2008, 5). Unlike in 1895, when Japan's relative isolation and relative military weakness had allowed the Triple Intervention to succeed, in 1904, Japan was a British ally and had invested substantial sums in new warships, training, and doctrine. Meanwhile, Japanese diplomats skilfully represented the Russian threat as one which posed a threat to all major power interests in China, and particularly to those supporting the Open Door: the United States and Britain (Storry 1979, 61). These moves led Germany to declare a strict neutrality, whilst France, though an ally of Russia, was motivated by the German threat and had little interest in East Asia beyond how it impacted the

European balance of power. Moreover, Anglo-French relations were rapidly improving, and neither sought to jeopardize this, since each was increasingly concerned by growing German power. This meant that as the war broke out, the Marquess of Lansdowne, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Pierre Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, 'resolved speedily to settle the few remaining points' (Otte 2007, 96) to conclude the Anglo-French Entente on 8 April 1904, with a view to ensuring the war would not unravel the progress made. Beyond alliances, the United States played an important role in resolving the war, through the Treaty of Portsmouth, which President Theodore Roosevelt personally helped to negotiate as an 'honest broker', but in reality a mediator Japan hoped would be advantageous. To this end, the Japanese government sent Kentaro Kaneko, 'an old acquaintance of the U.S. president' with the mission 'to convince the president to support Japan and, at the same time, to elicit American public support for Japan, so the U.S. government would be willing to mediate' (Koda 2005, 23–24)[51].

Evidence for the theory of subordinate monopolization

The Russo-Japanese War is clearly a major power violent dispute since Japan was opposed by a major power, Russia. In this section, the roles of closure and monopolization are examined in shaping the onset of the war. By 1904 Japan had established a pre-eminent, if not exclusive, position in Korea. Japan's interests in Korea were both economic and strategic, with the latter playing a larger role, since if a major power were to control Korea it could pose a direct threat to Japan by dint of its geographic position (Duus 1998, 49). This pre-eminent position was based on a closure of the subordinate to others, and understood

[51] Again, this highlights the high degree of intention behind the decision to make war, since Japan was actively strategizing about how also to win the peace.

Korea to have a specific strategic function as a bastion against major power adversaries and as a base for expansion into China (Nish 1985, 243). In addition, Japan had established a formal role for itself in Korea through the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa, an unequal treaty, through which Japan was granted extensive commercial and social rights for its interests and citizens (Agrawal 2006, 320). However, Russia remained an important influence, particularly over King Gojong (Emperor from 1897), who essentially utilized Russian support to deter Japan from further penetration of Korea. The war aims of Japan with regards Korea are quite clear: to monopolize control of the entire territory. Nish explains that Japan wanted supremacy in Korea 'and would only achieve it by removing Russian influence from the court and the territory as a whole' (Nish 1985, 254).

However, Russia and Japan also contested control of Manchuria, collectively the three north easternmost provinces of China which the Chinese government exerted only limited authority over, both due to internal unrest, and strong external pressure. Japanese interests in, and influence over, the region waxed and waned substantially over the prior decade. Before the outbreak of war in 1904, Japan's interests and influence over the territory were clearly far weaker than those of Russia, which had occupied the territory over 1901-2 and subsequently had refused to withdraw (Connaughton 1988, 10). Japan lacked, therefore, control over the territory prior to the war. However, it was exactly this issue which led to the decision to attack Russia. Whether the aim of the war was to monopolize the territory, or this became an aim as Japan succeeded in its initial advances (White 1969, 361), is still debated by historians. However, pre-war Japan had 'recognized Manchuria as being outside her sphere of influence' (Connaughton 1988, 10), and on the outset of war made the case for reducing Russian influence in the region to allow the rights of all major powers to be re-established (White 1969, 362). This argument was designed to appeal to Britain and the

United States (Katō 2007, 101; Storry 1979, 61). At the least, Japanese monopolization of Manchuria appears to have emerged due to military success, and it is hard to dissociate the major advances throughout 1904 from a determination to hold the territory controlled, but may have emerged from under the cloak of apparent support for openness. Complicating this picture, however, is that though a distinct political unit from Korea, both Japan and Russia 'negotiated up until the start of the war as if Korea and Manchuria were one entity, doing so in a way that blurred the connections between the Korea question and the Manchuria question' (Katō 2007, 101). This should not be viewed as mere confusion, rather, it reflected the spirit of the day: neither Korea, and especially Manchuria, were considered as full members of international society. Rather, they were subordinate, and the boundaries between the two – geographic, social, and political – were trampled by the major powers.

Bound up within the war is contestation over the norms of subordinate governance, and how these were applied to China. Nish considers that the Japanese position was to seek a 'share in the Chinese cake as it crumbled' (1985, 243). From this position, monopolization of Korea followed, with the Japanese position toward Manchuria being ambiguous. This is reflected by the negotiating position that Japan had taken between 1901-4. Certainly Japan saw a permanent Russian occupation of the territory as constituting a threat to Korea (Connaughton 1988, 10), but was prepared to accept a clear division of Russian and Japanese interests if Russia would renounce interest in Korea (Ibid.). Yet, such a division, which would grant Russia a monopoly in Manchuria, and allow a threat to be posed to the Chinese capital, would be difficult for the other major powers to accept. Katō explains that, from the perspective of the other major powers, Korea was of limited interest, but that the governance of Manchuria was of deep concern to the other major powers since it would impact China (2007, 101). Russian intransigence prevented any division in any case, particularly as

Russian 'consistently suggested neutralizing Korea' (Nish 1985, 255). Changing tack was required, and so Japan argued for 'equal treatment for all countries in trade and navigation in China' (Jukes 2002, 13), aligning their position with Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, this argument for openness was never realized. The demand for the 'recognition of the general rights of the powers in Manchuria' (White 1969, 362) was quietly dropped as a Japanese peace condition. White interprets this not as weakness, but rather, as 'recognition that she no longer needed to rely on demands that would find general support among the other powers but could not turn to a more overt drive for monopoly' (1969, 362). In ignoring the rights of the other major powers, but having previously emphasized their importance, Japan was left in control of Manchuria without any commitment to ensure openness.

The role of iteration

Tensions between Japan and Russia over their relative positions and interests in East Asia had simmered for at least the decade prior to 1904, and arguably had their origin in the 1875 forced Japanese withdrawal from Sakhalin. For Connaughton, this demonstrated to Japan the threat Russia posed to their interests – and for their independence – and led to the conclusion that only military power could ensure their security (1988, 2). Notably, as part of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the southern half of Sakhalin was transferred to Japan. Of greater significance are three disputes centred on their interests in Korea and Manchuria, the subordinates at the centre of the 1904-5 war, and where the fighting would mainly take place: the Triple Intervention in 1895, the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in 1897-8, and the Russian occupation of Manchuria in 1900-1. To Japan, each of these showed Russia to be utterly unresponsive to Japanese claims, suggested they faced a deeply hostile neighbour, and that only monopolization of subordinates would guarantee their economic and security interests in Korea and Manchuria. In contrast, few Russian leaders noted the growing hostility of Japan, tending to see it as mere bluster, meaning that a deepening threat was not seriously regarded. Though these prior disputes were very significant in shaping Japan's foreign policy, they appear to have only minimally shaped Russia's.

The First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-5, led to an overwhelming Japanese victory as 'within two months…Japanese forces drove all Chinese troops out of Korea' (Auslin 2005, 20). The peace settlement which followed, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, led to Taiwan and associated islands (the Pescadores) being ceded to Japan, as well as giving Japan control of the Liaodong peninsula, including Port Arthur and a large indemnity. Korea would be independent, seemingly resolving its previously 'ambiguous international status as a tributary state of China, making the kingdom neither a fully independent country nor an integral part of the Chinese empire' (Matsusaka 2001, 23). An independent Korea would allow Japan to ward off other major powers from encroaching, something deeply feared given the proximity to Japan. That Russia was actively expanding in East Asia, and developing railways to the north in Manchuria (Patrikeeff 2007), suggested a future where Russian influence in Korea would be very strong, and hard to counter. Japan expected the victory and subsequent settlement to be received as an indication that Japan was now a major power[52] (Steinberg 2008, 3), and thereby, it would receive the privileges this position accorded it.

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[52] 1895 is taken as the year that Japan should be coded as a major power by the Correlates of War. Whilst an exact year is debateable, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is undoubtedly when Japan became a major power. The reaction of Russia, France, and Germany to Japan's gains in 1895 suggests an unwillingness or inability to perceive Japan in such terms. This is likely evidence of pervasive racism – the Japanese being understood as an uncivilized people who could not hope to rival the development and power of the European major powers – but may also reflect the relative thin evidence for claiming major power status. In 1895 Japan had defeated China, a surprise to be sure, but also a state wracked by internal division and widely perceived as being vulnerable to external penetration. Therefore, its defeat did not necessarily demonstrate the

Instead, the reaction of the major powers was shock, and a determination by Russia, in conjunction with France and Germany to reverse nullify the gains Japan had made. Malozemoff explains that '[b]efore 1895 Russia had been content with the status quo, because no power had entered her security zone – Korea, Manchuria and neighboring areas' (1958, 67). The Treaty of Shimonoseki shattered this status quo, with Japan laying claim to subordinates Russia considered its own. In addition to Russia, France also objected – somewhat reluctantly – with a view to supporting its new ally[53]. Germany meanwhile was an 'enthusiastic supporter' (Nish 1985, 24) of Russia's attention being fixed on East Asia, which would reduce friction between the two in Europe. In support of their insistence that Japan withdraw from Liaodong, Russia and France amassed warships in East Asia (Nish 1985, 26) and Russia called up reservists in the Trans-Baikal and Vladivostok regions (Nish 1985, 27). This suggested that if Japan would not heed the Triple Intervention, that war would be the result. Japan caved to their demands, and withdrew.

Storry argues that '[n]o understanding of twentieth century Japanese nationalism is possible without some comprehension of the bitterness and sense of humiliation that swept the country in the wake of the Triple Intervention' (1979, 29–30). Koda, meanwhile, argues that the 'Japanese people…saw the cold reality of international relations – that the weak were the victims of the strong' (2005, 16) and that both 'the Japanese people and their government believed that the concessions gained through the treaty of 1895 were lawful in light of current international custom and, further, had been bought with the blood of Japanese

martial, diplomatic, and economic credentials necessary to be considered a major power, or at least, strong scepticism remained across these attributes.

[53] The Franco-Russian Alliance having been concluded in 1894.

soldiers' (Ibid.). The conclusions were several. Japan's leaders and populations felt a strong sense of loss and injustice, recognized the importance of power politics, and had the threat of external intervention reaffirmed. The consequences of this were a determination to monopolize, which required a powerful military, the capture of Korea, and the isolation and defeat of Russia. All of this would take place in 1904-5.

The lessons from 1895 grew starker in 1897-8 and in 1900-1, as Russia first advanced into the Liaodong peninsula, the very area Japan had gained as a result on the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and then occupied all of Manchuria. In the aftermath of the Triple Intervention, Britain had sought 'to secure bilateral agreements with other powers to persuade them to accept the principle of no territorial concessions but he failed to clinch such an agreement with Russia just before the Russian move on Port Arthur [in Liaodong]' (Chamberlain 2003, 159). This was a restatement of Britain's embrace of the Open Door on China, as well as a clear indication that Russia would accept nothing but exclusive control. No doubt, this allowed Japan and Britain to see increasingly eye-to-eye over Russian expansion in the region, and contributed to their alliance of 1902 (Chamberlain 2003, 162)[54]. A further lesson was learned in Japan: Russia could not be trusted to negotiate in good faith (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2005, 26). Rather, Russia had 'no intention of settling the dispute on the Manchuria and Korean Peninsula issues. Instead, the Russians had merely drawn Japan along, buying time for a military buildup in Manchuria, for intimidation and warfare' (Koda 2005, 24). In summary, the prior disputes between Russia and Japan strongly

[54] Nish explains that 'most of the world was opposed to the Russian military protectorate over part of their [China's] territory' (1985, 108).

indicated to Japan that only by convincing Russia of Japan's strength could their interests be secured.

In contrast, there is much less evidence that Russia's leaders learned from these prior interactions. Rather, Russia continued to treat Japan as both a social inferior and with a haughtiness which could not conceive of a threat being posed to their interests. This is most clearly observed in the failure of those in St Petersburg to understand that Japan was not bluffing in 1904, rather, they were committed to resort to war if Russia continued to prevaricate over an equitable diplomatic settlement. On 4 February 1904 Japan withdraw their Ambassador to Russia, Shin'ichirō Kurino, which was interpreted as a bluff. This was despite Russia's Ambassador to Japan, Baron Rosen 'consistently warn[ing] his masters in St Petersburg that if Japan was manoeuvred into a corner she would fight' (Connaughton 1988, 10). Though Russia did authorize the Pacific Fleet to attack any Japanese warships north of the 39th parallel, this limited step seems to have been intended as a warning, rather than as a declaration of war (Malozemoff 1958, 249)[55]. This step also failed to appreciate the military strength of Japan, which had increased markedly over the last decade relative to Russia. Podalko argues that a significant part of this blindness is rooted in the de facto alliance between the two during the Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1901, in which Japan's army served as the 'loyal deputy' to Russia on the battlefield, reinforcing an idea of subordination and comparative weakness (2016, 266). More generally, Russia had few Japanese language specialists before 1904, severely harming intelligence (Podalko 2016), and contributing to

[55] Had Russian warships engaged their Japanese counterparts first, it seems inconceivable that given the feelings of both the Japanese government and public that war would not have immediately resulted. This suggests, once more, that Russia's leaders were ill-informed and/or blinded by preconceptions about the likely Japanese response.

ignorance that Japan's navy ships tended to be newer and the crews much more experienced than Russia's (Connaughton 1988, 21; Jukes 2002, 22–23). Overall, little learning occurred in Russia, with the result that the growing strength of Japan, and its determination to wrest control of Korea and Manchuria, was largely missed.

Alternative explanations

As before, three sets of alternative explanations provide additional insight into the onset of the Russo-Japanese War. A power politics explanation highlights two crucial issues, the relative balance of power in East Asia between Japan and Russia, and how alliances constrained and enabled the combatants. Domestic politics points towards two conclusions, that Japan was remarkably united behind the war and monopolization, whereas Russia's leaders were hamstrung by poor information about their adversary's capabilities and resolve. However, the high expectations that the Japanese public had meant that the peace, despite being hugely favourable to Japan, led to the fall of the Japanese government. The domestic consequences in Russia were also severe: the abortive 1905 Revolution. Finally, status sheds light on the Japan's motivations for war. In particular, that Japan's leaders felt a combination of loss of face from their past treatment by Russia, and sought for Japan to be recognized as a major power by emulating major power behaviour: to defeat other major powers and claim an empire.

Power politics

In early 1904, the Japanese army had 156 infantry battalions, 106 artillery batteries, and 54 cavalry squadrons. By comparison, the Russian army in the Far East had 100 infantry battalions, 30 artillery batteries, and 75 cavalry squadrons (Jukes 2002, 20). The immediate regional balance of power favoured Japan. However, not only could Russia significantly reinforce its positions, it was doing so (Koda 2005, 24), and this process would likely speed up with the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The naval situation was similar: the total Russian fleet was larger, with 10 pre-Dreadnoughts to Japan's 6 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 76), and a total tonnage of 538,000 tonnes compared to 238,000 tonnes (Crisher and Souva 2014), but the Russian fleet was divided between the Far East and Europe, whereas Japan's fleet was concentrated. Given adequate warning, the Russian position could be substantially augmented, deterring a Japanese attack, or even prosecuting their own attack against Japan. In the words of Fearon, Japan had an incentive to misrepresent information since they planned an offensive war and 'explaining how they planned to win a war might seriously compromise any such attempt by changing the likelihood that they would win' (1995, 400). In summary, the balance of power favoured Japan, but convincing Russia of this to try and force a diplomatic solution would lead to Russian reinforcement, eroding this advantage, and thereby increasing the probability of a less favourable bargain. Therefore, given the exhaustion of diplomatic overtures, war was selected as the only option to achieve Japan's foreign policy goals.

Examining only the balance between the two sides of course misses the substantial role that allies played. Japan was clearly well aware of this, having been subjected to the Triple Intervention in 1895 which led not only to the substantial gains achieved at the expense of China being reversed, but Russia gaining at China's and Japan's expense. Japan concluded an alliance with Britain in 1902, largely because each had sought stability in the Far East through deals with Russia, and neither had been successful, raising suspicion about Russian intentions (Chamberlain 2003, 162). Japan went further, and sought if not alliance with the United States, then at least benevolent neutrality, by advocating for an Open Door in China (Storry 1979, 61). Japan clearly approached the other major powers from the perspective of needing to diplomatically isolate Russia. However, no agreements were struck with France and Germany, the other two major powers that had intervened in 1895. Happily, at least from the perspective of Japan, the British alliance was able to keep them in check, since the Anglo-French rapprochement meant France (and Britain) were eager to avoid disputes with each other since each increasingly feared the rise of Germany. Moreover, article two of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance laid out that the other would support their ally should they be involved in war with more than one major power, a clause that provided a deterrent effect to Germany, as well as for all other major powers. As German foreign policy sought to ensure Russian attention in the Far East, to avoid clashes in Europe, a war between Russian and Japan was arguably favourable to Germany, particularly given the assumption that Russia would win.

In contrast, Russia appears to have given little thought to alliances to protect its interests in East Asia. Once more, Russian interests and attention, like her military, were divided between multiple regions. Since Japan was regarded as little more than an irritation, rather than a security threat (Nish 1985, 241), there was little need to seek allies. However, Russia was certainly hostile to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and after war broke out 'It was widely believed that Japan could not fight without explicit offers of British support' (Nish 1985, 233). Undoubtedly, the alliance enabled Japan, but Britain remained neutral throughout. In summary, alliances did not cause the war, but they did make it more likely, since the 'concentrated efforts by the Japanese government since the Sino-Japanese War to reshape its image in an attempt to mobilize international support' (Kowner 2000, 129) were highly effective[56].

Domestic politics

Three domestic political factors shed significant light on the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia. Firstly, the Japanese government and public were united in their belief that war was the only option left. This meant there was little opposition to the march to war, so policy faced less scrutiny than otherwise. Incredibly, the momentum for war that this created resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth being poorly received in Japan, since the public were primed to expect a victory that would see Japan dictate its will to Russia. That the war remained widely understood outside of Japan as a stunning victory was irrelevant. In Japan, anger at the treaty led to the fall of the government in 1906. Secondly, the political institutions of Japan selected risk acceptant leaders, but had relatively weak oversight over the army and navy, which competed with each other. This led to aggressive foreign policy, but the distinct possibility of overextension. Thirdly, and as noted above, Russia's domestic political apparatus was largely ignorant or incredulous of the threat posed by Japan. It failed to respond with the speed or decisiveness to either reach a diplomatic settlement over the 1901-3 period, or to bolster military preparedness to deter or blunt attack.

In early 1904 the Japanese government, and public opinion, overwhelming favoured war (Nish 1985, 247). However, what they sought from war differed. For the government and

[56] Though arguably fleeting. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance ending in 1923 once it was clear that Britain must choose either a pro-American, or a pro-Japanese position. Without the alliance, Japan became a relatively isolated major power, until the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 gave her a German alliance against the Soviet Union.

the *genrō*[57] Korea was the crucial interest at stake (Katō 2007, 102). By contrast, the public saw the grounds for war as being located in the need to pursue Japanese interests in Manchuria (Ibid.). This gap would prove problematic as the fighting ended and the terms of peace became known. However, war had huge support, and was opposed only by a small group of newspapers and writers who largely opposed war on humanist or Christian grounds (Storry 1979, 54). The government faced little constraint, and the public were prepared for the likelihood of war. However, by the end of the war Japan's 'resources and manpower were strained and her commitments were dangerously dispersed' (Nish 1985, 22). Despite a series of dramatic victories, particularly at sea, Japan's leaders recognized that a peace settlement was required, since Japan had no further resources to deploy, whereas Russia could continue to send troops east[58]. The Treaty of Portsmouth gave Japan much of what it had sought[59], but Russia refused entirely to pay any form of indemnity[60]. The Tsar's instructions to his negotiation team made it clear that 'Russia would not hesitate for one minute to continue the war if Japan presented demands which tarnished the honor and worth of Russia as a great power' (White 1969, 406). In response, this demand was removed. Major riots followed in early September 1905 in Tokyo, with the terms being considered too lenient, and contributed to the fall of Katsura Tarō's government. The united position of

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[57] Koda explains that 'Genrō is an informal, collective term embracing several of the most influential and experienced politicians and military leaders of the Meiji era' (2005, 18).
[58] The Battle of Tsushima, in which the Russian Baltic Fleet, having sailed some 30,000 kilometres, was almost entirely lost over the course of two days, 27-28 May 1905. The victories on land required Japanese domination of the sea to maintain the gains made for fear that resupply would not be possible. Similarly, to save its position in Manchuria, Russia needed to inflict serious damage to the Japanese navy. With the near total victory of the Japanese Navy, the position on land seemed to stabilize around the major gains Japan had made, paving the way for peace.
[59] The 'independence' of Korea – meaning Japanese control, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria, the ceding of bases including Port Arthur in Manchuria, and half of Sakhalin.
[60] Something sought by Japan largely because of the dire economic situation it found itself in as a result of the war.

public and government for war proved to be a double-edged sword, enabling decisive action to be taken, but proving difficult to control.

Japan’s political institutions created two pathologies making war more likely. Firstly, Macri argues that the civilian political structure created incentives for leaders to emphasize risky policy in their competition for resources and power (Macri 2012, 28), with a result that foreign policy became more aggressive. There is little doubt that the war was a gamble, and whilst meticulous planning provided a successful blueprint for the war, the relative incompetence of the Russian Navy was something outside of their control. Had orders to the Pacific Fleet been received earlier, then the surprise attack on Port Arthur which began the war may have been less successful, as it is plausible that more units would have been at sea. Moreover, the evacuation of the Japanese population from Port Arthur on 6 February – a clear indication that military action might follow – appears to have been ignored or missed (Connaughton 1988, 11). Perhaps more surprising is that despite knowing of the huge difficulties the Baltic Fleet would face on its ponderous journey to East Asia, and knowing that Britain would obstruct the sailing as a result of its alliance with Japan, the fleet sailed anyway. Once more, these deficiencies were beyond the control of Japan. The almost total success at sea supported the far more costly advance on land, and had these naval battles proved less decisive, it is hard to see that Japan could have sustained the advance on land. This illustrates the second institutional component that made war more likely. Rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy encouraged a plan that would commit both of them to an aggressive course (Nish 1985, 246), to ensure that resources and prestige were accrued. For the Japanese government, this meant war was desired by both, and it could only be a total mobilization.

War is a dyadic phenomenon. The domestic politics of Russia also made it more likely, less because Russia's leaders and population clamoured for war (though they did not shy from it), but rather because governance relied on the Tsar's decision-making. Nicholas II saw his role as being to 'preserve the autocracy and to defend the dignity, honor, and worth of Russia' (Esthus 1981, 397), thereby, he would not accept a political settlement with Japan prior to war, nor after, which impinged upon these constructs. This proved a strength in the negotiations to end the war, since the threat to continue fighting appears to have led to Japan caving on its demands for an indemnity (Esthus 1981, 398–99), but before the war was undoubtedly a weakness. Nicholas's saw the Japanese as an unbalanced and dangerous people, partly as a result of being attacked when he visited Japan as heir to the throne in 1891 (Connaughton 1988, 3). However, Japan was also understood to be a social inferior and undeveloped, posing little threat. That the domestic political system focused on the Tsar meant these perceptions and views deeply coloured foreign policy, resulting in Russia frustrating Japanese diplomacy, and failing to recognize that Japan would resort to war if this was the only alternative to accepting a subaltern position.

Status

The primary argument for status as a cause of war is that a state seeks to gain in rank as a result of (successful) military action. For Japan, this meant to seek recognition of its position as a major power, by defeating Russia. The evidence for this argument is persuasive, particularly given that the Triple Intervention in 1895 was widely understood in Japan as having denied both the prestige and material benefits that the Treaty of Shimonoseki made clear (Steinberg 2008, 3). In this reading, the 1904-5 war against Russia, was fought by Japan to gain the recognition of others. In this regard it was successful. Post-war, and at the initiative of the British government, 'the two governments decided upon the reciprocal upgrading of their respective diplomatic missions in each other's capital from the rank of legations to that of embassies' (Otte 2007, 100). This was 'symbolic recognition of Japan's newly acquired status of a first-rate power' (Ibid.). More generally, 'Japan was perceived by most Western nations, Great Britain and the United States in particular, in a positive light' (Kowner 2000, 129), the result of a concerted effort to mobilize international support for its foreign policy. However, was war truly necessary to achieve this goal of recognition, rather, it seems that recognition was understood as a step toward ensuring it retained its material gains. That is, the lesson from 1895 was not that Japan should become a major power for its own sake, but instead that attaining such status would make an alliance of major powers against it less likely, since Japan would be perceived as both powerful, and justified, in the territorial claims it had made. At root, therefore, Japan sought not merely to 'join' the major powers, but rather, to defeat those major powers that might constrain it (Storry 1979, 17). In 1904, this clearly meant Russia.

