Journal article
Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
- Abstract:
- I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 395.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Journal:
- International Journal of Game Theory More from this journal
- Volume:
- 45
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 817–838
- Publication date:
- 2015-08-04
- Acceptance date:
- 2015-07-27
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1432-1270
- ISSN:
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0020-7276
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1599270
- UUID:
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uuid:e835d423-f3fc-40cd-862a-1b4b5df7a861
- Local pid:
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pubs:1599270
- Deposit date:
-
2015-09-14
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
- Copyright date:
- 2015
- Rights statement:
- © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Springer Berlin Heidelberg at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5
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