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Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages in a matching model for the US

Abstract:

This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as the...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2010-11-01
Paper number:
511
Keywords:
Pubs id:
451341
Local pid:
pubs:451341
Deposit date:
2020-12-14

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