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Thesis

Sovereign contingent liabilities: a perspective on default and debt crises

Abstract:

Chapters 2-3: A global games approach to sovereign debt crises

The first chapters present a model that investigates the risks involved when a fiscal authority attempts to roll-over a stock of debt and there is the potential for coordination failure by investors. A continuum of investors, after receiving signals about the authority's willingness to repay, decides whether to roll-over the stock of debt. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates, the authority defaults. ...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Keble College
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics
Role:
Author

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Role:
Supervisor
Publication date:
2014
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
Oxford University, UK
URN:
uuid:c25e36be-bd42-4a0f-9af6-42d17f87424f
Local pid:
ora:10639

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