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Bargaining and social structure.

Abstract:

This paper presents a bargaining model between individuals belonging to different groups where the equilibrium outcome depends on the communication network within each group. Belonging to a group gives an informational advantage: connections help to gather information about past transactions and this information can be used to make more accurate demands in future bargaining rounds. In the long-term there is a unique stochastically stable equilibruim which depends on the peripheral or least ...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2009-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:6c3aa2fc-9d74-482e-8a43-294845d47e8c
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14276
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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