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Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

Abstract:

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary ...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2006-02-01
Paper number:
2006-FE-02
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1144172
Local pid:
pubs:1144172
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

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