Thesis
Sovereign contingent liabilities: a perspective on default and debt crises
- Abstract:
-
Chapters 2-3: A global games approach to sovereign debt crises
The first chapters present a model that investigates the risks involved when a fiscal authority attempts to roll-over a stock of debt and there is the potential for coordination failure by investors. A continuum of investors, after receiving signals about the authority's willingness to repay, decides whether to roll-over the stock of debt. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates, the authority defaults. ...
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Actions
+ Department of Economics, University of Oxford; Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
More from this funder
- Funding agency for:
- Menzies, J
- Publication date:
- 2014
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- Oxford University, UK
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:c25e36be-bd42-4a0f-9af6-42d17f87424f
- Local pid:
-
ora:10639
- Deposit date:
-
2015-03-19
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- John Menzies
- Copyright date:
- 2015
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