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The evolution of misbelief

Abstract:
From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting "culpable" limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of "forgivably" limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs unlike occasional lucky falsehoods would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious - but doxastically noncommittal - action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1017/S0140525X09990975

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
SAME
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Anthropology and Museum Ethnography,School of - Anthropology and Mind,Centre for
Role:
Author
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Department:
The Center for Cognitive Studies
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Journal:
Behavioral and Brain Sciences More from this journal
Volume:
32
Issue:
6
Pages:
493-510
Publication date:
2009-12-01
Edition:
Accepted Manuscript
DOI:
EISSN:
1469-1825
ISSN:
0140-525X


Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:98289f10-e585-4e2d-9404-cb1c8f850532
Local pid:
ora:3476
Deposit date:
2010-03-09

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