Vagueness, inconsistency, and semantic competence

Thesis

I defend Cognitive Inconsistentism, a novel explanation of vagueness qua susceptibility to sorites paradoxes. The view is contrasted with the Inconsistency Theories of Michael Dummett and Matti Eklund. I argue that these latter views are committed to unattractive theories of linguistic understanding. I propose an alternative Chomskyan, cognitive theory of linguistic understanding. I employ this cognitive framework to argue that speakers mentally represent a similarity constraint on conceptual classification, which is causally and explanatorily implicated in language acquisition and use. This cognitive similarity constraint causally explains our linguistic intuitions with respect to sorites paradoxes.

Authors: Davies, W

• Publication date: 2008
• Type of award: BPhil
• Level of award: Bachelors
• Awarding institution: Oxford University, UK
• Language: English
• Keywords: understanding; inconsistency; vagueness; semantics
• Subjects: Philosophy of mind; Philosophy