Concerns about status are part of a causal mechanism linking prior events to the decision to make war, since they shape how behaviour is understood, and inform where motivations are presumed to lie. In addition to the Triple Intervention, two earlier additional events illustrate how this shaped foreign policymaking in Japan during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Firstly, the territorial dispute over Sakhalin, which Japan was forced to withdraw from in 1875 by Russia was 'an unacceptable loss of face' (Connaughton 1988, 2) for Japan. This contributed to the conclusion that only military power could ensure freedom of action for Japan. Secondly, in 1891, when the Russian heir to the throne, Nicholas[61], visited Japan, he was accompanied by six warships. One of these was named *Koreyetz* (Korea) and another

[61] When he was also attacked, see above.

the *Majour* (Manchuria), a choice that Connaughton calls 'an act of incredible insensitivity' (1988, 3). These events shaped perceptions in Japan, leading to the conclusion that '*might* was acceptable, either in the political or military sense, as a substitute for *right'* (White 1969, 361).

Conclusion

The Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars took place just six years apart in a region of deep interest to the major powers. The end of the long nineteenth century saw East Asia emerge as the 'main arena of international interest' (Otte 2007, 91–92). The comparison of these two disputes, therefore, takes place within a shared context, whereby the interests of the major powers were high, system polarity comparable, and norms of subordinate governance constant. Moreover, the two cases differ substantial in both the dependent and independent variables, allowing focus upon the theory and causal mechanisms. Whereas the Russo-Japanese War was a major power violent dispute, the Spanish-American War was not. In the former case, Japan had well established interests in Korea, and to a lesser extent Manchuria, and certainly had a closed relationship with Korea. Moreover, Japan undoubtedly sought to monopolize Korea from the outset of the war. Though debate remains over Japan's war aims with regard Manchuria, this was a war in which Japan deployed its full force, which suggests that control of the territory was not designed to be temporary. Finally, Russia and Japan had repeatedly clashed in the region in the decade following 1894. By contrast, the United States had little interest in the Philippines prior to the war, and though monopolization was arrived at, this does not appear to have been a war aim. In prior disputes, meanwhile, the United States had advocated strongly for open subordinate governance. The evidence assembled suggests support for the theory: that closure and monopolization increase the probability of major power violent dispute.

The evidence also points to a number of additional findings. Firstly, that reputations are malleable and not rooted only in perception of events, but also how an actor seeks to explain their actions. The United States had established a reputation for favouring open subordinate governance, and therefore, the other major powers did not suspect that the Philippines would be annexed, and moreover, believed that their interests in the archipelago would be respected. In contrast to this, Japan, which clearly had previously sought to monopolize Korea and Manchuria as the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki laid out, carefully argued for the 'Open Door' in Manchuria in the lead up to the Russo-Japanese War. The other major powers, notably Britain and the United States, appear to have offered support to Japan partly on this basis, though their concerns that Russia has established control of Manchuria and could threatened China more generally were undoubtedly part of their calculations. Regardless of what Japan's leaders said, the prior record suggested that monopolization was a likely goal. Ultimately, demands for the rights of other major powers to be respected in Manchuria were dropped from the Treaty of Portsmouth since Japan no longer needed the general support of the major powers to achieve its aims (White 1969, 362).

Secondly, that alternative explanations, relying on the balance of power and alliances, domestic institutions and decision-making processes, or status and prestige, add support to the theory of subordinate monopolization, but offer only a partial picture alone. Certainly, unbalanced multipolarity, alliances between major powers, and the large number of rising powers in the time period made a collective response to subordinate monopolization very difficult. It meant for those major powers keen to reassert norms of open subordinate governance that they had to pick and choose when to oppose monopolization. In both cases explored in this chapter, British policymakers concluded that improved relations with the

United States, and alliance with Japan, trumped concerns about their domination of the Philippines and of Manchuria respectively. That the United States reassured Britain that their interests would be respected, and Japan built its case for war against Russia around the need to enforce the Open Door, no doubt reassured. However, in neither the Russo-Japanese, nor the Spanish-American, war do power political explanations offer sufficient insight alone. Primarily this is because such explanations ignore the value of subordinates to major powers, that is, these wars were fought over subordinates, and entirely miss the relationship between security threats and the determination to monopolize subordinates. On this latter point, the Japanese choice to monopolize subordinates rests on the threat posed by other major powers, particularly Russia. That monopolization would bring war meant a war fought on their own terms, and with the benefit of securing a significant zone where their economic and security interests could be pursued, insulating Japan from future anticipated threats.

Domestic politics play a crucial role in international relations, since it is here that policymakers are located. This means considering institutional structures, the roles of veto players, the position of the public with regards the anticipated costs of war, as well as the private interests and ideas of policymakers. For the two cases examined in this chapter this adds additional richness to understanding why the wars occurred in the form that they did, particularly, why the United States was not opposed by other major powers, and why Japan resorted to monopolization and war in its disputes with Russia. However, it is very clear that in both the United States and Japan external factors were critical. For the United States, the decision to annex the Philippines was arrived at since they feared the islands would be occupied by another major power – likely Germany – should they not do so. Moreover, the imperial lobby proved important, arguing not only for an expanded navy, but also overseas bases to serve this fleet, and for interests to pursue with them. Perhaps somewhat hypocritically, therefore, annexation of the Philippines gave the United States a greater stake in Asia, allowing it to more assertively press for the Open Door in China. For Japan, the shock of the Triple Intervention led to fears that not only would the country's rise be blocked, but also that a direct threat to Japan might be posed. The response was monopolization and war, a decision taken with very widespread support. Perhaps curiously, Russia ignored, or was ignorant of, the strong support for war amongst the public, which should have suggested that those who bear the costs of war were unlikely to be an impediment to the decision to make war, thereby making Japanese threats credible.

Status seeking behaviour can be observed in two ways in these cases. Firstly, through mimicry of behaviours and practices, and secondly, through the use of war as a means of improving social standing. To be compelling, these features must be able to explain why the United States avoided a major power adversary in 1898, but Japan determined to attack one in 1904. Arguably, the behaviours mimicked were different, at least as far as subordinate governance goes. For the United States, the embrace of openness meant that its interests clashed less regularly with other major powers than an embrace of monopolization, and moreover, openness aligned with Britain. By contrast, Japan paid lip service to openness, but actually sought an exclusive empire in East Asia, which would inevitably challenge the interests of other major powers. By pursuing openness, the rise of the United States was little opposed by Britain, and notably, Japan slowly built support for its war against Russia by arguing for the Open Door in China, gaining the respect of Britain and the United States. The practices and behaviours which appear particularly relevant, therefore, and those surrounding norms of subordinate governance, and thereby, status may be increased by mimicking the 'right' behaviours.

Chapter IV: Bipolarity and the Middle East during the Early Cold War

The defeat of most of the major powers left just three states by 1945[1] that could claim to be major powers: the Soviet Union, United States, and Britain. Economic and military decline of Britain only increased after 1945 relative to the other two as the United States and Soviet Union experienced significant economic growth and could afford to maintain far larger military forces. Moreover, the nuclear revolution and dissolution of the British Empire further emphasized that the gap which had developed over the course of the war had become a chasm. For the United States and Soviet Union, these multiple developments brought new interests, opportunities and responsibilities. The collapse of empires, major power decline, and proliferation of new states, saw the international system rapidly transformed. Though Europe remained the focus of Soviet and American strategic considerations, the Middle East, a region in which both had limited prior interests[2], became significant to their competition.

[1] In addition to the Axis powers, the liberation of France could not immediately expunge defeat and occupation in 1940. China remained embroiled in civil war, and would only emerge as a major power in 1949 at the earliest.
[2] With a land border with states in the region, as well as earlier Russian imperial attempts to expand southwards toward Turkey, the Caucasus, Iran and Afghanistan, these interests had a deeper history and clearer aim. However, Soviet and Russian interests in the region were inferior to those of Britain and France in the interwar period, as well as for most of the nineteenth century, with the exception of the larger issue of the

This chapter examines two disputes in the region. The first involved two rising powers, the United States and Soviet Union, and took place over 1956-58 and focused on Syria. The dispute resulted in a major power violent dispute, that is, military forces were engaged and major powers opposed each other. The United States sought to prevent Soviet expansion in the region, and thereby had supported the Middle Eastern states, along with Britain, to create a formal, closed, and specialized international organization aimed at preventing this. In this way, the United States sought to monopolize subordinates in the region. Soviet goals in the region were to prevent hostile powers – the United States and Britain – from being able to threaten the Soviet Union, whose territory bordered Turkey and Iran. By 1956, the Soviet Union had developed important ties with Syria and Egypt, primarily based around the specialized supply of arms and development aid, and though closed to the interests of others, was not able to create a formal relationship. Soviet goals, therefore, were less grand than those of either the United States or Britain, which sought to monopolize the region, and focused on a combination of denying the region to the western powers and monopolizing one or two states: Syria and Egypt. This dispute, therefore, allows comparison on three axes, firstly, by examining the components of closure and monopolization, that is, formal alliances, favoured by the United States and Britain, and military aid, favoured by the Soviet Union. Secondly, it allows comparison of alternative conceptualizations of subordinates, particularly that the western powers understood the Middle East as a region of barely-legitimate states, whereas the Soviet Union focused on bilateral state-to-state ties. Thirdly,

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Eastern Question, that is, attempts by the major powers to cope with the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the potential for competition and instability this opened up. The development of the regions oil industry and the central role this came to play in the global economy (Painter 2010; Yergin 2008), as well as the location of three strategic waterways – the Turkish Straits, Suez Canal, and Strait of Hormuz – which give significant control over global trade, ensured that the region would be of great interest to the superpowers.

that both of the rising powers in this dispute were reacting to the decline of a third state, Britain.

The second dispute involves a single rising power, the Soviet Union. During the 1967 Six-Day War, in which an Israeli surprise attack led to significant material and territorial losses for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the Soviet Union issued deterrent threats against Israel to halt their advance. Several notable elements differentiate this dispute from that in Syria, 1956-58. Firstly, a major power violent dispute did not occur, since though the Soviet Union was opposed by the United States, no violence occurred[3]. Soviet involvement was restricted to threats of intervention and the deployment of naval vessels, whilst American participation led to naval manoeuvres, surveillance[4], and coercive diplomacy. Secondly, despite the Soviet Union having closed ties with Syria and seeking to maintain this monopolistic stance during the dispute, a major power violent dispute was avoided, challenging the theory of subordinate monopolization. However, such a dispute was only narrowly avoided since had the Soviet Union acted upon its threat to intervene, this surely would have resulted in American participation[5]. Thus, this case, despite challenging the general predictions of the

[3] The Correlates of War treats the Soviet threats of intervention, the subject of this case study, as a dispute distinct from the Six-Day War itself. However, this context is clearly relevant, and is referenced throughout.

[4] During the dispute, the United States reconnaissance vessel, *USS Liberty*, was monitoring Egyptian and Israeli forces when it came under attack by Israeli jets and fast attack boats leading to it being crippled and the loss of 34 lives. Though Israel maintained that this was a case of mistaken identity with the ship being identified as an Egyptian destroyer, this explanation remains contested. Taylor argues that the *USS Liberty* had intercepted Israeli signals which suggested they sought to engage Syrian and Jordan forces, contrary to what they had told the United States, by falsely claiming that Egypt was winning in the Sinai. In this explanation, the attack on the *USS Liberty* was an attempt to prevent the United States finding out about the trap it had set (Taylor 1991, 76–77).

[5] Though not necessarily meaning that forces from the Soviet Union and United States would engage each other. Both were aware that such an occurrence could rapidly lead to an all-out conventional war, which may lead to a nuclear exchange. During the Korean War both sides were cautious about engaging jets from the other side, and did little to publicise the occasions when this occurred for fear this might escalate the war. More generally, it is possible for major powers to be actively involved in conflicts on opposing sides whilst preventing – or at least minimising – their direct engagement. The ongoing Syrian civil war has involved troops from the United States and Russia, and in the Battle of Khasham, 2018, the rumour of significant casualties

theory, also provides significant support since this case suggests that major powers recognize that involvement of opposing major powers in conflicts over subordinates can lead to major power war, and are able to take steps to avoid it. Thirdly, this dispute builds on earlier ones, and is part of a pattern of Soviet attempts to exclusively control subordinates in the region and to force the withdrawal of other major powers. In this way, the earlier 1956-58 crisis helped to shape perceptions in 1967. Fourthly, the war demonstrates the potential for major powers to be drawn into wars with each other due to their relationships with subordinates. This nuances the assumption relied upon in this dissertation that subordinates lack agency due to the overwhelming material advantages enjoyed by major powers which drag subordinates into conflicts where they typically have little to gain but much to lose. Instead, there are conditions where this is reversed, which this case sheds some light on: subordinates that are states retain greater agency than those that are not, and global major power struggles stretch the attention of policymakers. Finally, the context of a bipolar system structure and nuclear weapons cannot be overlooked since these elements simultaneously create zero-sum competition and threaten total defeat.

The rest of this chapter proceeds to examine how norms of subordinate governance evolved in the Cold War era. Four issues are specifically explored: decolonization and the spread of the state system, the end of multipolarity, the role of ideology, and the rapid spread of universal formal intergovernmental organizations. In addition, the role of nuclear weapons are considered, given this presents an existential risk, particularly in dyads of states with second strike capabilities. The chapter then moves to discuss the observable implications of

imposed on the latter by the former, something that both sides have downplayed (France-Presse 2018; Reuters 2018; BBC News 2018).

the theory of subordinate monopolization. Empirical evidence is then examined directly. Firstly, the 1956-58 Syria Crisis is discussed. This involves describing the dispute, detailing evidence for subordinate monopolization, the role of iteration, and examining alternative explanations. Secondly, Soviet threats during the 1967 Six-Day War are examined utilizing the same framework. Finally, the conclusion to this chapter summarizes the findings.

Norms of subordinate governance in the Cold War

Four features of the Cold War altered the context for subordinate governance: the spread of the state system, the end of multipolarity, the roles of ideology, and the creation of universal formal intergovernmental organizations. This suggests systemic revolution, an overturning of prior practice, and a normative evolution in international society. Yet, change was at best partial, and at worst a thin, often hypocritical, veneer. Competition between major powers remained, and due to bipolarity, intensified. For the Soviet Union and United States, competition quickly became zero-sum. Moreover, their material power made competition increasingly global, spreading from Europe and Eastern Asia in the 1940s, to Western and Southern Asia by the mid-1950s, and by the mid-1960s essentially incorporating all regions[6].

The spread of the state system

The strength of national independence movements, the moral arguments for decolonization, and the material weakness of most colonial powers[7], made the end of colonial control a reality in most places by 1970. Violence was, ultimately, a common feature, either due to

[6] Waltz argues that bipolarity meant there are no peripheral regions (1979, 125).
[7] With the clear exception of the United States and the partial exceptions of France and Britain in a minority of colonies.

the determination of the colonial power to remain, as seen in Algeria, Goa, and Kenya, or because the expectation of independence led to the political activation of dormant intrastate and interstate social cleavages[8], for example in Palestine, India/Pakistan, and Malaya. The crucial governance decision concerned the institutional form of these new polities. In short, from the perspective of international society, the colonized, and the colonizer, what was the alternative to colonial control. In nearly all cases, the answer was statehood[9]. Anything short of this was understood to be unacceptable or unviable, with only a few comparatively small and often isolated territories taking a different path[10]. Moreover, independence almost invariably meant the continuation of existing political and bureaucratic institutions, including administrative boundaries, meaning that the bases of these new states were the borders of empire and structures of the colonizer (Atzili 2012)[11].

This essentially marked the end of what had been the dominant form of political organization on the planet for centuries: empire. It made real the idea that the international system, and

[8] In many cases, such cleavages had been at the very least exacerbated by imperial rule, if not created. Regardless of the cause, independence meant that these cleavages became viable political bases for entrepreneurs to draw upon.
[9] Two alternatives are worth noting here. Firstly, that Portugal, and to a lesser extent France, insisted that certain territories were part of the metropole itself. France claimed Algeria as being an integral part of France, whilst Portugal claimed the same for Angola, Mozambique, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Portugal’s Indian enclaves (Goa, Dadra and Nagar Haveli). Following the Carnation Revolution, 1975, Portugal withdrew from all remaining colonial territories, save Macau, which was transferred to China in 1999 mirroring the ‘one country, two systems’ policy implemented in Hong Kong in 1997.
[10] For instance, New Caledonia or Gibraltar. Perhaps the most unusual case is Malta, which was offered full integration with Britain, to be confirmed through referendum. The referendum subsequently held in 1956 returned overwhelming support for the proposal, with 77% voting in favour, but low turnout (just 59.1%), meant the proposals were not implemented. A second referendum, in 1964, led to the independence of Malta, with 54.5% voting in favour of independence, with turnout at 79.7%.
[11] Again, it is unclear that alternatives truly existed. Wholesale dismantling of institutions, and the loss of the experienced individuals within them, and the creation of new ones is at best time consuming and expensive, and at worst means state collapse. If borders were not clearly established, then conflict seemed probable in many regions. Moreover, the need to establish legitimacy quickly for the new states meant providing public goods and stability, in essence necessitating reliance on prior arbitrary boundaries and inherited institutions. The major institutional change that was commonly implemented in the short-term was land reform, often triggering economic crises, even if this satisfied political aims and calls for justice.

society, was composed of alike units: states. This altered the acceptability of behaviours and practices between the strong and the weak since statehood means de jure sovereignty. The units had the same rights, duties, and obligations, with a theoretically sharp distinction between internal and external affairs[12]. The political elites of colonies have always been agents, that is, able to choose from amongst options[13]. What statehood changed was how those options were limited. As these pre-state polities were diverse[14], there was no common framework governing interactions between the colonizer and colonized, with the result that bargaining was idiosyncratic and bilateral. Whilst this meant governance could be adapted to local circumstance, it also meant that precedent had only limited wider applicability. Imperial powers saw that they could exploit this, and did so. By contrast, statehood provided a common framework for interactions, and allowed collective bargaining[15]. Secondly, and derived from this common framework, it gave greater legitimacy to the resistance of the weak, since interference in their domestic affairs was explicitly prohibited. Of course, interference would continue, but international society began to contest more vigorously the nature and legitimacy of such interventions[16]. The outcome of this is to rule out formal empire as a political structure between the strong and weak, an increase in the costs of interfering in the affairs of these actors, and to incentivise alternative modes of hierarchy construction: through aid, military alliance, and ideology promotion.

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[12] This has never been the reality, as both Krasner (1999) and Jackson (1990) have argued.
[13] This means often, though not quite always, colonialism involved the cooperation and collaboration of local agents.
[14] For a historical perspective on empire, and the diversity it encompassed, see Darwin (2009; 2007; 2012). For how encounters between colonizer and the colonized impacted state formation and decolonization, see Chong (2012) who examines the divergent paths of China, Indonesia and Thailand.
[15] Which is, of course, what the Bandung Conference and Non-Aligned Movements explicitly endorsed in their interactions with the United States and Soviet Union, however imperfectly.
[16] Khalidi argues that the states of the Middle East were not previously considered to be part of the states-system, and nor were they considered legitimate (2009). The post-1945 change relabelled a European order an international one, but despite the change the Middle East remained ‘almost continuously a major arena where the ambitions and rivalries of the great powers played out’ (Khalidi 2009, 72).

The end of multipolarity

In 1939 there were seven major powers, by the end of 1945 there were just three, and one of those, Britain, was significantly weaker than the other two, and continued to decline relative to the United States and Soviet Union. By 1950, and arguably as early as 1947[17], the international system was bipolar, with the superpowers far surpassing in military capabilities and economic capacity any third state. Though Britain remained a major power, and France, West Germany and Japan all plausibly could claim this status by the 1960s, and the end of the Chinese Civil War led to the gradual emergence of a new major power, the gap between any of them and either of the superpowers meant that though they were politically important, potentially even regionally decisive, they were not peer competitors of the Soviet Union and United States. From the perspective of world history, superpowers and bipolarity had few precedents, though two are worth considering. Firstly, the British and French global competition, and series of wars, between 1689 and 1815 in what Seeley (1883) called the 'Second Hundred Years' War'. Secondly, the competition between protestant England and catholic Spain during the mid-1500s (Westad 2017, 3). However, in both cases, a core component of the competition between two sides was not merely for allies and influence, but rather, for major power allies. This difference is important, since these alliances were frequently short-term, involved defection, and allowed an aggressive or ambitious rival to be checked by a coalition (Kedourie 1969, 195).

By contrast, the alliances formed between the United States and the severely diminished major powers in Europe and Asia were robust, with little idea of defection[18]. For the Soviet

[17] When Britain withdrew from supporting Greece and Turkey.
[18] The closest seen was France under de Gaulle. France withdrew from integrated NATO military command in February 1966, having previously forced many foreign military units to leave it territory, and having

Union, its 1950 alliance with China would officially last until 1979, but in reality had crumbled by the late 1950s, due to the Sino-Soviet split. Though relations markedly improved between China and the United States in the early 1970s, they were not allies, rather, both saw the Soviet Union as their primary rival. The distance and hostility which developed between the Soviet Union and China suggests a similar dimension to that which characterized Franco-British and Anglo-Spanish strategic competition in prior centuries. However, it was clearly less dynamic – only one major power significantly altered its relations with the Soviet Union or United States during the Cold War – and had fewer consequences for the relative balance of power since the gap to any third state remained so large.

According to neorealism (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979; Walt 1987), bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity[19] exactly because of the absence of shifting major power alliances. Yet, this simultaneously means that rivalry is with a single adversary, making competition more intense, since the waxing and waning of relative power, and of influence over others, is by definition zero-sum (Heller 1992, 29). In short, the absence of further peer competitors means that attention is fixed, and can only be fixed, on the other[20]. The consequence, from the perspective of subordinate governance is twofold. Firstly, to see the influence of the other in zero-sum terms, and secondly, to directly relate this to the balance of power. The

withdrawn French units from NATO command structures. Despite this, France remained in NATO and quietly negotiated with NATO to agree how its forces would slot back in if war were to break out.

[19] Notably, other realists, including Copeland (1996) and Midlarsky and Hopf (1993), argue that bipolarity is often far from stable.

[20] For example, in 2022, the system looks increasingly bipolar, given the huge relative gains China has made relative to the United States and any third state. A significant subset of commentary on the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has examined the consequences for Sino-American relations, particularly the prospects for Chinese military support for Russia (Shepherd 2022; *The Economist* 2022; Tang 2022), abandonment of Russia (Power 2022; B. Scott 2022),and what war in Europe means for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan (Lopez 2022; Kuo, Chiang, and Wu 2022).

form of hierarchies subsequently constructed leave limited room for the interests of the other, meaning monopolization is common. Though communication between the two should be clearer, in that relations with any third are largely irrelevant, it also makes signalling harder, since the zero-sum nature of competition makes a costly signal a potential gain for the adversary. A withdrawal from a military alliance or of economic support for a subordinate may instead be understood as weakness, and crucially, could lead to alternative ties forming between the subordinate and the other major power. The fear that such actions signal, or that the vacuum created would be filled by the adversary, makes it risky to do so.

Ideology

Ideology differentiates the Cold War from prior practice in three ways, firstly, because the United States and Soviet Union understood their rivals' ideologies to pose a direct threat to their domestic order, secondly, because both the United States and Soviet Union were anti-imperialist[21], and thirdly, because the international solidarity of nationalism in recently decolonized states formalized by the Bandung Conference shaped competition for subordinates. The first of these ideological factors suggested that external threats were also internal. Fear of revolution in the United States, and of counter-revolution in the Soviet Union, were real, albeit largely exaggerated, often with domestic political purposes in mind. By the end of World War Two, however, these threats were far less potent[22], and though the

[21] Of course, the United States having colonies, most notably the Philippines, and westward expansion during the nineteenth century mirrored – and in some ways exceeded – the violence perpetrated by European imperialism in Africa and Asia, since Native Americans were eradicated in the east and forced to marginal lands in the west. For the Soviet Union, the prior imperial – and colonial – expansion of Russia eastwards and southwards was carried out by a different regime. Yet, by the early Cold War, the Soviet Union essentially occupied the same geographic space as the Russian Empire had pre-World War One, and minority groups were systematically targeted by the state as they were deemed potential fifth columnists.
[22] This did not stop hysterical hunts for fifth columnists and sympathisers in both states.

domestic framing of communism and capitalism remained one which emphasized internal threat, the regimes in both were essentially secure.

The domestic role of ideology was also crucial in allies and subordinates. The threat of communist parties coming to power in Western Europe was plausible, as were counter-revolutions in Eastern Europe. In both cases, the United States and Soviet Union took aggressive steps to inhibit these possibilities. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency funnelled money to centrist Italian political parties to compete with the communists (themselves funded by the Soviet Union). This interference continued from the 1948 general election until at least 1972 (Weiner 2006). The CIA programme, Operation Gladio, which created covert military cells in Italy to be activated should the country be invaded by the Warsaw Pact, is also widely accused of harassing left-wing political parties in collaboration with the Mafia, and are also suspected of involvement in terror attacks (Del Pero 2000; Ganser 2006). The Soviet Union, meanwhile, essentially appointed the leaders of countries in Eastern Europe, and removed communists who had not been selected by Moscow (Applebaum 2012). Of course, its efforts to maintain ideological discipline and alignment are best remembered for the suppression of protest in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968) with the latter forming the template for the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Outside Europe, anti-imperialism and nationalism were more important ideological constructs than those of capitalism versus communism. For American policymakers, the United States had a special mission based on 'international cooperation, self-government by the people, anti-colonialism and freer trade between nations' (Lundestad 2018, 15). Between 1945 and 1950 the purpose of American aid 'was to reform the states and societies of the countries that received it' (Westad 2005, 31) with scant attention paid to the wider ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union. In this period, colonialism was identified as a greater problem than revolutionary movements in the developing world. The Dutch were pressured into withdrawing from Indonesia, whilst the United States withdrew from the Philippines (though they did secure economic access and military bases). The 1949 victory of the communists in China marked the end of this comparatively benign approach, though the seeds of a change were already planted, since the United States had largely accepted Britain's fight against the Malayan Communist Party that began in 1948. Instead, domino theory meant communism was to be actively opposed, and aid used far more strategically as a means to this end. The result was radical. Now, European colonial powers could be supported, as long as the national liberation movements opposed were left-wing. Intervention in the Third World increasingly focused on a single objective, to prevent Soviet gains, and this meant keeping left-wing parties out of power. By 1953, and the American (and British) sponsored coup in Iran to depose Prime Minister Mossadeq, it was clear that earlier anti-imperial and developmental goals had been wholesale replaced with competition for influence with the Soviet Union. Yet, this did not make states in the Third World mere passengers in the Cold War, rather, the growth of the Non-Aligned Movement vocalized and gave an intellectual foundation for countries seeking not only to avoid taking sides in the Cold War, but actually to prosper during it.

The Soviet Union was avowedly anti-imperial but its support for national liberation movements, even those with communist leaders or sympathies, was very limited until after Stalin's death. This was true even of major battlegrounds in the early Cold War, most notably, China. For Stalin, Marxist-Leninist ideology was deterministic and absolute, meaning that in a country of subsistence farmers, revolution simply was not plausible. Rather, a bourgeoisie revolution was first expected, with a proletarian one coming later. Of course, the fact that in 1917 Russia was dominated by rural agricultural workers, rather than the urban industrial base this same ideology claimed was essential for success, was glossed over. The upshot of this was to view Europe, and to a lesser extent Japan, as the essential ideological – and strategic – battlegrounds. After Stalin's death, Soviet foreign policy became far more supportive of such movements.

New relationships were sought not only with China, which was identified as the most important state in the Third World by Khrushchev, but also with 'radical bourgeois regimes' (Westad 2005, 67), including Sukarno's Indonesia, Nehru's India, and Nasser's Egypt (Haykal 1978). Two conclusions can be reached, firstly, that by the 1960s Soviet ideology had reached a stage where the competition for influence in the Third World was an 'essential part of the existence of socialism' (Westad 2005, 72). Secondly, that many of these efforts were only partially successful, and in the case of China, were a failure since the Sino-Soviet Split opened from the late 1950s.

For both the Soviet Union and United States the Third World rapidly became a location for competition. But, superpower competition impacted the states which comprised it unevenly. This unevenness was not for lack of trying. Both invested significant material, diplomatic and ideological resources in attempts to firmly entrench Cold War division, but outcomes refracted due to local contexts, most notably, the strength, stability and ideological disposition of state leadership. Two general trends deserve attention, firstly, the emphasis upon nationalism and independence, and secondly, the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nationalism grew as a critical mechanism via which support could be aggregated and organized to oppose colonial control. It was also, of course, directed inwards, to define the nation which would comprise new states. From the perspective of these national liberation movements, and newly independent states, the critical goals were to take political power and ensure stability, whilst also delivering social progress (though what this looked like differed greatly from a focus upon education, health and development, through to conservative statements of theocratic control). The superpowers could be used as part of this, to provide material assistance for economic projects, or to enhance security through military equipment. Of course, communist governments did emerge in the Third World, as did democratic capitalist ones, but in the main the crucial features were instrumentalism and agency. Relations with the superpowers could be traded for benefits, and the results used to pursue domestic goals.

The second feature is internationalism in the shape of the Non-Aligned Movement, which emerged formally in 1961, but owed its creation to the earlier Bandung Conference, 1955. The purpose of the organization was collective non-alignment, that is, by grouping together, the members aimed to resist coercion by the United States, Soviet Union, or their respective allies. Initially, this took the form of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, but morphed to instead be primarily aimed at the superpowers, rather than the European colonial powers. There is no doubt that this was new, that is, a collective interstate ideology and organization of the weak had no clear predecessor. This generated frustration in both Washington and Moscow since the zero-sum nature of their competition led them to believe non-alignment really meant alignment with the other. Examined today, more than 30 years after the Cold War ended, it is clear that many of the NAM members did align more closely with one or the other, often quite decisively. However, many also switched between patrons over the Cold War, for instance Egypt and China. Taken together, this suggests another important difference from earlier periods, in addition to the mere existence and statement of NAM, that of greater agency on the part of the weak.

Though the agency of Nasser's Egypt (Citino 2019, 442; Gerges 1994), or Castro's Cuba, a clear ally and theoretical subordinate of the Soviet Union, is striking, it is only so if a lack of agency is assumed. When the collaboration of domestic elites with colonial powers is compared with Cold War side-switching it is less obvious that the latter is marked by greater agency than the former (Dillon Savage 2020; McCormack 2018; MacDonald 2014). The major difference is the form taken, with earlier agency of the weak taking place outside of an interstate context. The recognition of sovereignty, and the near universality of the state system, is an important contextual difference between the Cold War and earlier periods, as noted above, but this does not mean that agency is clearly of a different strength. Institutional and normative change matters, but not because it means an inevitable change in power relations. Rather, it means different pathways for the influence of the strong to impact the weak.

Universal formal intergovernmental organizations

Whilst the League of Nations had been universal, in that all states could join, the qualitative difference between it and the United Nations, and the many subsidiary organizations which its umbrella covers, are very large. In essence, though the interwar period saw the genesis of ideas on universal international organization, it was the post-World War Two era which saw them widely implemented (Mazower 2009; 2012). However, the impact of these organizations upon subordinate governance during the Cold War was surprisingly modest[23]. Two aspects require attention, firstly, how formality and universality differentiate the Cold

[23] Khalidi goes further, to claim that in the context of the Middle East, these institutions 'rather than restraining the dominant power or powers from expanding their dominion…have often facilitated this dominion' (Khalidi 2009, 73).

War from earlier periods, and secondly, that these organizations provided clear material incentives for all members. Taken together, the main qualitative change from the perspective of subordinate governance is by providing an alternative pathway, particularly for economic domination, often assumed to be more legitimate than any bilateral one would be. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank conditional loans, for instance, have the backing of multiple states, and in theory, of all members. Though these approaches to development are often seen as too rigid, hypocritical, or neo-imperial, they look less like this than the plausible alternative: bilateral loans and aid[24]. During the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union invested heavily in these bilateral tools (McCormack 2018, 162–66), despite the existence of the IMF, largely because they allowed greater discretion on the part of the superpowers, and allowed secrecy.

The formality and universality of these organizations differentiates them from earlier periods. The League of Nations had a membership heavily concentrated in Europe and the Americas, since much of Africa and Asia were controlled by colonial empires[25]. The Congress System was informal, and clearly exclusive, since smaller European and all non-European[26] states were excluded. These differences have little impact on rising power subordinate governance since universal membership means that all major and rising powers

[24] Consider the contemporary qualitative difference between loans from the multilateral Bretton Woods institutions and loans from China under the Belt and Road Initiative. Most notably, the terms of loans from the latter are rarely made public, and appear to be oriented toward Chinese strategic and economic interests rather than development of the loan recipient (Eisenman and Heginbotham 2017).
[25] Over its lifespan, the League had 63 members, and peaked at 58 between September 1934 and February 1935. Breaking the 63 down by region gives: Europe (28), Americas (21), Asia (8), Africa (4), and Oceania (2).
[26] Though a 'club' of major powers, it was in essence a regional organization, since the maintenance of peace in Europe, and the management of the foreign affairs of smaller states, was its essential reason for existence.

are themselves members, making it difficult – though not impossible[27] – to repurpose the organization for private aims. The more crucial element is that the UN system offers material benefits to members. UN membership is understood as a crucial means of legitimating claims to statehood, and thereby, to gain the protection of the system. Meanwhile, the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization (or during the Cold War, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) all emphasize the importance of free-trade, meaning that members can prosper through comparative advantage. However, Keohane (1984) saw this as a crucial means of entrenching American interests in the system, by essentially morphing the interests of others, with the result that exiting the UN system means foregoing a raft of security and economic benefits[28]. All polities with the aspiration of statehood, therefore, are incentivized to join, and this means some endorsement of American – more generally Western – preferences for economic and political openness. This does suggest, that at least for the United States, that subordinate governance could utilize the UN system, but the comparison with bilateral means, and the necessity of accommodating the political interests of powerful rival states, makes the pathway far less attractive, in the short-term at least, for the purpose of subordinate governance.

The four changes from prior periods highlighted have two major implications for hierarchy construction during the Cold War. These are the zero-sum nature of competition, and the partial closure of certain pathways. To this first point, despite the NAM, the Soviet Union

[27] For instance, Vreeland and Dreher (2014) show how the P5, and particularly the United States, can influence the voting patterns of non-permanent members of the UN Security Council by offering economic benefits through the IMF (where the United States has an effective veto) or bilaterally.

[28] For example, in the contemporary world, in which the importance of these formal intergovernmental organizations has continued to grow, Nye has suggested that whilst China's growing economic power will create problems for the United States, that China benefits greatly from the status quo order, meaning that exit and revisionism are not currently likely options (2020).

and United States rapidly understood a gain for the other as a loss to themselves. This logic was well understood in Europe even prior to the end of World War Two, and was applied globally by at least 1950 for the United States and 1953 for the Soviet Union. Competition for influence was not, therefore, confined to just highly-developed, resource rich, or populous regions and states, though these criteria still shaped the intensity of competition. Secondly, decolonization, the spread of the state system[29], and anti-imperialism in both Moscow and Washington, meant occupation, annexation and formal subjugation was less acceptable. Yet, comparable pathways remained, and proliferated. For example, Soviet influence over the foreign – and domestic – policies of many communist states was made possible through the Cominform[30], whilst the alliance blocs allowed clear shaping of defence policy and coordination of strategy (Cooley 2005; Triska 1986). Most notably, of course, both the United States and Soviet Union regularly intervened in the domestic affairs of others states, using military intervention to depose disagreeable leaders, for example, in the 1956 invasion of Hungary, as well as clandestine means, for example the 1961 CIA-backed murder of Patrice Lumumba. Though lacking the legal 'right' to such intervention, unlike in imperial relations, this mode of subordinate governance is similar.

Major power nuclear weapons and subordinate governance

The consequences of nuclear armament for major power conflict differ somewhat between the two cases examined in this chapter, largely because by 1967 the risk of a dispute rapidly escalating to a strategic nuclear exchange had become clearer to policymakers in both the

[29] Including the recognition of statehood, and its inviolability, declared through the UN.
[30] This was dissolved in 1956.

Soviet Union and United States due to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis[31]. Moreover, doctrinal differences in the two superpowers led to different understandings of how nuclear weapons could be used, and the risks that a limited use would escalate to a full strategic exchange. In the early 1950s, policymakers in both superpowers considered, and articulated, nuclear threats, under the general assumption that these threats would be understood by an adversary as being limited to a specific subject. Whilst in the United States mutually assured destruction (MAD) rapidly came to dominate understandings of nuclear weapons, with the idea that second strike capabilities would be used to inflict devastation upon countervalue targets, deterring first use of either countervalue or counter-force weapons (Snow 1979, 449–50), this was not true of the Soviet Union even post 1961. Rather, contemporary Soviet doctrine saw MAD as inherently unstable since new technologies could render it ineffective. Instead, the Soviet Union maintained that ‘deterrence rests upon the ability of the Soviet Union to win a nuclear war should it occur’ (Snow 1979, 457). Whilst a first-strike was not advocated for, that the Soviet Union sought to achieve strategic superiority raised the possibility that given the ‘confidence in war-winning’ that they might be ‘tempted to initiate attack’ (Snow 1979, 457). Though the Cuban Missile Crisis clearly gave pause for thought in both superpowers, the impact in the Soviet Union was recognition of their nuclear inferiority, and given the doctrine of winning a nuclear war, a massive increase in nuclear procurement.

[31] In fact, in Khrushchev’s 1960 speech in the UN General Assembly, he warned of such dangers, arguing: ‘It is hardly necessary to point out that the great Powers may be drawn into the orbit of any such [colonial] conflict and then, inevitably, a war which has begun by being local would develop into a general war, a world war’ (Khrushchev 1972, 296).

The emergence of nuclear weapons may impact subordinate governance in three ways. Firstly, by raising the possibility that the status quo is frozen, preventing subordinates from being monopolized. Secondly, by drastically increasing the coercive tools that nuclear armed major powers could wield over their subordinates, thereby making it easier to ensure compliance. Alternatively, by virtue of protection under a nuclear umbrella, subordinates may be emboldened in their interactions with other actors. Thirdly, by deepening the difference between major powers and subordinates, with the potential for major powers acting collectively to prevent nuclear acquisition by subordinates, thereby preventing subordinates from closing themselves to major power interests. In the rest of this section, the collision of divergent superpower nuclear doctrine, and what this meant for subordinate governance, is considered.

Assuming a scenario in which two major powers are not only nuclear armed, but also have credible second strike capabilities, then this is a dyad constrained by MAD. This is essentially the context for the early Cold War, at least from the mid-1950s once Soviet production of nuclear weapons had increased[32]. If MAD was truly constraining, and credible threats could be issued, then this would paralyse efforts to monopolize subordinates in a bipolar system, since both superpowers would be able to deter the other from action. The result would be a freezing of hierarchies. Though there are observable elements of this during the early Cold War, particularly in Europe and East Asia[33], their dynamic roles in

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[32] However, Soviet retaliatory strikes against the continental United States were only possible after 1959 when its first intercontinental ballistic missiles became operational.

[33] At least post-Korean War, though it should be noted that during the Korean War the United States retained a large nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union (Calingaert 1988, 183). Even in 1953 the Soviet Union had just 120 nuclear weapons, compared with 1,000 for the United States (1988, 183–84). Of course, the United States also sought to avoid drawing the Soviet Union into the Korean War, for fear that this would trigger a general war (1988, 179).

the Middle East during this period suggests no freeze occurred. Rather, both superpowers saw their interests expand dramatically in the region.

There are three primary reasons why this freezing did not occur. Since Soviet nuclear doctrine did not rest on MAD, but rather saw nuclear weapons as a means of advancing foreign policy goals, this paradigm did not apply[34]. Moreover, the weaknesses of MAD are laid bare, since to threaten constantly, in response to any foreign policy move by an adversary that is disliked, is to weaken the value of the threat. Over time, this might make any threat less credible, since it is unclear which interests are prioritized over others. Finally, and in specific reference to the Middle East, the region would remain in motion irrespective of lack of interest by the superpowers, both due to the decline of Britain, and the rise of assertive new states. Instead, nuclear weapons offered only a limited constrain upon the development of interests in the Middle East, and particularly offered little to enforce open norms of subordinate governance.

Nuclear weapons offer security, but it is unclear which actors gain. Within a hierarchy comprising a nuclear-armed major power and subordinates, the former actor may be able to ensure compliance with its foreign policy preferences more readily since the fundamental security of its subordinates is guaranteed through extended deterrence. If a state’s primary interest – its survival – is ensured, then the provider of this security may receive greater loyalty and deference. Alternatively, by virtue of this nuclear guarantee, the protected

[34] This could create danger, since in essence the superpowers’ assumptions about the other were false. The Soviet Union was not necessarily deterred by the potential for American strikes against its cities, whilst the Soviet Union failed to recognize that the United States saw any nuclear use as a precursor to full exchange, and simply had no concept of a limited nuclear war.

subordinates may be able to direct their foreign policies toward alternative goals, replacing their own security with more adventurous or aggressive postures. Once more, the evidence is quite mixed.

In Western Europe, European states generally sought to align their foreign policies with the United States. The reason for this is a mixture of a shared adversary, meaning that their baseline foreign policies were comparable from the outset, the large conventional contribution the United States could make to the defence of their territories, as well as the nuclear umbrella[35]. Nevertheless, meaningful foreign policy independence also existed, most notably as France fought to retain its empire, most notoriously in Vietnam and Algeria. In the Middle East, where relations with subordinates were more fluid, and foreign policy priorities rarely aligning, the result seems to have been to embolden. With some level of protection[36] by a nuclear-armed patron, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, were able to pursue conflicts with each other with vigour. From the perspective of the superpowers, the raised the possibility of being drawn into a conventional war in the Middle East, which, should the other superpower also feel compelled to intervene in, could rapidly lead to nuclear escalation. Therefore, the effects of nuclear weapons upon subordinate dependability in the Middle East during the early Cold War may have been greater disorder.

[35] A similar description applies to Eastern European states aligning with the Soviet Union, though the role of coercion is clearly relevant here, since the occupying Red Army essentially was rebranded as a force deterring NATO from attacking, as the core of the Warsaw Pact.
[36] True extended deterrence being enshrined in formal treaties to that effect. By contrast, superpower relations with subordinates in the Middle East did not specify such protection, but, by virtue of close relationships raised the possibility of such protection being assumed.

Recognizing that nuclear weapons could drastically alter the chessboard of international politics, essentially allowing relatively weak and socially inferior[37] polities to exert themselves more fully in international relations, the major powers might seek to entrench their positions by preventing nuclear proliferation. This has the effect of hindering the ability of weaker entities to pursue an independent course, and may also prevent rising powers from attaining the status of a major power. However, rather than a collective effort to forestall a flattening of international society, nuclear non-proliferation seems chiefly to be informed by security concerns. An adversary might acquire such weapons[38], and more generally, the concern that weak command and control functions might lead to nuclear accident[39]. For example, in 1946, the outset of the early Cold War, the United States passed the McMahon Act, whereby all sharing of nuclear technology with its wartime allies, Britain and Canada[40] was suspended, in part because of Soviet penetration of the programme[41]. However, it is clear that nuclear weapons are important markers of status. Whilst having nuclear weapons is not synonymous with being a major power, and it is possible to be a major power without nuclear weapons[42], the association is strong. Most states that are major powers have nuclear weapons, and most states with nuclear weapons are major powers. Nevertheless, collective

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[37] In terms of social rank.

[38] A related, and intriguing finding is reported by Lanoszka, who concludes that alliances are generally a poor means of preventing nuclear proliferation, unless they are combined with compatible foreign policies and supported with conventional military deployments (2018). Debs and Monteiro reach a similar conclusion (2017, 37).

[39] A concern that non-rational and/or sub-state actors might acquire nuclear weapons being a related problem.

[40] Britain and Canada created the Tube Alloys programme early in World War Two to jointly develop nuclear weapons. After the American entry into the war, the programme was replaced with the tripartite Manhattan Project, with the United States providing the bulk of the funding, facilities, and scientists, but benefiting from the prior research. For this reason, the programme was considered a joint endeavour in Britain and Canada.

[41] Nuclear sharing with Britain was restarted in 1958 in the aftermath of Britain successfully testing a thermonuclear bomb in 1957. Cooperation with France would be clandestine, since legally this was not possible. Nevertheless, Ullman explains that from the early 1970s, after France had tested a thermonuclear bomb in 1968, that technological advice was offered to France in the form of 'negative guidance' (1989). This took the form of French experts describing their plans, and American scientists offering general comments as to the direction of the programme (Ullman 1989, 10).

[42] In the contemporary era, Japan and Germany are non-nuclear major powers.

efforts to restrict acquisition seem not to have the goal of entrenching power and status, though this may be an outcome. Rather, they are focused on security concerns. From the perspective of subordinates this reasoning may be less important than the effect, since it creates a material gap that is very difficult to close, and so fixes the existing social status of states.

Observable implications of subordinate monopolization in the early Cold War

To assess the theory of subordinate monopolization, and to compare it with alternative explanations, means examining whether the evidence supports the implications of theory. For the theory of subordinate monopolization these implications are that closed ties, and especially attempts at monopolization, lead other major powers to conclude that a rising power is revisionist, and therefore, to adopt more hostile foreign policies toward the rising power. In contrast to this, should a rising power embrace an open approach to subordinate governance, then policymakers in the other major powers should perceive the rising power as supporting the status quo. These relationships are made more complicated due to the role of iteration, that is, perceptions of revisionism and of threats posed are derived in part from previous interactions and not only shaped by the subject of a specific dispute.

In the early Cold War the general expectation is for the observable implications of theory to be comparable to those for other time periods, with some modifications. In particular, the spread of the state system flattened the types of polities inhabiting the international system. This homogenization, logically, also impacts the social form that monopolization (and openness) may take. The functional equivalence between units, whether materially strong or weak, places greater emphasis upon treaty making and formal intergovernmental organizations than in earlier periods, as a means of binding subordinates to particular goals.

The terms of these agreements matter for understanding monopolization, as does the broader context in which such a treaty was proposed, for instance, whether the subordinate could truly refuse, or not. In this regard, the creation of the 1955 Warsaw Pact is instructive. Given the very substantial garrisons of the Red Army across Eastern Europe, as well as the significant control over the nominally independent governments of these states, it is far from clear that membership could be refused. That withdrawal from the alliance by Hungary the following year by Imre Nagy as part of the Hungarian Revolution was punished with invasion strongly suggests that refusal was not possible[43].

As outlined above, the end of multipolarity left the United States and Soviet Union with a single peer competitor in the early Cold War: each other. The observable implications of this with regards the theory of subordinate monopolization are twofold. Firstly, and fairly obviously, collective action against monopolization is no longer possible, or at least, it means a collective response involving non-major powers. This may still array substantial material capabilities and social power against the monopolizer, but is more cumbersome, difficult to coordinate, and risks being perceived as mere followship[44]. Secondly, due to the zero-sum nature of competition, as well as the lack of any powerful third party to add weight to the arguments one side makes, differentiating between norms of subordinate governance and individual preferences becomes difficult. Whenever one of the two expands its interests in a subordinate this may be portrayed as monopolization, which may act as an impediment and therefore be expedient in the short-term, but erodes norms over the longer term. For this

[43] Though this is not an absolute. Albania withdraw in 1968 (though in this case, invasion would have required either a massive seaborne landing, or passing through one of Yugoslavia or Greece, neither friendly to the Warsaw Pact) and after 1964 Soviet troops were banned from entering Romania, though it did remain a member.

[44] That is, the non-major powers – even subordinates – being perceived as joining in the censure of a major power because they seek to gain from the major power they are supporting.

reason, the existence of universal formal intergovernmental organizations in the early Cold War, and beyond, is potentially important, since it provides an alternative and authoritative voice within international relations[45], potentially allowing for the maintenance of norms of open subordinate governance, despite superpower predation.

Syria Crisis, 1956-58

This case primarily concerns the geopolitical position of Syria, and whether it would continue on its pathway towards Soviet domination, or instead, reverse course and join the Baghdad Pact. In addition, the backdrop of the Suez Crisis provides important context for change during this period, and highlights the importance of iteration. The core of the dispute concerns tensions between Syria, supported by the Soviet Union, and Turkey, supported by the United States. However, during the crisis, a second front opened, since Jordan, which had developed friendlier ties with Syria and Egypt and reduced its reliance on Britain following the Suez Crisis, shifted its position radically. Now, it developed friendlier relations with Iraq and expelled pro-Syrian and pro-Egyptian military leaders, with Jordan fearing a combined Syrian-Egyptian invasion and annexation of its territory. The peak of the crisis occurred in October 1957 when Turkish and Syrian troops engaged each other, and subsequently de-escalated once more.

