Postliberalism and its discontents: assessing the postliberal critique of liberalism

Thesis

This thesis concerns the postliberal critique of liberalism. It does not assess the overall value of liberalism as a theory of political morality, or of constructive ‘postliberal’ proposals in political theory. Rather, I ask: have thinkers labelled (by themselves or by others) ‘postliberal’ propounded a novel and distinct critique of liberalism; and is this critique true or false?

I argue that there is a novel and distinct postliberal critique. This critique is what I call, drawing on Kevin Vallier, the No Alternatives Argument. This argument claims that it is impossible to sustainably realise the protection of the basic rights of citizens holding both progressive and traditionalist conceptions of human flourishing, at the same time.

The conceptual No Alternatives Argument claims that any theory of political morality purporting to endorse protecting basic rights for both progressive and traditionalists is conceptually incoherent. The empirical Argument argues that, as a matter of fact, mutual rights protections for progressive and traditionalists are unrealisable because of structural dynamics that cause real-world liberal states to decay into progressive-authoritarian ones.

I show that the conceptual No Alternatives Argument is unsound; liberalism is not conceptually incoherent. I then show that the empirical No Alternatives Argument does not show that the decay of liberal states into progressive-authoritarianism is inevitable. However, it does show that actually-existing liberal states probably have a significant structural tendency towards such decay. This tendency poses a risk that traditionalists may lose their basic liberties.

I argue, however, that traditionalists concerned about this risk should regard real-world liberalism more favourably than postliberals recommend. This is for two reasons: first, the two most salient constructive postliberal proposals (state financial support for marriage and for religion) are compatible with central versions of liberalism; second, through promoting religion, the state can weaken the secular progressive-authoritarianism that postliberals fear. Postliberals can mitigate liberalism’s dangers without abandoning liberalism altogether.

Authors: Williams, J

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-ppnpp2adm
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: postliberalism; perfectionism; liberalism; religion and politics
• Subjects: Political science; Philosophy