

Assembly dissolution powers and incumbency advantages in coalition formation

Petra Schleiter

Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Oxford

Cristina Bucur

Lecturer/Assistant Professor, University College Dublin

Online Appendix

OA 1: Data and variables

This section provides further information about our data and variables. Table OA 1.1 details the number of formation opportunities per country; table OA 1.2 reports descriptive statistics for all variables; table OA 1.3 provides information about the data sources and coding; table OA 1.4 gives the dissolution power scores of prime ministers and governments, based on Goplerud and Schleiter (2016), for the countries and time periods covered by our data.

Our dataset is constructed on the basis of the coalition governments included in the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016) and cross validated using data on government composition and seat distributions of the European Representative Democracy Data Archive (Andersson *et al.* 2014). It covers 631 coalition formation opportunities, i.e., situations in which parties bargain and form a new government, in 32 parliamentary democracies from World War II or democratization to 2015. Because we are interested in the formation of fully empowered, party-based coalition governments, we exclude formation opportunities in which caretaker and technocratic, i.e., non-party, cabinets form, as well as situations where a single party controlled the majority in parliament. Table OA 1.1 reports the number of formation opportunities per country. Of our 631 formation opportunities, 54 per cent (340 opportunities) follow an election while 46 per cent (291 opportunities) occur at other points during the inter-electoral term.

Table SI 1.1: Government Formation Opportunities

Countries	Time Periods	Formation Opportunities (Total)	Post-Election Formation Opportunities	Inter-Election Formation Opportunities
Australia	1946-2013	20	15	5
Austria	1945-2008	21	13	8
Belgium	1946-2011	34	19	15
Bulgaria	1991-2014	5	5	0
Croatia	2000-2011	8	3	5
Czech Rep.	1993-2014	10	6	4
Denmark	1945-2014	36	25	11
Estonia	1992-2015	13	6	7
Finland	1944-2014	44	20	24
France IV	1945-1958	18	2	16
France V	1959-2014	19	8	11
Germany	1949-2013	22	16	6
Greece	1974-2015	5	4	1
Hungary	1990-2014	7	3	4
Iceland	1942-2013	29	20	9
Ireland	1944-2011	20	16	4
Israel	1949-2006	57	18	39
Italy	1946-2014	57	16	41
Latvia	1990-2014	22	8	14
Lithuania	1990-2012	8	5	3
Luxembourg	1945-2013	18	15	3
Netherlands	1946-2012	22	20	2
Norway	1945-2013	23	13	10
Poland	1989-2014	14	6	8
Portugal	1975-2011	13	10	3
Romania	1990-2014	19	6	13
Slovakia	1990-2012	8	5	3
Slovenia	1990-2013	14	6	8
Spain	1977-2011	7	6	1
Sweden	1945-2010	27	19	8
Turkey	1983-2014	7	3	4
UK	1945-2010	4	3	1
Total		631	340	291

Table OA 1.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Main paper					
Coalition Formed (dependent variable)	433,401	0.00	0.04	0	1
High Dissolution Powers	433,401	0.03	0.18	0	1
Incumbents	433,401	0.49	0.50	0	1
Minority Government	433,401	0.55	0.50	0	1
Minimal Winning Coalition	433,401	0.04	0.18	0	1
Number of Parties in Coalition	433,401	6.29	2.27	1	16
Largest Party in Coalition	433,401	0.50	0.50	0	1
Median Party in Coalition	433,401	0.53	0.50	0	1
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	433,401	68.25	32.24	0	131.08
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	433,401	0.49	0.50	0	1
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	433,401	7.93	8.05	0	43.18
Familiarity Index	433,401	0.42	0.16	0	1
Average Seat Change	433,401	0.97	2.65	-56.27	50
Supplementary Information					
Continuation Rule	433,401	0.06	0.24	0	1
Pre-Electoral Pact	65,320	0.00	0.02	0	1
Anti-Pact	65,320	0.38	0.49	0	1
Intra-Cabinet Conflict	65,320	0.45	0.50	0	1
SQ Government	65,320	0.00	0.06	0	1
Previous Prime Minister Party in Government	65,320	0.49	0.50	0	1

