Journal article
Seeing goal-directedness: a case for social perception
- Abstract:
- This paper focuses on social perception, an area of research that lies at the interface between the philosophy of perception and the scientific investigation of human social cognition. Some philosophers and psychologists appeal to resonance mechanisms to show that intentional and goal-directed actions can be perceived. Against these approaches, I show that there is a class of simple goal-directed actions, whose perception does not rely on resonance. I discuss the role of the STS (superior temporal sulcus) as the possible neural correlate of perception of goal-directed actions. My proposal is intermediate between claims according to which we perceive intentional actions and claims according to which we cannot perceive goal-directed actions.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, 349.0KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/bjps/axy046
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- British Journal for the Philosophy of Science More from this journal
- Volume:
- 71
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 855–879
- Publication date:
- 2018-08-03
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-06-06
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1464-3537
- ISSN:
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0007-0882
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:859236
- UUID:
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uuid:fef78c15-2b9d-4478-ae0a-ab1d53ec5e8d
- Local pid:
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pubs:859236
- Source identifiers:
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859236
- Deposit date:
-
2018-06-25
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Smortchkova
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from OUP at: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy046
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