Journal article
The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities
- Abstract:
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A long debated but still open question in the game theory literature is that of how to extend the Shapley Value to coalitional games with externalities. While previous work predominantly focused on developing alternative axiomatizations, in this article we propose a novel approach which centers around the coalition formation process and the underlying probability distribution from which a suitable axiomatization naturally follows. Specifically, we view coalition formation in games with extern...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 380.2KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.008
Authors
Funding
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior Journal website
- Volume:
- 108
- Pages:
- 65-80
- Publication date:
- 2017-05-08
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0899-8256
- Source identifiers:
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697504
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:697504
- UUID:
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uuid:921b2ddd-e79d-4040-beb0-79a9d7fdf67f
- Local pid:
- pubs:697504
- Deposit date:
- 2017-05-26
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier Inc
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.008
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