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Thesis

Confidential remote computing

Abstract:

Since their market launch in late 2015, trusted hardware enclaves have revolutionised the computing world with data-in-use protections. Their security features of confidentiality, integrity and attestation attract many application developers to move their valuable assets, such as cryptographic keys, password managers, private data, secret algorithms and mission-critical operations, into them. The potential security issues have not been well explored yet, and the quick integration movement into these widely available hardware technologies has created emerging problems. Today system and application designers utilise enclave-based protections for critical assets; however, the gap within the area of hardware-software co-design causes these applications to fail to benefit from strong hardware features. This research presents hands-on experiences, techniques and models on the correct utilisation of hardware enclaves in real-world systems.

We begin with designing a generic template for scalable many-party applications processing private data with mutually agreed public code. Many-party applications can vary from smart-grid systems to electronic voting infrastructures and block-chain smart contracts to internet-of-things deployments. Next, our research extensively examines private algorithms executing inside trusted hardware enclaves. We present practical use cases for protecting intellectual property, valuable algorithms and business or game logic besides private data. Our mechanisms allow querying private algorithms on rental services, querying private data with privacy filters such as differential privacy budgets, and integrity-protected computing power as a service. These experiences lead us to consolidate the disparate research into a unified Confidential Remote Computing (CRC) model. CRC consists of three main areas: the trusted hardware, the software development and the attestation domains. It resolves the ambiguity of trust in relevant fields and provides a systematic view of the field from past to future. Lastly, we examine the questions and misconceptions about malicious software profiting from security features offered by the hardware.

The more popular idea of confidential computing focuses on servers managed by major technology vendors and cloud infrastructures. In contrast, CRC focuses on practices in a more decentralised setting for end-users, system designers and developers.

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Sub department:
Computer Science
Research group:
Systems Security Group / Cyber Security Centre
Oxford college:
Kellogg College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0001-5484-7096

Contributors

Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Sub department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Kellogg College
Role:
Supervisor
ORCID:
0000-0002-8236-980X
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Sub department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Kellogg College
Role:
Examiner
ORCID:
0000-0003-2340-3040
Institution:
Royal Holloway University of London
Role:
Examiner
ORCID:
0000-0002-6118-0055


More from this funder
Funder identifier:
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100014013
Funding agency for:
Küçük, KA
Programme:
One chapter on InnovateUK/UKRI grant File reference: 105592
More from this funder
Funder identifier:
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100002418
Funding agency for:
Küçük, KA
Programme:
AppTRE Grant, first 2 years
More from this funder
Funder identifier:
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000769
Funding agency for:
Küçük, KA
Programme:
1-year on Computer Science Department Funds


DOI:
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford

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