Reflections on the intellectual foundations for metaphysical ground

Thesis

"This essay is a plea for ideological toleration", wrote Rosen (2010) on the idioms of metaphysical dependence, and especially '(metaphysical) ground'. This thesis is likewise a plea for ideological clarity. Much work on ground has connected it to "metaphysical explanation" – perhaps distinct from its causal cousin – and maintained that ground is somehow ineluctably wrapped up with it. Unfortunately, there is hardly consensus about what "explanation" is; the term 'explanation' is itself highly ambiguous, and is used by many philosophers in various guises, often without recognition and in theoretically risky ways.

It is my aim here to bring some lucidity to debates about ground vis-à-vis "explanation". To do so, I will do a few things. I will begin by trying to home in on the phenomenon of interest in the literature on ground – which I refer to as constitutive determination,/em> – absent potentially distracting talk of "explanation". Next, I will consider the varieties of "explanation" relevant to ground-theoretic discourse, imposing some basic conditions on constraints on things that may plausibly be so named. Given these considerations, I will then try to throw into relief some metaphysical and greater philosophical commitments of several of ground's biggest supporters – including and centrally those regarding the nature of "explanation" – drawing connections between them when possible, and demonstrating their (dis)agreements too. Ultimately, I believe that certain significant beliefs about "ground" may illicitly trade in ambiguities of "explanation", intentionally or not, leading to either erroneous theoretical posits, or the right ones for the wrong reasons. As such, I will offer what I take to be the most promising position for the realist who recognizes a seemingly unified phenomenon of constitutive determination – namely, that of a metaphysical dependence relation holding between entities or phenomena of arbitrary ontological category – and attempt to demonstrate where I think some philosophers who instead offer a more restricted relation, such as one holding only between facts, have been led astray. All told, without recognition of vital distinctions among the varieties of explanation, "explanation"-talk may be more harmful than helpful in theorizing about "ground".

Authors: Albergo, T

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-5jkgp8yeg
• Type of award: BPhil
• Level of award: Bachelors
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Metaphysics; Facts; Ontology; Explanation; Causation; Grounding; Philosophy; Determination relation
• Subjects: Metaphysics; Philosophy; Explanation