Table OA 1.3: Data sources and coding

Variable	Source
Main Paper	
Coalition Formed (dependent variable)	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Coalition government formed in each formation opportunity. Source, ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016).
High Dissolution Powers	Indicator (1, otherwise=0) if either the PM or the government collectively in a potential coalition has a dissolution power score of at least 8 (the mid-point on the 0-10 scale). Source, Goplerud and Schleiter (2016).
Incumbents	Indicator (1, otherwise=0) when a potential coalition satisfies at least one of the following conditions: it (i) is the status quo coalition; or (ii) contains the previous PM party. Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Minority Government	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Minimal Winning Coalition	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Number of Parties in Coalition	Number of parliamentary parties weighted by size. Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Largest Party in Coalition	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Median Party in Coalition	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016) and party policy positions from the 2016 set of manifestos data on party left-right positioning included in the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens <i>et al.</i> 2016).
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	Absolute ideological distance on left-right dimension between the most distant pair of parties in a potential coalition. Own calculations based on CMP data (Volkens <i>et al.</i> 2016).
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	Continuous measure corresponding to the anti-system score of the party with the greatest anti-system score in a potential coalition. Own calculations based on sources of government data and CMP data (Volkens <i>et al.</i> 2016) following the method proposed by Martin and Stevenson (2010: 509).
Familiarity Index	Own calculations based on sources of government data and CMP data (Volkens <i>et al.</i> 2016) following the method proposed by Martin and Stevenson (2010: 509).
Average Seat Change	Average change in seat share experienced by each potential govt between the most recent election and the election prior to that. Own calculations based on sources of government data (Döring and Manow 2016).

Supplementary Information

Continuation Rule	Indicator (1 for government formations in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, otherwise=0).
Pre-Electoral Pact	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Source, Martin and Stevenson (2010).
Anti-Pact	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Source, Martin and Stevenson (2010).
Intra-Cabinet Conflict	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Source, Martin and Stevenson (2010).
SQ Government	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on ParlGov data (Döring and Manow 2016).
Previous Prime Minister Party in Government	Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Own calculations based on ParlGov data (Döring and Manow 2016).

Table OA 1.4: Index of Government and PM Dissolution Powers

Country	Government	PM	Country	Government	PM
Australia	0	10	Italy	0	0
Austria	0	0	Latvia	0	0
Belgium (1831)	8.5	0	Lithuania	2.01875	0
Belgium (1995)	4.25	0	Luxembourg	8.5	0
Bulgaria (1990)	0	0	Macedonia	0	0
Bulgaria (1991)	0	0	Netherlands	8.5	0
Croatia (2000)	2.125	0	Norway	0	0
Czech Rep. (1992)	0	0	Poland (1989)	0	0
Czech Rep. (2009)	0	0	Poland (1992)	0	0
Denmark	0	10	Poland (1997)	0	0
Estonia	2.125	0	Portugal (1976)	0	0
Finland (1919)	0	0	Portugal (1982)	0	0
Finland (1991)	0	5	Romania	0	0
France (1946)	1.80625	0	Slovakia (1992)	0	0
France (1958)	0	0	Slovakia (1999)	2.01875	0
Germany	0	2.5	Slovenia	0	5
Greece (1975)	2.125	0	Spain	0	8.55
Greece (1986)	4.25	0	Sweden (1809)	8.2195	0
Hungary (1989)	0	0	Sweden (1971)	0	10
Hungary (2011)	0	0	Sweden (1975)	8.2875	0
Iceland	0	0	Turkey (1982)	0	2.375
Ireland	0	10	UK (1945)	0	10
Israel (1958)	0	0			
Israel (1996)	0	5			
Israel (2003)	0	2.5			

Note: Source, Goplerud and Schleiter (2016)

