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Is it a norm to favour your own group?

Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Author


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Funder identifier:
https://ror.org/03n0ht308
Grant:
ES/I000208/2


Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Experimental Economics More from this journal
Volume:
18
Issue:
3
Pages:
491-521
Publication date:
2014-08-27
Acceptance date:
2014-08-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1573-6938
ISSN:
1386-4157


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:484911
UUID:
uuid:b0f83e54-68f4-4bf6-88c8-336209372151
Local pid:
pubs:484911
Source identifiers:
484911
Deposit date:
2018-07-26

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