A hybrid naive realist-representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness

Thesis

This is a Thesis about a tension in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness. Many philosophers have endorsed the view that phenomenally conscious perceptual experiences are transparent, in the sense that when we try to attend to those experiences, we find ourselves instead attending to the objects and properties in the external world we perceive by undergoing them. At the same time, many are attracted to the view that the items we immediately attend to on introspecting our conscious pe...

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Authors: Mathers, D

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-6rbdkmvy1
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: Representationalism; Naive Realism; Consciousness; Perception
• Subjects: Philosophy; Consciousness; Philosophy of Perception; Philosophy of Mind