Journal article
Is it a norm to favour your own group?
- Abstract:
- This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
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- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 11.3MB, Terms of use)
-
(Supplementary materials, doc, 125.3KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9
Authors
+ Economic and Social Research Council
More from this funder
- Funder identifier:
- https://ror.org/03n0ht308
- Grant:
- ES/I000208/2
- Publisher:
- Springer
- Journal:
- Experimental Economics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 18
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 491-521
- Publication date:
- 2014-08-27
- Acceptance date:
- 2014-08-05
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1573-6938
- ISSN:
-
1386-4157
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:484911
- UUID:
-
uuid:b0f83e54-68f4-4bf6-88c8-336209372151
- Local pid:
-
pubs:484911
- Source identifiers:
-
484911
- Deposit date:
-
2018-07-26
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Economic Science Association
- Copyright date:
- 2014
- Rights statement:
- © Economic Science Association 2014
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Springer at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9
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