Thesis
Shades of value: aesthetic properties, aesthetic value and the determination relation
- Abstract:
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Many believe that different aesthetically valuable things have different kinds of aesthetic value: Yosemite and the Norfolk Broads have aesthetic value of different kinds. This raises the question: what are the kinds of aesthetic value? One answer is particularly popular. According to the kind thesis, the kinds of aesthetic value are aesthetic properties, i.e. elegance, monotony, flamboyance and the like. This claim is usually articulated by way of analogy: the relationship is like that between redness and colour, that is one of determination.
This thesis argues that the kind thesis is false. This has been largely overlooked for two reasons. Firstly, insufficient attention has been devoted to the features of kindhood and determination relations. Secondly, very little has been said about the metaphysics of what it is to be P in some respect, or pro tanto P. This notion is central to assessing the kind thesis, which is best read as claiming that aesthetic properties are kinds of pro tanto aesthetic value. After all, elegance does not always make its bearers overall aesthetically good, although it may always make them pro tanto aesthetically good. Once the metaphysics of what is the case pro tanto is examined more closely, even this articulation of the kind thesis fails.
Two alternatives are considered. According to dimensionalism, the relationship between aesthetic properties and aesthetic value is like that between brightness, hue and saturation and colour. According to realizationism, it is like that between brains and minds.
A surprising argument exactly parallel to that against the kind thesis shows that aesthetic value is not a kind of value. This will strike many as implausible – but, importantly, it does not involve denying that aesthetically valuable things are valuable. Philosophers have overlooked how demanding the notion of a kind is.
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(Preview, Dissemination version, pdf, 2.0MB, Terms of use)
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Authors
Contributors
+ Hanson, L
- Institution:
- University of Oxford
- Division:
- HUMS
- Department:
- Philosophy
- Role:
- Supervisor
+ Grant, J
- Institution:
- University of Oxford
- Division:
- HUMS
- Department:
- Philosophy
- Role:
- Supervisor
+ Catharine, A
- Institution:
- University of Oxford
- Division:
- HUMS
- Department:
- Philosophy
- Role:
- Examiner
- ORCID:
- 0000-0002-8165-1790
+ Dodd, J
- Role:
- Examiner
- DOI:
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- Deposit date:
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2026-04-20
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Artur Harris
- Copyright date:
- 2025
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