- Abstract:
-
I consider the workings, under free entry, of some plausible mechanisms enforcing product quality when it is not readily observed by buyers, but is chosen by sellers: there is a moral hazard problem to be overcome. In equilibrium, uninformed buyers can often take price as indicating quality. This is however not the sarne as Spence's signalling notion, since quality is chosen by sellers. It is fruitful to consider price as a commitment, which changes the quality-incentives in a co...
Expand abstract - Publication date:
- 1981
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
- URN:
-
uuid:46fbe824-027b-4692-9028-dd607607aa59
- Local pid:
- td:602337148
- Language:
- English
- Subjects:
- Copyright holder:
- Farrell, Joseph von Rosthorn
- Copyright date:
- 1981
- Notes:
- The digital copy of this thesis has been made available thanks to the generosity of Dr Leonard Polonsky
Thesis
Prices as signals of quality
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