Frege puzzles in metaphysical debates

Thesis

Frege puzzles arise in opaque contexts—linguistic contexts in which sentences that differ only in co-referential expressions appear to differ in truth value. These cases challenge the principle of compositionality, which holds that the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by the semantic values of its parts, and thus expressions with the same semantic value should be freely substitutable without affecting truth value. Propositional attitude verbs such as “know” and “believe”, as well as terms like “because”, are taken to generate opacity: both attitude ascription and explanation appear to be sensitive not only to the referents of the relevant expressions, but also to the manner in which those referents are represented.

This dissertation examines a range of philosophical problems through the framework of Frege puzzles. Chapter 1 discusses verbal disputes; Chapter 2 addresses the Knowledge Argument against physicalism; Chapter 3 analyses reductive accounts of metaphysical explanation. The dissertation aims to show, first, that the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions plays a central role in these debates, and that the intuitions driving them frequently arise from the presence of expressions that give rise to apparently opaque contexts. Second, it argues that potential solutions to the problems in question—including the relevant error theories—often amount, in effect, to familiar strategies for resolving Frege puzzles.

By drawing out these connections, the dissertation aims to offer a unifying framework that brings together seemingly unrelated issues, while providing insights into the scope and significance of Frege puzzles and the conceptual tools involved in their formulation. More broadly, this dissertation seeks to motivate an anti-exceptionalist stance to the problems discussed. Recognizing these issues as manifestations of a familiar phenomenon reduces the need for ad hoc theoretical devices tailored to each individual case.

Authors: Sassarini, E

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-vjnvydq85
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: fundamentality; phenomenal knowledge; verbal disputes; phenomenal states; propositional attitude ascription; disagreement; perspicuity; modes of presentation; semantic content
• Subjects: Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Metaphysics