OA.2: Robustness

To assess the robustness of the results of our main models (cf. table 1, models 1a and b), we proceed in five different ways: OA 2.1 tests the robustness of the results using an alternative (lower) threshold to identify incumbents with high dissolution powers. In OA 2.2, we explore the impact on our findings of potential additional confounders that may affect the coalition bargaining process, including the conflictual termination of the previous coalition government, pre-electoral pacts and anti-pacts between parties. OA 2.3 gives attention to the concern that dissolution powers may be bundled with other institutional and political features of democracies, which could confound the relationship with government formation (Acemoglu 2005). In OA 2.4, we examine whether an additional actor with potential influence on the process of assembly dissolution – the president – might drive the effects that we attribute to the incumbent government’s control of dissolution. OA 2.5 restricts the sample to Europe to test how far our results depend on the inclusion of non-European democracies in the analysis.

For the purpose of these robustness tests we employ the conditional logit model because a mixed logit model yields substantively very similar results but gives rise to identification and separation problems in several of the supplementary analyses. Throughout, we report odds ratios (i.e., exponentiated coefficients) to ease the interpretation of the results.

OA 2.1 Changing the threshold characterizing extensive discretion to dissolve

Conceptually, we are interested in the question whether incumbents who have *discretion* to dissolve the assembly are able to achieve advantages in government formation. In the main paper we follow Goplerud and Schleiter (2016) and set the threshold at which incumbents are classified as having discretion to dissolve at 8 or above on the 10-point dissolution powers scale. This threshold, however, might reasonably be set lower – for instance at the mid-point (5) of the scale. Here we use this alternative lower threshold in order to identify incumbents with high dissolution powers and re-estimate our main models (cf. table 1, models 1a and b). Table OA 2.1 reports the results and lends further support to the results reported in the main paper.

As is consistent with hypothesis 1, model 1a shows that incumbents with high dissolution powers are 4.4 times more likely to enter the next government than the baseline coalition of non-incumbents parties and more than twice as likely as incumbents with little or no dissolution power (odds ratio 2.05). The difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant. Moreover, model 1b indicates that this incumbency advantage is greater in inter-electoral government changes than in bargaining after elections, as hypothesis 2 anticipates. In inter-electoral coalition negotiations, incumbents with high dissolution powers are over 13 times more likely to secure their inclusion in the next government than the baseline non-incumbent coalition and 3 times more likely than their incumbent peers who lack extensive dissolution powers (a difference that is statistically significant). In post-electoral government formation negotiations these advantages reduce to a 2.8-fold chance of coalition inclusion for high dissolution power incumbents compared to non-incumbents and incumbents with low dissolution powers (who have no statistically significant advantage over non-incumbents in ensuring their return into government).

Table OA 2.1: Effect of dissolution powers on coalition formation (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)		
	(1a)	(1b)
	Dissolution powers ≥ 5 ,	
	Pooled	Post/Inter-electoral formations
<i>Dissolution powers * Incumbency</i>		
Low dissolution powers – Incumbents	2.052*** (0.275)	
High dissolution powers – Incumbents	4.386*** (0.944)	
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		4.389*** (0.959)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		13.151*** (6.283)
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		1.233 (0.207)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		2.872*** (0.697)
<i>Coalition Characteristics</i>		
Minority Government	0.615** (0.127)	0.581*** (0.121)
Minimal Winning Coalition	3.152*** (0.412)	3.104*** (0.406)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.773*** (0.051)	0.760*** (0.051)
Largest Party in Coalition	2.221*** (0.291)	2.230*** (0.296)
Median Party in Coalition	3.098*** (0.356)	3.084*** (0.356)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.983*** (0.003)	0.983*** (0.003)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	0.804 (0.141)	0.870 (0.153)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.938*** (0.015)	0.937*** (0.015)
Familiarity	34.579*** (12.667)	31.099*** (11.413)
Average seat change	1.073*** (0.010)	1.066*** (0.010)
N-Formation opportunities	631	631

