Thesis
First impression biases and the value of blind auditioning
- Abstract:
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Motivated by the performing arts, I investigate the repercussions of an evaluator's bias against a specific group of applicants, such as women, in a setting where the evaluator decides upfront between holding an informed or a blind audition. In the latter case, the evaluator learns neither the applicant's ability nor the gender. I show that a blind audition comes with a fundamental trade-off: it avoids misleading first impressions but prohibits the screening of applicants by ability. Above a threshold bias, the evaluator prefers a blind audition to provide high effort incentives exclusively for highly able applicants while low-ability applicants do not participate. For a low bias, requiring supplementary information about the applicant's type acts as an efficient screening device and, thereby, provides such targeted effort incentives. From a policy perspective, committing to no information can, therefore, be beneficial for the evaluator if he knows that he would otherwise not be impartial. Applicants' audition preferences differ by ability if the evaluator's bias against female applicants is low and differ by gender if the bias is large. Surprisingly, the preferences of a highly biased evaluator align with those of a highly able female. My model explains the empirical finding that blind auditions have increased the probability of women being hired via taste-based discrimination and challenges competing explanations grounded in statistical discrimination. Additionally, I show that uncertainty introduces the sizeable risk of market failure and may render informed auditions more profitable even if the evaluator is highly biased. From a policy perspective, ability-targeting interventions under uncertainty are, therefore, crucial to ensure equality of opportunity and to avoid zero-hour contracts.
Actions
- Type of award:
- MPhil
- Level of award:
- Masters
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- Deposit date:
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2020-06-04
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Droege, J
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