Three articles on international economic coercion: aid suspensions, retaliation, and weaponised interdependence

Thesis

How do states leverage their international interactions to influence foreign policy outcomes through economic coercion? This thesis comprises three studies investigating states' ability to exert power at the international level by restricting international economic interactions.

Article 1 integrates research on economic sanctions and foreign aid by assessing the relative effectiveness of sanctions and aid suspensions. It argues that aid suspensions are more effective at obtaining foreign policy concessions. A quantitative analysis estimates the success rate of imposed aid suspensions to be 44% and that of economic sanctions 26%. The results are robust across two alternative datasets and newly gathered data. Qualitative interview evidence corroborates the outlined mechanisms.

Article 2 investigates when sanctioned states retaliate by adopting countersanctions. It posits that materially powerful sanctioning states deter retaliation through their ability to absorb economic costs. Materially weaker states lack this ability and disproportionately benefit from the support of international organisations (IOs) when sanctioning stronger adversaries. An event study analysis using cross-sectional panel data provides empirical support for this argument while carefully mitigating various potential biases inherent in the observational study of economic coercion.

Article 3 contributes to the study of 'weaponised interdependence,' a field investigating how states use their international economic relationships to coerce others. The article focuses on monopolies and monopsonies—situations where one party in an economic exchange lacks alternatives. It argues that a state's capacity to inflict economic and political costs depends on the strength of the international monopolies and monopsonies it controls. Informed by interview evidence, the theory delineates three sources each for monopolies and monopsonies, offering a nuanced understanding of why specific economic exchanges can be 'weaponised.'

Collectively, these studies make theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions to the field of international economic coercion. They have important implications for states and other actors operating within the international political economy.

Authors: Mertens, C

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-gjdw0ejxd
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: economic sanctions; economic coercion; weaponised interdependence; aid suspensions; international political economy
• Subjects: Economic coercion, economic sanctions, aid suspensions, weaponised interdependence, international political economy