On the memory of the soul: the spiritualist metaphysic of Saint Augustine and Henri Bergson

Thesis

This doctoral dissertation, On the Memory of the Soul: The Spiritualist Metaphysic of Saint Augustine and Henri Bergson, systematically presents the philosophical argument for the immateriality of the soul based on the phenomenon of recollection. It engages in a novel conceptual reconstruction of this argument by uniting the historically disparate philosophies of Saint Augustine (354–430) and Henri Bergson (1859– 1941). This dissertation not only provides an original comparative study of these monolithic thinkers, but it also rehabilitates and reframes their ideas by placing them in the context of both historical and contemporary philosophical discourse surrounding mind–body dualism and reductive materialism. With Bergson and Augustine, we advance a novel conception of the relationship between memory, time, and the human mind which serves to challenge the modern belief that the idea of the soul has no place in contemporary philosophy.

This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I, “Psychology” (Chapters I and II) consists in an analysis of memory in its diverse forms and a critical assessment of its traditional philosophical explanations. Part II, “Metaphysics” (Chapters III and IV), follows the steady approach from this alternative philosophy of memory to its wider implications for theories of self, mind, and soul. In Chapter I, “Image and Act”, we begin with an analysis of the psychology of memory and its ordinary operations. In Chapter II, “Brain and Mind”, we situate this model within the context of contemporary memory theory and question the limitations of the current “brain–storage” and “computer–brain” paradigms. In Chapter III, “Time and Duration”, we illustrate how memory expresses the peculiar relationship between the human being and time, expressed by Bergson in his concept of duration (la durée) and by Augustine in his concept of the distentio animi. In Chapter IV, “Memory and Soul”, we explore the meaning of soul, mind, and person in light of the previous analysis of recollection. Finally, in the Conclusion, we summarise the synthetic vision of the Augustinian–Bergsonian metaphysic of time, life, and memory.

Authors: Gross, V

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-qyaz6m1br
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Augustine; computational theory of mind; consciousness; philosophy of mind; soul; Plotinus; Bergson; memory
• Subjects: Philosophy; Philosophical theology