N-Potential coalitions	433,401	433,401
Log-likelihood	-2301	-2286
BIC	4757	4753
Average p-value for rejecting IIA	0.85	0.83

Note: Omitted category - non-incumbent coalitions. Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA 2.2 Potential omitted confounders (conflict, pre-electoral pacts, anti-pacts)

As noted in the main text, previous work suggests that several additional variables may influence coalition formation including pre-electoral pacts between potential coalition members or anti-pacts, and the conflictual termination of a previous government (Laver and Budge 1992; Strøm and Leipart 1992; Martin and Stevenson 2001: 39–40; Golder 2010; Martin and Stevenson 2010: 511). Unfortunately, data regarding these attributes are not available for the full set of countries and time periods covered by our dataset. To address the concern that these variables might be omitted confounders, we re-estimate our main model on the significantly smaller data set for which these variables are available. Compared to the models that we present in our main paper, this robustness check includes as additional controls an indicator for whether a potential coalition is based on a pre-electoral pact between its members (*Pre-electoral Pact*) and an indicator for whether a potential coalition is affected by an *Anti-pact*. The conflictual termination of a previous coalition has been found to moderate incumbency effects, specifically the odds that the status quo coalition or the previous PM party will return to power.

To examine whether this moderating effect impinges on the advantages that incumbents can derive from dissolution powers, we include the three-way interactions (and their constitutive terms) between conflict, incumbency and dissolution powers in the analysis, distinguishing between previous PM and status quo governments, as previous work does (*Intracabinet Conflict * SQ Government * High dissolution powers; Intracabinet Conflict * Previous PM Party * High dissolution powers*). We confine this part of the analysis to model 1a in the main paper because re-estimating model 1b involves four-way interactions and all of their constitutive terms, which gives rise to identification problems.

Table OA 2.2a presents the results, which employ a significantly reduced data set, to re-estimate our main model. The “implied” odds ratios on the status quo and PM indicators at

various levels of dissolution powers are presented in Table OA 2.2b.¹ The results confirm our main findings that incumbents with extensive dissolution powers reap advantages in securing coalition inclusion. Specifically, we find that status quo coalitions with extensive dissolution powers are on average more successful in negotiating their inclusion in the next government than both their incumbent and non-incumbent peers without such powers, while PM parties with extensive dissolution powers are less disadvantaged in negotiating their return to power than PM parties without such powers. These effects obtain when the previous termination was non-conflictual, no significant differences emerge when the previous government terminated in conflict. In sum, taking account of the additional potential additional confounders does not alter our conclusions.

¹ As Martin and Stevenson (2010: 504) note, “there is an implicit interaction between the status quo indicator and the previous PM party indicator: The previous PM party indicator always equals one when the status quo indicator equals one because the incumbent coalition, by definition, includes the party of the previous prime minister (although the previous PM indicator often equals one when the status quo indicator equals zero). ... The ‘implied’ coefficient on the status quo indicator variable is thus the sum of the estimated coefficient on that variable and the coefficient on the previous PM indicator.”

Table OA 2.2a. Effect of dissolution powers among incumbents on coalition formation (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)	
<i>Dissolution powers *PM/SQ*Intracabinet Conflict</i>	
Previous PM Party in Coalition	0.55* (0.18)
Previous PM Party in Coalition * High dissolution powers	0.99 (0.54)
Status Quo Government	5.53*** (1.94)
Status Quo Government * High dissolution powers	1.73 (0.77)
Intracabinet Conflict * SQ Government	0.14*** (0.10)
Intracabinet Conflict * SQ Government * High diss. powers	0.27 (0.29)
Intracabinet Conflict * Previous PM Party	1.21 (0.58)
Intracabinet Conflict * Previous PM Party * High diss. powers	0.16 (1.46)
<i>Coalition Characteristics</i>	
Minority Government	0.85 (0.38)
Minimal Winning Coalition	3.41*** (0.94)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.42*** (0.09)
Largest Party in Coalition	7.50*** (2.98)
Median Party in Coalition	1.54* (0.35)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.98*** (0.01)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	1.30 (0.57)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.97 (0.03)
Pre-electoral Pact associated with Coalition	111.98*** (90.73)
Anti-pact associated with Coalition	0.01*** (0.01)
Familiarity	3.79** (2.53)
Average seat change	1.08 (0.03)

