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Sustainable and unchallenged algorithmic tacit collusion

Abstract:
Algorithmic collusion has the potential to transform future markets, leading to higher prices and consumer harm. And yet, algorithmic collusion may remain undetected and unchallenged, in particular, when it is used to facilitate conscious parallelism. The risks posed by such undetected collusion have been debated within antitrust circles in Europe, the US, and beyond. Some economists, however, downplay algorithmic tacit collusion as unlikely, if not impossible. “Keep calm and carry on,” they argue, as future prices will remain competitive. This paper explores the rise of algorithmic tacit collusion and responds to those who downplay it, by pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion is not only possible but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publication website:
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol17/iss2/2/

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Law
Sub department:
Law Faculty
Oxford college:
Pembroke College
Role:
Author


Publisher:
University of Tennessee
Journal:
Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property More from this journal
Volume:
17
Issue:
2
Pages:
217-260
Publication date:
2020-03-13
Acceptance date:
2019-03-29
ISSN:
1549-8271


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:975937
UUID:
uuid:fde32e64-30b0-41b8-9477-de4cc716d902
Local pid:
pubs:975937
Source identifiers:
975937
Deposit date:
2019-04-03
ARK identifier:

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