Thesis
Robots from Venus, robots from Mars: legal personhood for autonomous AI
- Abstract:
-
The debate surrounding the ascription of legal personhood—viz., the capacity to hold legal rights and/or to bear legal responsibilities—to autonomous AI systems has so far focused on developing an appropriate legal framework to regulate wrongs caused by those systems. This has generated a growing literature on so-called ‘responsibility gaps’ where an autonomous AI system causes harm for which no agent appears to bear responsibility.
Part One of this dissertation shifts the focus: I argue that there are contexts in which we need to develop an appropriate legal framework to regulate wrongs inflicted on robots. I focus on sexual autonomous robots (SARs)—viz., humanoid AI-based autonomous robots which enact sexual relationships with humans. The imminent emergence of this kind of sexual technology introduces a troubling new way to enact sexual violence. I articulate and defend the first politically liberal argument for the legal proscription of what I call ‘robotic sexual violence’. I show that the attribution of legal personhood to SARs, including legal rights against robotic sexual violence, is part of an appropriate legal response.
Part Two returns to the question of responsibility which has so exercised academic and public debate on AI ethics. I focus on lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs)—viz., weapons systems which can select and engage targets without human intervention. I argue that the legal personification of LAWs would form part of an appropriate legal response to the risk of lethal accidents which the imminent proliferation of LAWs introduces. The ascription of a legal duty to LAWs not to direct attacks against civilians is justified by appeal to the role which LAWs play as quasi-employees of a military enterprise. Additionally, I argue for reforms to strict product liability mechanisms, reflecting the role which LAWs play in the space of legal obligations as both ‘products’ and ‘persons’.
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Dissemination version, pdf, 2.0MB, Terms of use)
-
Authors
Contributors
+ Kaiserman, A
- Institution:
- University of Oxford
- Division:
- HUMS
- Department:
- Philosophy
- Role:
- Supervisor
- ORCID:
- 0000-0002-7209-5980
+ Institute for Ethics in AI
More from this funder
- Programme:
- Institute for Ethics in AI DPhil Scholarship
- DOI:
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- Deposit date:
-
2026-08-31
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Imogen Lucy Grace Rivers
- Copyright date:
- 2026
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record