Thesis icon

Thesis

Prices as signals of quality

Abstract:

I consider the workings, under free entry, of some plausible mechanisms enforcing product quality when it is not readily observed by buyers, but is chosen by sellers: there is a moral hazard problem to be overcome. In equilibrium, uninformed buyers can often take price as indicating quality. This is however not the sarne as Spence's signalling notion, since quality is chosen by sellers. It is fruitful to consider price as a commitment, which changes the quality-incentives in a co...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Faculty of Social Studies
Role:
Author
Publication date:
1981
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford
Barcode:
602337148
URN:
uuid:46fbe824-027b-4692-9028-dd607607aa59
Local pid:
td:602337148
Language:
English
Subjects:

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP