Power, power politics and the periphery of the European Banking Union

Thesis

The establishment of the European Banking Union marked a significant shift in the supervision of credit institutions within the Eurozone, transferring authority from national competent authorities to the European Central Bank and creating the Single Resolution Board for the recovery and resolution of failing banks. Despite the objective to create a set of uniform rules that would apply to all credit institutions established in the Eurozone, regulatory rules remain inherently incomplete, leaving room for the exercise of ex post discretion. While the European Banking Union framework stipulates ex ante that the European Central Bank and the Single Resolution Board must act in the interest of the EU as a whole, individual member states have strong incentives to prioritise their domestic interests ex post. This dynamic requires an examination of the role of power in shaping, supervising and enforcing financial regulations within the Eurozone. This thesis introduces an analytical framework to categorize power into instrumental, institutional and structural forms, revealing a core-periphery divide where core member states exert greater influence over regulatory practices. The analysis suggests that core states have shaped the European Banking Union to align with their national interests, raising concerns about power imbalances and potential biases that judicial review alone may not fully address due to its inherent limitations in this complex and specialized field. The thesis contends that amending the EBU's institutional framework is essential to ameliorate power disparities among member states, warning that the prevailing dynamics, which favour core states, threaten the EBU's long-term stability in the face of rising Euroscepticism. Nonetheless, it recognises that the legal frameworks within the EBU are deeply embedded in the Eurozone’s banking system structure and in major power confrontations, strategic state interests and power capabilities frequently overshadow legal arguments.

Authors: Chatzivasileiadis , A

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-jvj5nmnng
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: European Banking Union; power; core; periphery; Eurozone; Single Supervisory Mechanism; Single Resolution Mechanism; European Central Bank; Single Resolution Board
• Subjects: Financial Regulation; Law; Political Economy