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A Hotelling-Downs framework for party nominees

Abstract:
We present a model for the strategic selection of party nominees, where competing groups choose their representatives based on the expected electoral returns. Technically, we look at a generalisation of the Hotelling-Downs model, where each nominee has a predefined position on the political spectrum and attracts the closest voters compared to all other representatives. Within this framework we explore the algorithmic properties of Nash equilibria, which are not guaranteed to exist even in two party competitions. We show that finding a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete for the general case. However, if there are only two competing parties, this can be achieved in linear time. The results readily extend to games with restricted positioning options for the players involved, such as facility location and Voronoi games.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.5555/3463952.3464025
Publication website:
http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2021/forms/index.htm

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Association for Computing Machinery
Host title:
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2021)
Pages:
593-601
Publication date:
2021-05-03
Acceptance date:
2020-12-17
Event title:
20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 20201)
Event location:
Virtual event
Event website:
https://aamas2021.soton.ac.uk/
Event start date:
2021-05-03
Event end date:
2021-05-07
DOI:
ISSN:
2523-5699
ISBN:
9781450383073


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1168870
Local pid:
pubs:1168870
Deposit date:
2021-03-22

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