Assembly dissolution powers and incumbency advantages in coalition formation

Journal article

Abstract:: Are dominant governing parties with discretion to call early elections better able to negotiate their return to office? Dominant incumbents in parliamentary democracies sometimes have extensive powers to dissolve parliament, which enables them to affect coalition bargaining. Yet, whether these powers advantage them in forming the next coalition remains poorly understood. To address this gap, this article develops a theory of coalition formation in the shadow of parliamentary dissolution. Incumbents who can dissolve the assembly, it argues, are more likely to return to government than their peers who lack this power because they enjoy greater bargaining leverage and reputational advantages in coalition formation. The article tests this expectation using mixed and conditional logistic regression analysis of data on 631 government formation opportunities and 433,401 potential coalitions and finds that coalition leaders with discretion to dissolve parliament secure significant advantages in negotiating their return to power.

Files:: Schleiter_and_Bucur_2023_Assembly_dissolution_powers.pdf

(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 360.1KB, Terms of use)

Appendix.pdf

(Preview, Supplementary materials, pdf, 596.2KB, Terms of use)

Language:: English
Keywords:: incumbency advantage

assembly dissolution

cabinet formation

legislative bargaining

coalition formation
Pubs id:: 1317640
Local pid:: pubs:1317640
Deposit date:: 2023-01-03
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_aaa4c3b343524819abbe8cbd4b3197d3

Copyright holder:: Informa UK Limited
Notes:: This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Taylor and Francis at https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2165356

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record