N-Formation opportunities	256
N-Potential coalitions	65,320
Log-likelihood	-550.1

Note: Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA 2.2b. Implied Odds Ratios on Incumbency Variables, by Termination Context and Dissolution Powers

Explanatory Variables	Conflict		No Conflict	
	Dissolution powers ≥ 8	Dissolution powers < 8	Dissolution powers ≥ 8	Dissolution powers < 8
Previous PM Party	0.75 (0.87)	0.66 (0.26)	0.54 (0.25)	0.55* (0.18)
Status Quo Government	0.27 (0.36)	0.49 (0.34)	5.17*** (2.45)	3.01*** (1.24)

Notes: All implied odds ratios estimates are calculated from Table OA 2.2a. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA 2.3 Compound causation

This section addresses the concern that dissolution powers may be bundled with other institutional and political features of democracies, which could confound the relationship with government formation (Acemoglu 2005). Three such features stand out: Dissolution powers may be particularly common in political systems that also feature a *continuation rule*. The continuation rule advantages the incumbent cabinet in government formation by allowing it to remain in office after an election and to make the first government formation attempt (Diermeier and Roozendaal 1998: 621). Politics with *fragmented party systems* may be more likely to feature dissolution powers as a means to address assembly gridlock and parliamentary fragmentation may simultaneously raise the incumbent's chances of returning to power by creating opportunities to exploit the complex parliamentary arithmetic. Finally, incumbent assembly dissolution powers may be bundled with (and balanced by) extensive *presidential influence on government formation*. Instead of the incumbent's influence on dissolution, it may be the president's influence on government formation that may determine the incumbent's chances of returning to power (Bucur and Cheibub 2017). In order to distinguish the effects of dissolution powers from the features with which these powers may be bundled, we remove from our sample, one category at a time, cases (i) which apply the continuation rule (table OA 2.3a), (ii) with high party system fragmentation (table OA 2.3b), and (iii) which feature presidents with extensive influence on government formation (table OA 2.3c). In each instance we re-estimate our main models on the reduced dataset.

In our data set the continuation rule applies in four countries, three of which, Denmark, Sweden, and the UK, also grant incumbent governments strong dissolution powers (Golder 2010). Cases with high party system fragmentation are defined as having more than four effective parliamentary parties. To identify presidents who are actively involved in government formation we use an indicator variable that captures presidents who play a

proactive (rather than passive) role in the appointment of the prime minister (Bucur and Cheibub 2017).

As tables OA 2.3a-c demonstrate, our results are robust to these alternative specifications. Incumbents with extensive dissolution powers are advantaged in government formation negotiations compared to non-incumbents and compared to their incumbent peers who lack dissolution powers. In all instances this advantage is substantively large and F -tests suggest that it is statistically significant. Moreover, the analyses consistently show that the advantages that accrue to incumbents with discretion to dissolve are particularly large when bargaining about government formation occurs between elections.

Table OA 2.3a: Effect of dissolution powers among incumbents on coalition formation, observations with continuation rule omitted (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)		
	(1a)	(1b)
	No continuation rule	
<i>Dissolution powers * Incumbency</i>		
Low dissolution powers – Incumbents	2.238*** (0.321)	
High dissolution powers – Incumbents	3.984*** (1.305)	
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		5.905*** (1.487)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		51.846*** (39.306)
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		1.222 (0.218)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		2.035** (0.720)
<i>Coalition Characteristics</i>		
Minority Government	0.146*** (0.040)	0.135*** (0.037)
Minimal Winning Coalition	2.735*** (0.369)	2.665*** (0.361)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.754*** (0.053)	0.734*** (0.052)
Largest Party in Coalition	1.908*** (0.280)	1.901*** (0.283)
Median Party in Coalition	2.904*** (0.375)	2.932*** (0.383)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.987*** (0.003)	0.987*** (0.003)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	2.833*** (0.679)	3.123*** (0.753)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.927*** (0.015)	0.925*** (0.015)
Familiarity	37.936*** (14.952)	32.806*** (12.976)
Average seat change	1.080*** (0.011)	1.071*** (0.011)
N-Formation opportunities	541	541
N-Potential coalitions	407,283	407,283
Log-likelihood	-1980	-1960
BIC	4115	4101
Average p-value for rejecting IIA	0.79	0.82

