Tool or distraction? The strategic role of crime control in U.S. military interventions in the early 21st century

Thesis

In both the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions, the United States confronted a pernicious crime-conflict nexus. This crime-conflict nexus often posed a dilemma for U.S. war strategy. On the one hand, crime spurred conflict by funding adversaries and contributing to grievances of the local population. Hence, the United States faced incentives to combat crime. On the other hand, crime was often an important avenue for civilians on the ground to make a living or crime financed important allies in the war. Hence, the United States was incentivised to ignore it. When and why did the United States seek to combat crime as part of its military strategy and when and why did it not? This thesis seeks to answer this question by building a theory which focusses on the politics of crime control in the United States. It argues that a mere demand for crime control efforts, based on the strategic requirements on the ground, is insufficient to lead to a strategic change in crime control. Instead, whether the United States decides to combat crime is dependent on domestic political considerations inside the United States. In particular, confronted with a decision on whether to implement crime control efforts in a military intervention, the U.S. President and his advisors will weigh the expected domestic audience costs from ignoring crime against the expected material and human costs of crime control. If the former outweighs the latter, the United States will implement crime control efforts in the military intervention. If not, then it will ignore crime in the military intervention.

Authors: Florenz, FG

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-5roza56jp
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: U.S. strategy; crime and conflict nexus; U.S. military interventions; U.S. foreign policy; illicit economies
• Subjects: International Relations