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Dynamically stable preferences

Abstract:

This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched to play a symmetric 2 x 2 game in biological fitnesses. Each agent is biased in favor of one of the strategies, and receives a noisy signal of his and his opponent's bias. With sufficiently accurate signals, the resulting global game selects a unique outcome, allowing preference biases to be shaped by the replicator dynamics. Stability analysis in this setting requires the e...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2004-10-01
Paper number:
207
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1144224
Local pid:
pubs:1144224
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

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