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Journal article

Coercion and provocation

Abstract:
Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target’s resolve. However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provocation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative explanations: confounding or misimputation of resolve, revelation of information, character, or capabilities, or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experiments we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques — a hypothetical natural experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators — to evaluate our key hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation, and suggestive evidence that it arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1177/0022002720957078

Authors

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author


Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Journal:
Journal of Conflict Resolution More from this journal
Volume:
65
Issue:
2-3
Pages:
372-402
Publication date:
2020-09-29
Acceptance date:
2019-11-14
DOI:
EISSN:
1552-8766
ISSN:
0022-0027


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1107116
Local pid:
pubs:1107116
Deposit date:
2020-05-27
ARK identifier:

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