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Matching with contracts: an efficient marriage market?

Abstract:
This paper studies a marriage market with two-sided information asymmetry in whichthe gains from marriage are stochastic. Contracts specify divisions of ex-post realizedmarital surplus. I first study a game in which one side of the matching market offerscontracts. I show that when expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents
Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2012-11-26
Paper number:
630
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1143789
Local pid:
pubs:1143789
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

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