From reasons to rules

Thesis

What reasons for action do we have? When do our reasons conflict with each other? How are these practical conflicts resolved? And, most importantly, what ought we do in the face of such conflicts? To answer these questions, the thesis develops and defends the balance model of practical reason, according to which: our reasons conflict when they favour incompatible actions, these conflicts are resolved by the relative strength of our reasons, and we ought to act according to the balance of all our reasons. This simple idea has been famously contested by Joseph Raz, who has put forward an alternative theory of practical reason, the exclusion model. This model rejects that it is always the case that we ought to guide our conduct in light of the balance of our ordinary (first-order) reasons. Conversely, it holds that in certain cases we also have (second-order) exclusionary reasons not to act for some reasons on balance that defeat these reasons by their kind, not by their strength. The thesis uses Raz’s model as a foil for illuminating and advocating the balance model. Specifically, it elaborates that the balance model has the resources to account for all the normative phenomena in the situations where exclusionary reasons supposedly arise, namely cases involving: temporary deliberative incapacities, personal decisions, authoritative directives, and voluntary undertakings. Building on this argumentation, the thesis finally shows that the balance model can solve the notorious puzzle of rules which entails that rules must be either redundant or unjustified. To this end, it proposes a new theory of rules, according to which the modus operandi of rules is to change our epistemic position and thereby put us in a new practical situation where we have undefeated reason on balance to act accordingly.

Authors: Vassiliou, A

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-r5bjyoqmz
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: rules; practical reasons; normativity
• Subjects: Philosophy of Law