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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.

Abstract:
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fÄur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189{206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141{162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2005-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:292327e7-a37b-44be-9d8a-3db7954fc78e
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13572
Deposit date:
2013-04-20

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