In this case, a major power violent dispute occurred, since troops from the opposing sides did fire at each other, and both sides were supported by a major power. During this period, both of the United States and Soviet Union were rising powers, with the United States rising

[45] Though the UN system all too often is hamstrung by material weakness, and the Security Council by veto power, it at least means an arbiter exists beyond only powerful states.

until approximately 1960, and the Soviet Union until 1970. Therefore, this case study has important intra-case variation, particularly with regards the formality of their relations with subordinates, and whether specific states, or the region as a whole, were the focus. In summary, the United States understood the Middle East as a region, and the Soviet Union as a collection of states, with the former championing formal alliances led by Britain – the Baghdad Pact – and the latter bilateral ties focusing on arms supplies. This diversity allows for comparison, but, since the dispute has but a singular outcome – that is, a major power violent dispute – conclusions are limited to the mechanisms rather than the overall theory.

However, this is also a strength of utilizing this case. To pre-empt the empirical analysis, the formal, regional, and monopolistic approach of the United States toward subordinate governance in the Middle East[46] led to opposition from states within the region, notably Iraq and Jordan, and confirmed Soviet fears about the region being used by hostile forces to threaten it. This contributed to insecurity over the course of the period since it inflamed tensions between states in the region, as well as provoking a hostile response from the Soviet Union, culminating in the onset of a major power violent dispute. The Soviet approach sought to leap over the cordon sanitaire that the United States desired, and thereby cultivated relations with Syria and Egypt. Though this allowed these states to distance themselves from the former colonial powers, and in effect were monopolized by the Soviet Union, significant agency remained with Damascus and Cairo, with the result that the return on Soviet efforts to challenge Western hegemony in the Middle East was surprisingly limited. Moreover, the

[46] A pattern set by their approaches to Europe and Southeast Asia too, but without considering that the success of the former was based around a clear and consistent common enemy, the Soviet Union, whereas in both the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the threat of the Soviet Union was one of many to the states of the region, and rarely even the most severe. Yeşilbursa notes that neither CENTO nor SEATO deterred Soviet expansion (2020, 868).

arming of these states and the new political direction this indicated, similarly contributed to the onset of the major power violent dispute, since with Soviet support, Syria and Egypt were emboldened in the demands they made of the American-backed Israel.

Evidence for subordinate monopolization

American policy toward the Middle East during the 1950s was almost entirely driven by the perception of a Soviet threat to the region, resulting in a determination to apply the policy of containment to the region (Yeşilbursa 2020, 868). This, it was thought, would stymie expansion of Soviet influence by preventing revolutions and deterring military force. Whilst Britain had ended World War Two in a dominant position in the region, effectively monopolizing it, its relative decline quickly led to a loss of this monopoly. The withdrawal of support from Greece and Turkey in 1947 was the first retreat, and led to an American commitment under the Truman Doctrine. In the early-1950s the British position appeared strong[47], if not entirely stable (Petersen 2006, 11), since Britain failed 'to come to terms with Arab nationalism' (Petersen 2006, 12).

To bolster the British position, and to deter the Soviet Union from pursuing interests in the region, the Middle East Defense Command was created by the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey in 1952, to defend the region from outside aggression (Donovan 1972, 81). This plan was surpassed by the Baghdad Pact[48], created over 1954 and entering force

[47] Petersen explains that in 1952 Britain had 80,000 troops guarding the Suez Canal, naval facilities in Aden, fighter bases in Iraq, had a strong relationship with Jordan via the largely British-led Arab Legion, further military bases in both Cyprus and Malta, control of the world's largest oil refinery in Abadan (Iran), and a string of protectorates in the Persian Gulf (2006, 11). In contrast, Soviet and American military facilities and economic interests in the region were minimal, with the exception of the American security relationship with Turkey and growing ties with Saudi Arabia.
[48] Officially, the Middle East Treaty Organization, and renamed Central Treaty Organization in 1959. The membership included Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq (until 1959).

in 1955, with Britain and Turkey being members, and the United States observing and supporting (Spiegel 1988, 7). For the United States, this would contain the Soviet Union[49], but minimize direct American commitments since the alliance was led by Britain. For Britain, the Soviet threat was perhaps second to the 'determination to maintain strategic paramountcy in an area considered vital for the defense of the empire' (Jasse 1991, 141).

The reaction of the Soviet Union was outrage, seeing the alliance as a means of threatening the territory of the Soviet Union (Donovan 1972, 149), and led to the Kremlin denouncing the pact as a 'poor disguise for building American military bases at its back doorstep' (Hurewitz 1969, 9)[50]. However, it also generated an opportunity since Khrushchev was keen to cultivate ties with states in the region (Fukuyama 1987, 26; Hunt and Levine 2005, 262) and was able to use the alliance as a means of differentiating the Soviet Union from its major power rivals by stressing their shared commitment to 'complete liberation from foreign dependence' (Donovan 1972, 150). In response, the Soviet Union sought to escape from containment by investing in ties with Syria and Egypt, positioned further south than the members of the Baghdad Pact, and in effect, preventing containment from succeeding (Spiegel 1988, 6). These relations were based on three pillars, firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the identification of the communist struggle with that of Arab nationalism, secondly, the supply of arms and armaments, and thirdly, economic aid.

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[49] Livne explains that in 'early 1952, Washington concluded that the West could not defend the Middle East against a Soviet invasion. The only response conceived by American military planners was the use of nuclear weapons on mountain passes in the area. Other U.S. officials shared this sense of despair. At the same time, the State Department estimated that if Arab states fell to the Soviets, the price to the United States would be "incalculable". The Pentagon concluded that the area should be protected in full cooperation with the Arabs' (2021, 229).

[50] Given Pakistani membership, similar concerns were triggered in India, leading to closer ties developing with the Soviet Union (Horn 1987, 212–13).

Heller concludes that 'the exploitation of anti-western nationalism permitted the Soviet Union to expand dramatically its political and military presence in the Middle East' (1992, 25), but this necessitated serious ideological compromise. Notably, in supporting nationalists, the oppression of domestic communist parties was ignored by the Soviet Union (Sella 1981, xii). Though a socialist reading of history, whereby the end goal of communism first required a bourgeois – nationalist – revolution, might legitimate this, the reality appears to have been essentially instrumental. Ties between the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern states were motivated by a shared opponent, rather than any true ideological sympathy, leading to this conclusion that 'the Soviet Union exerted very little influence, if any, on the cultural, ideological, political, or economic inclinations of its Arab clients' (Ja'far 1985, 259).

From the perspective of Arab nationalists, particularly in Egypt which began to receive Soviet military supplies in 1955 (Heller 1992, 24; Livne 2021, 236), and Syria which did in 1956 (Ja'far 1985, 261), the core of their relations with the Soviet Union were based around security. Yet, their opponents were rarely shared. For the Soviet Union, the concern was British, and especially American, efforts to utilize the region as a means of bottling up the Soviet Union and threatening it through the basing of military forces in the region. By contrast, though Egypt and Syria certainly feared Western intervention, whether British, American, or French, this fight was essentially one of throwing off imperialism, not strictly part of superpower rivalry. Moreover, both saw Israel as a significant problem, an affront to their prestige, and security threat. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the severe tensions between Arab nationalists and the conservative monarchies created deep antipathy, most notably in this period played out in Jordan and Iraq (Westad 2017, 454). The lack of shared strategic goals resulted in the Soviet Union tending ‘to exercise influence rather than power’ (Mangold 1978, 12), with their clients being ‘unpredictable and often uncooperative with Soviet aims’ (Fukuyama 1987, 29). Neatly summarizing these difficulties, no overt defence treaties existed between the Soviet Union and any of the countries in the Middle East (prior to 1967) in significant contrast to the United States and Britain (Kemp 1969, 22).

The final component of Soviet relations with Middle Eastern states during the period was economic. Economic aid to Egypt began in 1951 (Donovan 1972, 152), but expanded dramatically from 1955 following American and British refusal to help finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Similarly, trade with Syria was boosted following a deal signed in 1955 (Donovan 1972, 159). For Moscow this was motivated by ‘the possibility of using expanded trade and economic aid as a weapon to drive a wedge between the West and the newly-independent underdeveloped countries’ (Heller 1992, 12). Yet, ‘in a competition based on trade and aid, the Soviet Union was not necessarily well-positioned to win’ (Heller 1992, 15). The economic result was rather unimpressive, but rather significant in terms of education, since there was a ‘constant rise in the number of Third World trainees and students in the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries’ (Heller 1992, 14).

The tensions that followed over 1956-68 were driven directly by the decisions taken by the superpowers. A series of steps followed which edged the region not only toward war, but one which threatened to draw in the superpowers into direct confrontation. During early 1956, relations between Syria and Jordan drew closer, with the former a Soviet client, and the latter's monarchy propped up by Britain[51]. The friendship between subordinates supposedly on opposing sides of the Cold War being framed around the shared Israeli threat (Donovan 1972, 192–93). In January 1957, in response to the substantial gains that the Soviet Union had made at the expense of the West as a result of the Suez Crisis (examined in more detail below), the United States announced the Eisenhower Doctrine. This pledged opposition, with military force if needed, to any Soviet armed aggression in the Middle East (Donovan 1972, 263), suggesting unlimited intervention in the region (Hurewitz 1969, 11). The sudden replacement of political and military leaders in Syria with individuals suspected of Soviet or communist sympathies triggered fears that the country would become a Soviet satellite. Exacerbating this situation, pressure was applied on Syria to join the Baghdad Pact, that is, to cut ties with the Soviet Union, and in effect, adhere to American-led monopolization of the region.

The result of these twin efforts at monopolization were that Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq began to prepare for military action against Syria, with the imperative that action be taken before Syria chose to formally align with the Soviet Union though a formal defence treaty (Mangold 1978, 101). American support was sought, primarily to provide arms, and more importantly, to issue deterrent threats against any actor that might intervene – the Soviet Union or Egypt – or which might take advantage of the situation – Israel. The United States thereby alerted Strategic Air Command, sent additional combat aircraft to Turkey, and moved the Sixth Fleet to the Syrian coast (Mangold 1978, 101). However, none of the four were seemingly willing to attack Syria. Turkey alone continued to press for

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[51] Though Jordan was not a member of the Baghdad Pact, for fear that such overt alignment would fatally destabilize the conservative monarchy, which vied with Nasser's Egypt to lead alternative conceptions of the Arab world, it was a British subordinate, maintained through a defence treaty and military aid.

intervention, and massed troops along their border, essentially leading to a Turkish-Syria dispute, which involved skirmishing between the two sides. The Soviet Union now intervened, issuing warnings and sending troops to Syria. This meant that now, with troops massed, and both superpowers with forces mobilized in the region, that a real risk of war had developed. However, the situation stabilized and the dispute petered out (Mangold 1978, 102).

Amidst the tensions between Turkey and Syria, events in Jordan triggered new fears. Relations between Jordan and Syria had become much warmer during 1956, with Jordanian President Nabulsi seeking to form a left-leaning federation with Syria. The position of Jordan was difficult. As a conservative monarchy, it had in the first decade of the Cold War, relied on close and continuing ties with Britain to ensure stability and prevent the collapse of the regime. However, Jordan refused to join the Baghdad Pact, citing its pre-existing defence relationship with Britain, but also being motivated by concerns of how Egypt might react (Donovan 1972, 148), and popular opposition in the country (Petersen 2006, 16). In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Jordan's reliance on Britain looked ill-judged and generated significant opposition both in Jordan and the other Arab states. This resulted in the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian defence agreement (Mangold 1978, 106) and the expulsion of the British commanders of the Jordanian army (Livne 2021, 237), actions advocated for by Egypt and supported by the Soviet Union. This dire outlook led King Hussein to depose Nabulsi, and lead a military coup against pro-Syrian and pro-Egyptian military officers, purging Jordan of anti-monarchist forces. In response, Syria threatened to intervene (Mangold 1978, 106), but with the ongoing tensions with Turkey, this stretched credibility.

This illustrates some of misconceptions of the superpowers during the early Cold War in the Middle East. Relations between subordinates and major powers were very fragile, and prone to sudden change. This injected significant unpredictability into events, and allowed a crisis ostensibly about the political orientation of Syria to rapidly engulf much of the region. For the superpowers, each intent on rival and conflicting programmes of monopolization, efforts to bolster allies – or alternatively to prop up clients – were perceived by the other as dangerous escalation and challenges to their authority and aspirations. The sudden shock experienced by Jordan, in the midst of a broader and ongoing crisis, was not a rare event during the period.

The following year would see two such shocks. Firstly, on 1 February 1958 Syria and Egypt united to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). This posed a threat not only to Israel, but also to both Lebanon and Jordan, which remained oriented toward the West, had substantial Arab populations, and difficult relations with the UAR. Secondly, Iraq experienced a coup on 14 July, resulting in a re-orientation toward the Soviet Union and withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. Again, Lebanon and Jordan felt acutely threatened, with American troops being sent to the former under the Eisenhower Doctrine, and British troops returning to Jordan following an appeal from King Hussein. Also being caught by surprise, the Soviet Union conducted military exercises on the Turkish-Bulgarian border (Mangold 1978, 104) to deter military action from being taken against Iraq. Beyond the Syrian crisis, therefore, subordinates continued to pose significant questions for the foreign policies of the United States and Soviet Union, leading them into dangerous confrontation since each saw the spectre of the other behind every development.

The case of the Syria Crisis allows examination of two competing visions of monopolization, each struggling to get to grips with the new realities of the spread of the states-system and the end of multipolarity. The United States had limited interests in the Middle East prior to 1950, and subsequently endeavoured to contain the Soviet Union by bolstering the British position through formal alliances. This approach suffered from several failings. Firstly, the British position was fragile in the early 1950s, and post-Suez untenable outside of the Persian Gulf (Petersen 2000, xi). Secondly, British interests did not necessarily concord with those of the United States. Though Britain's leaders were wary of Soviet penetration of the region, they were also concerned about their economic interests being supplanted by the United States (Jasse 1991, 142; Petersen 2006, 16). Thirdly, the American response to British weakness, particularly post-Suez, was to double-down on containment through the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This suggested a pretext legitimizing the use of military force in the region. Fourthly, and perhaps most crucially, the United States approached the Middle East not as a series of states, but rather, as a cohesive whole sharing their fear of the Soviet Union. Rather, the region was riven by division. Some certainly feared the Soviet Union – most obviously Turkey. Others saw only opportunity. Meanwhile tensions between Israel and the Arab states, and in this period even more acutely, between Arab nationalists and conservative monarchies, ensured that a 'regional approach' was deeply flawed and stood little chance of success. Nevertheless, the United States was quick to recognize the potential importance of formal agreements between theoretically equal sovereign states, and used this tool as a means of binding states in the region to the anti-Soviet cause. That the alliance ultimately failed is not because it was the wrong tool, but rather, because binding the region was not a plausible goal.

In contrast, the Soviet approach to monopolization was quicker to recognize the decline of Britain, or at least, to respond to it, and targeted particular states rather than the region as a whole. Moreover, the ideological affinity that Khrushchev endeavoured to emphasize in his interactions with Arab nationalism, and particularly with Nasser, appeared a relatively credible basis for developing relations. For the United States, despite its overwhelming image as an economic success, its association with colonialism both directly by virtue of its forays in the Philippines and Caribbean, and indirectly through alliance with Britain and France, posed ideological barriers. This allowed the Soviet Union to quickly develop ties with Syria and Egypt. Though the Soviet Union recognized that it should approach states in the region as independent states, with particularly pathologies, its approach to monopolization failed to utilize formal means to bind subordinates to it. It played the role of armourer and provided extended deterrence, but was unable to translate this into a formal relationship, meaning relations, particularly with Egypt were largely transactional.

Neither of these approaches wholly succeeded in securing subordinates, but the Soviet policy came closer to success, in that it escaped containment and prevented the United States from mobilizing the region against the Soviet Union (Heller 1992, 24). Each contributed to the onset of a major power violent dispute during the Syria Crisis. The United States, by seeking to monopolize the region through formal security architecture, emboldened regional allies and generated insecurity in Moscow. Soviet arms sales to Syria and Egypt, meanwhile, appeared to have little other purpose than to challenge western interests in the region by bolstering Arab nationalist regimes determined to throw of western control. A collision course was set based around competitive and conflicting monopolizations, with the result that 'for 30 years after 1955, competitive superpower involvement posed a constant danger that Middle Eastern conflicts would escalate into direct superpower confrontation, perhaps leading to war' (Heller 1992, 4).

The role of iteration

The Syria Crisis, and particularly tensions between the Soviet Union and United States, existed with the context of prior hostile interactions, suggesting endogeneity. For the theory of subordinate monopolization, the crucial question is how previous disputes and decisions on subordinate governance impacted future calculations. In particular, prior hostility reinforced threat perception, and lead to a reinforcement of monopolization. In this way, a downward spiral was generated, whereby threat perception provided a rationale for subordinate monopolization, and yet, it was monopolization which ultimately generated threat. Three features of prior interactions led to this spiral. Firstly, that both the Soviet Union and United States were competing for influence in a region previously dominated by another. British decline provided opportunities, and problems, for both. Moreover, as the system became bipolar, both Moscow and Washington understood their competition in the region to be zero-sum. Secondly, disputes over Turkey 1946, Iran 1951, and the Suez Crisis 1956, generated suspicion, since it was easy to conclude that the actions of the other were opportunistic and aggressive. Thirdly, both superpowers found it difficult to ensure subordinates complied with their foreign policy prerogatives. In effect, each sought to impose order, but found this action generated new and unexpected sources of disorder, with the result that crises were unpredictable. The conclusion reached by both was the monopolization was the only answer, since each assumed the other would take advantage of any withdrawal.

British decline, relative to the United States and Soviet Union, was rapid post-1945. In the Middle East, the first signs of this were in the British withdrawal from supporting Turkey in 1947, rapidly followed by the withdrawal from Mandatory Palestine in May 1948. Though Britain retained a significant military presence in the region, its presence in Egypt came under significant pressure, particularly after the 1952 coup which deposed King Farouk and espoused a national ideology aimed at removing Britain from control of the Suez Canal and taking a leading role in both Arab nationalism in the wider region and in the Non-Aligned Movement. This opened up an opportunity for the pursuit of interests in the region for both the Soviet Union and United States, but also posed a threat. As Kedourie explains, the bipolarity which developed left the region unstable, since the possibility of a major power alliance against an aggressive rival was no longer possible (1969, 195).

Whilst bipolarity does not rule out support for open norms of subordinate governance, it poses inherent problems. This is because in opposing aggression by a rival, the defender stands alone. It may claim to stand for a wider social good, that is, open norms of governance, but this claim is indistinguishable from simply using the norm as cover for the pursuit of distinctly self-interested goals. Without a third power to, in effect, adjudicate, or at least support one version of a norm, then the system is simply left with competing visions, with the norm itself being set aside, ignored, or overridden. The United States sought to enforce the status quo, both by supporting the continued British presence in the region, and by directly pursuing its strategic interest in keeping the Soviet Union out. Though this could appear to be benign, since it suggested the region would merely continue to be dominated by the West (whether British, American, or a joint endeavour), from the point of view of the Soviet Union this was mere cover for containing the Soviet Union. Moreover, it ignored that irrespective of major power interests, actors in the region were agitating for change. To the

Soviet Union, therefore, the United States was making an exclusive claim to the region, and this was unacceptable. But, in contrast, Soviet efforts to expand into the region were perceived as a change to the status quo, and therefore, as a threat. In summary, the decade between the end of World War Two and the Syria Crisis saw the emergence of bipolarity, which almost inevitably led to zero-sum conceptions of subordinate governance in the Middle East, with the result that each perceived only threat from the other, and responded with monopolization.

Three disputes during the decade leading up to the Syria Crisis informed both American and Soviet approaches to subordinate governance in the Middle East. In 1946, the Soviet Union made territorial claims against Turkey, with the purpose of controlling the Turkish Straits. This would then allow the Soviet Navy to pass unhindered from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, and prevent hostile warships from entering[52]. Turkey mobilized its military, which the Soviet Union then mirrored. The United States, in response to this monopolization, issued a deterrent threat. Ultimately, no fighting occurred. Though historians are divided as to the seriousness of the Soviet threat (Roberts 2005, 53), policymakers in the United States understood both a threat to the Middle East to exist, and their threats to have been effective (Mark 2005).

In 1951, Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). In response, Britain sent warships to the Persian Gulf to blockade Abadan[53], an Iranian port at the northern end of

[52] The Montreux Convention (1936) would presumably have be abrogated, or at least renegotiated. The convention guarantees free passage of civilian vessels during peace, allows Turkey to re-militarize the Straits and close them in war, and imposes limits on the size and number of non-Black Sea warships which can transit and be in the Black Sea at any one time.
[53] The then largest oil refinery in the world (Petersen 2006, 11).

the Persian Gulf, from which oil was exported. This assertion of British control drew a Soviet response, in the form a deterrent threat, essentially making it clear to Britain that it did not have exclusive interests in Iran. Once more, violence was avoided, but the crisis reinforced pre-existing views. For the Soviet Union, that the West sought to monopolize the region, and for the United States, that the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence southwards.

Though both important disputes, both Turkey 1946 and Iran 1951 pale in significance compared to the Suez Crisis. The Anglo-French mission to recapture the canal, ostensibly to protect it from Israeli-Egyptian fighting, shattered the British position in the Middle East. Whilst both the United States and Soviet Union placed massive pressure on the two to withdraw, Soviet threats of intervention – perhaps even nuclear strikes (Lundestad 2018, 57) – significantly raised the stakes[54]. Not only did the episode demonstrate, if there was any doubt remaining, that the international system was bipolar, it also pointed to the critical links between apparently local, regional, and colonial conflicts, and system stability (Hurewitz 1969, 10). Significantly, the crisis led to 'a collapse of Western dominance in the Middle East' (Livne 2021, 238) and a massive increase in Soviet prestige in the eyes of many in the Arab Middle East (Lundestad 2018, 57). Buchan concludes that the significance of Suez was threats of missile attack and the extension of superpower conflict into a new region (1974, 20).

[54] Whether these threats were credible is debatable. The Soviet Union had a relatively small nuclear arsenal, which suggests caution might have prevailed. However, Soviet nuclear doctrine in the period was framed around winning a nuclear war, and saw a seamless move from the conventional to the nuclear, suggesting a lower threshold for use (Snow 1979).

The impact of these prior disputes were to deepen the perception of threat that both the United States and Soviet Union perceived. To the United States, the international environment appeared deeply hostile, since Western domination of the Middle East was being rapidly eroded, and the Soviet Union was apparently poised to make significant in-roads. This would mean not only an escape from containment, but the potential for Soviet military forces in the region to threaten oil supplies to Europe, and even to pose a threat to the vulnerable southern flank of NATO (Sella 1981, 106). To the Soviet Union, these disputes suggested both a threat, since the Soviet Union could be attacked from the region, but also opportunity. Therefore, for the United States, the response was to seek to shore up existing relationships, and replace the failing and discredited British domination of the region. The Soviet Union sought to improve its security position, and thereby targeted its resources at those regional actors most likely to be receptive, chiefly, Nasser's Egypt, with a view to excluding the United States and Britain.

Finally, both superpowers found subordinate compliance to be deeply problematic. Rather than their efforts at monopolization bringing greater stability, instead, it committed them to supporting states and organizations with little interest in the foreign policy preferences of their superpower patrons. With the exception of Turkey, which clearly shared American concerns about Soviet expansion given its border and the 1946 dispute, the other states in the region were more concerned with throwing off colonial control, economic development, tensions with Israel, and the battle between Arab nationalism and conservative monarchism. This failed to result in a re-evaluation of their positions in the region, likely because to do so would open the door to the other superpower. Once more, the zero-sum nature of bipolarity posed a problem for any reset. Instead, the commitments that the superpowers made became larger. Soviet arms transfers to Egypt, already large in 1955, continued to increase. The United States, meanwhile announced the Eisenhower Doctrine, that is, a policy to ‘oppose – with military might if necessary – any armed Soviet aggression in the Middle East’ (Donovan 1972, 263). Therefore, over the early Cold War, in response to failed initiatives, limited success in influencing subordinates, and unexpected shifts in the allegiance of subordinates (notably Iraq in 1958), the answer was further investment in monopolization.

Alternative explanations

The alternative explanations add further insight into the dispute. A power politics explanation helps to explain Soviet reactions to American expansion into the Middle East, but requires the addition of the somewhat hysterical domino theory to be a convincing explanation for American foreign policy given that no direct threat would be posed by Soviet domination of the region. Domestic politics is particularly helpful in explaining the changes in Soviet foreign policy, that is, under Khrushchev, that significant effort was expended in seeking to attract states in the Third World. By contrast, this is a less convincing lens for explaining American foreign policy during the period. Though the logic of containment held sway, contributing to the Eisenhower Doctrine, private economic interests in the region were focused on Saudi Arabia, rather than Syria. This suggests a somewhat less coherent policy position than the efforts to create the Baghdad Pact demonstrated. Finally, status and prestige usefully highlight the non-material goals and mechanisms of rising power foreign policymaking. Soviet leaders, at least post-1953 sought prestige from the states in the region by offering an alternative ideological path for socio-economic development and underpinned by extended deterrence. This could allow states in the Middle East to both reap clear economic benefits, whilst asserting their independence from the West. By contrast, American leaders were slow to recognize the damaging association of the United States with colonialism, and though Eisenhower sought to realign American foreign policy during the Suez Crisis by chastising Britain and France, in the Syria Crisis this behaviour conforms relatively well with a status dissatisfaction argument. The United States, in seeking to arrest its slide in the Middle East, attempted to use threats of military force to bolster its position, but in doing so, deepened the crisis.

