On the prospects of longtermism

Journal article

This article objects to two arguments that William MacAskill gives in What We Owe the Future in support of optimism about the prospects of longtermism, that is, the prospects of positively influencing the longterm future. First, it grants that he is right that, whereas humans sometimes benefit others as an end, they rarely harm them as an end, but argues that this bias towards positive motivation is counteracted by the fact that it is practically easier to harm than to benefit. For this greater easiness makes it likely both that accidental effects will be harmful rather than beneficial and that the means or side‐effects of the actions people perform with the aim of benefiting themselves and those close to them will tend to be harmful to others. Secondly, while our article agrees with him that values could lock‐in, it contends that the value of longtermism is unlikely to lock in as long as human beings have not been morally enhanced but remain partial in favor of themselves and those near and dear.

Authors: Persson, I; Savulescu, J

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Wiley
• Journal: Bioethics
• Publication date: 2024-06-18
• Acceptance date: 2024-05-29
• DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13323
• ISSN: 0269-9702 and 1467-8519
• Language: English
• Keywords: William Macaskill; longtermism; moral enhancement; value lock‐in; easiness of harming