The prohibition on veto use: formal rules, informal norms, and retaliation in European Union sanctions negotiations

Thesis

The primary decision rule in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is unanimity. This means that each member state has the right to veto most decisions. Curiously, member states do not always exercise that right even when they prefer to block a decision. Instead of blocking undesirable decisions, they cooperate. This thesis focuses on sanctions, the most important instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Why do member states agree to sanctions that they would prefer to block? Why do they not exercise the veto right? This thesis argues that opposed member states cooperate because they expect retaliation for exercising the veto, and they expect retaliation because there is a community norm against veto use. While all member states formally have the right to block decisions, the exercise of this right is informally severely restricted. Veto use is prohibited, except where it is exercised to protect national interests perceived to be vital. Drawing primarily on official documents and interviews with national diplomats, this thesis establishes the norm against veto use in the study of three cases: sanctions against Russia, sanctions against Belarus, and sanctions against Turkey.

Authors: Raissar, G

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-2a9dnedq0
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: European Union; common foreign and security policy; European Union foreign policy; sanctions