Efficient explanations: a powers hypothesis for how the mental causes

Thesis

This thesis attempts to offer a powers causation solution to the difficulties posed by mental causation. I do so by arguing against what I call “events-pair” analyses of causation. As is known, mental causation seems to raise the problems of overdetermination and the possible exclusion of the mental cause. Jaegwon Kim presents one possible answer by using his Supervenience Argument to urge reduction, whereas Thomas Kroedel presents another by defending a Lewisian counterfactual condition for causation. I argue that both these views use a common view of causation that depends on the assumption that causation is the relationship between a pair of temporally separated events. Against this assumption, I present and defend a powers view of causation, which can account for both the simultaneity and interruptibility of a causal process. I then apply the powers perspective to mental causation, with the beneficial results that overdetermination no longer poses a threat, double-prevention can be re-analyzed into constituent causal stages, and mental causes can be, without contradiction, one part of the sufficient cause of intentional bodily movement. Overall, I thus present a new powers solution to the difficulties of mental causation.

Authors: Nolan, W

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-yjkn8mrbx
• Type of award: BPhil
• Level of award: Bachelors
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: philosophy of Mind; mental causation; powers causation; counterfactuals; overdetermination
• Subjects: Causation; Philosophy of mind