Note: Omitted category – non-incumbent coalitions with low dissolution powers. Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table OA 2.3b: Effect of dissolution powers among incumbents on coalition formation, observations with high party system fragmentation removed (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)		
	(1a)	(1b)
	ENPP < 4	
<i>Dissolution powers * Incumbency</i>		
Low dissolution powers – Incumbents	1.544** (0.341)	
High dissolution powers – Incumbents	3.628*** (1.070)	
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		4.118*** (1.624)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		19.427*** (13.225)
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		0.989 (0.261)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		2.270** (0.756)
<i>Coalition characteristics</i>		
Minority Government	0.775 (0.293)	0.739 (0.281)
Minimal Winning Coalition	4.104*** (0.982)	4.049*** (0.969)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.598*** (0.081)	0.585*** (0.079)
Largest Party in Coalition	3.923*** (0.877)	3.840*** (0.871)
Median Party in Coalition	3.420*** (0.621)	3.409*** (0.625)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.990** (0.005)	0.991** (0.005)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	0.853 (0.218)	0.922 (0.238)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.920** (0.031)	0.917** (0.031)
Familiarity	61.799*** (37.261)	52.202*** (31.556)
Average seat change	1.066*** (0.015)	1.058*** (0.016)
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N-Formation opportunities	304	304
N-Potential coalitions	53,208	53,208
Log-likelihood	-757	-750
BIC	1644	1652
Average p-value for rejecting IIA	0.83	0.81

Note: Omitted category – non-incumbent coalitions with low dissolution powers. Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA 2.3c: Effect of dissolution powers among incumbents on coalition formation, observations with presidents who have strong influence on government formation omitted (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)		
	(1a)	(1b)
	PR Passive Role in Cabinet Formation	
<i>Dissolution powers * Incumbency</i>		
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents	1.635*** (0.296)	
High dissolution powers - Incumbents	5.072*** (1.210)	
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		3.664*** (1.135)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		14.014*** (7.619)
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		1.053 (0.234)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		3.626*** (0.960)
<i>Coalition Characteristics</i>		
Minority Government	1.816** (0.512)	1.752** (0.497)
Minimal Winning Coalition	4.367*** (0.840)	4.363*** (0.841)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.707*** (0.065)	0.704*** (0.065)
Largest Party in Coalition	2.450*** (0.434)	2.503*** (0.450)
Median Party in Coalition	3.055*** (0.476)	3.030*** (0.475)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.981*** (0.004)	0.981*** (0.004)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	0.317*** (0.077)	0.344*** (0.084)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.897*** (0.025)	0.893*** (0.025)
Familiarity	12.044*** (5.886)	11.261*** (5.515)
Average seat change	1.095*** (0.015)	1.087*** (0.016)
N-Formation opportunities	343	343
N-Potential coalitions	293,737	293,737
Log-likelihood	-1204	-1197
BIC	2559	2569
Average p-value for rejecting IIA	0.85	0.93

Note: Omitted category – non-incumbent coalitions with low dissolution powers. Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA 2.4 Presidential influence on assembly dissolution

Next, we consider whether the effects that we attribute to incumbents may in fact be driven by the role of presidents in parliamentary dissolution because assembly dissolution processes often involve multiple actors (Goplerud and Schleiter 2016). To examine this possibility, we re-estimate our main models excluding cases in which presidents have extensive influence on assembly dissolution. We use Goplerud and Schleiter's (2016) index to measure presidential assembly dissolution powers and apply a threshold of 8 or larger as the score that identifies actors (in this case, presidents) with high powers to dissolve.

