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Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities

Abstract:
I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5

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Department:
Department of Economics, University of Oxford
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Publisher's website
Journal:
International Journal of Game Theory
Acceptance date:
2015-06-29
DOI:
EISSN:
1432-1270
ISSN:
0020-7276

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