Dynamic voting in clubs

Journal article

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by its set of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate is endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers’ cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterized. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analyzed in detail.

Authors: Roberts, K

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Research in Economics
• Volume: 69
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 320-335
• Publication date: 2015-02-16
• Acceptance date: 2015-02-08
• DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2015.02.004
• ISSN: 1090-9443
• Language: English
• Keywords: majority voting; organization size; trade unions; cooperatives; partnerships; median voter; local public goods