Table OA 2.4 reports the results and shows that our central conclusions remain robust, whether or not the sample includes countries with presidents who have extensive influence on parliamentary dissolution.

Table OA 2.4: Effect of dissolution powers among incumbents on coalition formation, observations with presidents who have strong influence on assembly dissolution omitted (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)		
	(1a)	(1b)
	PR Dissolution Powers < 8	
<i>Dissolution powers * Incumbency</i>		
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents	2.107*** (0.312)	
High dissolution powers - Incumbents	5.905*** (1.366)	
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		4.684*** (1.153)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		17.541*** (9.280)
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		1.249 (0.233)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		4.040*** (1.030)
<i>Coalition Characteristics</i>		
Minority Government	1.643** (0.414)	1.536* (0.390)
Minimal Winning Coalition	3.908*** (0.621)	3.865*** (0.614)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.788*** (0.061)	0.777*** (0.060)
Largest Party in Coalition	1.663*** (0.244)	1.690*** (0.251)
Median Party in Coalition	2.924*** (0.387)	2.918*** (0.389)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.983*** (0.003)	0.983*** (0.003)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	0.321*** (0.070)	0.353*** (0.078)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.912*** (0.019)	0.910*** (0.019)
Familiarity	16.805*** (6.935)	15.353*** (6.345)
Average seat change	1.089*** (0.012)	1.081*** (0.012)
N-Formation opportunities	460	460
N-Potential coalitions	322,684	322,684
Log-likelihood	-1699	-1687
BIC	3551	3552
Average p-value for rejecting IIA	0.77	0.84

Note: Omitted category – non-incumbent coalitions with low dissolution powers. Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA 2.5 Restricted sample (European democracies only)

Finally, we examine how far our results are driven by the nature of our sample, in particular, the inclusion in the analysis of non-European, and perhaps exceptional, parliamentary systems. Hence, we omit Australia, Israel, and Turkey from the sample and re-estimate our main models. Table OA 2.5 reports the results and shows that our central conclusions remain robust, whether or not the sample is restricted to European democracies.

Table OA 2.6: Effect of dissolution powers among incumbents on coalition formation, European democracies only (conditional logit analysis)

Dependent Variable: Government that forms (1, 0)		
	(1a)	(1b)
	European democracies only	
<i>Dissolution powers * Incumbency</i>		
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents	2.001*** (0.276)	
High dissolution powers - Incumbents	4.938*** (1.216)	
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		4.301*** (0.970)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Inter-election		15.911*** (8.718)
Low dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		1.220 (0.210)
High dissolution powers - Incumbents - Post-election		3.283*** (0.895)
<i>Coalition Characteristics</i>		
Minority Government	0.638** (0.141)	0.605** (0.135)
Minimal Winning Coalition	3.052*** (0.431)	2.995*** (0.424)
Number of Parties in Coalition	0.829** (0.061)	0.815*** (0.060)
Largest Party in Coalition	2.387*** (0.337)	2.394*** (0.341)
Median Party in Coalition	2.880*** (0.344)	2.892*** (0.347)
Ideological Divisions in Coalition	0.981*** (0.003)	0.981*** (0.003)
Minority Government with Investiture Requirement	0.690** (0.129)	0.742 (0.140)
Antisystem Presence in Coalition	0.919*** (0.019)	0.916*** (0.019)
Familiarity	44.741*** (18.004)	39.796*** (16.033)
Average seat change	1.078*** (0.011)	1.071*** (0.011)
N-Formation opportunities	547	547
N-Potential coalitions	216,100	216,100
Log-likelihood	-1940	-1927
BIC	4028	4026
Average p-value for rejecting IIA	0.84	0.78

Note: Omitted category – non-incumbent coalitions with low dissolution powers. Table entries are odds ratios. Standard errors clustered on formation opportunities in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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