Working paper
Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages in a matching model for the US
- Abstract:
- This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as they are for credible bargaining. Efficiency wages fit the data better, with the over-identifying restrictions not rejected statistically, and result in a lower, more plausible estimated value of non-work activity.
- Publication status:
- Published
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Authors
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2010-11-01
- Paper number:
- 511
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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451341
- Local pid:
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pubs:451341
- Deposit date:
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2020-12-14
- ARK identifier:
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- Copyright date:
- 2010
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2010 The Author(s)
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