Power politics

The Soviet Union bordered both Turkey, a NATO member, and Iran, which would join the Baghdad Pact in November 1955. These alliances, though ostensibly defensive in nature, could only be understood as hostile to the Soviet Union, since they were clearly aimed at containing Soviet expansion. What Moscow feared was that the already substantial British military presence in the region would be massively bolstered by the deployment of American military forces, with nuclear capable bombers being a particularly concern. If the region could be brought firmly under western military control, then it could offer a position to strike deep into the populous and economically important south of the Soviet Union. Given these concerns, Soviet efforts to prevent the region from aligning (willingly or otherwise) with the United States and Britain, appear rational and persuasive (Heller 1992, 23). To support this assessment the dramatic change of Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East under Khrushchev must be explained since it suggests the threat was far from objective.

If the potential for American military forces being based in the Middle East was the driving force behind Soviet foreign policy, then it needs to be explained why Soviet policy toward the region moved from being largely disinterested under Stalin to instead actively seeking to cultivate ties in the region under Khrushchev. Two possibilities suggest themselves, that the American threat had not yet developed, or that perceptions of the threat shifted. Though

American interest in the region undoubtedly grew over the 1950s, the possibility of a rival utilizing the region to strike at the Soviet Union was not a new one. Indeed, prior to the German invasion of France in May 1940, Britain and France considered bombing Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus from bases in the Middle East[55]. Moreover, Turkey joined NATO in 1952, prior to the death of Stalin, and the 1947 dispute over control of the Turkish Straits suggests Soviet security interests in the south had already been identified. Though the potential threat posed by a hostile state controlling the Middle East did increase, it was something that had already manifested.

A shift in perceptions is more plausible in explaining the change. Under Stalin, the threat to the Soviet Union was from the west. This was of course the direction from which invaders had come in World War Two, but also during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War[56], World War One, and the Napoleonic Wars. In the early Cold War, this meant the possibility of a future revanchist Germany, but also an American-led attack. Other threats paled in comparison to this. By contrast, Khrushchev perceived a broader range of possibilities, with attack from the Middle East being a possibility. It is difficult not to conclude, however, that the fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy was derived from both the attempt by the United States and Britain to bind Middle Eastern states into the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact (Donovan 1972, 149), in conjunction with the emergence of Soviet

[55] A plan code named Operation Pike, and driven by the twin concerns that the Nazi-Soviet Pact effectively made the Soviet Union an ally of Germany, and to support Finland in the Winter War. The plan was dropped following French defeat.
[56] British troops also intervened from the south via the Caspian and Caucasus, and Japanese, British, and American troops from the East. Czech troops intervened in Siberia. These troops had fought alongside the Russian Army, but after the exit of Russia from World War One, and the subsequent creation of the Soviet Union, they sought to travel to the Western Front by way of Vladivostok and thereby continue to fight for their independence from Austro-Hungarian rule. Tensions between them and the Soviets led to active participation in the civil war.

interests in expanding into the region. The former point suggests that a power politics explanation requires elements of the theory of subordinate monopolization, whilst the latter places greater emphasis on non-security interests than a strictly power political account typically allows. In summary, though security threats loomed in the background of Soviet foreign policy during the period, the hostility level of the dispute is only partially explained by a power politics explanation.

From the perspective of American foreign policy, power politics offers a weaker account than for the Soviet Union. This is chiefly because the region was far from the United States. Soviet control of the Middle East would not directly threaten the United States, though would pose a threat to its European allies, both because of disruption to the oil supply and because of the potential for striking at the southern members of NATO from bases in the region, most obviously, Syria and Egypt (Sella 1981, 106). Rather, a power politics explanation for the United States requires a particular lens: that of domino theory. In essence, the American determination to prevent any Soviet in-road into the Middle East rested on the assumption that Soviet expansion, if left unchecked, would be rapid and inexorable, and would lead to the Soviet bloc dominating much of the globe. The evidence for this red wave, even in the period, was quite mixed. Though communism had spread across Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia, the mechanisms driving the spread were quite different. Most starkly, the communism that dominated Eastern Europe was akin to occupation, since indigenous communist movements – however successful – were removed from all but Yugoslavia and Albania. In Southeast Asia, the mechanism was one which combined the throwing off of colonialism, along with ethnic conflict, limited Soviet support, and domestic support of communism. In China, ideological adherence was combined with battlefield success to win the civil war. In summary, domino theory ignored these nuances, leading to the perception of any version of communism and any Soviet influence as an almost existential threat.

American efforts to keep the Middle East out of Soviet, or communist, control rested less on the actualization of a threat, and more on a distorted analytical lens articulating the high probability of runaway Soviet expansion unless checked everywhere, simultaneously, forever. Intriguingly, despite Britain having much more to lose from Soviet penetration of the Middle East than the United States, the perception of threat in London was much lower than in Washington DC. Petersen explains that to British policymakers, the ‘absence of a credible Soviet threat of indigenous Communism in the Middle East’ (2006, 12) led to them to conclude that economic considerations actually drove American policy, underestimating the anti-communist hysteria that played such a crucial role in shaping America’s foreign policy during the early 1950s. This leads to twin conclusions, firstly, that power politics can offer an account for why the United States acted so forcefully to prevent Soviet influence from growing in the Middle East in the early Cold War, but requires the substantial theoretical addition of domino theory to be convincing. Secondly, that an explanation utilizing domino theory suggests a powerful place for subordinates in major power politics, and thereby, tacit endorsement of the theory of subordinate monopolization, particularly in the context of an ideological struggle under bipolarity.

Domestic politics

Soviet foreign policy toward states in the Middle East undoubtedly became more focused under Khrushchev than it had been under Stalin, since the former saw a natural alliance between the socialist world and Third World nationalism (Hanak 1972, 282; Hunt and Levine 2005, 262). Whereas Stalin saw no reason for the Soviet Union to support the newly independent bourgeois regimes, Khrushchev saw providing support as a key function of the Soviet Union's global role (Edmonds 1975, 12). This helps to explain the deepening of ties between the Soviet Union and both Syria and Egypt during the period, but this does not necessarily explain the resultant hostility level of disputes.

Given Khrushchev's powerful role in shaping Soviet foreign policy, his ideas, perceptions, and personality influenced policy (Anderson 1995, 22). Gaddis argues that Khrushchev's ideological romanticism overrode strategic analysis (2007, 77), which suggests that he may have been blind to the fears Washington had about a Soviet presence in the Middle East, and may have been more willing to gamble on a positive outcome in disputes. Moreover, Khrushchev was clearly deeply concerned by the creation of the Baghdad Pact, and looked for ways to undermine it, particularly by emphasizing that the United States and Britain were coercing states to join (Donovan 1972, 149–50). In this reading of the Syria Crisis, Khrushchev either emboldened Syria through the support the Soviet Union provided, or actively encouraged Syria to take an antagonistic position toward members of the Baghdad Pact in the hope of undermining it. This explanation has some merit, but assumes a high degree of strategic planning on the part of Khrushchev – which Gaddis is sceptical of – and would imply a level of Soviet influence over Damascus which clearly was not yet present[57]. Though domestic political factors help to explain the evolution of Soviet foreign policy, it is a less persuasive account for the high hostility level of the Syria Crisis.

[57] Though the Soviet Union made several large arms transfers to Syria between 1955 and 1958, Soviet political influence only reaped tangible results in 1971, with the agreement to allow a Soviet naval base at Tartus.

As an explanation for American foreign policy, domestic politics offers only a partial account. Bipartisan support for containment ensured that Eisenhower's foreign policy was supported, though notably the Eisenhower Doctrine is considered to have failed (Yaqub 2004, 114–16) since Syria and the Soviet Union continued to move closer together. Notably, private American economic interests in the oil industry were concentrated in Saudi Arabia, far from Syria, which suggests an economic lens is not useful for explaining American policy prior to, and during, the crisis[58]. However, a pathway via which American domestic politics did influence the hostility level of the Syria Crisis is discernible.

Fears of communist takeover led to the Red Scare in the United States, and contributed to the foreign policy position of containment. Despite these fears of imminent communist takeover of any country in the Middle East being overblown (Anderson 1995, 39; Petersen 2006, 12), there is no doubt that this perception of a Soviet Union poised to sweep communists to power in the region dominated American understanding of events in the region. Therefore, the replacement of key political and military actors with those suspected by western countries of having pro-Soviet or pro-communist leanings was greeted with deep alarm, which became public when Eisenhower gave press conference alleging a communist takeover of Syria (Anderson 1995, 25). This heightened alarm throughout the region with three results, firstly, that the members of the Baghdad Pact, and especially Turkey, prepared for military action, secondly, deep alarm was triggered in Syria, and thirdly, the Soviet Union was able to gain diplomatically at the expense of the West. Whilst the United States did seek to prevent a communist takeover of Syria, there was little desire for military action,

[58] The United States had military forces based in Saudi Arabia, something explained by these economic interests (Kemp 1969, 22).

especially since the shadow of Suez meant western credibility in the region was at a crushing low. In summary, the signals received by Syria, regional allies, and the Soviet Union, were somewhat unclear, on the one hand encouraging aggressive action against Syria, and on the other, suggesting restraint and a downplaying of the Syria threat. This contributed to the aggressive position taken by Turkey, deepened Syrian fears, and allowed the Soviet Union to one again reap the reward of protecting Arab nationalist regimes from western imperialism (Anderson 1995, 35).

Status

The Syria Crisis took place in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis in which the Soviet Union, by virtue of the threats issued and support given, gained significant prestige in much of the Arab Middle East. In contrast, and despite similarly opposing Franco-British military action against Egypt, the United States was viewed with deep suspicion. It was guilty by association, but through the creation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, formally took a position with little to distinguish it from the previous years' Franco-British attack. During the Syria Crisis, Soviet prestige was once again enhanced, due to the diplomatic support given to Syria, and material support to Syria and Egypt, yet, as an explanation for the high hostility observed in the dispute it is less convincing. By contrast, American efforts to arrest their relative decline in the region, compounded by fears that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union more generally as a result of the surprise launch of Sputnik in October 1957, contributed to the clumsy reaction to events in Syria, inflaming tensions, and further weakening American influence.

Khrushchev reoriented Soviet foreign policy toward the developing world, seeing this as a means of boosting the prestige of the Soviet Union and undermining the West. The standard account of the relationship between status and conflict is through the mechanism of status dissatisfaction, that is, aggressive behaviour is understood as a means to enhance status. Though there is evidence of Soviet attempts to take advantage of the Syria Crisis, chiefly by drawing attention to the imperial pretensions of the United States and West, Soviet policy appears to be essentially reactive, arms supplies to Syria notwithstanding. Khrushchev's status motivations, rather than being rooted in dissatisfaction, instead are based on a trifecta of opportunism, prior experience, and ideological conviction. This did bolster the status and prestige of the Soviet Union, particularly in Damascus, but only tangentially contributed to the high hostility of the dispute, since Western fears of the imminent communist takeover of Syria were far from accurate.

Khrushchev's engagement with the developing world was neither based on altruism, nor a cunning strategic plan to undermine the West, though both factors are present. Rather, his ideological position saw a kinship between the socialism and national self-determination movements, both having a common enemy: western imperialism. From this premise, a strategy to undermine the West, and stimulate economic development, followed. Soviet prestige would be rooted not only in these material benefits, but also as an image of the future, for these nationalists to emulate and aspire to (Anderson 1995, 41)[59]. In the 1950s, this appeared possible – and was certainly feared in the West – but the anticipated step from nationalism to communism did not occur. Rather, as Seton-Watson explains, despite the prestige the Soviet Union gained as a result of Suez and the Syria Crisis, communist parties in both Syria and Egypt were dissolved, contrary to Soviet ideological aims (1960, 375).

[59] Anderson considers Khrushchev's foreign policy to fundamentally have been driven during the Syria Crisis by this ideological approach.

Building on this ideological pathway, Khrushchev must have recognized that the positioning of the Soviet Union during the Suez Crisis had been hugely beneficial, and was something to be mimicked during the Syria Crisis the following year. The Soviet Union successfully argued that it sought no special privileges in the region, whereas the United States wanted to dominate them economically and deny their self-determination (Anderson 1995, 40). Of course, that this argument could be persuasively made was because of the opportunity handed to it by the United States. All of this leads to the conclusion that 'Khrushchev's diplomacy was primarily reactive…and succeeded in undermining the Western position in the Middle East while increasing Soviet prestige' (Anderson 1995, 40), but cannot, therefore, explain the high hostility level of the dispute.

In contrast, status dissatisfaction is a more plausible explanation for the foreign policy of the United States. This for two reasons, firstly, that the United States, at least relative to the Soviet Union, had experienced a loss of prestige in the Arab Middle East as a result of the Suez Crisis, and secondly, because the United States actively took steps in the lead up to, and during, the Syria Crisis which deepened tensions. This loss of prestige was both specific to the region, and systemic. In the region, though the United States put significant public, and private, pressure on Britain and France to withdraw, it was still perceived in Arab states, and particularly in those with nationalist governments, as being an accomplice. This contrasted with the Soviet Union's bellicose interventions, which suggested (probably erroneously) that the Soviet Union would resort to war to protect Egypt. However, in the global competition with the Soviet Union, the United States also appeared to be losing ground, most notably in the technological sphere, since the Soviet Union successfully launched the Sputnik satellite in October 1957. This was an apparently clear demonstration of the superiority of Soviet, and communist, means of economic organization.

This backdrop, of a loss of status, impacted policymaking during the Syria Crisis in conjunction with the already established logics of containment and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Fear of an imminent Soviet takeover, married with a loss of prestige, essentially pre-selected a hostile response to events in Syria. Importantly, Anderson notes that 'decision-makers were staunchly resistant to less alarmist counsel' (1995, 39), which is suggestive of groupthink. The United States appeared to be facing both a Soviet takeover, which would have the effect of further weakening America's prestige in the region. Therefore, the members of the Baghdad Pact were encouraged, with new arms supplies, and a flurry of American diplomatic activity. This show of force would compel Syria to remain neutral, demonstrating the American commitment to the region. The effect was to embolden Turkey, stimulate fear in Syria, and give the Soviet Union further ammunition in its propaganda campaign.

Soviet threats during the Six-Day War

This case study focuses on threats issued by the Soviet Union against Israel during the Six-Day War. These threats aimed to prevent Israel from advancing further into Syria and Egypt, and thereby were motivated with the immediate goal of protecting subordinates. In turn, the threats led to American counter-moves, themselves designed to deter Soviet intervention. The dispute is considered by the Correlates of War project to be distinct from the Six-Day War itself, but this is crucial context, and is discussed in the section on iteration, below. Focusing on Soviet threats explicitly means that in this dispute, a major power violent dispute did not occur, since despite the participation of major powers on both sides, violence did not occur.

The Six-Day War, fought in June 1967, was a short but violent conflict in which the militaries of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan suffered severe losses. Israel not only weakened its opponents, but also occupied territory previously controlled by each of the three: the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan[60]. The sudden and overwhelming advances made, first, against Egypt, and second, against Syria, led the Soviet Union to issue threats insisting on an end to the Israeli offensives and suggesting that the Soviet Union might militarily intervene otherwise. These threats, particularly that issued in defence of Syria, led to American countermoves, with the purpose of deterring Soviet intervention. Nevertheless, the United States did agree to restrain Israel, as long as the Soviet Union would do the same with Syria (Golan 2006, 13)[61].

This case study sheds useful light on the theory of subordinate monopolization in four ways. Firstly, since a major power violent dispute did not occur, but the Soviet Union did have closed ties with Syria and Egypt, the case challenges the predictions of the theory. However, a major power violent dispute was only narrowly avoided, and moreover, the broader context of the simultaneous Six-Day War is clearly of high-levels of interstate violence. That Soviet threats did not cascade into direct involvement actually provides some support for theory, since it demonstrates that major powers recognize the dangers posed by disputes over subordinates, and may seek to avoid such confrontations.

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[60] Israel remains in direct control of the Golan Heights today, and the Sinai Peninsula having been returned to Egypt in 1982 after the peace treaty between the two was concluded in 1979. The status of the three Palestinian territories differs. East Jerusalem is claimed as part of Israel, Gaza is governed by Hamas and blockaded by Israel, and the West Bank governed by the Palestinian Authority with varying levels of authority and with the imposition of multiple Israeli settlements.

[61] Golan notes that the threat of intervention was taken seriously by Israel, which led to some hesitation, before the decision was taken to occupy all of the Golan Heights (2006, 13). Having achieved this goal, the Israeli advance halted.

Secondly, the case demonstrates the importance of prior disputes, and therefore, of how previous patterns of subordination and hostility can shape interactions in the present. Thirdly, the case highlights the agency of subordinates. Soviet and American foreign policy during the crisis was reactive, and largely trying to catch-up with their frequently recalcitrant subordinates. The crisis reiterated the dangers to both superpowers, as well as the international system, posed by conflicts between their subordinates. Finally, the crisis highlights two important contextual features, bipolarity, and especially, nuclear weapons. Whilst the system structure in the Syria Crisis was also bipolar, by 1967 the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers were capable of mutual destruction, and the legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis had taught them that the steps between dispute and nuclear exchange were surprisingly few. In this way, the Soviet intervention was zero-sum and potentially existential, a mark of the seriousness with which Moscow took the potential total defeats of Egypt and Syria.

Evidence for subordinate monopolization

Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East in the 1960s continued to seek to deepen ties with Arab nationalist regimes and to reduce American influence in the region. These goals would reduce the threat posed to the Soviet Union from the south (Hurewitz 1969, 15), and, should military bases be made available, increase the ability of the Soviet Union to strike against NATO, or to expand its influence into new regions (Golan 2006, 4). These goals were advanced by the Six-Day War, though not via the intended pathway. Soviet expectations were either that heightened Arab-Israeli tensions, or a limited war, would bolster the Syrian and Egyptian regimes, in turn increasing their reliance on – and admiration of – the Soviet Union, yielding tangible results in the form of basing rights (Bar-Noi n.d.;

Oren 2002, 54–55). A war in which their allies would be taken by surprise and risked total defeat was not considered likely since the Soviet Union had transferred such high volumes of weapons over the previous decade (Vassiliev 1993, 65–66).

The reality of a crushing Israeli victory led Syria and Egypt to increase massively their dependence upon the Soviet Union in the short term due to their vulnerability (Karsh 1988, 147)[62]. They required resupply and rearmament[63], but also Soviet military trainers, and extended deterrence. In exchange, basing rights were subsequently granted in Syria for the construction of a naval base at Tartus, and for naval and air bases in Egypt (Mangold 1978, 46), whilst more than 20,000 Soviet troops would serve in Egypt between 1967-70 during the War of Attrition with Israel (Citino 2019, 449)[64]. Simultaneously, the war demonstrated the strong American support for Israel, resulting in an almost total loss of influence for the United States in these Arab states (Hurewitz 1969, 15), with both Egypt and Syria breaking all relations with the United States (Campbell 1969, 201)[65]. Nevertheless, despite this new reliance upon the Soviet Union, the Arab states, and especially Egypt, were aware that Soviet threats to intervene had come late in the war, severely damaging the trust between them and the Soviet Union, since it appeared as little more than a bluff (Fukuyama 1980, 4, 24)[66].

[62] Hanak concludes that Soviet foreign policy was very successful in the region during this period since Soviet naval forces were now present in sufficient numbers in the Mediterranean to influence events, Soviet influence over Egypt became particularly strong, and the Soviet Union championed Arab states and Arab nationalism (1972, 332).
[63] By 11 July, the Soviet Union had already made 544 deliveries of equipment by transport plane, as well as delivered 336 fighter planes (Ginor and Remez 2017, 6).
[64] This deployment included Soviet control over Egypt's air defences (Mangold 1978, 46).
[65] Israel would similarly sever all diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union following the war (Livne 2021, 238).
[66] Fukuyama goes on to argue that 'the repeated failure to intervene on Cairo's behalf led directly to Egypt's defection from the Soviet camp between 1972 and 1974' (1980, 24–25).

The Soviet Union, therefore, saw its hierarchical relations with Syria and Egypt deepen as a result of their losses in the war, granting it tangible material benefits in the shape of long sought after military bases. However, the theory of subordinate monopolization is not that war alters the balance of hierarchical relations between a dominant and subordinate state. Rather, the theory argues that attempts to deepen such ties increase the likelihood of conflict with other major powers. The above description of the gains made by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the war indicates endogeneity, but this is not itself evidence against the theory.

Two aspects of the Soviet role in the Six-Day War require scrutiny. Firstly, and most obviously given the focus of the dispute, the Soviet threats of intervention issued against Israel in defence of Syria and Egypt. Taken in isolation, these threats could simply be evidence for extended deterrence, and suggest that the Soviet Union was reacting to an attack upon its subordinates. At the least, this suggests that the war did not begin with a Soviet attempt to monopolize subordinates. Whilst the former is essentially borne out by the historical record, the latter is inaccurate. The Soviet Union was not merely reacting, but had played a role in fermenting the war. Secondly, the extent to which this role in fermenting the war was determinative, that is, how did Soviet influence in Damascus and Cairo prior to the war contribute to the eventual issuance of threats against Israel. Notably, the core of the Soviet relationship with Syria and Egypt was based around the transfer of arms and armaments, and it was the threat that this posed to Israel which is particularly important.

Though the Soviet role in initiating the Six-Day War is still debated, Golan convincingly argues that the Soviet leadership informed Egypt of a potential Israeli threat to Syria not to trigger a war but to instead aid the embattled Syrian leadership (2006). In particular, she highlights that this information was not passed on with particular urgency by the Soviet Union, and nor was it done through the most obvious diplomatic channels[67] (Golan 2006, 6–7). In addition, if the Soviet Union expected a war to result, it is puzzling that no diplomatic or military preparations were taken by the Soviet Union (Golan 2006, 8). Instead, the leveraging of Egypt appears to have been designed to strengthen the Syrian regime, by allowing them to point to an external threat. In this way, therefore, the Soviet Union gambled that contributing to heightened tensions would strengthen a valued subordinate[68]. The steps taken by Egypt, of expelling the UN peacekeeping force from the Suez Canal, remilitarizing the Sinai Peninsula, and closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, led Israel to pre-emptively attack. In this way, the Soviet role, of encouraging Egypt, was a miscalculation, since the Egyptian reaction was sufficient to convince Israel that war was inevitable. Given the strongly anti-Israeli foreign policy of Egypt, Mangold concludes that the Soviet Union bears some direct responsibility for the war, since it helped to 'precipitate a crisis it was no longer able to control' (1978, 118).

The broader question is how prior Soviet ties with Syria and Egypt, and particularly the supply of weapons to both countries, contributed to the onset of war, leading to the Soviet threats to intervene. Soviet relations with Syria and Egypt were focused on security, closed to the other major powers, informal[69], and specialized (Campbell 1969, 199). This

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[67] She writes 'if Soviet leaders were trying to provoke a war, one might expect that the meeting with [Soviet Foreign Minister] Gromyko, rather than the chance conversation with his deputy, would have been an appropriate forum' (Golan 2006, 7).
[68] This case also points to the potentially important differentiation and disaggregation of domestic actors in studies of hierarchy since the Soviet Union was seeking to protect the pro-Soviet Syrian Ba'athist regime, which had returned to power in February 1966 but was quite weak, facing opposition from religious sources. On such a relationship, Dillon Savage is particularly insightful, showing how sovereignty may be parcelled out to secure a regime (2020).
[69] Defence treaties were only concluded with Syria in 1980 and Egypt in 1971.

specialization, primarily meant the supply of sophisticated weaponry, but also meant extended deterrence. From the perspective of the theory of subordinate monopolization, the closure of these states, bolstered with specialist ties, aggravated relations with the other major powers, particularly the United States[70], since it encouraged Israel, as well as the conservative Arab monarchies, to themselves arm due to the nervousness caused (Kemp 1969, 35). A cascading militarization forced states within the region to arm, and Jordan's pro-Western position came under significant strain due to its inability to defend itself from Israel (Campbell 1969, 199). Moving toward the Soviet-backed Syrian and Egyptian positions would provide greater security. Overall, Mangold concludes that Soviet arms, rather than deterring Israel or Western intervention in the Middle East, spurred it on (1978, 116).

The context of Soviet foreign policy toward the region is important here. Prior to the mid-1950s, Soviet interests in, and influence over, states in the Middle East were minimal. The decline of Britain, the potential for the United States to utilize the region as a springboard for attack against the Soviet Union, in conjunction with fears about the system of alliances created (however ineffectually), and a change of Soviet leadership, led to the clear position that 'it would not abide American military and political paramountcy in the Middle East' (Hurewitz 1969, 15). From a low base, the Soviet Union became a crucial Middle Eastern player, largely through its ties with Syria and Egypt (Campbell 1969, 199), and at the expense of the West. The Soviet Union was quicker to recognize the differences between

[70] American foreign policy during the period continued to perceive the Middle East in regional terms, rather than as a set of distinct states. However, the core of this approach was shifting from a focus on the Baghdad Pact as a buffer against the Soviet Union, to instead focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict and how the Soviet Union might exploit it. However, after 1967, the United States increasingly focused upon Israel, with the Arab-Israeli conflict being the lens through which foreign policy was made (Petersen 2006, 5).

Arab states in the region, which provided opportunities by dividing the Arab states, as well as the effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on differentiating the Soviet Union from the United States (Lundestad 2018, 56). These opportunities increasingly ran in parallel during the early Cold War, as the Arab-Israeli conflict began to surpass in importance the differences between Arab states, but still created points of friction, increasing the potential for miscalculation. However, the Soviet Union was keen to gamble, as this case study shows. In large part this risk taking, which gave significant authority to subordinates – notably in this case Egypt – stemmed from a twin conceptualization of the links between local wars and global conflict.

On the one hand, the Soviet Union recognized the necessity of maintain a ‘firebreak between local conflicts and a potentially global conflict’ (Mosely 1969, 222). This clearly drew on lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests a ceiling to the support the Soviet Union would provide to subordinates engaged in conflicts with adversaries backed by the United States. On the other hand, this case suggests the ceiling remained high. Furthermore, Karsh explains that Soviet military intervention – threatened but not acted upon in the Six-Day War – was considered by Soviet military planners to not necessarily lead to world war (1988, 150). For the Soviet Union, therefore, a space existed in which significant military support, potentially even including the deployment of Soviet military forces, to a subordinate at war could occur without the intervention of the United States. Alternatively, it suggests that Soviet planners considered that even if conventional American forces were deployed, and clashes with the Soviet Union occur, that this would not necessarily result in world war, nor a nuclear exchange. As explained earlier, the Soviet Union planned for how a nuclear war could be won, in contrast to their American counterparts, who saw the steps between a conventional clash and an existential nuclear exchange as being few, and short. Therefore, the Soviet Union actively sought to bolster its subordinates in the region through the transfer of weapons, and keenly supported efforts by these subordinates to pressure Arab states in the region. This particularly meant Jordan and Iraq, which had continued to rely on the West (Hurewitz 1969, 11), since these interventions were not at odds with a strategy which emphasized risk and the differences between local conflict and global war.

Two Soviet threats were issued against Israel during the war. Firstly, on 7 and 8 June 1967 they threatened to sever relations with Israel if they did not adhere to a UN Security Council ceasefire proposal (Golan 2006, 12). This was with the goal of preventing the total collapse of Egypt, whose army was in total disarray and subject to frequent air attacks since their air force had been neutralized. After the end of the war, this threat was strengthened by adding a military component: if Israeli troops crossed the Suez Canal, that they would no longer consider the conflict a solely Arab-Israeli matter (Ginor and Remez 2017, 12)[71]. This had the immediate goal of preventing the total collapse of Nasser's regime.

Secondly, and far more seriously, following the Israeli attack on Syria on 9 June 1967 that overran well-fortified Syrian positions in the Golan Heights, and threatened an advance on Damascus, threats were issued via the United States that the Soviet Union might intervene:

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[71] This threat was delivered to the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, via Sweden, in July 1967 since the Soviet Union had broken relations with Israel. Moreover, 'the Soviets, Brezhnev said, would continue to support the 'progressive' Arab states [Syria, Egypt and Iraq], since Moscow was convinced that the United States had encouraged and facilitated the Israeli attack' (Westad 2017, 461).

> '[Premier] Kosygin spoke [to President Johnson over the hot line] about the possibility of an 'independent' decision by Moscow and the risk of a 'grave catastrophe', and stated that unless Israel unconditionally halted operations within the next few hours, the Soviet Union would take 'necessary actions, including military'' (Fukuyama 1980, 7).

Soviet naval vessels were deployed to the Syrian coast, and in response, the United States moved warships of the Sixth Fleet to 100 miles off the Israeli coast, with the intention of deterring Soviet intervention (Golan 2006, 13). Israel was accused by the Soviet Union of violating successive UN Security Council resolutions, and sanctions were threatened (Bar-Noi n.d.). Though Fukuyama considers the Soviet threats to be a bluff, since they occurred after the destruction of the Egyptian army in the Sinai, he notes that Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State, 'assumed that the Soviets would have deployed airborne divisions to Syria in the June [Six-Day] War had the US not pressured Israel to cease firing' (1980, 24)[72]. The result was Israeli control of the Golan Heights by 10 June when a ceasefire was signed, but the Syrian regime remained intact.

Having established closed and specialized ties with Syria and Egypt, the Soviet Union both indirectly, and directly, encouraged these states to pursue aggressive foreign policies against the regional rivals. This contributed to the high level of tensions between them and Israel in 1967, and, along with Egyptian miscalculation triggered by Soviet information about an

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[72] Golan argues, in contrast to Fukuyama's remarks on Rusk, that the 'US government…was doubtful that Moscow would carry through on its threat' (2006, 13). Similarly, Spiegel concludes that the Soviet threats 'during the last hours of the war appeared to be little more than posturing' (1988, 7). This might suggest differences of opinion on Soviet intentions, but is likely simply indicative of the high risk associated with the crisis, that is, the Soviet Union might be unlikely to actually attack Israel, but could deepen the crisis further by sending troops to Syria, and this would increase the probability of war with the United States.

Israeli military build-up on the Syrian border, led to war. The rapid destruction of the Egyptian air force, isolation of the Egyptian army in the Sinai, and strikes against both Jordan and Syria, led to the real possibility of a collapse of both the Egyptian and Syrian regimes. The Soviet Union issues deterrent threats to prevent these collapses, though appears to have been relatively unconcerned with the large-scale loss of military capabilities their subordinates suffered. The result was a tense confrontation with the United States, and though the threshold for a major power violent dispute was not reached, since these threats did not lead to violence, the case highlights the importance of the pre-existing closed and specialized ties that the Soviet Union had established which allowed the dispute to emerge and escalate so rapidly.

The role of iteration

This section considers the immediate lead up to the issuance of Soviet threats of intervention, the Six-Day War in more detail. It also then considers the more general pattern of prior Soviet disputes in the region, most notably, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1956-58 Syrian Crisis, and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. The Six-Day War was clearly necessary to the issuance of Soviet threats: had the war not occurred, these threats would not have followed. The more general pattern of prior disputes leads to two conclusions, firstly, that competition for subordinates was fierce, largely because of the potential for defection, and that in turn this heightened tensions since the superpowers sought to prevent defection through monopolization. Secondly, from a Soviet perspective, closure and monopolization of subordinates was thought to prevent the region from being dominated by the United States, but this instead dragged the Soviet Union into confrontations with the United States.

The Six-Day War began on 5 June 1967 following a period of high tension between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, operating out of the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. In spring of 1967 the Soviet Union passed a series of warnings to Egypt suggesting that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border and preparing to attack (Golan 2006, 6). Golan suggests that, rather than this being deliberately false information conveyed with the intention of triggering a war[73], instead it served as useful propaganda for the Syrian regime, which had recently faced a coup and anti-government religious demonstrations (2006, 7). In this context, support from Egypt for Syria, with which Egypt had a mutual defence pact, might bolster the regime by deflecting domestic anger. The Egyptian reaction was to expel the United Nations peacekeepers from the Sinai, allowing Egyptian troops to advance into the peninsula toward Israel, and to close the Straits of Tiran. Of these moves, the latter was particularly inflammatory since it effectively blockaded the Israeli port of Eilat, and would be considered *casus belli* by Israel. Accusations that Egypt was preparing for war, and alternatively that Israel was, followed.

On 5 June 1967 the war began with surprise Israeli airstrikes against Egypt, which neutralized much of the Egyptian air force on the ground. Israel then advanced into Egypt and seized control of the Sinai Peninsula. Jordan, having entered into a defence pact with Egypt on 30 May, welcomed Iraqi troops on the 31st, and on 1 June King Hussein gave command of his country's forces to Egypt. The rapid defeat of Egypt left Jordan isolated, and Israel forced Jordan out of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Meanwhile, following four

[73] Golan argues that had this been the Soviet intention that surely they would have taken preparations to support their allies (2006, 8). Moreover, she is sceptical about the benefits such a war would have had for the Soviet Union, since defeat for their allies would damage Soviet prestige, and victory might trigger American intervention to protect Israel.

days of smaller-scale airstrikes and artillery barrages on the Syrian-Israeli border, Israel committed to war on 9 June, following the successes against Egypt and Jordan, and despite Syria seeking a ceasefire.

Soviet threats of intervention were made with the intention of deterring further attacks on Egypt, and preventing an advance into Syria beyond the Golan Heights. The context of a war being lost is a necessary one for the issuance of these threats, since without this context there would be no need for intervention. Two aspects of this context stand out. Firstly, and most importantly, that the agency of subordinates was crucial to the dispute onset. Rather than the United States or Soviet Union initiating the crisis, essentially this was a crisis derived from the Arab-Israeli conflict, which drew in the superpowers. As with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the dispute highlights that major powers do not exercise total control over their subordinates, that the steps from local conflict to global nuclear war are surprisingly few, and that the pathway from pursuing closed interests in subordinates to major power confrontation is short. Secondly, the function that risk plays in crises. On paper, the Soviet-backed Arab states, and particularly Syria and Egypt, had superior militaries to Israel. The war illustrated deficiencies in training, morale and preparedness, but also points to the difficulties of predicting outcomes of war. Not only did the Soviet Union – and presumably Egypt – consider that a war would unlikely be lost, but the Israeli surprise attack which caught the Egyptian air force largely on the ground could have failed. Had the Egyptian air force remained effective, then the war would no doubt have been longer, and the Israeli army's advance into the Sinai much more hazardous.

Earlier disputes, specifically, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1956-58 Syrian Crisis, and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis also shaped Soviet foreign policy during the Six-Day War. In-line with the theoretical expectations of the theory of subordinate monopolization, these disputes led Soviet leaders to invest further in monopolization of subordinates. Having identified the Middle East as a region where Soviet security was at stake, the Soviet Union, post-Stalin, saw subordinate monopolization as a means of furthering these interests, whilst also challenging the interests of their primary rival, the United States. That this contributed to tensions with the United States was not in and of itself a problem, but crucially, Soviet leaders only recognized the dangers that this approach posed in extreme circumstances, where the intervention of the United States appeared plausible. Fukuyama considers that this is because 'Soviet leaders have continued to regard the American stake in the region as more important than their own' (Fukuyama 1980, v), but it is readily apparent that American power projection capabilities were far superior throughout the 1950s and 60s. Despite these twin recognitions, the Soviet Union continued to prosecute an active foreign policy in the Middle East with the intentions of monopolizing subordinates and preventing American domination of the region. For Golan, this leads to the conclusion that 'Soviet activities in the Middle East were a function of Moscow's overall foreign policy, particularly the US-Soviet rivalry, which in the 1960s was increasingly military in nature' (2006, 4). Though Soviet foreign policy in the region was certainly made with the United States in mind, this conclusion misses that attempts to monopolize subordinates in the region, particularly Syria and Egypt, contributed directly to disputes with the United States by preventing containment, but also indirectly by fuelling the Arab-Israeli conflict with weapons and diplomatic support. In part, therefore, the Soviet Union's monopolistic approach to subordinates in the region was the cause of its security concerns in the 1960s[74].

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[74] Golan writes that 'Soviet leaders worried that continued conflict would only make matters worse, threatening the very existence of the pro-Soviet regimes in Egypt and Syria and creating pressure for Soviet intervention' (2006, 12).

Alternative explanations

The three alternative explanations offer additional insight into the issuance of Soviet threats during the Six-Day War. Perhaps surprisingly, given the ferocity of the fighting during the Six-Day War, a power politics explanation for Soviet behaviour is unconvincing. This is chiefly because the Soviet threats received by Israel were seemingly designed to save face, rather than to actually materially impact the course of the war. If the Soviet Union truly sought to defend its allies, then the absence of resupply and the small Soviet military mobilization are puzzlingly weak reactions. In contrast, a domestic political explanation is more persuasive. Following the overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964, the collective leadership which succeeded him were divided over Middle East policy. In this explanation, Soviet actions prior to, and during, the Six-Day War were designed to bolster the domestic standing of Brezhnev and Grechko, the Soviet Defence Minister. This explanation adds insight into why the Soviet Union encouraged a war, and crucially, adds credibility to the idea that Soviet threats of intervention were about saving face. Unsurprisingly, this focus upon saving face suggests a status explanation is particularly persuasive. This can either build upon a domestic explanation, that is, locating status within specific domestic actors, or instead see status as an attribute of the Soviet state. In this latter understanding, a collapse of the magnitude experienced by Egypt and Syria damaged Soviet prestige, and the threat of intervention was a means of arresting this decline in how the Soviet Union was perceived regionally, and globally.

Power politics

The fundamental problem with a power politics explanation is that the Soviet threats would have been far more credible had they been backed by efforts at re-arming their subordinates, and by a greater level of militarization. On this first point, the threat of intervention would have been more persuasive had intermediary militarization steps been taken, chiefly, that the huge equipment losses experienced by Egypt and Syria would be rapidly replaced through airlift. Instead, the Soviet Union refused to resupply them whilst fighting continued (Bar-Noi n.d.; Golan 2006, 12). This reluctance to commit hindered the credibility of Soviet threats, since it hinted an underlying unwillingness to become involved.

The latter point concerns the threats directly. Whilst Soviet warships were deployed off the coast of Syria to bolster the credibility of their threats calling for Israel to cease its advance into Syria, no other military units were deployed. Airborne units, which could in theory be rushed to Syria, were placed on alert, but were not sent. Though Golan explains that landing these troops in Syria would have been difficult, since Israel had damaged or destroyed so many airfields (2006, 14), it seems unlikely that this was insurmountable. The possibility exists that the Soviet Union did not pursue further militarization out of concern that this would be the final step toward war with Israel and the United States, but that fact remains that absent greater credibility, these threats were not entirely convincing. Golan reports that American leaders perceived them as a bluff (2006, 13), and though the Israeli advance into Syria did pause, it then restarted, only halting when the target of the Golan Heights was secured (Ibid.)[75]. Moreover, the initial threat to protect Egypt were purely diplomatic in nature, and accompanied by no threat of militarization. This led Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states, to conclude post-war that the Soviet Union was unreliable (Fukuyama 1980, 4).

[75] Fukuyama states that the 'Israeli's had already achieved most of their objectives and were winding down operations at the moment that the Soviet threat arrived' (1980, 9).

Domestic politics

Following the overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964, the Soviet Union was ruled by a collective leadership, with Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Communist Party, Kosygin as Premier, and Podgorny as Presidium Chairman. These leaders, as well as other senior ministers, were divided over foreign policy toward the Middle East. Kosygin, Podgorny, and Gromyko, the Foreign Minister, wanted to avoid conflict in the Middle East for fear this would lead to confrontation with the United States. In contrast, Brezhnev and Grechko[76] sought to utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of pressuring the United States (Ramet 1990, 43–44). The dispute, therefore, was a means of improving their domestic standing, by seeking to demonstrate success in international affairs. This explanation sheds light on three distinct elements of the dispute. Firstly, it explains the relatively cavalier way in which Egypt was encouraged to pressure Israel, since some of the Soviet leadership sought a war. Secondly, it may also explain why the Soviet approach to the war was dysfunctional, that is, encouraging war, but making no preparations for it. If the Soviet leadership were divided as this account suggests, then it is plausible that policymaking was inconsistent. Thirdly, once the scale of the Israeli success became clear, it explains the need to save face, that is, Brezhnev and Grechko had their own positions on the line, not only that of the Soviet Union.

Status

The lack of preparations to follow through on their threats, as well as domestic political rivalry, point to the importance of non-material factors in explaining Soviet foreign policy during the Six-Day War. A status-focused explanation can draw on the domestic argument,

[76] Grechko had only become Defence Minister in April 1967, and so may have attempted to make a name for himself in his new role through an aggressive Middle East policy.

that is, what was at stake was Brezhnev's personal position within the Soviet system. However, a status-focused account also exists at the level of the state[77]. The disastrous performance of the Syrian, and especially the Egyptian, militaries tarnished Soviet prestige by demonstrating the superiority of Israel's western military equipment, as well as its strategies, tactics, and morale. In this context, the threats were designed to recoup some of what had been lost by at least posing the question of Soviet intervention (Fukuyama 1980, 23). In this reading, the Soviet Union calibrated a response which was unlikely to be challenged, that is, since the peak of the crisis had passed by the time the threat to protect Syria was issued (Fukuyama 1980, v), it was unlikely that there would be grounds for a Soviet intervention. The Soviet Union, therefore, would appear to be defending its Arab allies, but essentially ensured its response to the war was such that it would not have to intervene.

Soviet prestige was severely damaged by the 1967 war, and the calibrated threats were part of the reason for this damage. For Soviet subordinates in the Middle East, and especially for Egypt and Syria, Soviet threats were understood to be a bluff. Whilst their dependence on the Soviet Union increased in the short term due to the severe losses suffered and regime insecurity generated, any semblance of trust or ideological affinity had disappeared. Fukuyama considers this bluffing to have been crucial in Egypt's defection from the Soviet sphere in 1972-74 (1980, 25). However, the damage to Soviet prestige went beyond the region. In the aftermath of the war, Kosygin visited Havana, to reassure Castro of the Soviet

[77] Fukuyama argues that 'while the Soviet stake in the Middle East had increased considerably in the intervening years simply by virtue of tradition and precedent, it remained more a matter of prestige than of vital interest' (1980, 27).

Union's commitment to the defence of Cuba (Ginor and Remez 2017, 16)[78]. That the threats failed to significantly alter the collapse of Soviet prestige in the Middle East is unsurprising, but the decline itself should also be traced to additional processes: prior bluffs, and particularly the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to provide armaments during the war. As the bedrock of their relationship was armaments, weakening it altered the whole tenor of their relations.

Conclusion

To recapitulate the empirical findings from each of the case studies, the 1956-58 Syria Crisis allows comparison of two alternative visions of subordinate monopolization. The United States sought to exclude the Soviet Union from the Middle East by creating a regional security organization, the Baghdad Pact. Though not a member, the project was undoubtedly driven by American foreign policy priorities in the region. The project was largely a failure, since divisions between the newly independent states in the region – especially between Arab nationalists and conservative monarchies – meant that perhaps only Turkey saw the Soviet Union as their primary security problem, and it was already a member of NATO. The effect of these efforts to monopolize through formal and specialized ties was to make real Soviet fears: the United States would use the region as a means of targeting the Soviet Union. The reaction of the Soviet Union was to seek to break the attempt at containment by developing exclusive ties with a subset of states in the region, especially Syria and Egypt. By focusing on specific states, emphasizing ideological affinity, and especially through the specialist transfer of arms and armaments, the immediate goal was successful: the Soviet

[78] This also illustrates how commitments to one subordinate can affect those elsewhere.

Union would not be contained. However, weapons transfers generated hostility from the United States, as well as states within the region. The Syria Crisis was fuelled by these monopolizations. The Soviet Union's security was questioned by the Baghdad Pact, and American interests challenged by the arming of Syria. By seeking to dominate the region with an anti-Soviet alliance the United States generated Soviet hostility, and by arming Syria and Egypt the Soviet Union generated American hostility by making real fears of Soviet expansion.

Soviet threats against Israel during the Six-Day War did not result in a major power violent dispute, despite the closed and specialized ties it had developed with Syria and Egypt. Though the Soviet Union was opposed by a major power, the United States, violence did not occur. Of course, analysed as part of the Six-Day War, then violence clearly did occur. Since the Correlates of War consider these to be distinct disputes, this convention has been followed. This results in a harder test for the theory of subordinate monopolization, that is, despite the presence of some of the independent variables – closure and specialization – a major power violent dispute did not follow. The case study shows, however, that the probability of such a dispute was significantly increased for two reasons. Firstly, because the longstanding supply of weapons to Syria and Egypt made their aggressive foreign policies possible. Secondly, because during the dispute, the Soviet Union essentially encouraged Egypt to mobilize against Israel, resulting in the outbreak of war. This led to the surprise Israeli attacks against Egypt, and the invasion of the Golan Heights, providing the circumstances in which Soviet threats were issued. This case, despite superficially appearing to challenge the theory of subordinate monopolization, reveals important information about the pathway to war which subordinate monopolization makes far more likely.

The cases examined in this chapter also reveal features of the Soviet and American approaches to subordinates, and to the region. Both saw monopolization of subordinates as a means of generating greater security, despite the contributions monopolization made to the generation of tension and the onset of disputes. These monopolizations took on different forms. The United States sought a regional formal alliance system to contain the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet Union sought to leapfrog containment by targeting specific states and utilizing the specialist supply of armaments. Neither of these projects were particularly successful, with only the American relationship with Turkey being robust, largely stable, and reliable. The Baghdad Pact was flawed from the beginning, since its members had competing geopolitical agendas and its membership was incomplete. Arms transfers certainly curried favour, but the Soviet Union only acquired the desired military bases in Syria and Egypt after 1967. American influence over states in the region declined precipitously due to its support for Israel, meaning that over the second half of the Cold War, its influence was largely restricted to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. Similarly, Soviet influence declined markedly post-1970, with Egypt leaving the Soviet camp by 1974, restricting significant Soviet influence to Syria. In summary, the efforts to monopolize over the early Cold War, and thereby to increase their security relative to the other superpower, consistently generated new sources of insecurity. The realization that monopolization was a source of this insecurity was slow to dawn, and only arrived after repeated cycles of monopolization, crises, and war. Contrary to American and Soviet hopes, their strong commitments to their subordinates could draw them into unwanted confrontation, diminishing security, rather than enhancing it (Citino 2019, 448).

Beyond these conclusions, the case studies reveal an important feature of subordinate monopolization during the early Cold War: the high degree of subordinate agency. Both superpowers struggled to establish a clear sphere of influence in the region (Spiegel 1988, 3). This was driven by three factors. Firstly, these subordinates were states, and therefore, could be coerced less directly than non-state polities. Decolonization, the spread of the states-system, and an emphasis in many newly independent states upon the pursuit of a national course independent of outside influence all supported this change from prior periods. Secondly, bipolarity ‘provided Middle East states with hitherto unfamiliar room for manoeuvre’ (Rabinovich and Susser 1988, 301), since they could seek concessions from both superpowers. Bipolarity meant the pursuit of subordinates became a zero-sum game: the loss of a subordinate would be a gain for their adversary. Thirdly, that the region had several sources of conflict including Arab-Israeli tensions, Arab nationalism versus conservative monarchism, and the rise of Islam as a political force. These conflicts were often cross-cutting, hindering the ability of the superpowers to create a united front against any rival. Nevertheless, subordinate monopolization played a crucial role in deepening tensions between the superpowers, and contributed to the insecurity both felt.

Conclusion

This dissertation proposed the theory of subordinate monopolization as an explanation for the association of rising powers with major interstate war. Rising powers that seek to close and monopolize subordinate states infringe upon the interests of other major powers and provide information that they seek to revise the international order. Together, this increases the probability of major interstate war. This conclusion has three purposes. Firstly, the empirical evidence for subordinate monopolization is summarized. Secondly, the limitations of my argument are considered plus potential areas for further research. Finally, policy implications are outlined, with particular reference to contemporary China and India.

Evaluating the evidence

To test the theory of subordinate monopolization quantitative and qualitative evidence was used of rising power disputes during the 1816-2010 period. In Chapter II which examines the quantitative data, support for two of the three independent variables of interest, monopolization and economic closure, was consistently found, whereas only limited support was found for political closure. This suggests that the pre-dispute political closure of subordinates is unrelated to the onset of major interstate war, a surprising finding. Rather than this being due to the rarity of political closure, it is actually due to its ordinariness: of the 368 disputes, 183 involved the political closure of a subordinate. This is due to two features of the set of disputes, firstly, the inclusion of imperial relations means that, by definition, such ties are politically closed, and secondly, relations of the United States with Latin American states are political closed (though economically open) due to the Monroe Doctrine. Unsurprisingly, the constituent elements of political closure – formal ties and role specialization – also did not attain conventional levels of statistical significance in the tests performed. By contrast, monopolization and economic closure are consistently associated with major power violent disputes, as are the constituent elements of economic closure, formal ties and role specialization. Moreover, the predicted effects of closure and monopolization are consistently substantively significant. This leads to the conclusion that there is support for the theory: when subordinates are economically closed, and where monopolization is sought, the risk of major power violent dispute increases.

Chapter III compared and contrasted two cases in the long nineteenth century with different independent and dependent variables, the 1898 Spanish-American, and 1904-5 Russo-Japanese, wars. Since the contexts for these wars was similar, many additional variables could be controlled for, allowing a focus on the core theoretical predictions of subordinate monopolization. The Spanish-American War was not a major power violent dispute, and American interests in the Philippines were minimal prior to the war. Moreover, the United States had regularly articulated a position supporting open subordinate governance prior to the war. In contrast, the Russo-Japanese War was a major power violent dispute. Japan had significant interests in Korea and Manchuria prior to the dispute, with the former being characterized by closure. From the outset of the war, Japan clearly aimed to monopolize Korea and Manchuria. This leads to the conclusion that the closure and monopolization of subordinates increases the probability of major power violent disputes.

Chapter IV focused on two disputes during the early Cold War in the Middle East, the 1956-58 Syria Crisis, and Soviet threats during the 1967 Six-Day War. As the former case involved two rising powers, the United States and Soviet Union, their approaches to subordinates in the region can be compared and contrasted during the same dispute. As both sought monopolization and the dispute has only one outcome, the comparative study in this chapter is of their alternative modes of monopolization, rather than to assess the overall theory. The United States utilized formal ties in the form of the Baghdad Pact, an attempt to bind the region, and prevent Soviet penetration. By contrast, the Soviet Union utilized the specialized provision of arms and armaments, and provided extended deterrence, primarily to two states, Syria and Egypt. This case study particularly shows how major powers may rely upon subordinate monopolization as the solution to their security concerns, despite the fact that this practice drives the security concerns of their adversary. The second case study is a hard test of the theory since despite the presence of closure and monopolization a major power violent dispute did not occur. This case study demonstrates that Soviet foreign policy during the Six-Day War was not about protecting Syria and Egypt per se. Rather, it was fundamentally about the influence the Soviet Union had over these two subordinates, developed over the prior 10-15 years. Soviet monopolization of the two contributed to security problems in the region, emboldened the Egyptian leadership, and served to bolster the Syrian leadership. The deterrent threats issued, therefore, were a statement of how the Soviet Union viewed the two as being their exclusive subordinates, and this view was arrived at by prior practice.

Based on the empirical evidence, there is good reason to reject the null for the three hypotheses. Firstly, the hypothesis that subordinate monopolization is associated with an increased probability of the onset of major power violent disputes is consistently supported.

Secondly, the hypothesis that pre-existing closure is associated with an increased probability of the onset of major power violent disputes is also consistently supported. Thirdly, the hypothesis that pre-existing closure, in conjunction with an intention to monopolize, is particularly dangerous is also supported.

Further research

The theoretical framework, and empirical assessment, that this dissertation has developed could be broadened and deepened in several promising directions, particularly, to examine subordinate bargaining; and alternative conceptions of power, interests and actors. In this dissertation, little agency is ascribed to subordinates, whether these are states or territories. This is a strict assumption, and though it allows an exploration of how major powers squabble for access and influence over subordinates, it does ignore the bargaining of the weak. Small states, and territories, or more accurately, their leaders, are able to exert some agency over their futures (Handel 1990). That they are deficient in capabilities relative to major powers, does not mean that they lack resolve – that is, a willingness to pay costs – nor choice. There are several strategies that may allow a small state to deter monopolization and thereby reduce sovereignty losses including: diplomatic appeals to international authorities, seeking extended deterrence, militarization, and alliances with other small states. However, this dissertation suggests it is rare for subordinates to avoid being drawn into major power hierarchies, and that when they are successful, that significant costs are regularly experienced.

Although Nasser skilfully navigated between the Soviet Union and United States as he sought economic aid, military equipment, and diplomatic support, Egypt remained dependent on one or the other throughout the Cold War. Whilst it frustrated both superpowers, and may have prevented deeper penetration by either, this strategy also left Egypt relatively isolated. An alternative approach was taken by Finland during the late 1930s and 1940s. Fierce Finnish defence of its territory during the Winter and Continuation Wars convinced Stalin that occupying the country would be too costly. Finland secured its sovereignty during the Cold War, but at the cost of foreign policy independence. Militarization and high cost acceptance is risky since it relies on a potential monopolizer being more cost sensitive, which is far from guaranteed. Finally, coalitions of smaller states are also plausible, though have high transaction costs since coordination is complex. This pathway relies on creating an international organization, typically defined by the issue-area where the influence of the potential monopolizer is greatest. The Visegrád Group allows Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary to coordinate on a variety of issues. Whilst this gives them more effective lobbying power within the EU and NATO than they would have individually, ultimately these organizations are dominated by Germany and France, and the United States, respectively. Whilst small states can choose, it is from a menu of options which all involve subordination, and may fail to prevent monopolization by a determined and more powerful state.

The conceptualization of interests and power relations used in this dissertation is material, and nearly all actors are public ones. These are not the only interests or types of power that matter for international relations, although one might contend that others rely upon material interests and power. For example, the interests that a state may have in another are plausibly social, whilst the means of enacting change – the type of power – be cultural, soft, or institutional. This may be normatively positive but should not be assumed to be so. Nationalism is perhaps the single most important social force to have impacted international relations in the past 200 years (Mearsheimer 2018; 2016, 148), above even ideological or religious attachments, and is widely associated with conflict, wars and oppression. Moreover, for all that Nye's work has spurred examination of how culture may be inadvertently reshaped by the actions of private multinationals (2004), the deliberate manipulation of the information environment through propaganda, censorship, management of social media, and strategic investments in educational and policy institutions, suggest malign uses are just as plausible[20]. Examining nationalism appears to be a fertile ground for the theory, particularly given that this is invariably a zero-sum game, meaning that closure and monopolization are the necessary result, rather than strictly chosen as policy[21].

Finally, across time and rising power cases, it is clear that private actors play important roles in shaping approaches to subordinates. In the age of empire, merchants and missionaries, and in some cases settlers, were crucial to the establishment of particular forms of influence of subordinates (Srivastava 2022). Today, these processes are continued by multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations. The trilateral interactions of these actors with their home governments and those of subordinate states provide further complication to the hierarchical relations outlined in this dissertation. There is significant variation in how these private actors relate to their home governments, ranging from being agents for state interests, through to direct opposition to them. In turn, states may follow their private actors, out of a duty to protect them, but also may readily abandon them in favour of other interests.

[20] Moreover, these state backed approaches have a sharper means of using the third face of power (S. Lukes 2005), and a clearer mechanism via which policy and outcomes are shaped.

[21] Ward argues that in the domestic context of dissatisfied states hardliners, who favour coercive diplomacy and military force, have the advantage in their struggle against moderates because nationalism makes their arguments appear more legitimate in the eyes of other elites and the public (Ward 2017b, 48). This suggests an important role for nationalism in explaining why some rising powers monopolize subordinates whilst others do not.

Further research is needed to uncover how private actors from rival major powers compete for access and influence in the same subordinate.

Rising powers and the future

There is little to suggest that attempts to close and monopolize subordinates have decreased over time. The end of the Cold War, the unipolar moment, and the apparent twin victories of capitalism and democracy are increasingly distant memories. The Cold War ended[22] but was replaced with new antagonisms. The United States remains dominant, but its military and economic position has eroded relative to China far faster than predicted in the 1990s. Meanwhile, capitalism and democracy have come under severe stresses internationally as the result of prosperous and self-confident autocratic regimes, and domestically due to the spread of populism within even long consolidated democracies. This is a bleak outlook for international peace and security, and has led to laments about misplaced optimism and squandered opportunities. Though there were clearly mistakes, particularly as a result of the American (and British[23]) invasion of Iraq, challenges to democracy would have occurred regardless, and rising powers were bound to emerge (Layne 1993; 2006). There are two such states today: China and India. Each should be encouraged to pursue openness, and forego closure and monopolization, otherwise major interstate war is made more likely. However, a significant complicating factor exists. China and India are competing with each other, just

[22] At least, tensions between the Soviet Union and United States in Europe ended. Enmity and division in Eastern Asia appears similar today as it did during the Cold War.

[23] The British contribution is too often forgotten or understood as a mere accessory to the American crime. Not only was the crucial 'evidence' for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction collected and distributed by British intelligence, the British commitment to the invasion was 45,000 troops – near all that could be used for expeditionary warfare – whilst the American was 150-190,000 by most counts. Though clearly the smaller component, the British military capabilities committed was essentially total, the American partial. Based on defence spending and the respective size of their militaries, the British commitment, all things being equal, would have been closer to 10-15,000.

as they compete with other major powers, which makes for more complex bargaining over subordinate access in regions of mutual interest: Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

China

China is rising from within the ranks of the major powers. In material terms, it is clearly second only to the United States, with the third most powerful being distant[24]. Despite the huge benefits an open global economy has brought to China, its approach to subordinates is politically and economically closed, whilst the Belt and Road Initiative and increasingly assertive military posture concords with monopolization. In short, China appears to be investing heavily in relationships with subordinates which aim to benefit Chinese economic and security interests, and ride roughshod over those of other major powers. This is most directly demonstrated through its territorial disputes with India and Japan, as well as its assertions of control over Taiwan and the South China Sea which challenges American interests (R. D. Kaplan 2014; Friedberg 2011)[25].

This will not be easily resolved, and there are limits as to how the other major powers can accommodate China, meaning Chinese policymakers are the most critical actors. The major powers must seek to reassure China that its future prosperity and security are not threatened by the interests of others (Christensen 2015). Given the importance of Taiwan to China, it is likely that this de facto state is the cornerstone of any successful means of reorienting

[24] Likely Russia, though this largely rests on its huge nuclear weapons arsenal. The remaining major powers – Japan, Germany, Britain, and France – are more distant. It seems likely that India, rising from beneath the major powers, will rapidly surpass these four and then vie with Russia for ranking third.
[25] Other interests – particularly the desperate plight of the Uighur, as well as the crushing of Hong Kong – are morally of similar importance, more so certainly than the division of the South China Sea. However, beyond public criticism of China, as well as of Western companies happy to ignore these cruelties, it seems unlikely that even sanctions would be applied, let alone compellent threats issued.

Chinese policymaker perceptions of the United States (and others). In short, it is not plausible that China will negotiate over the status of Taiwan, and the military balance is moving extremely rapidly toward a future where conventional extended deterrence is no longer effective. Any intervention in a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan would already be extremely costly and faces a decreasing chance of successfully preventing invasion or dislodging occupiers (Mearsheimer 2014, 35). This means the only means of deterring China will be nuclear, and this is risky. China's leaders may calculate that an American nuclear deterrent threat is a bluff, and so embark upon invasion regardless. Even if taken seriously by China, this dramatically raises the stakes, and would alter the tenor of Sino-American relations globally (Posen 1991b).

Regardless of accommodation, the most critical factor remains China's leadership. Given the increasing centralization on Xi Jinping, this looks likely to mean a single individual for the foreseeable future[27]. Therefore, the big question with regard to China's future foreign policy orientation concerns not the steps taken to reassure and accommodate by potential adversaries, but rather, how such signals would be understood by Xi. It is not implausible that a dictator, isolated from alternative viewpoints, and with a strong belief in the magnificence of their destiny, simply views accommodation as weakness, rather than any sort of willingness to de-escalate and cooperate. This might further solidify belief in Xi's methods, leading to a greater monopolization of small states, perceiving other major powers as being likely to fold when their interests are threatened (Ross 2006; Roy 1994). Clearly Xi's perceptions cannot be controlled, but efforts to reassure must surely be undertaken, to

[27] Xi Jinping is 68 and appears to be set on ruling for the rest of his life. The 20th Party Congress is scheduled for autumn 2022 and it is widely assumed that Xi will retain his leadership despite the precedent of standing down after two five-year terms.

avoid a future of division, nuclear threats, and zero-sum understandings of any and all policies.

India

India is rising from below the major powers, and looks set not only to become a major power, but also then to keep rising. Plausibly, India will be the world's third largest economy and spend the third largest amount on its military by 2030 (Lowy Institute 2021), though it seems likely per capita income will remain far lower than in any other major power over the long term. By virtue of being a democracy, and being capitalist – albeit with significant protection of domestic industries and a focus on import substitution (Kohli 2004) – it is frequently assumed that India shares the foreign policy preferences of Western major powers. In terms of subordinate monopolization, this means open relationships. However, and contrary to these hopes, India's relations with subordinates are typically closed. Global attention on China, and the greater changes it undoubtedly heralds for the balance of power and international order, has meant that India's own embrace of subordinate monopolization has been overlooked (Gordon 2014).

The drivers of this are the same as in China, though arguably more acute. India's leaders seek to ensure a continued Indian rise, meaning greater prosperity and security. However, three challenges are encouraging the idea that closure is the means of achieving this. These are, competition – and geopolitical tensions – with China, the ongoing and deep-rooted conflict with Pakistan, and rising Hindutva nationalism. China's closure of subordinates, and the encirclement of India with Chinese investment, means that openness is understood to only be preferable if all major powers embrace it. Since their more powerful northern neighbour does not, India's leaders see closure and monopolization as the only means of securing their interests in any subordinates[29]. Conflict with Pakistan meanwhile directs India's leaders toward closure because Pakistan, much weaker than India, would never accept Indian influence. Rather, Pakistan is monopolized by China, which implicitly provides extended deterrence[30]. Finally, Hindutva nationalism, which has become increasingly entrenched in Indian policymaking under Narendra Modi (Jaffrelot 2021; Masih 2021; Ibrahim 2020; Subramanian 2020), articulates – in common with many other nationalisms – that only certain groups are true citizens, and that those not belonging to the dominant group should be treated with suspicion or outright hostility. In turn, this impacts relations with subordinates, as it encourages a perception of external threats.

The western major powers – the United States, Germany, Britain, France and Japan – certainly should seek to reassure India with regards China and Pakistan and accommodate India through institutional reform. India should become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a position supported by all current permanent members, though with some provisos: China insists that India drops support for Japanese permanent membership[31], whilst the question of whether India would also have veto power is unclear. In return, India might be persuaded to open its economy more fully and to accede to a (modified) nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime. Efforts like the Quad, and Franco-Indian military cooperation, should also reassure India. However, in taking steps to bolster Indian security, American policymakers must require behavioural modification, otherwise they will simply find themselves drawn into delicate and dangerous security relationships in South Asia with no increase of openness. Given long American support for Pakistan, as well as Indian

[29] Competition over Nepal being a case in point (Upadhya 2012).
[30] Of course, Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but these are vulnerable to a first strike.
[31] India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil mutually support each other's bids for permanent membership.

accusations of American hypocrisy[32], it is currently difficult to see that the United States can persuade India of the merits of an open approach to subordinates. Finally, the most difficult element to address, as with China, is the domestic. Support from public agencies and non-governmental organizations for indigenous movements emphasizing cosmopolitanism and human rights is logical but must avoid being presented as foreign interference (as it has been in both China and Russia). However, challenging nationalism from outside is invariably quixotic, and is perhaps the least resolvable driver of India's monopolization of subordinates.

Sino-Indian rivalry

The bilateral relationship of India and China is crucial. China is clearly India's primary competitor, and though this is not reciprocated, a strengthening India must increasingly be reckoned with by China (Frankel 2011; Zahir 2021; D. Scott 2008). Acharya suggests one possible pathway is that their simultaneous rises may mean significant competition between them since both are willing to 'assert their national interest, increase their power and influence in the world at large, and when necessary, resort to the use of force' (2017, 192). Given the past competition between the Soviet Union and United States in the early Cold War detailed in this dissertation, we should be deeply concerned about the prospects for conflict via the pathway of subordinate monopolization. In essence, both of these rising powers must account for another rising power in their strategic calculations. Relations between the two are likely to be the single most important determinant of international

[32] American, and European, requests that India impose sanctions on Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine has led to comparisons with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and criticism that the United States has remained studiously neutral during serious Sino-India border skirmishes which have taken place since 2020 (Shih 2022; Dhillon 2022).

relations over the medium term, since their unsolved border dispute and presence in the most economically dynamic regions of the world mean that global prosperity and security rests on their management of their competing interests in subordinates throughout the Asia-Pacific.

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Appendix

Table 27: Appendix power one, rising power to major power ratios of military capabilities

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.512**	0.478*	0.404*	0.204
	(0.236)	(0.249)	(0.231)	(0.234)
Political closure	0.851**	0.822**	0.866***	0.915**
	(0.331)	(0.343)	(0.321)	(0.416)
Status dissatisfaction	0.064**	0.069**	0.073**	0.064**
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Joint democracy	-1.974*	-2.067**	-1.841	-1.969
	(1.063)	(1.005)	(1.138)	(1.362)
Rising power polity	0.104*	0.055	0.096*	0.100
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.103)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.040	0.060	-0.042	0.165
	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.071)	(0.171)
Ratio RP:MP military spending	-0.390			
	(0.808)			
Ratio RP:MP military personnel		-3.545**		
		(1.709)		
Ratio RP:MP CINC			-3.230**	
			(1.300)	
Ratio RP:MP naval tonnage				0.830
				(0.534)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.156	0.863	0.928	-0.572
	(1.040)	(1.330)	(1.380)	(0.941)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.838	0.613	0.174	0.677
	(0.763)	(0.947)	(1.287)	(0.710)
Unbalanced multipolarity	2.101*	2.099*	2.161*	1.986*
	(1.150)	(1.099)	(1.142)	(1.068)
Number of major powers	-0.486*	-0.587**	-0.593*	-0.496
	(0.265)	(0.280)	(0.350)	(0.312)
Dispute participants	0.439***	0.433***	0.432***	0.363***
	(0.149)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.138)
Region dummy	-0.282	-0.238	-0.391	-0.459
	(0.349)	(0.386)	(0.409)	(0.372)
Dispute duration, log	0.396***	0.397***	0.389***	0.401***
	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.107)
Constant	-4.743***	-3.359**	-1.875	-6.398**
	(1.249)	(1.509)	(1.685)	(3.099)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	339

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 28: Appendix power two, rising power to hegemon ratios of military capabilities

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.463*	0.514**	0.481**	0.300
	(0.253)	(0.229)	(0.225)	(0.194)
Political closure	0.936***	0.857**	0.839**	0.878*
	(0.341)	(0.344)	(0.337)	(0.469)
Status dissatisfaction	0.067**	0.064**	0.067**	0.066**
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Joint democracy	-1.840*	-1.804*	-2.125*	-2.014
	(1.047)	(1.026)	(1.106)	(1.505)
Rising power polity	0.093	0.084	0.117*	0.085
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.091)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.032	0.048	0.036	0.042
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.129)
Ratio RP:H/C military spending	-0.318**			
	(0.148)			
Ratio RP:H/C military personnel		-0.151		
		(0.165)		
Ratio RP:H/C CINC			-0.267***	
			(0.088)	
Ratio RP:H/C naval tonnage				0.051
				(0.100)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.086	-0.230	-0.182	-0.922
	(1.034)	(0.856)	(0.799)	(1.274)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.542	0.721	0.706	1.330
	(0.888)	(0.698)	(0.744)	(1.239)
Unbalanced multipolarity	2.371**	2.186*	2.074*	1.885*
	(1.201)	(1.191)	(1.081)	(1.090)
Number of major powers	-0.514*	-0.488*	-0.487*	-0.397
	(0.276)	(0.264)	(0.283)	(0.304)
Dispute participants	0.435***	0.430***	0.432***	0.357***
	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.152)	(0.136)
Region dummy	-0.359	-0.256	-0.304	-0.447
	(0.402)	(0.361)	(0.376)	(0.376)
Dispute duration, log	0.386***	0.392***	0.390***	0.403***
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.111)
Constant	-4.078***	-4.487***	-4.511***	-4.735
	(1.309)	(1.372)	(1.052)	(3.083)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	339

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 29: Appendix power three, rising power to dispute participant major power ratios of military capabilities

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.482**	0.481**	0.318*	0.404**
	(0.244)	(0.238)	(0.178)	(0.164)
Political closure	0.976***	0.896**	1.119***	0.871**
	(0.283)	(0.355)	(0.308)	(0.351)
Status dissatisfaction	0.062**	0.064**	0.065**	0.069**
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Joint democracy	-2.215*	-1.988**	-2.059*	-1.759
	(1.144)	(0.999)	(1.154)	(1.314)
Rising power polity	0.109*	0.073	0.088	0.071
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.086)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.021	0.046	-0.066	-0.070
	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.113)
Ratio RP : dispute MPs military spending	-1.000*			
	(0.567)			
Ratio RP : dispute MPs military personnel		-1.035		
		(0.688)		
Ratio RP : dispute MPs CINC			-2.252***	
			(0.541)	
Ratio RP : dispute MPs naval tonnage				-0.213*
				(0.122)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.082	0.063	0.187	-0.867
	(1.008)	(0.982)	(0.927)	(0.801)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	1.007	0.964	0.954	1.447**
	(0.833)	(0.832)	(0.960)	(0.684)
Unbalanced multipolarity	2.192**	2.017*	2.099**	1.903*
	(1.102)	(1.066)	(1.023)	(1.103)
Number of major powers	-0.512*	-0.461*	-0.486*	-0.384
	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.291)	(0.264)
Dispute participants	0.430***	0.414***	0.369***	0.347***
	(0.145)	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.130)
Region dummy	-0.440	-0.317	-0.486	-0.429
	(0.379)	(0.376)	(0.421)	(0.391)
Dispute duration, log	0.403***	0.402***	0.411***	0.420***
	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.112)
Constant	-4.126***	-4.373***	-1.898**	-2.845
	(1.212)	(1.192)	(0.790)	(2.295)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	339

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Dispute MPs consists of major power allies, adversaries, and potential participants.

