Journal article
Drugs, guns, and targeted competition
- Abstract:
- We consider a dynamic competition game involving three players, in which each player can vary the extent of his competition on a per-rival basis. We call such competition targeted. We show that if the players are myopic, then the weaker players eventually lose the game to their strongest rival. If instead the players are sufficiently far-sighted, then all three players converge in their power and stay in the game. We develop our model in application to drug wars, but the approach of targeted competition can be applied to competition between firms or political parties, or to warfare.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 191.2KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.007
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior More from this journal
- Volume:
- 87
- Pages:
- 497-507
- Publication date:
- 2014-07-28
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0899-8256
- Language:
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English
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:975832
- UUID:
-
uuid:348da5ca-0018-4001-85b4-3565806653d7
- Local pid:
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pubs:975832
- Deposit date:
-
2019-02-22
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier
- Copyright date:
- 2014
- Notes:
- © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.007
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