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Working paper

Evolutionary dynamics and fast convergence in the assignment game

Abstract:

We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility. At random points in time firms and workers match, break up, and re-match in the sesarch for better opportunities. We propose a simple learning process in which players have no knowledge about other players' payoffs or actions and they update their behavior in a myopic fashion. Behavior fluctuates according to a random variable that reflects current market conditions: sometimes the firms exhi...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2014-03-03
Paper number:
700
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1143710
Local pid:
pubs:1143710
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

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