On what we should believe

Thesis

My aim is to understand our epistemic obligations. To what extent are we able to believe at will? If we are not able to believe at will, what ought we go about investigating? What must we learn for moral reasons? Independently of morality, what is of epistemic value? The dissertation seeks to help build a grand vision of the relationship between ethics and epistemology. It does not propose such a vision; rather, its organizing principle is to fill gaps in the literature to help enable such a vision. The thesis focuses almost exclusively on untrammelled ground. For this reason, some chapters are disconnected from others. However, each chapter presents opportunities and dangers for philosophers working on more widely discussed questions, for each has implications for their subject matter.

Authors: Helms, NR

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-g7k7g9qed
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: epistemic axiology; philosophy of action; epistemic dilemmas; doxastic voluntarism; doxastic incompatibilism; epistemology