Kantian-Republicanism: toward a new theory of political authority

Thesis

States claim to have normative powers that ordinary people, like you and me, do not. These include the powers to give others binding moral obligations and enforce those obligations with violence. Since ordinary moral agents lack these abilities, states are claiming to be exceptional. Obviously, claims to be exceptional require justification. If none can be found, then we ought to conclude that these claims are mistaken — we should all become anarchists. This would require a seismic shift in the way we see the world. Most people on earth are governed by states that claim to have these powers, and much of day-to-day life is built around institutions that take these powers for granted. Moreover, many see the obligations purportedly created by their states as partly constitutive of their national identity and sense of self. Therefore, agreeing with the anarchist is not something we should do lightly. This is the problem of political authority. In this thesis, I examine the political philosophy of Immanuel Kant in search of ideas that might help us make progress on this problem. The result of this investigation is the sketching of a new(ish) theory of authority: Kantian-Republicanism. This combines the structure of Kant’s theory with the republican apparatus of popular control. I argue that this theory is worthy of further consideration and development because it helps move the debate forward on the problem of political authority.

Authors: Elijah, L

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-7jg7nar0j
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Kant; Republicanism; political authority; political legitimacy
• Subjects: Political Philosophy