Property and Rawlsian justice

Thesis

What property institutions should be taken to characterize a society which is, by Rawlsian standards, just? The aim of my thesis is to answer this question. The thesis does so by focusing on three central questions of property and Rawlsian justice. The first is whether Rawlsian political philosophy should include a basic right to privately own or be eligible to privately own personal property. The second is whether Rawlsian political philosophy should include a basic right to privately own or be eligible to privately own productive property. The third is whether Rawlsian political philosophy should defend – on grounds other than a commitment to basic rights – the claim that all citizens should have a stake in the means of production. I answer these questions by doing two things. Firstly, I develop an account of what basic property rights a Rawlsian account of justice should include. With respect to the things normally taken to fall under a basic right to personal property – housing and personal items – I argue that Rawlsian justice should include a basic right to rent, rather than to own, these things. In the thesis, I spell out what a basic right to rent should be taken to consist in. I also argue that Rawlsian justice should not be understood to include a basic right to productive property of any sort. Secondly, I argue that Rawlsian political philosophy should not defend – on grounds other than a commitment to basic rights – the claim that all citizens should have a stake in the means of production. In making these arguments, the thesis claims that the Rawlsian view, properly understood, places less overall emphasis on the importance of ownership than has often been thought.

Authors: Wells, K

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-7r7odpxw1
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford