Anything but quiet: essays on the metaphysics of normativity

Thesis

This thesis concerns the meta-metaphysics of morality and of normativity more generally. Normative metaphysics often proceeds without much engagement with meta-metaphysics. My first aim is to rectify this neglect and encourage its broader correction. I do this by offering a sympathetic yet critical discussion of the so-called ‘quietist’ or ‘relaxed’ normative realism of Derek Parfit, John Skorupski, and Tim Scanlon. This discussion illustrates how attention to meta-metaphysics can demystify such views and explain their attractive features, the difficulties they face, and what meta-ethicists and meta-metaphysicians stand to gain from engagement with one another. My second aim is to explore two questions my discussion raises: is the moral error theory epistemically possible and, if so, what follows? And is there a way to generate a view in the spirit of ‘quietist’ views that appeals to assumptions likely held by their opponents?

Chapter 1 sympathetically develops Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism by appeal to truthmaker theory and reveals a troubling dilemma. Chapter 2 develops a response to this dilemma that suggests that non-realist cognitivism can be plausibly developed into what I call normative trivialism. Chapter 3 concerns Skorupski’s irrealist cognitivism and Meinongian meta-ethical theories in general, where I argue that we have good reason to pay attention to such views, dispel some misunderstandings of them, and argue that Skorupski’s irrealist cognitivism faces strong objections. Chapter 4 develops Scanlon’s novel theory and the background meta-metaphysics it relies upon, arguing that whilst my development can respond to common objections to Scanlon’s theory, it highlights novel challenges. Chapter 5 offers an argument from the epistemic possibility of the moral error theory against each of the aforementioned views, as well as any form of moral non-cognitivism and moral naturalism. Chapter 6 argues that if three widely held views are true, then the naturalism/non-naturalism debate is settled by ethical debate and concerned meta-ethicists should do normative ethics instead. I conclude whilst noting that, properly understood, ‘meta-ethical quietism’ is anything but quiet.

Authors: Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh, F

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-o5v0ojeoo
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Non-Realist Cognitivism; John Skorupski; Meta-Ethical Quietism; Relaxed Realism; Derek Parfit; Truthmaking; Tim Scanlon; Normative Realism; Ontological Pluralism; Meta-Metaphysics; Meta-Ethics; Irrealist Cognitivism; Non-Naturalist Normative Realism; Meinongianism
• Subjects: Meta-Metaphysics; Metaethics; Moral Philosophy; Metaphysics; Philosophy