Journal article
Coercion and provocation
- Abstract:
- Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target’s resolve. However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provocation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative explanations: confounding or misimputation of resolve, revelation of information, character, or capabilities, or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experiments we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques — a hypothetical natural experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators — to evaluate our key hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation, and suggestive evidence that it arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 493.5KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1177/0022002720957078
Authors
- Publisher:
- SAGE Publications
- Journal:
- Journal of Conflict Resolution More from this journal
- Volume:
- 65
- Issue:
- 2-3
- Pages:
- 372-402
- Publication date:
- 2020-09-29
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-11-14
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1552-8766
- ISSN:
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0022-0027
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1107116
- Local pid:
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pubs:1107116
- Deposit date:
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2020-05-27
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Dafoe et al.
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s) 2020
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from SAGE Publications at: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002720957078
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