Journal article
Welfare‐Increasing Monopolization
- Abstract:
- The conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand to be sufficiently concave, and cannot hold when demand is convex. When there are no vertical issues conditions are found for elimination of an inefficient firm to raise welfare, building on Lahiri and Ono (1988). In general greater demand concavity increases the relative importance of the benefit of redistributing output to the efficient firm.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Version of Record, Version of record, pdf, 232.4KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/joie.12405
Authors
- Publisher:
- Wiley
- Journal:
- The Journal of Industrial Economics More from this journal
- Publication date:
- 2024-11-11
- Acceptance date:
- 2024-10-04
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-6451
- ISSN:
-
1467-6451 and 0022-1821
- Language:
-
English
- Source identifiers:
-
2412773
- Deposit date:
-
2024-11-12
This ORA record was generated from metadata provided by an external service. It has not been edited by the ORA Team.
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record