Journal article
Counterfactuals in “agreeing to disagree” type results
- Abstract:
- Moses and Nachum (1990) identified conceptual flaws (later echoed by Samet, 2010) in Bacharach's (1985) generalization of Aumann's (1976) seminal “agreeing to disagree” result by demonstrating that the crucial assumptions of like-mindedness and the Sure-Thing Principle are not meaningfully expressible in standard partitional information structures. This paper presents a new agreement theorem couched in “counterfactual information structures” that resolves these conceptual flaws. The new version of the Sure-Thing Principle introduced here, which accounts for beliefs at counterfactual states, is also shown to sit well with the intuition of the original version proposed by Savage (1972).
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 493.1KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.10.004
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Mathematical Social Sciences More from this journal
- Volume:
- 84
- Pages:
- 125-133
- Publication date:
- 2016-11-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-10-21
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
0165-4896
- ISSN:
-
0165-4896
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:664042
- UUID:
-
uuid:9cda5727-ebac-4026-bc76-5fed4a68bd38
- Local pid:
-
pubs:664042
- Source identifiers:
-
664042
- Deposit date:
-
2017-01-17
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.10.004].
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record