Table 30: Appendix power four, military spending variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.237	0.300	-0.033	0.432	0.459	0.288
	(1.152)	(0.233)	(1.255)	(0.518)	(1.298)	(0.318)
Political closure	1.761**	0.862	2.024**	0.721*	1.737**	0.882*
	(0.690)	(0.533)	(0.903)	(0.436)	(0.760)	(0.474)
Status dissatisfaction	-0.005	0.086*	-0.009	0.080**	-0.032	0.092***
	(0.132)	(0.045)	(0.142)	(0.034)	(0.114)	(0.031)
Joint democracy	-0.361	-1.783	-0.520	-2.133	-0.151	-3.333
	(1.531)	(2.007)	(1.793)	(2.360)	(1.270)	(2.167)
Rising power polity	-0.040	0.034	-0.045	0.066	-0.019	0.068
	(0.070)	(0.140)	(0.055)	(0.132)	(0.079)	(0.139)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.015	-0.078	0.045	-0.030	0.059	-0.062
	(0.039)	(0.176)	(0.071)	(0.153)	(0.053)	(0.165)
RP 1816-1913 military spending, log	-0.113					
	(0.272)					
RP 1914-2010 military spending, log		-0.215				
		(0.344)				
H/C 1816-1913 military spending, log			1.439			
			(1.102)			
H/C 1914-2010 military spending, log				-0.087		
				(0.499)		
MP 1816-1913 military spending, log					-1.559	
					(1.399)	
MP 1914-2010 military spending, log						0.355
						(0.387)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy		-0.764		-0.947		-1.886
		(1.304)		(1.319)		(1.202)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy		1.569		1.425		0.910
		(1.017)		(1.333)		(0.702)
Unbalanced multipolarity	0.563	2.405**	0.951	2.213**	0.939	1.899*
	(3.197)	(1.065)	(3.628)	(0.978)	(2.972)	(0.971)
Number of major powers	0.298	-0.558	-0.633	-0.549	0.885	-0.553
	(1.073)	(0.343)	(1.369)	(0.365)	(1.152)	(0.343)
Dispute participants	0.278	0.502***	0.249	0.503***	0.316	0.530***
	(0.542)	(0.172)	(0.594)	(0.167)	(0.511)	(0.150)
Region dummy	-0.981	0.263	-0.824	0.312	-0.828	0.170
	(2.176)	(0.258)	(2.270)	(0.262)	(1.928)	(0.267)
Dispute duration, log	0.421	0.440***	0.391	0.436***	0.437	0.451***
	(0.303)	(0.109)	(0.299)	(0.105)	(0.307)	(0.104)
Constant	-6.564	0.584	-16.874**	-2.212	5.638	-8.551
	(4.725)	(6.785)	(7.269)	(7.261)	(12.997)	(6.668)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	100	268	100	268	100	268

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 31: Appendix power five, military personnel variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.492**	0.456**	0.481**	0.468**	0.230
	(0.239)	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.229)	(0.227)
Political closure	0.823**	0.890**	0.844**	0.917**	1.005**
	(0.380)	(0.402)	(0.385)	(0.382)	(0.454)
Status dissatisfaction	0.067**	0.062**	0.063**	0.063**	0.080***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Joint democracy	-1.821*	-1.849*	-1.782*	-1.915*	-1.762**
	(1.007)	(1.016)	(1.050)	(1.048)	(0.798)
Rising power polity	0.080	0.092*	0.109*	0.094*	0.054
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.039)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.059	0.054	0.040	0.056	-0.010
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.043)
RP – H/C military personnel	-0.000*				
	(0.000)				
RP – H/C military personnel, log		-0.758***			
		(0.266)			
RP military personnel, log			0.245		
			(0.430)		
H/C military personnel, log				0.429	
				(0.541)	
MP military personnel, log					1.584***
					(0.455)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	0.034	-0.117	-0.674	-0.517	-0.343
	(0.802)	(0.791)	(1.188)	(0.903)	(0.673)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.384	0.593	0.739	0.296	-0.419
	(0.726)	(0.695)	(0.767)	(0.923)	(0.817)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.966*	1.907	1.739	1.613	0.234
	(1.132)	(1.186)	(1.401)	(1.558)	(1.275)
Number of major powers	-0.462*	-0.473*	-0.393	-0.341	-0.102
	(0.268)	(0.273)	(0.306)	(0.313)	(0.287)
Dispute participants	0.420***	0.432***	0.426***	0.420***	0.396***
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.144)
Region dummy	-0.240	-0.253	-0.223	-0.266	-0.315
	(0.357)	(0.365)	(0.345)	(0.378)	(0.398)
Dispute duration, log	0.390***	0.394***	0.394***	0.388***	0.406***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.115)
Constant	-4.871***	-2.234*	-6.822**	-8.288*	-18.324***
	(1.158)	(1.295)	(3.372)	(4.330)	(3.500)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 32: Appendix power six, CINC and naval tonnage variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.356	0.535**	0.496**	0.313	0.301	0.208
	(0.244)	(0.233)	(0.252)	(0.265)	(0.272)	(0.271)
Political closure	0.918***	0.776**	0.790**	0.748	0.819*	0.852*
	(0.328)	(0.375)	(0.350)	(0.455)	(0.448)	(0.469)
Status dissatisfaction	0.070**	0.065**	0.067**	0.062*	0.057*	0.055*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Joint democracy	-1.842	-1.884*	-1.755*	-0.930	-1.146	-1.378
	(1.153)	(1.015)	(1.020)	(1.325)	(1.118)	(1.289)
Rising power polity	0.091*	0.105*	0.088	0.054	0.050	0.065
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.098)
Hegemon/challenger polity	-0.018	0.037	0.000	0.036	-0.112	-0.075
	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.109)	(0.100)	(0.118)
RP CINC	-6.343**					
	(2.946)					
H/C CINC		2.257				
		(2.688)				
MP CINC			7.540***			
			(2.240)			
RP naval tonnage, log				0.377		
				(0.311)		
H/C naval tonnage, log					0.887***	
					(0.216)	
MP naval tonnage, log						1.095*
						(0.609)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	0.297	-0.298	0.560	-1.060	-0.754	-0.667
	(0.944)	(0.879)	(0.879)	(1.010)	(0.764)	(0.849)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.563	0.895	0.880	1.108	-0.143	0.536
	(0.825)	(0.764)	(0.892)	(0.810)	(0.560)	(0.554)
Unbalanced multipolarity	2.185*	2.087*	1.433	1.689	1.200	1.127
	(1.117)	(1.136)	(1.135)	(1.040)	(1.173)	(1.116)
Number of major powers	-0.519*	-0.402	-0.723**	-0.388	-0.291	-0.211
	(0.288)	(0.251)	(0.297)	(0.311)	(0.275)	(0.318)
Dispute participants	0.430***	0.427***	0.399**	0.349***	0.323**	0.333**
	(0.157)	(0.144)	(0.158)	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Region dummy	-0.348	-0.239	-0.329	-0.317	-0.274	-0.314
	(0.407)	(0.361)	(0.425)	(0.369)	(0.324)	(0.363)
Dispute duration, log	0.401***	0.391***	0.392***	0.395***	0.402***	0.407***
	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Constant	-2.793**	-5.664***	-6.513***	-9.217*	-14.706***	-20.235**
	(1.352)	(1.332)	(1.324)	(5.223)	(3.811)	(10.049)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	339	339	339

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 33: Appendix polarity and nuclear weapons variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute	(7) Major power violent dispute	(8) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.497**	0.641**	0.612**	0.649***	0.676***	0.433*	0.469*	0.546*
	(0.241)	(0.262)	(0.255)	(0.251)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.250)	(0.279)
Political closure	0.794*	0.699	0.813	0.707	0.615	0.811*	0.806*	0.751*
	(0.462)	(0.527)	(0.526)	(0.517)	(0.502)	(0.429)	(0.474)	(0.432)
Status dissatisfaction	0.072*	0.052	0.034	0.039	0.055**	0.080**	0.074**	0.081**
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Joint democracy	-1.731*	-2.555**	-2.040**	-1.047***	-2.087**	-1.383	-1.643*	-1.546*
	(1.014)	(1.185)	(0.937)	(0.325)	(0.877)	(0.967)	(0.945)	(0.889)
Rising power polity	0.066	0.071*	0.070*	0.075*	0.081	0.063	0.066	0.059
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.006	0.038	0.051**	0.046**	0.050	0.008	0.007	0.001
	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.059)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Military balance, log	-0.765***	-1.011***	-0.864***	-0.857***	-1.066***	-0.900***	-0.789**	-0.936***
	(0.286)	(0.137)	(0.183)	(0.174)	(0.151)	(0.342)	(0.341)	(0.332)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.458					1.455	1.478	1.314
	(1.115)					(1.110)	(1.087)	(1.060)
Multipolarity		-2.573*						
		(1.426)						
Bipolarity			3.136***					
			(0.799)					
Unipolarity				–				
				–				
Number of major powers					-0.165			
					(0.366)			
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.307	-1.743	-1.260*	0.399	-0.580	0.758*		
	(1.264)	(1.191)	(0.676)	(0.602)	(0.932)	(0.459)		
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	1.167	-0.341	-0.963	0.577	0.868		0.877**	
	(1.181)	(0.498)	(0.838)	(0.629)	(1.015)		(0.433)	
Number MPs nuclear weapons								0.125
								(0.116)
Dispute participants	0.406***	0.351***	0.334***	0.332***	0.356***	0.409***	0.408***	0.405***
	(0.141)	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.110)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.135)
Region dummy	-0.405	-0.386	-0.102	-0.043	-0.342	-0.413	-0.404	-0.464
	(0.396)	(0.408)	(0.317)	(0.328)	(0.366)	(0.401)	(0.399)	(0.380)
Dispute duration, log	0.389***	0.421***	0.433***	0.424***	0.410***	0.376***	0.385***	0.382***
	(0.102)	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.098)
Constant	-4.046**	-0.660	-4.109**	-4.059**	-2.186	-3.479*	-3.974**	-3.114*
	(1.823)	(1.955)	(1.671)	(1.734)	(1.372)	(1.911)	(1.907)	(1.787)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	322	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model (4) note: no major power violent disputes have taken place under unipolarity, so perfect prediction leads to exclusion of unipolar variable and 46 observations.

Table 34: Appendix status dissatisfaction variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.456**	0.458**	0.498**	0.498**	0.438*	0.398*
	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.242)	(0.210)
Political closure	0.890**	0.886**	0.861**	0.860**	0.872**	0.895**
	(0.402)	(0.402)	(0.376)	(0.376)	(0.433)	(0.405)
Status dissatisfaction	0.062**					
	(0.027)					
Status dissatisfaction recode		0.063**				
		(0.026)				
Status dissatisfaction, lag 1			0.083***			
			(0.027)			
Status dissatisfaction recode, lag 1				0.083***		
				(0.027)		
Renshon dissatisfaction community, lag 1					0.790**	
					(0.396)	
Renshon dissatisfaction overall, lag 1						0.908**
						(0.409)
Joint democracy	-1.849*	-1.844*	-1.785*	-1.785*	-1.727**	-1.769*
	(1.016)	(1.013)	(0.988)	(0.987)	(0.852)	(0.918)
Rising power polity	0.092*	0.092*	0.087	0.087	0.095*	0.093*
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.054	0.054	0.044	0.044	0.063	0.063
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Military balance, log	-0.758***	-0.757***	-0.753***	-0.753***	-0.706**	-0.673**
	(0.266)	(0.265)	(0.263)	(0.263)	(0.291)	(0.291)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.117	-0.132	-0.097	-0.099	-0.397	-0.139
	(0.791)	(0.796)	(0.771)	(0.772)	(0.865)	(0.831)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.593	0.605	0.538	0.540	0.893	0.821
	(0.695)	(0.697)	(0.658)	(0.659)	(0.728)	(0.703)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.907	1.907	2.022*	2.022*	1.976	1.960
	(1.186)	(1.186)	(1.186)	(1.186)	(1.245)	(1.257)
Number of major powers	-0.473*	-0.473*	-0.458*	-0.458*	-0.512*	-0.488
	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.287)	(0.297)
Dispute participants	0.432***	0.432***	0.445***	0.445***	0.449***	0.434***
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.149)	(0.145)
Region dummy	-0.253	-0.259	-0.328	-0.329	-0.204	-0.247
	(0.365)	(0.365)	(0.386)	(0.386)	(0.314)	(0.336)
Dispute duration, log	0.394***	0.393***	0.388***	0.388***	0.405***	0.396***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.109)
Constant	-2.234*	-2.223*	-2.241*	-2.239*	-2.377*	-2.672**
	(1.295)	(1.296)	(1.319)	(1.319)	(1.278)	(1.275)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 35: Appendix regime type one, major power and hegemon variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute	(7) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.634**	0.830***	0.618**	0.546*	0.515*	0.646**	0.725**
	(0.301)	(0.272)	(0.262)	(0.293)	(0.278)	(0.291)	(0.297)
Political closure	0.811**	0.639	0.768*	0.773*	0.814*	0.787*	0.781*
	(0.386)	(0.444)	(0.428)	(0.434)	(0.430)	(0.404)	(0.403)
Status dissatisfaction	0.066**	0.073**	0.067**	0.066**	0.064**	0.069**	0.069**
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Rising power polity	0.035						
	(0.031)						
Average major power polity		-0.157*					
		(0.083)					
Hegemon/challenger polity			-0.014				
			(0.037)				
RP and H/C joint democracy				-0.670			
				(0.702)			
RP and average MP joint democracy					–		
					–		
RP – H/C polity						0.018	
						(0.018)	
RP – average MP polity							0.045*
							(0.027)
Military balance, log	-0.801***	-0.865***	-1.013***	-1.167***	-1.155***	-0.837***	-0.672**
	(0.267)	(0.287)	(0.345)	(0.430)	(0.421)	(0.289)	(0.304)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	0.393	0.737	0.175	-0.149	0.385	0.237	0.564
	(0.580)	(1.192)	(0.585)	(0.980)	(0.713)	(0.587)	(0.648)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.021	0.579	0.237	0.534	0.174	0.215	0.105
	(0.524)	(1.002)	(0.583)	(0.901)	(0.713)	(0.567)	(0.555)
Unbalanced multipolarity	2.020*	1.924	1.899	1.786	1.754	1.965	2.062*
	(1.210)	(1.180)	(1.200)	(1.216)	(1.187)	(1.218)	(1.213)
Number of major powers	-0.406	-0.104	-0.341	-0.347	-0.285	-0.339	-0.341
	(0.251)	(0.252)	(0.239)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.241)	(0.252)
Dispute participants	0.452***	0.464***	0.440***	0.426***	0.415***	0.449***	0.464***
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.145)
Region dummy	-0.208	-0.146	-0.266	-0.318	-0.267	-0.215	-0.138
	(0.350)	(0.319)	(0.329)	(0.346)	(0.337)	(0.345)	(0.351)
Dispute duration, log	0.392***	0.368***	0.395***	0.399***	0.417***	0.389***	0.380***
	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)
Constant	-1.445	-1.262	-0.432	0.120	-0.434	-1.277	-2.054
	(1.775)	(1.744)	(1.513)	(2.416)	(2.368)	(1.548)	(1.717)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	368	368	368	354	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model (5) note: no major power violent disputes have taken place under joint democracy between a rising power and the average major power, so perfect prediction leads to exclusion of this variable and 14 observations.

Table 36: Appendix regime type two, major power dispute participant variants

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.599**	0.532**	0.541**	0.629**	0.595**
	(0.299)	(0.252)	(0.249)	(0.297)	(0.293)
Political closure	0.804**	0.606	0.632*	0.792*	0.780*
	(0.378)	(0.387)	(0.365)	(0.412)	(0.420)
Status dissatisfaction	0.066**	0.061**	0.063**	0.066**	0.064**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Average polity RP and MP allies	0.021				
	(0.035)				
Average polity MP adversaries and potentials		0.025			
		(0.034)			
RP – average polity of MP allies, adversaries and potentials			0.001		
			(0.021)		
Joint democracy: RP+allies and adversaries and potentials				0.014	
				(0.018)	
RP and average MP joint democracy					-0.214
					(0.425)
Military balance, log	-0.923***	-1.097***	-1.000***	-0.939***	-1.114***
	(0.265)	(0.389)	(0.280)	(0.307)	(0.387)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	0.344	0.249	0.258	0.305	0.233
	(0.638)	(0.550)	(0.596)	(0.649)	(0.672)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.052	-0.193	-0.118	0.098	0.114
	(0.579)	(0.460)	(0.526)	(0.624)	(0.640)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.973	1.452	1.444	1.932	1.886
	(1.208)	(1.104)	(1.110)	(1.177)	(1.181)
Number of major powers	-0.403	-0.270	-0.220	-0.376	-0.388
	(0.253)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.247)	(0.246)
Dispute participants	0.443***	0.616***	0.608***	0.443***	0.435***
	(0.147)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Region dummy	-0.241	-0.425	-0.421	-0.263	-0.298
	(0.348)	(0.293)	(0.318)	(0.339)	(0.335)
Dispute duration, log	0.397***	0.386***	0.382***	0.394***	0.401***
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.096)
Constant	-0.831	-0.949	-1.313	-0.680	0.054
	(1.685)	(2.146)	(1.651)	(1.820)	(2.181)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	349	349	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: N=349 in models (2) and (3) as all major powers allies of rising power.

Table 37: Appendix alternative model types

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute	(7) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.456	0.456**	0.456	0.456	0.419	0.419	0.417
	(0.494)	(0.217)	(0.517)	(0.468)	(0.449)	(0.449)	(0.474)
Political closure	0.890**	0.890**	0.890**	0.890**	0.810**	0.810**	0.816**
	(0.427)	(0.402)	(0.350)	(0.392)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.409)
Status dissatisfaction	0.062**	0.062**	0.062**	0.062**	0.057**	0.057**	0.057**
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Joint democracy	-1.849*	-1.849*	-1.849	-1.849*	-1.495	-1.495	-1.539
	(1.045)	(1.016)	(1.209)	(1.020)	(0.980)	(0.980)	(0.948)
Rising power polity	0.092**	0.092*	0.092*	0.092**	0.088**	0.088**	0.087**
	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.048	0.048	0.049
	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Military balance, log	-0.758	-0.758***	-0.758*	-0.758*	-0.447	-0.447	-0.568
	(0.610)	(0.266)	(0.459)	(0.431)	(0.414)	(0.414)	(0.445)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.117	-0.117	-0.117	-0.117	-0.066	-0.066	-0.067
	(1.085)	(0.791)	(0.992)	(1.035)	(0.995)	(0.995)	(0.983)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.593	0.593	0.593	0.593	0.507	0.507	0.502
	(1.129)	(0.695)	(1.119)	(1.130)	(1.085)	(1.085)	(1.023)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.907***	1.907	1.907**	1.907***	1.784***	1.784***	1.785***
	(0.615)	(1.186)	(0.942)	(0.699)	(0.671)	(0.671)	(0.590)
Number of major powers	-0.473*	-0.473*	-0.473	-0.473*	-0.449*	-0.449*	-0.448*
	(0.259)	(0.273)	(0.310)	(0.258)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.246)
Dispute participants	0.432***	0.432***	0.432***	0.432***	0.400***	0.400***	0.400***
	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.129)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.101)
Region dummy	-0.253	-0.253	-0.253	-0.253	-0.244	-0.244	-0.247
	(0.427)	(0.365)	(0.449)	(0.447)	(0.429)	(0.429)	(0.411)
Dispute duration, log	0.394***	0.394***	0.394***	0.394***	0.364***	0.364***	0.364***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.104)
Constant	-2.234	-2.234*	-2.234	-2.234	-2.880	-2.880	-2.474
	(2.709)	(1.295)	(2.176)	(2.015)	(1.936)	(1.936)	(2.215)
Model type	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Rare event logit	Rare event logit	Firth logit
Standard errors	Normal	Clustered by rising power	Clustered by year	Robust	Normal	Clustered by rising power	Normal
Observations	368	368	368	368	368	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Firth logit is penalized maximum likelihood estimation and does not allow clustering.

Table 38: Appendix alternative dependent variables

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power war	(3) All wars	(4) Violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.456**	2.308	2.248***	-0.380
	(0.217)	(2.172)	(0.749)	(0.332)
Political closure	0.890**	1.065	-0.810	0.447
	(0.402)	(1.138)	(0.669)	(0.423)
Status dissatisfaction	0.062**	0.059	-0.010	0.008
	(0.027)	(0.099)	(0.039)	(0.028)
Joint democracy	-1.849*	–	0.902	-0.124
	(1.016)	–	(1.481)	(0.422)
Rising power polity	0.092*	0.008	-0.067	0.009
	(0.054)	(0.081)	(0.061)	(0.047)
Hegemon/challenger polity	0.054	-0.018	-0.023	0.065*
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.074)	(0.034)
Military balance, log	-0.758***	-0.643	0.477	-2.189*
	(0.266)	(0.821)	(1.201)	(1.326)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.117	-14.052***	-1.752*	-1.134**
	(0.791)	(2.273)	(0.957)	(0.459)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.593	13.764***	0.658	1.593***
	(0.695)	(1.815)	(0.804)	(0.533)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.907	2.121	-0.984	1.139**
	(1.186)	(1.437)	(0.829)	(0.579)
Number of major powers	-0.473*	-1.004	0.029	-0.432
	(0.273)	(1.061)	(0.530)	(0.287)
Dispute participants	0.432***	0.978**	0.517***	0.090
	(0.146)	(0.380)	(0.133)	(0.069)
Region dummy	-0.253	2.332	0.001	-0.115
	(0.365)	(1.902)	(0.766)	(0.307)
Dispute duration, log	0.394***	2.991***	1.573***	0.363***
	(0.109)	(0.808)	(0.245)	(0.056)
Constant	-2.234*	-20.333***	-14.045***	8.357**
	(1.295)	(5.185)	(4.824)	(4.175)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Observations	368	313	368	368

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model (2) note: no major power wars have taken place under joint democracy between a rising power and the hegemon, so perfect prediction leads to exclusion of this variable and 55 observations.

Table 39: Appendix sensitivity to the 13 rising power cases

VARIABLES	(1) Major power violent dispute	(2) Major power violent dispute	(3) Major power violent dispute	(4) Major power violent dispute	(5) Major power violent dispute	(6) Major power violent dispute	(7) Major power violent dispute	(8) Major power violent dispute	(9) Major power violent dispute	(10) Major power violent dispute	(11) Major power violent dispute	(12) Major power violent dispute	(13) Major power violent dispute
Monopolization sought	0.273	0.394*	0.531**	0.420*	0.432	0.520*	0.428	0.456*	0.454	0.516**	0.454**	0.384**	0.447**
	(0.190)	(0.203)	(0.244)	(0.243)	(0.314)	(0.289)	(0.316)	(0.238)	(0.304)	(0.213)	(0.217)	(0.196)	(0.220)
Political closure	0.915**	0.873**	0.836*	0.857**	0.729*	0.802*	1.408***	0.985**	0.618	0.855**	0.869**	0.943**	0.936**
	(0.460)	(0.403)	(0.430)	(0.431)	(0.413)	(0.460)	(0.385)	(0.394)	(0.458)	(0.414)	(0.405)	(0.480)	(0.394)
Status dissatisfaction	0.073**	0.060**	0.062**	0.070**	0.055	0.073**	0.063*	0.065**	0.048*	0.072**	0.060**	0.040**	0.060**
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.028)
Joint democracy	-1.415	-1.965*	-2.655**	-1.909*	-1.088	-2.756***	-1.563	-1.517	-1.722*	-2.191*	-1.798*	-1.946*	-1.002
	(0.996)	(1.072)	(1.225)	(1.103)	(1.162)	(0.988)	(1.417)	(0.965)	(0.954)	(1.247)	(1.000)	(1.059)	(0.761)
Rising power polity	0.044	0.101	0.105*	0.110**	0.069	0.157***	0.031	0.066	0.095*	0.084	0.093*	0.080	0.092*
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Hegemon/challenger polity	-0.018	0.066	0.057	0.057	0.026	0.122***	0.080	0.040	0.033	0.044	0.056	0.047	0.051
	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Military balance, log	-0.768***	-0.755***	-0.705***	-0.568**	-0.407	-1.007***	-0.950***	-0.655**	-0.745***	-0.778***	-0.766***	-0.710**	-0.719**
	(0.292)	(0.270)	(0.254)	(0.236)	(1.057)	(0.315)	(0.294)	(0.299)	(0.270)	(0.275)	(0.266)	(0.311)	(0.280)
Rising power nuclear weapons dummy	-0.576	-0.058	-0.563	0.087	0.108	-0.234	-1.542	-0.171	-0.366	0.743	-0.297	-0.132	0.522
	(0.691)	(0.802)	(0.979)	(0.717)	(0.740)	(0.729)	(1.365)	(0.832)	(0.861)	(0.701)	(0.819)	(1.104)	(0.536)
Major power nuclear weapons dummy	0.682	0.582	1.058	0.511	0.797	0.344	1.504	0.553	0.619	-0.221	0.760	1.056	0.173
	(0.613)	(0.686)	(0.902)	(0.618)	(0.626)	(0.583)	(1.705)	(0.684)	(0.713)	(0.614)	(0.711)	(1.146)	(0.407)
Unbalanced multipolarity	1.722	1.944	1.829	2.731**	2.946**	0.849	1.281	2.210*	1.642	1.819	1.897	1.573	1.872
	(1.105)	(1.222)	(1.203)	(1.121)	(1.424)	(1.191)	(1.317)	(1.301)	(1.170)	(1.225)	(1.193)	(1.160)	(1.195)
Number of major powers	-0.422	-0.488*	-0.463*	-0.607**	-0.611**	-0.752**	-0.351	-0.475*	-0.333	-0.366	-0.485*	-0.279	-0.387
	(0.270)	(0.282)	(0.279)	(0.273)	(0.303)	(0.295)	(0.421)	(0.266)	(0.259)	(0.291)	(0.277)	(0.324)	(0.265)
Dispute participants	0.353***	0.432***	0.435***	0.507***	0.559***	0.438**	0.389**	0.436***	0.354***	0.423***	0.425***	0.399***	0.424***
	(0.132)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.173)	(0.161)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.160)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.143)
Region dummy	-0.384	-0.313	-0.178	0.033	-0.291	-0.290	-0.300	-0.293	-0.120	-0.375	-0.265	-0.081	-0.186
	(0.385)	(0.355)	(0.379)	(0.252)	(0.354)	(0.502)	(0.516)	(0.389)	(0.438)	(0.398)	(0.363)	(0.332)	(0.375)
Dispute duration, log	0.402***	0.396***	0.375***	0.424***	0.392***	0.537***	0.442***	0.392***	0.348***	0.354***	0.393***	0.368***	0.412***
	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.144)	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.099)	(0.114)
Constant	-0.346	-2.361*	-2.582**	-3.051**	-2.842	-1.830	-2.474*	-2.121	-2.201	-2.392*	-2.102	-3.098**	-3.041**
	(1.329)	(1.360)	(1.308)	(1.343)	(3.963)	(1.254)	(1.288)	(1.384)	(1.356)	(1.395)	(1.311)	(1.359)	(1.414)
Clustered standard errors	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power	By rising power
Excluding rising power:	Britain, 1816-56	Russia, 1860-90	USA, 1865-1900	Germany, 1880-1914	Japan, 1890-1937	Italy, 1900-40	USA, 1920-60	Germany, 1933-39	Soviet Union, 1950-70	W. Germany, 1950-90	Japan, 1960-90	China, 1975-2010	India, 2000-10
Observations	341	354	341	349	334	321	327	352	315	353	359	316	354

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1