Conference item
Mechanism design for defense coordination in security games
- Abstract:
- Recent work studied Stackelberg security games with multiple defenders, in which heterogeneous defenders allocate security resources to protect a set of targets against a strategic attacker. Equilibrium analysis was conducted to characterize outcomes of these games when defenders act independently. Our starting point is the observation that the use of resources in equilibria may be inefficient due to lack of coordination. We explore the possibility of reducing this inefficiency by coordinating the defenders-specifically, by pooling the defenders' resources and allocating them jointly. The defenders' heterogeneous preferences then give rise to a collective decision-making problem, which calls for a mechanism to generate joint allocation strategies. We seek a mechanism that encourages coordination, produces efficiency gains, and incentivizes the defenders to report their true preferences and to execute the recommended strategies. Our results show that, unfortunately, even these basic properties clash with each other and no mechanism can achieve them simultaneously, which reveals the intrinsic difficulty of achieving meaningful defense coordination in security games. On the positive side, we put forward mechanisms that fulfill some of these properties and we identify special cases of our setting where more of these properties are compatible.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Version of record, 1.3MB, Terms of use)
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- Publication website:
- https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/3398761.3398812
Authors
- Publisher:
- International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
- Host title:
- AAMAS '20: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
- Pages:
- 402-410
- Publication date:
- 2020-05-05
- Acceptance date:
- 2020-01-15
- Event title:
- 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020)
- Event location:
- Auckland, New Zealand
- Event website:
- https://aamas2020.conference.auckland.ac.nz/
- Event start date:
- 2020-05-09
- Event end date:
- 2020-05-13
- EISSN:
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1558-2914
- ISSN:
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1548-8403
- ISBN:
- 9781450375184
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1148903
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1148903
- Deposit date:
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2021-04-19
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © 2020 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- This paper was presented at the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020), 9–13 May 2020, Auckland, New Zealand. This is the publisher's version of the paper. The final version is available online from the International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/3398761.3398812
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